A Better Panther?

[Don71]

To my knoledge this issues were not so much transmission or the intermediate transmission problems, much more an oil and lubrication problem at the engines.
The quality of german engine oil droped massively at the middle to the end of 1944, there are original reports that the supplied oil was more water then oil.
Many german tank engines got lost to this problem and the loss of lubrication through the much less quality oil is very often mentioned at reports.

[SpicyJuan]

So, is there any way that the MAN Design could have turned into a proper strategic tank with more development time? IIRC, the French stated numerous times in their evaluation that the MAN Panther was a great tactical tank but not a strategic one due to its reliability issues (such as the final drive). On another note, I have seen good arguments that by the end of the war the Panther's reliability issues had largely been resolved (this is proven by the fact that the operational percentages exceeded that of the Panzer IV) and the Panther's critics make its reliability issues out worse than it really was (NOTE: Please let us not change the thread big to a big Panther debate over this and only stick to the hypothetical questions asked).

Isn't this a contradiction? If the reliability issues were resolved, then the French wouldn't have had post war problems because they lacked the supply and maintenance issues the Germans had in 1944-45. Also the French did note that there were issues with the turret layout:
http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/chie ... -panthers/

Would you mind quoting it? I can't seem to find it. What was interesting was that the trouble with the gunner not having his own gunsight was easily avoidable since in the original design it was included, but later deleted as it was see as "redundant".

[T. A. Gardner]

The lack of a wide view periscope for the gunner in a Panther is a serious error. The US gave gunners one in vehicles like the Sherman. There was usually a crude blade sight or sight mounted in front of it so the gunner could quickly align the gun on a target using it. That allowed gunners to get on target faster and fire first. First round hits, even non-penetrating ones, give the firing side a big advantage.

[SpicyJuan]

The lack of a wide view periscope for the gunner in a Panther is a serious error. The US gave gunners one in vehicles like the Sherman. There was usually a crude blade sight or sight mounted in front of it so the gunner could quickly align the gun on a target using it. That allowed gunners to get on target faster and fire first. First round hits, even non-penetrating ones, give the firing side a big advantage.

Not only I agree, but the German's themselves do too. That's why a gunner's periscope was mounted on the Schmallturm of the Ausf. F.

[pintere]

From what I understand, what was really needed was more development time. On a tactical level the Panther was a competent vehicle with a particularly good anti-armour capabilities. Poor planning and rushed design was the downfall. The German designers should have designed a chassis that anticipated heavier weight, not just for the initial design but the inevitable upgrades as well. This was a big strength of the Panzer IV. Thing is, improved reliability mainly needs time for better testing and to sort out whatever issues present themselves. The Sherman tank was at an advantage because it incorporated many parts of existing allied tanks and could be easily upgraded. The Panzer IV went through a very long stage of development and ended up with good reliability, at least at first. The German's greatest mistake during the war in tank design was their reactionary approach. The Panther was built in response to the T-34, not as the next gen German medium tank. What the Germans should have done was begun designing a new generation of tanks as soon as war broke out, using experience to influence the design. Anticipating the need for a better tank in the future, rather than designing one out of necessity, would have been a much more sensible approach.

[stg 44]

The Panther was supposed to be a revolutionary design to leapfrog the T-34, but used existing development to do so; they didn't anticipate the weight that that would result in that the design was not able to handle; the Tiger I had the same problem as they couldn't make it work unless it was 10 tons heavier than the design weigh (VK45.01 stood for 45 tons, which came from the VK36.01, which was already going overweight). So as you say the problem was that it was good in time, it just needed time to work out the bugs, which the Panther II or F was supposed to address.

[pintere]

The Panther was supposed to be a revolutionary design to leapfrog the T-34, but used existing development to do so; they didn't anticipate the weight that that would result in that the design was not able to handle; the Tiger I had the same problem as they couldn't make it work unless it was 10 tons heavier than the design weigh (VK45.01 stood for 45 tons, which came from the VK36.01, which was already going overweight). So as you say the problem was that it was good in time, it just needed time to work out the bugs, which the Panther II or F was supposed to address.

An even better idea (though a bit impractical by the middle of the war) would have been to adopt the E-series panzers, or something like it. Another big German flaw was the sheer multitude of different parts and designs in the field, leading to a quartermasters nightmare. The E-series was supposed to resolve this problem with plenty of standard parts and was designed so that the German trend of different self propelled artillery, AA or tank destroyers based on tank chassis' could still be done without fear of the chassis being outdated.

[T. A. Gardner]

The Panther was supposed to be a revolutionary design to leapfrog the T-34, but used existing development to do so; they didn't anticipate the weight that that would result in that the design was not able to handle; the Tiger I had the same problem as they couldn't make it work unless it was 10 tons heavier than the design weigh (VK45.01 stood for 45 tons, which came from the VK36.01, which was already going overweight). So as you say the problem was that it was good in time, it just needed time to work out the bugs, which the Panther II or F was supposed to address.

An even better idea (though a bit impractical by the middle of the war) would have been to adopt the E-series panzers, or something like it. Another big German flaw was the sheer multitude of different parts and designs in the field, leading to a quartermasters nightmare. The E-series was supposed to resolve this problem with plenty of standard parts and was designed so that the German trend of different self propelled artillery, AA or tank destroyers based on tank chassis' could still be done without fear of the chassis being outdated.

The E series had too many vehicles in it, some of which were insane. The E 75 and 100 were dinosaurs. The lights were irrelevant by 1944 for the Germans.

I would say a better choice would have been to improve what they already had. For example, what if you add one or two road wheels to a Pz III chassis, add stronger torsion bars, and slightly widen the hull? Add a wider track and you have a hull for a vehicle in the 35 ton class that is using parts mainly already available.
Go to a 75L60 or a lighter version of the 88L56 and you have a decent gun on a decent medium tank with better protection than a Pz V.

The Germans kept reinventing the wheel.

Russia, the US, and Britain for all intents had one light, one medium, and one heavy tank in production for most of the war, if not all of it.

Germany kept the Pz II in some altered form in production into 1944 (the Luchs). They had the Pz III, IV, V, VI, VIb, and 38t/d, all in production for most of the war. Better is always the enemy of good enough.

[SpicyJuan]

The Panther was supposed to be a revolutionary design to leapfrog the T-34, but used existing development to do so; they didn't anticipate the weight that that would result in that the design was not able to handle; the Tiger I had the same problem as they couldn't make it work unless it was 10 tons heavier than the design weigh (VK45.01 stood for 45 tons, which came from the VK36.01, which was already going overweight). So as you say the problem was that it was good in time, it just needed time to work out the bugs, which the Panther II or F was supposed to address.

An even better idea (though a bit impractical by the middle of the war) would have been to adopt the E-series panzers, or something like it. Another big German flaw was the sheer multitude of different parts and designs in the field, leading to a quartermasters nightmare. The E-series was supposed to resolve this problem with plenty of standard parts and was designed so that the German trend of different self propelled artillery, AA or tank destroyers based on tank chassis' could still be done without fear of the chassis being outdated.

The E series had too many vehicles in it, some of which were insane. The E 75 and 100 were dinosaurs. The lights were irrelevant by 1944 for the Germans.

Sure, the E-Series did have a large array of proposed vehicles, but the production of them would have been greatly alleviated due to the standardization of parts (this would also be a great benefit to the maintenance and logistical operations in supporting the E Series Panzers). The E-100 was a behemoth, yes, but would not have been masses produced, if at all (Hitler cancelled it in 1944). The E-75 was also very heavy, yes, but with a new engine (compared to the KT) and being the same size as the E-50, who knows how it would have turned out? It was only meant as a heavy after all.

[pintere]

The Panther was supposed to be a revolutionary design to leapfrog the T-34, but used existing development to do so; they didn't anticipate the weight that that would result in that the design was not able to handle; the Tiger I had the same problem as they couldn't make it work unless it was 10 tons heavier than the design weigh (VK45.01 stood for 45 tons, which came from the VK36.01, which was already going overweight). So as you say the problem was that it was good in time, it just needed time to work out the bugs, which the Panther II or F was supposed to address.

An even better idea (though a bit impractical by the middle of the war) would have been to adopt the E-series panzers, or something like it. Another big German flaw was the sheer multitude of different parts and designs in the field, leading to a quartermasters nightmare. The E-series was supposed to resolve this problem with plenty of standard parts and was designed so that the German trend of different self propelled artillery, AA or tank destroyers based on tank chassis' could still be done without fear of the chassis being outdated.

The E series had too many vehicles in it, some of which were insane. The E 75 and 100 were dinosaurs. The lights were irrelevant by 1944 for the Germans.

I would say a better choice would have been to improve what they already had. For example, what if you add one or two road wheels to a Pz III chassis, add stronger torsion bars, and slightly widen the hull? Add a wider track and you have a hull for a vehicle in the 35 ton class that is using parts mainly already available.
Go to a 75L60 or a lighter version of the 88L56 and you have a decent gun on a decent medium tank with better protection than a Pz V.

The Germans kept reinventing the wheel.

Russia, the US, and Britain for all intents had one light, one medium, and one heavy tank in production for most of the war, if not all of it.

Germany kept the Pz II in some altered form in production into 1944 (the Luchs). They had the Pz III, IV, V, VI, VIb, and 38t/d, all in production for most of the war. Better is always the enemy of good enough.

It does not necessarily have to be the E-series as was planned, just something like it. The Pz. II was also used as a basis for the Marder II, Wespe, etc. I think it would be a much more sensible approach to use a standard set of 3-4 chassis' with plenty of interchangeable parts than 7+ different kind of chassis', many of which were based on tanks already being phased out.

[Nautilus]

Eliminate entirely the overlapped suspension system for one like the Pz III has.

1. The overlapped / interleaved suspension system had advantages the Germans could not make without:

+ Allow a large, wide track with low ground pressure on a very massive tank which could still (barely) fit the loading gauge of the railways. T-34s could make ends meet wuth far simpler suspension because they were lightweight. Panthers had the weight of a M48 Patton or a T-72.

+ Allow smooth running at high speeds on rough ground. T-34s could not make good use of their speed with original 4-speed gearbox, since top gear often could not be engaged at all on rough ground. For modern armchair warriors, this counts as a nasty flaw. But on the Eastern Front, it was a wonder in some seasons the tank moved at all. They talked in terms of not sinking in liquefied mud, not of running 30 mph continuously.

2. The track system in Panthers and Tigers was not a true Schachtellaufwerk track.

Semantically, it was a "box-chassis" (a tank IS a big box). But original suspension in the Schachtellaufwerk system had:

1 - interleaved wheels - for weight spread;
2 - articulated links between metal track pads, with needle bearings and seals - for smooth following of road bumps at speed;
3 - articulated rollers instead of teeth on the drive sprocket - for the same reason;
4 - rubber pads on each metal track pad.

This resulted in a system which drives very well on road or rough ground, but it's expensive and royally time consuming to build. Each God-damned track link has to be carefully put together by hand tools, hundreds of times for each machine. Plus, it can't take the lateral loads of pivoting a full-tracked vehicle in place, it breaks immediately.

So a Panther / Tiger track had only 1 - interleaved or overlapped wheels. Track pads were connected by pins, drive sprockets had steel teeth, there were no rubber track pads.

Not that Panther track had to be simplified. It had already been simplified as much as possible from the start.

[maltesefalcon]

It was not simply a matter of design improvement or implimentation date. Panther was in service by mid-1943, but the Reich was still building outclassed PIII at the same time. They also built significant numbers of PIV and Stug III/IV until very late in the war.

This in a effort to compensate for the much higher production rates of Allied tanks in the same time frame. Germany needed (much) higher quantity, not just quality.

[T. A. Gardner]

Eliminate entirely the overlapped suspension system for one like the Pz III has.

1. The overlapped / interleaved suspension system had advantages the Germans could not make without:

+ Allow a large, wide track with low ground pressure on a very massive tank which could still (barely) fit the loading gauge of the railways. T-34s could make ends meet wuth far simpler suspension because they were lightweight. Panthers had the weight of a M48 Patton or a T-72.

This is clearly not true. Nobody today uses interleaved or overlapped suspension on an AFV. In fact, the suspension seen on the Pz III has become pretty much the most commonly used. That is, moderately sized road wheels in pairs (outer and inner) on a torsion bar with return rollers for support.

+ Allow smooth running at high speeds on rough ground. T-34s could not make good use of their speed with original 4-speed gearbox, since top gear often could not be engaged at all on rough ground. For modern armchair warriors, this counts as a nasty flaw. But on the Eastern Front, it was a wonder in some seasons the tank moved at all. They talked in terms of not sinking in liquefied mud, not of running 30 mph continuously.

This is a function of the entirety of the suspension system. Having a dead track return (the track is loose on top) actually increases lash and rolling resistance. The type of track is also important. Rubber bushed tracks like the US used lower rolling resistance at road speeds while solid steel tracks with pins like the Germans and Russians used increase resistance with speed.

2. The track system in Panthers and Tigers was not a true Schachtellaufwerk track.

An irrelevance.

Semantically, it was a "box-chassis" (a tank IS a big box). But original suspension in the Schachtellaufwerk system had:

1 - interleaved wheels - for weight spread;
2 - articulated links between metal track pads, with needle bearings and seals - for smooth following of road bumps at speed;
3 - articulated rollers instead of teeth on the drive sprocket - for the same reason;
4 - rubber pads on each metal track pad.

This is the sort of track system used on German half-- well, more like three-quarter-- tracks. The problem with it is that it is complex and expensive to manufacture. For a military vehicle in wartime, it really was an unaffordable luxury that the Germans should have abandoned immediately upon entering the war.

This resulted in a system which drives very well on road or rough ground, but it's expensive and royally time consuming to build. Each God-damned track link has to be carefully put together by hand tools, hundreds of times for each machine. Plus, it can't take the lateral loads of pivoting a full-tracked vehicle in place, it breaks immediately.

This is all true. That's why nobody uses this system on military vehicles today. The slight improvement in performance isn't worth the added cost and complexity.

So a Panther / Tiger track had only 1 - interleaved or overlapped wheels. Track pads were connected by pins, drive sprockets had steel teeth, there were no rubber track pads.

Not that Panther track had to be simplified. It had already been simplified as much as possible from the start.

And, as I stated, nobody has copied this system post WW 2. It is too complex and increases the difficulty of maintenance. Hence why everyone is using something that looks very much like the Pz III's suspension.

[antwony]

Also, how could the MAN Panther have been improved? If it was allowed to properly develop(IIRC it was rushed), would its huge reliability issues have been improved? If those issues had been improved could it have been a good strategic tank-a true replacement to the Panzer IV? Would the weak side armor have been improved at the expense of the front?

Ideally, they would have stuck a Spitfire/ Mustang engine in it. Although, from what I understand Daimler- Benz couldn't turn out enough engines as it was and given Nazi Germany's insane, even by mid-20th C German standards, application of Darwin's ideas to intellectual property in industry there couldn't have been a German version of a Rolls Royce Meteor produced.

Or, if they had more engineering ability, they could have side- stepped this production bottle neck and come out with something similiar to Chrysler's A57, which I understand was 5 (straight six???) bus engines synched together. Of course German engineers of the Nazi era, despite their best efforts, couldn't link two cylinder blocks together, to compete with first world engines of the late war period. The idea they could do five, which from my not extensive knowledge of combustion engines seems (pretty much) like a real world live unicorn, seems very unlikely.

To my knoledge this issues were not so much transmission or the intermediate transmission problems, much more an oil and lubrication problem at the engines.
The quality of german engine oil droped massively at the middle to the end of 1944, there are original reports that the supplied oil was more water then oil.
Many german tank engines got lost to this problem and the loss of lubrication through the much less quality oil is very often mentioned at reports.

Haven't heard that before, although it makes a great deal of sense- Could you, or someone else, provided a reference to somewhere were that subject is discussed?

[maltesefalcon]

The idea of hybrid power plants, using combinations of commercial truck/bus engines makes sense in principle. That would have made efficient use of essentially surplus production, had it existed.

However these types of engines were also in high demand to build more (much-needed) trucks themselves. The Reich was perennially short of wheeled vehicles and even captured enemy vehicles or factories never really solved the issue.