Japanese Panama canal/Gatun Dam commando raid.

[Kingfish]

there were facilities on both Coast to fix any damaged ships.

That's not entirely true, as several damaged ships from PacFlt were sent to east coast ports for repairs, USS Boise and Franklin being two examples.

The saving of 2 weeks to move a ship to a permanent duty station, meant almost nothing as to fleet strength

It would have had a significant effect on the timetable for Operation Watchtower.

USS Wasp transited from the Atlantic to Pacific via the Panama Canal on June 10th, and after stopping in San Diego arrived in the SW Pac area in mid July. In a no-canal scenario that timetable gets pushed forward 2 weeks, leaving her little to no time to support the Guadacanal / Tulagi landings.

[ChristopherPerrien]

USS Wasp transited from the Atlantic to Pacific via the Panama Canal on June 10th, and after stopping in San Diego arrived in the SW Pac area in mid July. In a no-canal scenario that timetable gets pushed forward 2 weeks, leaving her little to no time to support the Guadacanal / Tulagi landings.

If Your "little time" even if it means one day or less. That was enough time to load planes and stores. And It Does not push back the entire Watchtower operation as The Wasp sat in San Diego for 12 days. Even if USN could not somehow have expedited a day or2 , another carrier could have gone in for the initial strikes. Ergo-no delay, just a lost chance for some extra days shore duty for the crew of the Hornet if there were no Canal, if anything.

Besides my "2 weeks" is a upper limit. IIRC, that was for the older coal powered ships and freighters. Now to be honest , the ships most affected would have been destroyers since they would have had to refuel somewhere if going around the Horn, Or a larger ship with tankerage would have had to accompany them. I am unfamiliar with US refueling stations, friendly/neutral ports of S.A. for fuel in WWII. And operational ranges of various destroyer classes, cruising speeds , distances involved,etc., ATM. There were the Falkland Islands.

That's not entirely true, as several damaged ships from PacFlt were sent to east coast ports for repairs, USS Boise and Franklin being two examples.

Sure, still doesn't mean anything strategic, only that the US did so at various times for various reasons. The Boise was sent to the East damaged to fight in the Atlantic( adding 2weeks to the 4 months of repairs for a light cruiser means what?). The Franklin was so heavily damaged that she was sent to the Atlantic just to get her out of the way. She never fought again. Neither ship proves a great benefit of the Canal, just decisions of where to tie up dockyard space to make room for less damaged/more repairable ships. That the West Coast did not have "infinite/unlimited" repair yard space, does not make the Canal of great strategic value by default.

Exceptions prove the rule and in fact part of the rule themselves.
Too many exceptions might disprove a rule, , depend of how many of "N" along the bell curve, and on what end, or something like that. The gov don't pay me to do statistics no more, and my memory ain't what it used to be

*addenda, It would be interesting to how many US merchants ships actually used the Canal in WWII. Particularly tanker traffic. I don't know if the oilfields of California could support all the stuff we eventually had in the Pacific. So tankers "might" have been needed. Also I forget if there were any East to west pipelines(which are more efficient than trains. BUT If we had needed them(or more) they would have been built in short order. The interplay of needed oil where it, was, how it was shipped , where it was needed , IIRC , can be found in the book "The Prize" , I wish my copy was reachable.

[Kingfish]

I think its a mistake to judge the strategic importance of the canal based solely on its historical contribution during the war. To do so would prevent consideration of its true value in light of all possible scenarios, both actual and hypothetical. In essence it would be like rating the value of one's health insurance based solely on claims paid out.

[T. A. Gardner]

You might also note that the US Navy had a fair number of ships deployed in the Canal Zone and the Pacific region at the time. There was a task force, for example, flagged by the light cruiser Trenton. There were about a half dozen DD, all four pipers, along with a DD conversion to seaplane tender, and a number of smaller ships and craft.
The canal did sufficient business in the 1940's that ships arriving could expect to have to anchor out to wait their turn to enter the locks.

In addition, you have to recognize that there are two sets of locks that would have to be damaged and you'd have to do damage to the replacement parts stored on site for the purpose of repairing a damaged lock.

So, it is virtually impossible that a handful of Japanese saboteurs with a few hundred pounds of explosives could do sufficient damage to the lock system to put it out of action at all. More likely, the damage would be relatively light and repairs effected in a short period of time.

[thatfloridaguy]

The locks would be more of an annoyance this is true, but the destruction and subsequent loss of the lake would be far more. The canals strategic value although diminished since the days of coal and steam power is even to this day significant for war and commerce.