Pz III adopts L60 instead of L42 5cm cannon in 1940

[stg 44]

What effect would a 5cm L60 gunned Pz III have had on the Eastern Front if it had upgunned to that caliber in 1940 instead of the L42? The L60 could penetrate the T-34's frontal armor at 500m instead of not being able to with the shorter L42. The L60 equipped Pz III stayed combat relevant on all fronts into 1943 before the Pz IV with the 75mm L48 took over as the primary German AFV.

My thought is that in practice the Pz III would be much more effective on all fronts from 1941 on and reduce German losses in combat, as they could kill from a longer distance and not need to make the risky flank maneuver to kill T-34s, though the KV-1 and -2 would still need flank shots. More German tank crews then would make it longer to be upgraded to better tanks later and overall make the Panzerwaffe more effective; not sure if that's enough to change the course of any battle down the road, but it would be a significant tactical advantage and the resulting variables introduced might turn into something important. Thoughts?

[maltesefalcon]

I think there is already a thread with this exact same premise from a couple years back.

[stg 44]

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 42&start=0
I found this, but its slightly different in that its asking about from the beginning, while I'm just asking about from 1940 on after France instead of the L42. The thread didn't get very far and was 10 years ago.

As to this concept there were some 965 Pz IIIs in Barbarossa according to the Hungarian version of the Barbarossa article. Instead of the L42 that could only KO a T-34 from the side or rear they would have a gun that could KO the T-34 frontally at 500m or 1500m from the side or rear. That would have been extremely helpful in Ukraine and wouldn't hurt north of the Pripyat Marshes either. By 1942 the move to the 75mm L/24 for the N-series would be moved up by a year or so, while in 1942 the L60 version would be fully phased in and effective in the mobile battles in Ukraine.

[maltesefalcon]

Paraphrasing that old thread, it was someone moot what the PIII was armed with in 1940, as they were so few in number at that time.

Also most of the Mark III production took place after the long barrel 75 PIV was already on the scene. The PIII should have been phased out at that point and perhaps the factory used for StuGIII or other projects.

Edit. Sorry i found the original post a bit confusing because it mentions 1940 in the heading and immediately diverts to Barbarossa.
The 1941 campaign failed because of poor logistics among many other reasons, not due to inferior tanks. A few more tank crews may have survived of course, but the overall outcome would be the same.

Also the long barrelled PIV and 50mm PIII developed as a result of experience gained in Russia and North Africa vs heavier armour. So it is not logical to assume the Germans would seek a solution to a problem that had not occured yet.

[stg 44]

i don't necessarily agree about the caliber issue; Germany historically adopted the 3.7cm gun to keep the same caliber as their towed AT guns; the L42 was actually as smaller shell than their 50mm towed AT gun and that had to be adapted to fit the Pz III later; keeping with the original logic Germany could have kept the same caliber as their towed AT guns and simplified logistics:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_KwK_39
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_Pak_38

[maltesefalcon]

Let's crunch some numbers.

In 1941 Germany produced 1713 PIII and lost 782 for a loss rate of 46%
In 1942 Germany produced 2605 PIII and lost 1501 for a loss rate of 58%
Most of the 1942 were up-gunned 50mm L60
In 1943 Germany produced 315 PIII and lost 2295 for a loss rate of 729% Pretty well all were up-gunned 50mm L60

Using the numbers above the better the tanks guns got the worse the loss rate became. Why the paradox?
In order to analyse the situation, you need to assume that there is more to these losses than just gun size. Going to a bigger gun will not mitigate vehicle loss due to air strike, fuel issues, weather or mechanical breakdown.

I would need to see relevant statistics of direct tanks vs. tank losses for any fair comparison to come to the conclusion that a bigger gun for this vehicle in 1940 would be a game changer.

(Numbers above courtesy German Tanks of WWII Tables VI and VIII)

[GoldenState]

Let's crunch some numbers.

In 1941 Germany produced 1713 PIII and lost 782 for a loss rate of 46%
In 1942 Germany produced 2605 PIII and lost 1501 for a loss rate of 58%
Most of the 1942 were up-gunned 50mm L60
In 1943 Germany produced 315 PIII and lost 2295 for a loss rate of 729% Pretty well all were up-gunned 50mm L60

Using the numbers above the better the tanks guns got the worse the loss rate became. Why the paradox?
In order to analyse the situation, you need to assume that there is more to these losses than just gun size. Going to a bigger gun will not mitigate vehicle loss due to air strike, fuel issues, weather or mechanical breakdown.

I would need to see relevant statistics of direct tanks vs. tank losses for any fair comparison to come to the conclusion that a bigger gun for this vehicle in 1940 would be a game changer.

(Numbers above courtesy German Tanks of WWII Tables VI and VIII)

I think that the obvious explanation is that they were generally fighting more and more heavily armed/armored opponents as time passed. That's not much of a counter to the argument that a longer reach and stronger punch in 1941 would have led to fewer losses on the Panzer III crews while more T-34 and other Russian tanks would have been destroyed.

[stg 44]

Let's crunch some numbers.

In 1941 Germany produced 1713 PIII and lost 782 for a loss rate of 46%
In 1942 Germany produced 2605 PIII and lost 1501 for a loss rate of 58%
Most of the 1942 were up-gunned 50mm L60
In 1943 Germany produced 315 PIII and lost 2295 for a loss rate of 729% Pretty well all were up-gunned 50mm L60

Using the numbers above the better the tanks guns got the worse the loss rate became. Why the paradox?
In order to analyse the situation, you need to assume that there is more to these losses than just gun size. Going to a bigger gun will not mitigate vehicle loss due to air strike, fuel issues, weather or mechanical breakdown.

I would need to see relevant statistics of direct tanks vs. tank losses for any fair comparison to come to the conclusion that a bigger gun for this vehicle in 1940 would be a game changer.

(Numbers above courtesy German Tanks of WWII Tables VI and VIII)

1943 is skewed by the huge encirclements at Stalingrad and Tunisia, plus the major Soviet offensives after Kursk which overran a number of repair depots filled due to Citadel. In 1942 there were increased Pz III losses during the Soviet offensives over the Winter, while that weather played a role in write offs, plus abandoned vehicles in the Caucasus and losses in Stalingrad.

Also you suggest all Pz IIIs were built with the L60 in 1942, AFAIK that was phased in over the course of 1942, not starting from Jan. 1st 1942. In my What If the L60 would appear for all upgunned Pz IIIs after France before Barbarossa, so the 965 Pz IIIs that were used in Barbarossa have it for that campaign and all Pz IIIs built from 1941 onward have it. So rather than it being phased in over the course of 1942 its phased in in 1940 so that all Pz IIIs are built with them before Barbarossa, not by the time of Case Blue (if even then historically speaking). Losses will still get higher as time goes on and the Pz III will be phased out by 1943, but in the meantime the Pz III is more effective in 1941-42, meaning increased Soviet losses for fewer German, meaning more experienced crews live to be upgraded to better tanks later, creating a positive feedback loop in terms of manpower for the Germans, a negative one for the Soviets.

[Old_Fossil]

If all the Pz III's are up-gunned at the start of Barbarossa and are therefore effectively dealing with the T-34, would that not then diminish the urgency to up-gun the Pz IV? This delay would then counter balance the benefit of the earlier up-gunning of the Pz III and make the whole effort a wash.

[stg 44]

If all the Pz III's are up-gunned at the start of Barbarossa and are therefore effectively dealing with the T-34, would that not then diminish the urgency to up-gun the Pz IV? This delay would then counter balance the benefit of the earlier up-gunning of the Pz III and make the whole effort a wash.

Not, its clear the 50mm L60 isn't enough and the 75mm Pz IV is the only option; in fact that was also viewed as a stopgap. The L60 just makes things somewhat less bad in 1941 compared to the historical situation instead of solving the problem; also the KV-1 was not threatened by the L60, so something was needed to deal with that.

[maltesefalcon]

To explain:

I made several assumptions in my earlier analysis.
First, Wehrmacht units had already received the 50mm L60 version by April 1942, so I would assume the bulk of that year's production was that version, from March on.

Second I acknowledge that the losses in 1943 were caused by other issues than tank vs tank encounters. So what? I made the same point myself. If having a bigger gun would not mitigate those causes in 1942-43 it would not do so in 1940 either.

To swing me to the other side can anyone show losses for Panzer III in direct tank vs tank encounters only in 1940, 41, 42 etc.? Until then, I will stand by my case.

[stg 44]

To explain:

I made several assumptions in my earlier analysis.
First, Wehrmacht units had already received the 50mm L60 version by April 1942, so I would assume the bulk of that year's production was that version, from March on.

Second I acknowledge that the losses in 1943 were caused by other issues than tank vs tank encounters. So what? I made the same point myself. If having a bigger gun would not mitigate those causes in 1942-43 it would not do so in 1940 either.

To swing me to the other side can anyone show losses for Panzer III in direct tank vs tank encounters only in 1940, 41, 42 etc.? Until then, I will stand by my case.

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/14677-causes- ... y-calibre/

Source: Zaloga and Ness: Red Army Handbook 1939-1945
Causes of Soviet Tank Losses, by calibre
Unit, Operation/Date.................... 50sh. 50lg...75 ....88... . Unk
Up to September ‘42 ................................7.5 ......54.3 .... 0.1 ....3.4 ....7.1

Its very obvious that there is a huge difference between the 50mm L42 and L60. 7.5% of Soviet AFV losses were to the L42, 54.3% for the L60. So the L60 was about 6-700% more effective at AFV killing from June 1941-September 1942. The L60 was only around for a much shorter period of time and not even fully phased into service by September 1942 (the old L42's were probably still around in limited numbers by then). So most of the L60 killing was done from April-September 1942, yet it killed a much higher percentage of Soviet AFVs. Now to be totally fair, the L60 kills probably include towed 50mm AT guns, which were in service before Barbarossa, as they were the same caliber as the L60 and its impossible to differentiate them, while there were no towed L42 AT guns.

Still, its clear that the L60 was much more effective in any form than the L42 at inflicting losses on Soviet AFVs.

http://www.panzerworld.com/armor-penetration-table
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=133403

[GoldenState]

To explain:

I made several assumptions in my earlier analysis.
First, Wehrmacht units had already received the 50mm L60 version by April 1942, so I would assume the bulk of that year's production was that version, from March on.

Second I acknowledge that the losses in 1943 were caused by other issues than tank vs tank encounters. So what? I made the same point myself. If having a bigger gun would not mitigate those causes in 1942-43 it would not do so in 1940 either.

To swing me to the other side can anyone show losses for Panzer III in direct tank vs tank encounters only in 1940, 41, 42 etc.? Until then, I will stand by my case.

The "so what" is most people's premise that the L60 made the PIII both more deadly and more survivable (because they did not have to get within kissing distance to take a shot) in 1942-3. The logic in the post is that it would have provided similar benefits in 1941.

Or putting it another way. If you want to appreciate the benefit of the L60, just imagine the losses in 42&43 if the PIII was still exclusively armed with the L43.

[stg 44]

In fact the L60 in 1941 would be going up against even weaker opponents relative to 1942-43. The T-34 was progressively upgraded, same with the KV series, which ended up morphing into the IS series.

[maltesefalcon]

To explain:

I made several assumptions in my earlier analysis.
First, Wehrmacht units had already received the 50mm L60 version by April 1942, so I would assume the bulk of that year's production was that version, from March on.

Second I acknowledge that the losses in 1943 were caused by other issues than tank vs tank encounters. So what? I made the same point myself. If having a bigger gun would not mitigate those causes in 1942-43 it would not do so in 1940 either.

To swing me to the other side can anyone show losses for Panzer III in direct tank vs tank encounters only in 1940, 41, 42 etc.? Until then, I will stand by my case.

The "so what" is most people's premise that the L60 made the PIII both more deadly and more survivable (because they did not have to get within kissing distance to take a shot) in 1942-3. The logic in the post is that it would have provided similar benefits in 1941.

Or putting it another way. If you want to appreciate the benefit of the L60, just imagine the losses in 42&43 if the PIII was still exclusively armed with the L43.

Interesting. But how do you reconcile the fact that the 37mm version actually exceeded the 50mm short version using that same table?
I checked the Actung panzer site for production figures and by their data significant production of both the L42 and L60 seems to be taking place at the same time late 41 early 42. Bit confusing actually if you read through it.

I have one theory about the 37mm now that I think of it. The 50 mm tanks came out just when the Panzer forces were expanding and rebuilding post Barbarossa.
New units often got the newest equipment instead of gining it to trained veterans. Hence the new tanks did not live up to their potential until the rookies had learned the tricks of the trade.