Requirements for a successful Midway Invasion Force

[glenn239]

The map is certainly better than nothing. With at least 6 batteries covering Brookes Channel could see the Marines` big guns remaining silent until the assault wave was at practically point blank range before unleashing the 1st salvo with fully 1/2 of the SNLF lost before the 1st Japanese steps foot on either island. This of course would all but ultimately doom the assault...with the airfield on Eastern Island would think the majority of the attackers would land there to try to rapidly secure it.

Here,

http://books.google.ca/books?id=9wp7iqW ... ry&f=false

Is about the landing at Westkapelle, where the landing was under direct fire for several hours before the fortified positions were overrun, (the defending batteries ran out of ammunition). 10 landing craft doing cover fire were sunk, and 6 more damaged, with 172 killed and 125 wounded.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Suppresion, suppresion, suppresion. Tho top three keys to a sucessfull assault.

[glenn239]

Suppresion, suppresion, suppresion. Tho top three keys to a sucessfull assault.

Yep, but the battle linked gives an idea of the inherent lethality of coastal batteries against Diahatsu sized targets. In that instance, each gun in the defending batteries expended its entire load of ready ammunition to sink about 1 attacking landing craft. The attacking task over the coral reef south of Midway was impossible enough, even without Flakbait's supposition to missile-like accuracy in WW2 artillery.

[flakbait]

Do realize the accuracy (or IN-accuracy in this case) of then "modern" coastal artillery against small and mobile but relatively slow moving craft but also understand approx. shell burst and shrapnel radius of the defending 5" coastal defense guns from other readings. Am too assuming that the 3" AA guns will be capable of being used ala "88" PAK in a duel role against the landing waves. Am not at all familiar with the 7" older weapons; however any such shells bursting within 25-30` of a Dahatsu landing craft might very well either riddle it, swamp it or even flip it completely over; in all probability effectively disabling it... At point blank ranges obviously it`s harder to miss, especially against a stationary target...it would be a Tarawa in reverse but most likely with a different outcome.

[RichTO90]

Is about the landing at Westkapelle, where the landing was under direct fire for several hours before the fortified positions were overrun, (the defending batteries ran out of ammunition). 10 landing craft doing cover fire were sunk, and 6 more damaged, with 172 killed and 125 wounded.

While Steve Zaloga's work is good as always, I don't think it has the details for you to make a complete assessment. Eleven support craft were actually sunk by gunfire, and another three by mines, of 25 such craft deployed. In effect, they were sacrificed to allow the troop carrying craft an easier passage, which was part of the plan. Nevertheless, a large number of the LVT, LCA, and LCM were damaged. The Japanese did not have a similar option or plan that I am aware of.

[Carl Schwamberger]

6th Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Commanding Officer Capt. Robert E. Hommel
Battery H (24 .50-caliber MG)
Battery I (24 .30-caliber MG)
Tank Platoon, Provisional (5 M2A4 Light Tanks)

3d Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Battery K (8 37-mm)
Battery L (18 twin 20-mm on 40-mm carriage)

Have some unresolved thoughts on the heavier cannon. What is fairly clear are the 60+ MG of .30, .5, & 20mm calibers. Any of those unsuppressed Are going to be a problem for the assault as it disembarks. While the metal constructed Daihatsu are resistant to these weapons they are not invulnerable. The 37mm gun of the 3rd Def Bn were the M1 37mm AA gun, another super heavy MG. Which would have a greater effect than the rifle caliber MG on the boats.

Provisional Infantry Group
Detachment, 2d Raider (Each company included a weapons platoon of 2 60-mm mortars and 2 .30-caliber M1919A4 MG.)
Company C
Company D
Provisional Marine Companies (Each company included a weapons platoon armed with 2 60-mm mortars, 2 .30-caliber M191A4 MG, and 2 M1916 37-mm guns.)
22d Provisional Marine Company
23d Provisional Marine Company

I dont think much of this firepower would be directed at the boats, It was for counter attacking & would have been directed at whoever crossed the beach. The supporting fire of the mortars & MG is not a lot. The rifle strength of the Raiders is not a lot either. What the Provisional companies might have been on paper I dont know. It was expected any Marines not manning crew served weapons would be used by these companies and there was some organization and training for this by the Defense battalions and other Marine units at hand. The air wing ground crew and other service units represented a ready pool of armed riflemen. The Wake island battle being a example of how that worked. The mopping up of the Japanese infiltrators after the Bloody Ridge or Edisons Ridge battles on Guadalcannal being another.

[flakbait]

Another consideration in knowing with all but absolute CERTAINTY that Midway would face an imminent invasion attempt would be getting ALL the batteries some live fire and ranging practice. Considering that Nimitz himself came to Midway in May and flat out asked for anything the commanders wanted or needed which was immediately expedited to the island ASAP it would seem ridiculous in retrospect NOT to have asked for extra ammunition to allow the gunners to get in much needed practice and carefully set up even crude markers of some sort where possible on the reef. Am certain in the month that was available they very likely honed their gunnery skills and speed because shortly their lives might well depend upon that preparation...the daily log history of the 6th Marine Defense Battalion should record this training, and likely the number and types of rounds expended in this training. NOT having the gunners do this vital pre- battle training would make 1 question the professional competence of both the Marine Corps officers and senior enlisted personnel assigned there...

[glenn239]

While Steve Zaloga's work is good as always, I don't think it has the details for you to make a complete assessment. Eleven support craft were actually sunk by gunfire, and another three by mines, of 25 such craft deployed. In effect, they were sacrificed to allow the troop carrying craft an easier passage, which was part of the plan. Nevertheless, a large number of the LVT, LCA, and LCM were damaged. The Japanese did not have a similar option or plan that I am aware of.

Agreed, but it is one of the few instances I can think of where strong coastal batteries fired off their entire ammunition supply at Daihatsu-like targets at battle ranges broadly similar to what they’d be at Midway.

[flakbait]

Do understand that mobile even if slow small targets especially if supported by larger landing / beaching craft to draw the bulk of the defenders fire along with NGF support or not going to be easy targets, nor is every shot going to score a direct hit or near enough miss to do any damage. OTOH as have said before hand KNOWING that Midway was facing just such an attack in the very near future if it were me commanding, would have asked for ALL the ammo available and had my gunners practice, and practice, and practice some more...short of wearing out their barrels.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Betio Island is a negative example for large caliber guns vs landing craft. The cannon were fired against both the transports, at ranges of 6000 to 7000 meters, and at the LVT at ranges under 1000 meters. In both cases few to no hits were recorded in the AAR of the assault units. The post battle evaluation judged most LVT destroyed in the first wave (about 25% of the vehicles) to be hit by smaller caliber AP or HE ammunition. Interrogation of the 14 Japanese survivors and captured docs indicated the Japanese were supplied with AP ammunition for the smaller caliber cannon and rifle caliber weapons. This ammunition was also refered to as "anti boat ammunition". If this last is accurate then it suggests the Japanese anticipated the problem of attacking steel hulled small boats. It appears they were not anticipating the LVT as the survivors related their surprise at seeing the US "amphibious tanks" cross the reef, and indicated these reduced morale. Exactly why the larger cannon had so little effect is not clear in the accounts I've seen. The heavier AA guns are described as firing air bursts above the LVT on the reef and the boats outside the reef, but few direct hits are identified.

[glenn239]

if it were me commanding, would have asked for ALL the ammo available and had my gunners practice, and practice, and practice some more...short of wearing out their barrels.

What do you imagine the German battery crews were doing in the year before their battle?

I think the general outlines of this battle are safely summarized as the attack is most likely to get bogged down on the reef. It would almost certainly not have succeeded in its objective of capturing the airfield within 24 hours. It may have secured a beachhead, (especially if shifting the attack of the SNLF to the northwest), but the Marines would be holding the airfield for the duration of whatever sea battle took place, and, if not evacuated, the attacking forces would take weeks and sea reinforcements to take the island, and that assumes the Marines are not themselves reinforced in the meantime.

[ChristopherPerrien]

if it were me commanding, would have asked for ALL the ammo available and had my gunners practice, and practice, and practice some more...short of wearing out their barrels.

What do you imagine the German battery crews were doing in the year before their battle?

Sent to the Eastern Front to die and replaced by "White Bread" Units, which had the "stuff" bombed/shelled out of them in the preceding months.

[flakbait]

glenn239, wish we had more detailed plans of the Imperial SNLF assault, and also the defending Marines` tactical initial deployments, but in general agree with your summary. Even if ALL the Imperial landing force were concentrated upon Eastern Island and the contested airfield, the chances of getting ashore are there but not without taking crippling losses. Once the survivors do get ashore without just about superb and instant NGF support and the means to competently direct it their beachhead is going to be rapidly wiped out. Furthermore without effective and immediate reinforcement and resupply, it would be a moot point within a few hours at best...I doubt that with the then recent example of Wake Island and several other Marine garrisons that were forced to surrender that the Marines are going to spare ANY effort to prevent either reinforcement or evacuation by the Japanese. The professional pride of the United States Marine Corps was literally at stake here. Any Imperial troops that were unfortunate to put foot on Midway were going to stay, but not alive or at least for any longer than humanly possible...this was going to be a `no mercy asked, none given` engagement as the majority of the Pacific war had already shown itself to largely be.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Somewhat wrong Flakbait. June 42, US forces knew nothing about how the Japanese treated POW's.

However the massive Demoralization that occurred on Wake, beccause of the Pearl Harbor raid and being "cut-off" , and abandoned, was not present at Midway.

The USMC on Midway knew they had support and good commo with CIC-Pac. They also had the massive morale and confidence boosts of the continued successes of the Carrier Raids and the victory at Coral Sea. They also were full of grim determination and hatred for the Japanese and knew of a certainty of victory. Sure they knew the Philippines fell but that was the US Army, a colonial outpost from peacetime, surprise attacked and out-numbered.
To be exact, US forces lost no notable battles after the initial Pearl Harbor phase, except for siege of PI, and only 2 smaller naval engagements. The Marines on Midway would have fought far better than SNLF and handed them their heads, as later happened to these very same SNLF unit and IJA unit on Guadalcanal.

[glenn239]

Once the survivors do get ashore without just about superb and instant NGF support and the means to competently direct it their beachhead is going to be rapidly wiped out.

Counterattacking into an established beach head backed by corps-level artillery firepower would have been virtual suicide for the garrison, even supposing inadequate ship to shore communications.