Walter Wever doesn't die

[Don71]

Well,

for me simply your opinion didn't count weather for Stilla nore for Weaver!

Then ignore his opinion and work from facts? It doesn't help when you drag in your opinion of what you think someone else said - secondhand - to counter his opinion of what he doesn't know someone else said - secondhand.

Nor does it help when you equate exchange rates (Bf 109/110 versus Spitfire/Hurricane) with superior aircraft or when you imply that means the Luftwaffe could win the Battle of Britain.

Your agenda is well known!

And yours is becoming very well known with each additional post.

Where have I written that? Again putting words in my mouth!

But a Fw 187 is only one key element, because the numbers of Fw 187 would be equal to the numbers of the Bf 110 and 200 Fw 187 wouldn't change the outcome, they only would massively expand the loss rate of the RAF/FC. A drop tank for the Bf 109 would be essential to ever have a chance to to substantial damage to the FC.
And only without a close cover order and even then the chances are only 50:50 to do realy substantial damage to the FC and the FC must do the favor to the LW and must accept the fight over south england. If the FC didn't accept after massiv losses the fight over south england, there is no chance for the LW fighters.

Perhaps I have to learn the english language new!

1. Fw 187 with DB 601 engines instead of the Bf 110
2. Bf 109 E2-4 with drop tanks
3. No close cover order
My conclusion the LW could have had a real chance 50:50 to do substantial damage to the FC over south england, if the FC accepts the fight.

Your interpretation I have written and implied the LW could win the BoB!
Now your agenda to me is also ovious with every post from you.

[ljadw]

Why would the numbers of Fw 187 be equal to the numbers of Bf110 and why would they expand the loss rate of FC ?

[RichTO90]

or when you imply that means the Luftwaffe could win the Battle of Britain.

Where have I written that? Again putting words in my mouth!

Heus!

I hesitate to say, but perhaps you need to look up the word "imply"?

But a Fw 187 is only one key element, because the numbers of Fw 187 would be equal to the numbers of the Bf 110 and 200 Fw 187 wouldn't change the outcome, they only would massively expand the loss rate of the RAF/FC. A drop tank for the Bf 109 would be essential to ever have a chance to to substantial damage to the FC.
And only without a close cover order and even then the chances are only 50:50 to do realy substantial damage to the FC and the FC must do the favor to the LW and must accept the fight over south england. If the FC didn't accept after massiv losses the fight over south england, there is no chance for the LW fighters.

Perhaps I have to learn the english language new!

1. Fw 187 with DB 601 engines instead of the Bf 110
2. Bf 109 E2-4 with drop tanks
3. No close cover order
My conclusion the LW could have had a real chance 50:50 to do substantial damage to the FC over south england, if the FC accepts the fight.

Your interpretation I have written and implied the LW could win the BoB!
Now your agenda to me is also ovious with every post from you.

That does clear up the confusion somewhat, thank you. My problem is with a number of your assumptions.

1. I am unclear how a pre-production run of three Fw 187 in the summer of 1939 can be translated into full-scale unit replacement by summer 1940 and just why such a decision would be made?

2. What accelerates development and production of the Bf 109 E2-4 and the drop tanks?

3. The "close cover order" did have the undesired effect to make the abysmally bad British fighter tactics more effective, but yet again, what induces Luftwaffe leadership to realize the Freijagd was the correct tactics, when it seemed to them they were going to run out of bombers before the British ran out of fighters? (Which in fact may have been the actual outcome of such a decision.)

The fundamental problem was that the Luftwaffe, despite the favorable fighter exchange rates, was bleeding operational fighters and fighter pilots faster than Fighter Command. For example, the "pilot shortage" in Fighter Command is a badly misunderstood subject. Much of the "shortage" during June-August, when it was at its worst, was not a lack of pilots to fly operational aircraft, but a shortage of pilots to form the additional squadrons that the RAF was creating. The high operational tempo did lead to exhaustion and expedients like drawing on FAA pilots as fillers, but by 1 September the pilot training program was well enough advanced that most of the problems had been relieved. As of 1 September, FC actually had 2,012 flying officers for an establishment of 785 and had trained another 624 enlisted pilots, with another 323 in training, against an establishment of 762. In contrast, the Luftwaffe as of 28 September 1940 only had 676 fighter pilots operational and another 241 non-operational (none were on "light duty", indicating they were all in hospital or otherwise unavailable) against an establishment of 1,132. So who was suffering from a shortage?

It is always possible with a "what if" to put into place possible solutions for a problem, but that does not necessarily mean the solution is practical or that it will necessarily work - it is all too easy to miss other factors that may cause problems.

[Don71]

Hello RichTO90,

1. I am unclear how a pre-production run of three Fw 187 in the summer of 1939 can be translated into full-scale unit replacement by summer 1940 and just why such a decision would be made?

First some excursion to the destroyer advertisement of the RLM

The first destroyer advertisement were Rüstflugzeug II and Rüstungsflugzeugs III 1934.
At 1935 the advertisment was changed to a destroyer without bombs.
The Bf 110 wasn't fullfilling the destroyer advertisement weather 1934, 1935 nore 1936, anyway the Bf 110 got the pre production contract of the destroyer advertisemnt at November 1936 after the death of Weaver and the replacement of Wimmer through Udet as technical chief.
At Juli 1937 the whole destroyer advertisement was rephrased from the RLM to an, all weather fighter, heavy fighter,long range escort fighter and fighter bomber, to fit the Bf 110.
Between Juli 1937 and December 1938, 88 Bf 110 B with Jumo 210 engines were produced mostly from the Gothaer Waggonfabrik (62 out of 88), the other 26 were produced from Messerschmitt Augsburg. So only the Gothaer Waggonfabrik next to Messerschmitt was tooled to the Bf 110 at the beginning of 1939 and the introduction of the mass production of the Bf 110 C1 with DB 601 engines.

I don't refer now to the whole development of the Fw 187 but some essential data's and dates.
My source is Dietmar Hermann the Fw 187 an Illustrated Historie, which is basing on original documents of the FW archiv inclusive official specifications, and original documents from the RLM and Daimler Benz.
http://www.amazon.com/Focke-Wulf-FW-187 ... rds=Fw+187

The Fw 187 was designed from the begiining to the RLM advertisemnt of the 35Liter 1000Ps engines, so she was from the beginning designed to carry later a DB 601 or Jumo 211.
The first flight of the two seater Fw 187 V4 ( 2 x Jumo 210 engines) was at September 1938 and the aircraft met the whole rephrased "destroyer" advertisemnt of the RLM from July 1937.
The whole october 1938 the Fw 187 V4 (equiped with 2 x MG and 2 x MG FF) was at Rechlin and was compared to a Bf 109 C/D (with Jumo 210 engine) and a Bf 110 B (with Jumo 210 engines).
She outperformed the Bf 110 B at miles from speed (80-90km/h faster), climbing, turning and rolling, also she outperformed a Bf 109 from speed (at least 60km/h faster) and was rated equal at turning and rolling to the Bf 109.
This was 2-3 month before the Bf 110 was put into mass production.
Also after the official pay off document from FW to the RLM the Fw 187 A0 cost 137000RM with 2 x 210 engines, if we calculate with the engine price of the DB 601 and structural changes for a fictive Fw 187 "B" with 2 x DB 601 engines and conventional cooling, it would be at 160000RM compare to 210000RM for a Bf 110 C1.
Next to the production,
after the german Luftarchiv source, Messerschmitt had 27000 employee at 1938/39 compare to 35000 Focker Wulf employees at 1938/39. Focker Wulf had the most man power of all german aircraft companies at this time line, more then Junkers (250000) and Messerschmitt, but Focker Wulf had no mass production contract from the RLM compare to Junkers and especially Messerschmitt which had the Bf 109 and Bf 110. FW was only producing niche aircrafts like the Fw 200, Fw 189 and Fw 58. So the man power potential was not efficient more to unused.

If someone had decided November-December 1938 to put the Fw 187 in mass production instead of the Bf 110 with 2 x DB 601 engines, after it's amazing performance at Rechlin october 1938, I'm convinced that FW (no mass production since the Fw 190), MIAG and after retooling, the Gothaer Waggonfabrik, could have catched up with the production of the original Bf 110 till the beginning of the Norway Invasion or the France campaign.
To my estimation the production could have started with high priority development at April to June 1939 (at which timeline all companies should be tooled for the Fw 187 and the Fw 187 was smaler and cheaper to produce then the Bf 110.
Also there would be no major deficit at the pilot training,because the Bf 110 B were built and could be used as trainers.

The estimated performance (from Fw engineers and modern computed performance analyse) of a Fw 187 "B" with 2 x 601Aa engines (4 x MG and 2 x MG FF) and conventional cooling, would be around 610-620km/h top speed, she would have much more agility and climb performance then the Bf 110C1, because she would have around 800-1000kg less weight fully equiped. The original Fw 187A0 (2 x Jumo 210 engines) outperformed the Bf 110C1 (2 x DB601) regulary at Denmark and Norway at comparison flights.

2. What accelerates development and production of the Bf 109 E2-4 and the drop tanks?

I don't think that it would be a problem to mass produce a drop tank for the Bf 109 E2-4, an acceleration of the production of the Bf 109 E2-4 would be possible, but too much what if for my assumption or claim here for this issue

3. The "close cover order" did have the undesired effect to make the abysmally bad British fighter tactics more effective, but yet again, what induces Luftwaffe leadership to realize the Freijagd was the correct tactics, when it seemed to them they were going to run out of bombers before the British ran out of fighters? (Which in fact may have been the actual outcome of such a decision.)

To my informations the close cover order was a direct order and child from Goering, with no support of the individual commanders of the Luftflotten.
Perhaps I'm to optimistic and convinced from the Fw 187 and a drop tank for the Bf 109E2-4, but to my estimation the loss rate of the LW would be significant less at the France campaign, the Battle of Dunquerke and the following chanel fight, but the kill rate significant higher, with the Fw 187 in service and a drop tank in service for the Bf 109 since the France campaign and the same would happen to my estimation from the beginning of the BoB.

For example, the "pilot shortage" in Fighter Command is a badly misunderstood subject. Much of the "shortage" during June-August, when it was at its worst, was not a lack of pilots to fly operational aircraft, but a shortage of pilots to form the additional squadrons that the RAF was creating. The high operational tempo did lead to exhaustion and expedients like drawing on FAA pilots as fillers, but by 1 September the pilot training program was well enough advanced that most of the problems had been relieved. As of 1 September, FC actually had 2,012 flying officers for an establishment of 785 and had trained another 624 enlisted pilots, with another 323 in training, against an establishment of 762. In contrast, the Luftwaffe as of 28 September 1940 only had 676 fighter pilots operational and another 241 non-operational (none were on "light duty", indicating they were all in hospital or otherwise unavailable) against an establishment of 1,132. So who was suffering from a shortage?

I'm aware of this numbers and a don't disagree with them, but I think the attrition rate especially of produced fighters would be much higher for the FC, at my what if scenario, which would be also stick to the original plan and only attack the FC and not any cities.

[BDV]

The problem with the type of scenarios based on a specific weapon, or line of weapons, is that the optimum path depends on the exact date for war. That cannot be predicted upfront. Rather a continuous sustained development, rather than the discombobulated historical efforts, is the path.

OTOH, the Ju88 does not compare well as return for investment with the lowly Do17 and He111.

[RichTO90]

and conventional coolingHello RichTO90,

First some excursion to the destroyer advertisement of the RLM

Cheers!

I understand all that, but still have difficulty seeing what the sudden revelation for the Fw 187 is? Does Goering encounter a Burning Bush? After the commitment by the Luftwaffe to the Bf 110? It remains that the reality was the first production was in the summer of 1939. The reality of development programs is that they take time. And, finally, just why is the Fw 187 so much more of a "world beater" than the Whirlwind, or the P-38, or the Ki-45, or the Sm.91? ALL were supposed to be the greatest thing since sliced bread, but none was really suitable as an air superiority fighter by themselves. All air forces were sold on the notion, but none worked as advertised. Why would the Fw 187 have the required Ju-Ju?

I just have a problem accepting those intangibles are good enough to generate a50:50 probability of victory for the Luftwaffe.

I don't think that it would be a problem to mass produce a drop tank for the Bf 109 E2-4, an acceleration of the production of the Bf 109 E2-4 would be possible, but too much what if for my assumption or claim here for this issue

Sorry, but that you "don't think it is a problem" simply doesn't answer the question. It was a development item of kit - the drop-tank - plus the aircraft with the modification to accept it, along with the necessary piping arrangement. It took development time and then time to get an institution - the Luftwaffe - to accept such a radical idea. Why does the Luftwaffe do it suddenly faster than the RAF or the USAAF or anyone else?

To my informations the close cover order was a direct order and child from Goering, with no support of the individual commanders of the Luftflotten.

And who was Goering? And why did those "individual commanders" have to obey him? Again, you are proposing a technical solution for what is an institutional problem. Those are EXTREMELY DIFFICULT to change. I would go so far as to say the technical problem is simpler in direct proportion to the difficulty of getting past the institutional barrier. And it wasn't unique to the Luftwaffe. Look at the RAF resistance to tactical innovation. Or the USAAF instance that greater range could not be achieved by fuel conservation. Both were resisted until the institution got its face rubbed in reality.

I'm aware of this numbers and a don't disagree with them, but I think the attrition rate especially of produced fighters would be much higher for the FC, at my what if scenario, which would be also stick to the original plan and only attack the FC and not any cities.

Again, you are simply putting your faith into a technical solution - all that is needed is a better aircraft so we can achieve a better exchange rate - to solve an institutional problem - the Luftwaffe was never strong enough where it counted to defeat the RAF.

[RichTO90]

The problem with the type of scenarios based on a specific weapon, or line of weapons, is that the optimum path depends on the exact date for war. That cannot be predicted upfront. Rather a continuous sustained development, rather than the discombobulated historical efforts, is the path.

Exactly. History and especially military and technological history - is messy and filled with blind alleys.