Better German ground radar, improved FLAK?

[stg 44]

The Germans lacked cavity magnetron based radar until the end of WW2, meaning they lacked the high powered, high resolution ground and air radar that gave the Allies an edge in the war. What if they had spent the money to develop the cavity magnetron in 1935 when it was invented by Hans Hollman, but was abandoned due to instability in the signal and the lack of desire to sort out the problems.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Hollmann
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavity_magnetron#History

Assuming they did develop it and got the level that the British did by 1939-40, would the high powered and high resolution radar that would result have made a difference to FLAK accuracy? I know there are a wide variety of issues in terms of accuracy from the shell itself, the power of the gun, the computer gunlaying predictor, and of course the radar guidance. With a more accurate radar with greater range the predictors would have had better data to judge from. Would it have made any difference, if so how much, and what would it mean in terms of bomber losses?

[LWD]

The cavity magnetron isn't required for high power or high resolution. It does make the other easier. Note also that there was some significant synergies between the US and Britain when they started cooperating not just in the development of radar but in the fielding.

I suspect that as far as ground radar is concerned the improvments would have been met to at least some extent by more ECM on the part of the allies. What would have been more difficult to counter would have been proximaty based fuzes.

[wm]

They didn't need high power or high resolution, because the distance between antiaircraft guns, their fire-control radar and the enemy planes was small. Long range, early warning radars needed both power and resolution.
But they needed accuracy - in azimuth and elevation, and they had that thanks to a technique called conical scanning. Nothing else was available for the next twenty years - at least for a reasonable price.

[BDV]

Relatively feasible if there was a lot of electronic engineering capacity Nazis left untapped in Low Countries and France, and/or if there was duplication of effort with the italians.

My hunch is yes, but I don't have evidence to this end. One can imagine a chocolate-eater's closed city type of arrangement, but one doubts Nazis'd be able to pull it off, what with CURTA-style anecdotes.

[maltesefalcon]

As far as I remember the chief advantage of the cavity magnetron was its higher frequency hence shorter wavelength.

This allowed a more portable arrangement and smaller antennae for airborne radar sets. Most AI radar of the time was very short range and narrow beamed to get the last few miles to the target. It still needed more powerful ground stations to detect the aircraft at long range and set up an intercept flight vector.

It also allowed the detection of targets as small as a submarine periscope which aided in ASW. Targets as large as a full size aircraft were pretty easy to detect with the high powered ground stations on hand.

What may have been more helpful was integrated predictors and proximity fuses which the allies were ahead of the game on.

[Baltasar]

Churchill sent in the bombers, the few available that is, as a retalatory strike on the Reich during the Battle of Britain. They did suffer comparatively high losses, but this did not dissuade them from sending them in again and again. Eventually, the British and Americans were quite capable in this area of warfare, leading to widespread destruction of the German cities right until the end of the war.

Sometimes the losses those allied air fleets suffered during one mission reached 10 or 15%, but they still fought on. The Allies had so much more production capacity, that they apparently did not know what else to do with it. Once the Luftwaffe was no threat any more, friendly bombers were the most leathal thing the bombers could encounter.

Also, finding the air fleets would not be a problem. The Allies wanted the Germans to know they were coming, raising air raid alarms throughout many parts of the Reich. The air fleets would zigzag across the country, flying over one city only to come back and bombing it on the home turn etc. Creating a constant fear of being bombed was a vital goal of the whole operation, right back into 1940 when Chruchill himself said that the moral of the enemy population must be targeted.

By 1944, the Allied losses were neglectible under normal circumstances. Even assuming that the Germans had better AAA and detection techniques, I do doubt that they would've been able to put a large enough dent into the Allied air fleets to make a difference.

[maltesefalcon]

The only risk that was mitigated in the last year of the war was the reduction in Luftwaffe fighter strength.

This combined with loss of territory and airfields should have reduced losses markedly.

However losses due to weather, pilot error, mechanical failure were still there. And flak losses actually increased.

http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t159.htm

Tough to be a bomber crew member, no matter what Air Force or time period of WW2.

[wm]

The German radars were adequate for their role, only their night fighters needed smaller antennas (because of drag), but not badly.
Higher frequency doesn't mean better range, the horizon is always the main limiting factor. A Freya radar placed near Dover saw as far as London, they really didn't need any better.
Higher frequency allows to see a smaller objects, but planes never were as small as periscopes so the German anti-aircraft radars didn't need this improvement, at least not badly. Antennas were larger but were manageable, and they had thousands of radars with those larger antennas.

Precision was attained by lobe switching and conical scanning, they didn't need a narrow beam for this. And this is true even today.

[Baltasar]

The initial German radar / air defense system, the Kammhuber line, was defeated when UK and later USA began to concentrate large numbers of bombers on individual targets. The system could not cope with the sheer numbers and broke down. The radar battle, the constant struggle to find the enemy (either the bombers or the targeted cities), the enemy finding out how he was found and in turn inventing countermeasures, went on until almost the end of the war. However, by then the German air defense measures were almost wiped out. The Luftwaffe had ceased to exist and what remained of the AAA was often used in an anti tank role.

[maltesefalcon]

If you look at the table I posted above you will note the following.
There were about 1500 bombers lost to AAA in 1944.
In 1945,over 600.
Bearing in mind most of the bombing took place before end of March. After that the Allies were running out of viable targets.
So on a per month basis flak losses actually went up in 1945 despite any AAA guns or personnel deployed to PAK units.

What is the explanation for this apparent discrepancy?
Possibly because the Germans had far fewer targets to defend so they could concentrate their remaining resources over the most likely targets.

[stg 44]

If you look at the table I posted above you will note the following.
There were about 1500 bombers lost to AAA in 1944.
In 1945,over 600.
Bearing in mind most of the bombing took place before end of March. After that the Allies were running out of viable targets.
So on a per month basis flak losses actually went up in 1945 despite any AAA guns or personnel deployed to PAK units.

What is the explanation for this apparent discrepancy?
Possibly because the Germans had far fewer targets to defend so they could concentrate their remaining resources over the most likely targets.

That and FLAK improvements, such as the introduction of the Duppel Shell, improved guidance systems, and the 'Brandschrapnel' shell.

[maltesefalcon]

There is one other possible reason.
As the Luftwaffes fighter arm dwindled it became less dangerous for bombers to fly at lower altitudes most of the time.

This was needed as the bomber groups began to attack where greater precision was needed like sub pens, fortifications and enemy troop concentrations

The trade off was greater vulnerability to ground fire of all kinds.

[Baltasar]

Ground attacks were not made by the heavy bombers but by figherbombers. Sometimes medium bombers would be called upon, but definately not the heavies. These did stay at higher altitudes like 5km or higher.

[wm]

It was:
1587 in 1944,
624 in 1945.

Assuming no peace in May, but another year of war, it would be:
1587 in 1944,
1497 in 1945.
Not much difference.

But monthly bomb tonnage dropped was:
574,087 in 1944,
293,302 in 1945.

Assuming no peace:
574,087 in 1944,
703,924 in 1945.
So there were (or would be) more bombs dropped in 1945, and more planes used:

allied aircraft engaged in european war.jpg (33.68 KiB) Viewed 893 times

And it was only Germany in 1945, France and Germany in 1944.
In 1944 almost half of the bombs were dropped on France, on relatively lightly defended targets (including transportation networks, V-weapons launch sites).
In contrast the targets in Germany (cities, factories) were more heavily defended, and really fought back.
So there were not only no let up in 1945, but the targets were "harder" than in 1944.

It can be seen here, that the 1945, especially February/March/April were really hellish:

total bomb tonnage dropped by USAAF.JPG (31.12 KiB) Viewed 893 times

source: Statistical Appendix to Over-All Report (European War)

[Baltasar]

Indeed, the factories and cities which were targeted by the Allies were much better protected by AAA in Germany than elsewhere. However, the devastation of the cities meant that the Allies had to use explosive bombs instead of firebombs, since there wasn't much left to burn anyway. Even then they could only kill so many inhabitants.

Less places to attack also means less places to defend so defenses can be concentrated, which explains why the losses were not reduced. Less room for attacks also means less room for maneuver for the bombers. I wonder if accidents became more frequent at the end of the war, as more and more aircrews were sent up there, trying to hit something which had not been bombed repeatedly already.