Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Hitler and the Wehrmacht agree in October 1941 that its best to dig in and defend through the Russian winter season.
The plan is
1. Replenish, repair and rearm AGC for an attack on Moscow in June 1942
2. Luftwaffe bases will be established near the defensive line, Moscow is to be under constant bombardment until June 1942
What will happen?
The plan is
1. Replenish, repair and rearm AGC for an attack on Moscow in June 1942
2. Luftwaffe bases will be established near the defensive line, Moscow is to be under constant bombardment until June 1942
What will happen?
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
This is a loaded question (as most WI),because your assumptions (the plan ) is totally irrealistic.
1.AGC could not be repaired,replenished,rearmed for an attack against Moscow in june 1942
2.It was out of the question to bombard Moscow until june 1942.
1.AGC could not be repaired,replenished,rearmed for an attack against Moscow in june 1942
2.It was out of the question to bombard Moscow until june 1942.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Why? If AGC was at a fixed position for many month surely they would make repairs and resupply?ljadw wrote:This is a loaded question (as most WI),because your assumptions (the plan ) is totally irrealistic.
1.AGC could not be repaired,replenished,rearmed for an attack against Moscow in june 1942
2.It was out of the question to bombard Moscow until june 1942.
Ok Even if my 2 point assumptions don't happen then and Operation Typhoon is just delayed until spring 1942?
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
In the OTL,there was a Soviet winteroffensive and it was cold : in the ATL,there also would be a Soviet winteroffensive and it would be cold .And, if AGC was in a fixed defensive position,the Soviet offensive and the winter would not disappear .
Whatever, in your ATL,AGC would be to weak for a decisive victory and the result would be what we know was happening in the OTL in the South : Uranus .
In other words : in the OTL, in 1942,Blau failed,in the ATL Typhoon in 1942 also would fail .
And I forgot : the offensive capacity of the Ostheer had been broken in 1941, BEFORE the start of Typhoon .
Whatever, in your ATL,AGC would be to weak for a decisive victory and the result would be what we know was happening in the OTL in the South : Uranus .
In other words : in the OTL, in 1942,Blau failed,in the ATL Typhoon in 1942 also would fail .
And I forgot : the offensive capacity of the Ostheer had been broken in 1941, BEFORE the start of Typhoon .
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
While the winter offensives would occur ,the Wehrmacht being in prepared positions near supply lines instead of exposed after the typhoon offensive would suffer less loss of men and material just from avoiding deaths due to the weather. Hitler's no step back directive could still be given and the entrench Wehrmacht would suffer less than OTL. By not continuing the advance in Sept. the best strategy would have been to entrench and resupply for the spring.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
But why would the OKW even consider going on the defensive? The overwhelming thought (and rightfully so) was that the red army was broken. It would make no sense for the OKH and OKW even to entertain the thought.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Better intelligence, much better planning (activation of Case Stecken a 2year Ostkrieg plan in August 1941)?actiondan wrote:But why would the OKW even consider going on the defensive? The overwhelming thought (and rightfully so) was that the red army was broken. It would make no sense for the OKH and OKW even to entertain the thought.
Also it is key what would/could both players do with the newly available assets. Do 39th and 41st panzer corps keep pressure on Leningrad? Does Leningrad fall?
Does 2nd panzer join 1st panzer army for the drive East? Do they get stuck in mud and thrashed by a violent RKKA counterattack somewhere between Don and Donetsk?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Please read http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=77436 before posting what if's. Note the OP does not meet the requirements listed.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
But, at that time, there was no reasoning for better planning or more intelligence. Everyone in the upper echelons felt the enemy had been broken. It was impossible for there to be MORE reserves. Why go on the defensive and allow the Red Army to regroup?BDV wrote:Better intelligence, much better planningactiondan wrote:But why would the OKW even consider going on the defensive? The overwhelming thought (and rightfully so) was that the red army was broken. It would make no sense for the OKH and OKW even to entertain the thought.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
actiondan wrote:But, at that time, there was no reasoning for better planning or more intelligence. Everyone in the upper echelons felt the enemy had been broken. It was impossible for there to be MORE reserves.
Not more intelligence, better.
And there is one straightforward reason why Soviets would have additional troops available in November - December but not earlier. Harvest in September-October. Same reason Antonescu gave for pulling back a significant fraction of Romanian troops after Odessa. Nazi ignorance of this basic fact would be (is?) stultifying.
I can think of only one reason. If one can regroup "more". That is, if French-built equipment, turncoat troops, and boosted auxiliary units are to hit in June 1942. And localized offensives (Leningrad, Crimea) are not ruled out by a wider defensive stance. Quite the contrary, with the extra LW support, these may turn successful.Why go on the defensive and allow the Red Army to regroup?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
I would predict that AGC would absorb the Soviet offensive's with relative ease if dug in and on the defence
Once Typoon is initiated in the spring of 1942 the Germans get deep into the city of Moscow, celebrate too soon and demolish the Kremlin, Then the Red army gets reinforced and surrounds the city. The Winter arrives and AGC surrenders due to starvation and freezing to death.
Once Typoon is initiated in the spring of 1942 the Germans get deep into the city of Moscow, celebrate too soon and demolish the Kremlin, Then the Red army gets reinforced and surrounds the city. The Winter arrives and AGC surrenders due to starvation and freezing to death.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
I really do think that a lot of the thought process about the defensive defies logic (and is spending to much time playing crystal ball) . If you feel any enemy is completely battered and defeated, you have no reason to stall. No reason to allow that situation to change.
Of course if the OKW knew that a large offensive was coming in December then the thought process would be different. But there was no one who believed the red army could do so.
Of course if the OKW knew that a large offensive was coming in December then the thought process would be different. But there was no one who believed the red army could do so.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
Did Hitler and the high command really consider the red army finished once they took Kiev? The Soviet population in 1937 was 162 million! Did the Germans not know this? Did they really consider Moscow a sitting duck after the encirclement of Kiev?actiondan wrote:I really do think that a lot of the thought process about the defensive defies logic (and is spending to much time playing crystal ball) . If you feel any enemy is completely battered and defeated, you have no reason to stall. No reason to allow that situation to change.
Of course if the OKW knew that a large offensive was coming in December then the thought process would be different. But there was no one who believed the red army could do so.
If so that would be one of the biggest miscalculations in history
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
It wasn't just Germany, the Russian people felt it (martial law was declared on 19 October in Moscow due to looting and general lawlessness because of the panic) . Western governments also felt the war in the east was over. This is an excerpt from Moscow to stalingrad: decision in the east :
Hitler's address on 3 October had already sounded like a victory speech, and on the 9th, Dr. Otto Dietrich, secretary of state in the Propaganda Ministry and chief press spokesman, had told the Berlin foreign press corps that the campaign in the East was "decided."[ 140] On the 10th, the OKW had called off Army of Norway operations out of northern Finland because it believed the war was about over on the main front.[ 141] Much of the world, the British and United States governments especially, wanted to believe otherwise, but to do so, except as a desperate act of faith, hardly seemed reasonable. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow had reported on 10 October that it seemed "the end of Russian resistance is not far away."[ 142] The British government had suspected the end might be near in September, before TAIFUN began, when Stalin had called urgently on the British and the Americans for a second front on the Continent and, failing that, had asked for twenty-five to thirty British divisions to fight in Russia.[ 143]
Hitler's address on 3 October had already sounded like a victory speech, and on the 9th, Dr. Otto Dietrich, secretary of state in the Propaganda Ministry and chief press spokesman, had told the Berlin foreign press corps that the campaign in the East was "decided."[ 140] On the 10th, the OKW had called off Army of Norway operations out of northern Finland because it believed the war was about over on the main front.[ 141] Much of the world, the British and United States governments especially, wanted to believe otherwise, but to do so, except as a desperate act of faith, hardly seemed reasonable. The U.S. military attaché in Moscow had reported on 10 October that it seemed "the end of Russian resistance is not far away."[ 142] The British government had suspected the end might be near in September, before TAIFUN began, when Stalin had called urgently on the British and the Americans for a second front on the Continent and, failing that, had asked for twenty-five to thirty British divisions to fight in Russia.[ 143]
Last edited by actiondan on 02 Sep 2014, 23:42, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Operation Typhoon delayed until spring 1942
But yes, the OKW did underestimate the strength of the Red Army. From the same book and chapter-
The Germans substantially underestimated the Soviet strength. Estimates given to the chiefs of staff on November at the Orsha Conference put the totals of Soviet larger units at 160 divisions and 40 brigades and rated their combat effectiveness at below 50 percent because more than half of those units' troops and officers were believed to be untrained.[ 173] The actual numbers as of 1 December, according to the Soviet sources, would be 279 divisions and 93 brigades. In part, these units, particularly those from the reserves, lacked training and experience.
The Germans substantially underestimated the Soviet strength. Estimates given to the chiefs of staff on November at the Orsha Conference put the totals of Soviet larger units at 160 divisions and 40 brigades and rated their combat effectiveness at below 50 percent because more than half of those units' troops and officers were believed to be untrained.[ 173] The actual numbers as of 1 December, according to the Soviet sources, would be 279 divisions and 93 brigades. In part, these units, particularly those from the reserves, lacked training and experience.