Was Dunkirk REALLY that big of a deal?

[AJFFM]

Hi AJFFM,

The Maginot line breakthrough, such as it was, only occurred after the French had removed their interval troops to prop up the line on the Somme.

The Maginot line was not simply fortresses. The intervals between the fortresses were manned by conventional infantry available to deliver counter-attacks. Once these were withdrawn, the Germans were able to infiltrate between the fortresses and disable a few of them.

As a defensive system the Maginot line was never tested as the Germans did not attack it until it was already partly dismantled by the withdrawal of the interval troops.

Cheers,

Sid.

I know the main breakthrough happened around the 10th-15th of June, I was talking about the Ouvrage Le Ferte section which was a threat to the German flank in Sedan. German victory there rather than convincing the French to rethink their deployment reinforced it and the French wasted a golden opportunity of a coordinated attack on Sedan.

[AJFFM]

Hi AJFFM,

40% of the German Army may have been WWI veterans in 1940, but they were not the ones in the Active divisions that did all the decisive fighting. It was the Active divisions that were slated for the invasion of the UK.

The divisions with numbers of WWI-era veterans were mostly to be found on occupation duties in Poland or along the quiet Rhine border with France. They were never tested.

French B Category divisions were the weak kink that the Germans broke through at Sedan. French Active divisions were on a par with their German Active equivalents, but considerably fewer in number.

As ljaw detailed above WWI vets were well integrated in the German Army of invasion in France. Only units of special designation, the Panzer and Motorised divisions, were manned by well trained young recruits.

As for the French B category divisions, I returned to the old books and you were right in your evaluation of their combat status. The French thought that the Sedan, Charlesville-Mezieres and Maubeuge regions will play the same role as they did in first war, major forts that will draw German resources away the real battlefield where a battle of confrontation will end in German defeat.

You write, "A much better Industrialised Britain in 1940 would have managed raise the same number of divisions (30) in half the time, that is by Summer of 41." There are several problems. Firstly, as my last post pointed out, functional divisions are more than just 15,000 men + guns. It takes a long time to build up a fully operational division from scratch, especially in the absence of most of the regular Army and prime Territorial Army manpower as German prisoners. Secondly, time was short. Being ready by 1941 was no use if the invasion came in 1940.

If the British failed to save any units south of Dunkirk your assessment would be correct. However we know that the British Army had enough troops and regular units south of the pocket to be the basis of a force to protect the homeland. Not to mention the role allies would do in helping training the new British Army.

You are correct, a division is not men and uniforms, however with enough colonial officers, retired WWI junior officers and the number of conscripts since it was reintroduced I think the British Army had the capacity to build up from scratch enough units to fend off any German attempt that will have to win the seas and the skies before being able to land on British shores.

The evacuations south of Dunkirk did not go unmolested. 51st Highland Division was lost entirely and Britain suffered its worst maritime loss of life on a single vessel when ±4,000 servicemen died when the liner Lancastrian was sunk almost exactly 75 years ago.

The 51st was trapped manning the Maginot line. Two of its brigades escaped with large losses until the incident you mention. However the 1st Armoured survived and so did a several brigades and ad-hoc units.

You write, "Not all the units south of Dunkirk were inexperienced territorials, and in any case, colonial units were manned by British officers so there was no dearth in them."

Britain's interwar army, metropolitan and colonial, was not large relative to its responsibilities and was distributed in penny packets across the globe. In 1938 Britain could field only two divisions for a European war. The expansion to be able to provide the BEF in 1939-40 had stretched resources to limit. If the BEF had been lost entirely at Dunkirk, there would have been precious little professional military expertise left at any level, let alone for higher command. Besides, who was going to lead the colonial units? Colonial soldiering required very specific skills in languages and cultural awareness that were not quickly or easily acquired.

Cheers,

Sid.

You know your army better than me. However my assessment is based on past experience. The technocrats who built the New Army relatively from scratch were still in the War Office. Britain already had a large corps of trained conscripts unlike the first war, it had a better managed more productive industry better geared to war than the first war. And of course there is the large corps of retired middle aged officers and NCOs who although will not lead units will be essential in training them.

With the Royal Navy alive and kicking there was no way the Germans would have invaded and to be honest I have yet to see any concrete evidence to steps the Germans had for an invasion other than a supposed name for an operation without any operational plans.

[BDV]

BDV,

You ask, "Why would it be NEEDED at short notice?"

Because there was a threat of invasion that summer. The time scale in June 1940 was short. If the Germans were coming, the British assumption had to be that it was going to be within 3 or 4 months.

And my point is that if Panzerwaffe will be sacrificed to creating a land pocket in Flanders, and LW will be bloodied eliminating it, the attack on France will come later than historical, allowing France to mobilize more troops and modern equipment. As a result, the Fall of France will come even later than historical, or even (depending on how badly German impotence is exposed during pocket elimination) France will continue to fight from the colonies. Historically the 700,000+ in the pocket basically eliminated themselves, by withdrawal and surrender. If German actions force them to fight we will get into the cornered rat situation...

[RichTO90]

Hi AJFFM,

40% of the German Army may have been WWI veterans in 1940, but they were not the ones in the Active divisions that did all the decisive fighting. It was the Active divisions that were slated for the invasion of the UK.

The divisions with numbers of WWI-era veterans were mostly to be found on occupation duties in Poland or along the quiet Rhine border with France. They were never tested.

French B Category divisions were the weak kink that the Germans broke through at Sedan. French Active divisions were on a par with their German Active equivalents, but considerably fewer in number.

As ljaw detailed above WWI vets were well integrated in the German Army of invasion in France. Only units of special designation, the Panzer and Motorised divisions, were manned by well trained young recruits.

He may have made the statement that 40% of the Heer personnel had World War I experience, but that is not the same as "detailing" they were well integrated into the infantry divisions committed to the French Campaign. The composition of the first four Welle of divisions is well known. Landwehr, which is what soldiers of the World War I era were classified as, comprised 4% of 1. Welle, 3% of 2. Welle, 42% of 3. Welle, and 24% of 4. Welle divisions. Otherwise, the Bodenständige and 9. Welle divisions disbanded at the end of the campaign were almost entirely Landwehr and Landesschuetzen personnel with World War I experience.

However, claiming that 40% of the personnel of the active divisions in the Heer attacking France were comprised of 40-plus year-old men is silly.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Active divisions, which amounted to about half the German forces used against France, were constitutionally made up of 78% active conscripts. The next 18% were to have largely been time served inter-war regulars, young discharged conscripts or short-service volunteers on the Reserve I and II lists than 35+ year old WWI veterans. Only about 4% were meant to be from the WWI vintage.

As far as I can see, almost all the significant fighting in France was done by active panzer, light, motorized infantry, or infantry divisions overwhelmingly composed of active conscripts and regulars.

If you can find any major action headed by any other divisions, I would be interested to know of it.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi AJJFM,

On this occasion, ljadw is wrong. Please refer to RichT90's to-the-point reply above.

You write, ".....we know that the British Army had enough troops and regular units south of the pocket to be the basis of a force to protect the homeland."

Do we? What were these formations? The most important of them, 51st Highland Division, was captured entirely. The other, 1st Armoured, lost a third of its strength inside the Dunkirk perimeter, while the other two-thirds were evacuated without most of their equipment. What other British divisions are you suggesting were available "south of the pocket"?

You write, "Not to mention the role allies would do in helping training the new British Army." What "allies"? The only "allies" historically available in any number were the French withdrawn from Dunkirk. However, under this scenario they would have been lost at Dunkirk.

You keep referring to "colonial officers" as if these existed in large numbers, had not already been tapped to help expand the army that, under this scenario, had already been lost at Dunkirk, and as if those remaining had no responsibilities of their own. You cannot pluck hordes of largely imaginary "colonial officers" out of the ether or re-use those already lost.

Invasion presumes that the Germans had already neutralized the air and sea threats. If this were so, it seems highly unlikely that, in a 1940 where the BEF had been wiped out at Dunkirk, the British could have met them on the ground with a rebuilt army of anywhere near the quality of that lost, let alone as good as the German divisions designated for the invasion.

It is simply untrue that "Britain already had a large corps of trained conscripts unlike the first war". Conscription had only been reintroduced the previous year. German and French conscripts underwent two years of service. Few British conscripts had even half this length of service in mid 1940, and presumably the most advanced of them had already been lost with the BEF at Dunkirk.

Certainly, even had the BEF been lost at Dunkirk, Britain could have put lots of men in uniform in the third quarter of 1940, but their quality of leadership, organization, training and experience would generally have been poor compared with the designated German Army invasion force.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

I am afraid you are badly misinformed.

Active divisions, which amounted to about half the German forces used against France, were constitutionally made up of 78% active conscripts. The next 18% were to have largely been time served inter-war regulars, young discharged conscripts or short-service volunteers on the Reserve I and II lists than 35+ year old WWI veterans. Only about 4% were meant to be from the WWI vintage.

As far as I can see, almost all the significant fighting in France was done by active panzer, light, motorized infantry, or infantry divisions overwhelmingly composed of active conscripts and regulars.

If you can find any major action headed by any other divisions, I would be interested to know of it.

Cheers,

Sid.

No : 135 divisions were available for Fall Gelb,of which the prewar divisions constituted only the half :it is obvious that Germany did not win with 65 divisions .

Only 17 mobile divisions were available on a total of 135.

Even AG A had 8 reserve divisions .

[ljadw]

Hi AJJFM,

On this occasion, ljadw is simply wrong. Please refer to RichT90's to-the-point reply above.

You write, ".....we know that the British Army had enough troops and regular units south of the pocket to be the basis of a force to protect the homeland."

Do we? What were these formations? The most important of them, 51st Highland Division, was captured entirely. The other, 1st Armoured, lost a third of its strength inside the Dunkirk perimeter, while the other two-thirds were evacuated without most of their equipment. What other British divisions are you suggesting were available "south of the pocket"?

You write, "Not to mention the role allies would do in helping training the new British Army." What "allies"? The only "allies" historically available in any number were the French withdrawn from Dunkirk. However, under this scenario they would have been lost at Dunkirk.

You keep referring to "colonial officers" as if these existed in large numbers, had not already been tapped to help expand the army that, under this scenario, had already been lost at Dunkirk, and as if those remaining had no responsibilities of their own. You cannot pluck hordes of largely imaginary "colonial officers" out of the ether.

Invasion presumes that the Germans had neutralized the air and sea threats. If this were so, it seems highly unlikely that, in a 1940 where the BEF had been wiped out at Dunkirk, the British could have met them on the ground with a rebuilt army of anywhere near the quality of that lost, let alone as good as the German divisions designated for the invasion.

It is simply untrue that "Britain already had a large corps of trained conscripts unlike the first war". Conscription had only been reintroduced the previous year. German and French conscripts underwent two years of service. Few British conscripts had even half this length of service in mid 1940, and presumably the most advanced of them had already been lost with the BEF at Dunkirk.

Certainly, even had the BEF been lost at Dunkirk, Britain could have put lots of men in uniform in the third quarter of 1940, but their quality of leadership, organization, training and experience would generally have been poor compared with the designated German Army invasion force.

Cheers,

Sid.

This is starting from the wrong assumption that Britain needed the BEF to defend the homeland if Sealion was executed : one Canadian division was available and full operational and this was more than enough to eliminate the few German units that could have landed in Britain .

That the 1st armoured division had lost its tanks in France is irrelevant,as Germany would not have been able to discharge even one tank batallion on the British coast .

On 1 june there were 831 tanks available in Britain.

[AJFFM]

Hi AJJFM,

On this occasion, ljadw is wrong. Please refer to RichT90's to-the-point reply above.

He might have a point there, my knowledge about the German Army structure is limited to the Polish Campaign, anything after it only Orders of Battle.

You write, ".....we know that the British Army had enough troops and regular units south of the pocket to be the basis of a force to protect the homeland."

Do we? What were these formations? The most important of them, 51st Highland Division, was captured entirely. The other, 1st Armoured, lost a third of its strength inside the Dunkirk perimeter, while the other two-thirds were evacuated without most of their equipment. What other British divisions are you suggesting were available "south of the pocket"?

As I said you know your army better than me. As far as I know there were 4 divisions outside the pocket, 1st Armoured, 1st Canadian, 51st Highlander and attached brigades (Saar Force) and 20th Division (Lowlands). Some units of the British army were cut off from their parent Corps/Divisions south of the pocket from what I read (and old book 11 years ago) as well which in all adds up to the 144k men evacuated from ports south of Dunkirk.

You write, "Not to mention the role allies would do in helping training the new British Army." What "allies"? The only "allies" historically available in any number were the French withdrawn from Dunkirk. However, under this scenario they would have been lost at Dunkirk.

There were 24k Poles evacuated in Operation Ariel alone. Thousands of French troops also were evacuated to British ports. My point is that if the French government realised sooner that all was lost it might establish an exile government and move as many troops it can to Britain where they would in addition to the already saved British troops act as a shield against any possible invasion.

You keep referring to "colonial officers" as if these existed in large numbers, had not already been tapped to help expand the army that, under this scenario, had already been lost at Dunkirk, and as if those remaining had no responsibilities of their own. You cannot pluck hordes of largely imaginary "colonial officers" out of the ether or re-use those already lost.

First colonial officers include officers from dominion countries which were not under threat, not yet at least in case of Australia, as well as the relatively large Indian Army, the only all volunteer professional in WWII. The colonial officers will be first and foremost for reconstruction purposes, to rebuild the damaged Army and once they have done that they will return back to where they came from.

This is actually what happened in both wars. Career colonial officers recalled to rebuild the British Army before being sent back to win the war elsewhere. It worked.

Invasion presumes that the Germans had already neutralized the air and sea threats. If this were so, it seems highly unlikely that, in a 1940 where the BEF had been wiped out at Dunkirk, the British could have met them on the ground with a rebuilt army of anywhere near the quality of that lost, let alone as good as the German divisions designated for the invasion.

Invasion assumes the Germans actually wanted to invade. The reality is the Germans though they could bomb Britain into submission which did not happen. Invasion fever was imaginary. There is no solid evidence that the Germans wanted to invade in 1940 or even began to think about preparing for such an event. Any invasion in 41 would have failed because no matter how bad the defeat was in 1940 the Brits would have rebuilt their army to enough strength to stop such an invasion.

It is simply untrue that "Britain already had a large corps of trained conscripts unlike the first war". Conscription had only been reintroduced the previous year. German and French conscripts underwent two years of service. Few British conscripts had even half this length of service in mid 1940, and presumably the most advanced of them had already been lost with the BEF at Dunkirk.

My mistake about conscription, I thought it started in 37 (memory betrayal). I will give that. I would like to see numbers for the OTC recruitment throughout the 30s. It would be interesting.

Certainly, even had the BEF been lost at Dunkirk, Britain could have put lots of men in uniform in the third quarter of 1940, but their quality of leadership, organization, training and experience would generally have been poor compared with the designated German Army invasion force.

Cheers,

Sid.

Assuming Germany actually wanted to invade and had the capability to do so. Both not true in 1940.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

Active divisions, which amounted to about half the German forces used against France, were constitutionally made up of 78% active conscripts. The next 18% were to have largely been time served inter-war regulars, young discharged conscripts or short-service volunteers on the Reserve I and II lists than 35+ year old WWI veterans. Only about 4% were meant to be from the WWI vintage.



If you can find any major action headed by any other divisions, I would be interested to know of it.

Cheers,

Sid.

1)were to have,were meant = theory,not reality

2-a major action by non préwar units :capture of Antwerp (on 18/19 may) by the 208,225,556 ID.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Your last post makes my point for me.

1) Antwerp was not defended. This was because the Sedan breakthrough by Active German divisions had forced a general Allied retreat.

2) It was not defended by Belgian forces, who were not the most formidable Allied army.

The decisive fighting against the French was taking place elsewhere. The sorts of divisions you mention were useful as follow-up forces, but not in the schwerpunkt.

As I posted before, "If you can find any major action headed by any other divisions, I would be interested to know of it."

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

1)Antwerp was defended by 2 Belgian divisions reinforced by fortifications

2)The Dyle line was not given up because of Sedan but because of a German breakthrough

3) German "reserve" divisions were committed at the battles of the Dyle, the Escaut and the Lys :the infamous slaighter of civilians at Vinkt was committed by a reserve division .(the 225 ID )

[RichTO90]

No : 135 divisions were available for Fall Gelb,of which the prewar divisions constituted only the half :it is obvious that Germany did not win with 65 divisions .

Only 17 mobile divisions were available on a total of 135.

Even AG A had 8 reserve divisions .

My friend, you need to dig a little deeper before you make your assessments.

There were 155 divisions, not 135 divisions "available" for Fall GELB. 141 Infanterie (including motorisierte), 10 Panzer, 3 Gebirgs, and 1 Kavallerie.

All of the 36 infantry divisions formed in 1940 of Welle 7, 8, 9, and 10, as well as those specifically raised for the campaign, were either in OKH reserve until the end of the campaign or occupied static fortress positions along the Rhine or in the East. Another three nominally "Infanterie" divisions were formed in 1939 from various odds and sods and only had security roles in the campaign (all were disbanded shortly thereafter).

Of the remaining 102 infantry divisions formed in 1939, as already described, the 58 1 and 2 Welle divisions contained minimal Landwehr personnel, 4% and 3% respectively. All except 6 of them were with HG A or B. Welle 3 had the greatest percentage, 42%, but only 6 of them were committed to HG A or B, the remaining 15 were in the Rhine defenses withe HG C, were in Poland, or Norway. Similarly, of the 14 division of Welle 4 with 24% Landwehr, nearly half, 6, were committed with HG C along the Rhine. The 5 divisions of Welle 5 contained an unknown percentage of the Landwehr classes, but all were assigned to HG C. The 4 divisions of Welle 6 were formed from normally exempt personnel, likely with a large percentage of the Landwehr classes. They were all assigned to HG A or B and their personnel were placed on leave in August 1940 and not reformed until early 1941.

HG A and B had 17 Welle 3, 4, and 6 infantry divisions with a significant number of Landwehr, but 52 without. Also they had all 10 Panzer divisions, the Kavallerie division, and the single Gebirgs division not in Norway. No they did not "win with 65 divisions" (a strawman argument on your part), they won with 81, of which only 17 had a significant Landwehr presence.

To repeat, claiming that 40% of the personnel of the active divisions in the Heer attacking France were comprised of 40-plus year-old men is silly.

[RichTO90]

3) German "reserve" divisions were committed at the battles of the Dyle, the Escaut and the Lys :the infamous slaighter of civilians at Vinkt was committed by a reserve division .(the 225 ID )

Your exception does not prove the "rule", which was your claim that 40% of the forces attacking France were comprised of World War I veterans.

[RichTO90]

As I said you know your army better than me. As far as I know there were 4 divisions outside the pocket, 1st Armoured, 1st Canadian, 51st Highlander and attached brigades (Saar Force) and 20th Division (Lowlands). Some units of the British army were cut off from their parent Corps/Divisions south of the pocket from what I read (and old book 11 years ago) as well which in all adds up to the 144k men evacuated from ports south of Dunkirk.

Sorry, but no. Those forces outside the Dunkirk encirclement were comprised of the 51st Highland Division, which was part of the original Expeditionary Force assigned to the French as Saar Force. The Second Expeditionary Force was the 1st Armoured Division and 52nd Lowland Division. The "20th Division" you refer to was actually 20th (Guards) Brigade. Similarly, it was the 1st Canadian Brigade, not division.