18th artillery division used for AG-Center or North

[stg 44]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_Arti ... hrmacht%29
https://translate.google.com/translate? ... rev=search

88th Regiment pantserartilleriysky - three divisions of light howitzers (a total of 36 LeFH 18) and self-propelled artillery battalion conventional structure for armored divisions (12 "Vespa" and 6 "Hummel");
288th Motorized Artillery Regiment - two battalions of 150 mm howitzer (24 sFH 18), a division of 105-mm guns, 10,5 cm schwere Kanone 18 (12 guns) and Division 210-mm mortars 21 Mrs.18 cm (9 guns) ;
388 th motorized artillery regiment - one artillery battalion with nine 170-mm guns 17 K.Mrs.Laf cm; In addition, it consisted of the division of AIR and the anti-aircraft battalion (four batteries, a total of eight 88-mm, nine 37-mm and 18 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as two self-propelled quad 20 mm installation on half-track tractors Sd. Kfz. 7/1;
Transport Battalion, Battalion, as well as medical and repair parts.

Historically the Germans formed an entire division around artillery and used it in Ukraine in late 1943-1944 where it lost all of its equipment fighting as part of Hube's Pocket. Its seems wildly inappropriate to use it in that highly mobile environment and that it would have been better off in a more static environment like with AG-Center or North. It would have really been of use at Narwa in 1944. What if it had been used there? It was formed around a fire direction computer, enabling response time to requests for support of 4 minutes, which was less than half the time German artillery usually took to respond. How would it have effected some of the battles in late 1943-1944 with a more static/slow moving front?

Here I'm only interested in tactical/operation effects, not strategic. I don't care if it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war, I'm still curious about its ability to fight in a more suitable environment.

[Phaing]

Didn't the Lenningrad front have all the artillery it needed? They even had the K5E 28cm railroad guns. I don't think it would have been a game-changer there. AGC was fighting hard, but they made out pretty well until Bagration, and in the Summer of 44 that Division would have suffered the same fate it did down south.

What about Italy?
Good air support was even more impossible for the Germans down there, so they really could have used that unit at the Gustav line. With it, they might have been able to compete more effectively with the powerful and flexible US artillery, or perhaps have tipped the scale at Anzio.

[T. A. Gardner]

I see this unit changing nothing. Like the later Volksartillery Divisions it is simply an organizational grouping of a number of artillery battalions into a "division." It doesn't change their effectiveness, no does it change the mobility of the units used. It is for all intents an administrative measure.

[stg 44]

I see this unit changing nothing. Like the later Volksartillery Divisions it is simply an organizational grouping of a number of artillery battalions into a "division." It doesn't change their effectiveness, no does it change the mobility of the units used. It is for all intents an administrative measure.

No actually it did change their effectiveness; they had a huge number of extra artillery observers and a computing unit that took all of the batteries into the calculation thanks to telex links, which allowed them to mass the entire division's weight of fire on a single target within 4 minutes, less than half the time it took for individual batteries in an infantry division to respond to fire requests.
We got into its capabilities in this thread:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&t=218113

[T. A. Gardner]

A minor advantage and of no consequence in a fixed position siege situation like Leningrad. There, ammunition and transportation would be the issues.

[Sheldrake]

Artillery can be most effective if concentrated at the critical point. It follows the principle of concentration of force. If the threat was in the South Ukraine that is where it should have been deployed. Deploying guns where they were not needed disperses strength,

[Carl Schwamberger]

If this technical capability had been provided to all or a large number of the ARKOS it certainly would have been useful. The robust communications and well manned HQ of the Brit & US artillery allowed frequent and rapid large scale concentrations of artillery across corps wide fronts. Providing the 18th Div communication & fire control system helps the Germans.

[Carl Schwamberger]

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