Panther not rushed into service?

[stg 44]

You make prototypes and work on them. Are you seriously saying that Panthers and Pz IVs didn't compete for resources? Its pretty obvious that tank production for Panthers took up resources that could have been used for Pz IVs. Its up to you to prove otherwise.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Production
There is no reason Pz IVs couldn't have been tooled for by MAN.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Are you seriously saying that Panthers and Pz IVs didn't compete for resources?

Yep

Its pretty obvious that tank production for Panthers took up resources that could have been used for Pz IVs.

OK, obvious to a layman, I guess.

Its up to you to prove otherwise.

Why? a negative stands on its own, if the positive has no proof.

There is no reason Pz IVs couldn't have been tooled for by MAN.

So now you wish to stop building Tiger's , to retool to Pz-IV's And guess which vehicle did not share a common motor?

You don't get it. Here are some hints, IV's were only made in three factories, and none of them later switched to Panthers, and also by 1944 only one FACTORY was still building Pz-IV's.

Realize the Panther weighed about twice as much as a Pz-IV. You go tooling for IV production you are going to have to rip out most everything to start building the bigger vehicle. That also goes far for why MAN could build Panther's since they were building a tank of comparable weight and armor, and with the same engine, the Tiger.

well the bottom line is Pz-IV's , were only built in 3 plants down to one in 1944. The Pz-IV had reached its maximum potential through modifications. By 1944 the PZ-Iv , was becoming fast obsolete and vulnerable on the battlefield. A new tank was needed in 43, definitely by 44.

You idea, of not producing the Panther for a year, basically puts Germany fighting with PZ-IV's till war's end.
And if you want Pz-IV's built by MAN you "might" gain a year' s production , but you also sacrifice some Tiger production , and perhaps some other vehicles.

SO lets say MAN builds 3600(300 more a month is prolly kinda high) PZ-IV's in 43. I gather that will cost you 3000-4000 Panthers(figuring 1945 before they can build any production line that can build bug-free Panther's) and X amount of Tiger's/other heavy vehicles from the Henschel plant ,along with adding less Maybach 230's production capacity.


^ , above post is fuzzy- I got tired of looking at it.

[SpicyJuan]

AFAIK the Panther had serious mechanical issues until March 1944 that were corrected with the AusF G series. For example most of the Panthers used at Kursk were lost to mechanical issues, including two that burned up just moving off of the train.

“ Der Panzer-Werkstatte-Kompanie machte die grössten Anstrengungen, die Panzerlage zu verbessern. Ihre Arbeit machte sich bemerkbar, denn am 6 Juli [1944] konnte die Division folgendes an panzerbrechenden Waffen verzeichnen:

Sturmgeschütze: 19 = 55,9 % vom soll (-1 seit 4. Juli)
Panzer IV: 12 = 35,3 % vom soll (= seit 4. Juli)
Panzer V << Panther >>: 37 = 54,4 % vom soll (+ 2 seit 4. Juli)
schwere Pak: 15 = 27,8 % vom soll (+ 3 seit 4. Juli)

Der Anmarschweg der << Panther >> - Abteilung betrug nach der Ausladung immer noch rund 400 kilometer bis zum Einsatzstrum. Wenn mann bedenkt, dass dem << Panther >> ais Mangel eine verhältnismässig kurze Lebensdauer seines Motors anhaftete - sie lag zwischen dem 6-10 fachen des Fahrbereichs - das heisst also, wenn der Fahrbereich auf der Strasse 55 km betrug, die Lebensdauer des Motors etwa bis zu 550 kilometer bei einer Dauerbelastung betrug. Diese Panzer waren nicht dazu erschaften, grosse Marschstrecken zurückzulegen, sondern sie sollten sich nur auf kurze Strecken im Gefecht beschränken. Es blieb daher nicht aus, dass von der I. Panzer-Abteilung auf dem Marsch etwa 50 Prozent der << Panther >> mit Motorschäden auf der Strecke liegen blieben. Die Werkstatt-Kompanie, bestehend aus:

1 Zug für die Instandsetzung von Panzern III und IV,
1 Zug für die Instandsetzung von Panzern V << Panther >>,
1 Zug Waffenwekstatt, und
1 Panzer-Bergezug mit 5 schweren Zugmaschinen,
4 Tiefladern und 1 Berge-Panzer V, sowie
1 Ersatzteil-Beschaffungstaffel,

konne sich also auf keinem Fall über fehlende Arbeit beklagen. Der Berge-Zug war unentwegt unterwegs, um die liegengebliebenen << Panther >> einzusammeln, entweder an Ort und Stelle zu reparieren oder abzuschleppen und der Front zuzuführen. Diese Männer leisteten schier umenschliches.”

See p.306-307
Herbert Fürbringer. 9.SS-Panzer Division 'Hohenstaufen' 1944 | Normandie-Tarnopol-Arnhem. Heimdal, 1998.

Not all Panthers used in the West were the latest G model variant, or does it mention anywhere in particular in the book what variant they were?

Your 100+ "what if the nazi's had space bats? topics are getting pretty thin, and I am surprised no mod has hit you up on this, yet.

I fully agree. It takes an amazing amount of hindsight to not send in a half-baked tank into production and combat. Anyone questioning this and posting any topics of "What if they decided to fix their tank first?" should be immediately struck with a ban for sympathizing with the Nazi's.

[SpicyJuan]

Yep.

There are much more resources needed than production capacity. The German's obviously did not want to forego development/production of the Tiger I/II, thus the Panzer IV and V indeed competed with resources.

The Pz-IV had reached its maximum potential through modifications. By 1944 the PZ-Iv , was becoming fast obsolete and vulnerable on the battlefield. A new tank was needed in 43, definitely by 44.

The Pz IV was far from obsolete by the end of 1943. The 75mm still could take out virtually any Allied tank save the IS-2, strategic mobility was good, and reliability was OK-Good (the extra weight of the later variants became quite taxing), but armor was nothing (as on the Sherman and T-34). What you're forgetting is that the Panther put a massive strain on German logistics by adding another slew of parts that had nothing to do with the large portions of others (38(t), Panzer III, Panzer IV, Tiger), and not being strategically mobile (I remember reading that in Italy, Panthers would even be put on trains for short distances of 10-12km for the fear of breaking down [not sure of the variant]). If Germany really wants a new tank by 1943, the best bet is to build one with large amounts of common parts to the Pz III/IV. However, if they completely stop production of many variants and release a reliable, working Panther in early 1944, it would be much better than what they did historically (even better is to use the suspension of the Panther II to share common parts with the Tiger II).

You idea, of not producing the Panther for a year, basically puts Germany fighting with PZ-IV's till war's end.

Not having tangled supply lines and a bunch of tanks that don't work is a much better option.

[Cult Icon]

My view is that the operational readiness of the early model Panthers in the Ukraine 1943 (like those in PzB 10, 1.SSLAH, 2.SS, 1.Pz, 16.Pz. etc.) usually hovered around 20-25%. However, they have high kill claims of tanks/AT guns and overall more per 'operational unit' than the PzIV.

[paspartoo]

This discussion is probably only good for inducing migraines…

My advice to those interested in the Panther is:
1). Read the reports included in Jentz’s ‘Panzertruppen’ vol 2
2). Identify the problems with components mentioned in 1943.
3). Compare reliability and operational statistics with the rest of the German vehicles in the same year.
4). Identify the problems with components mentioned in winter 1943-44. Are they the same as in 1943? If not why not?
5). Compare reliability and operational statistics with the rest of the German vehicles in 1944.
6). Think about what I said previously on training, spare parts and a heavy towing vehicle.

To clear your head forget about German tanks for a minute and read up on superior Allied armor:

T-34 tank: http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... f-war.html

Superior Imperial British Engineering:

Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War: http://www.amazon.com/Death-Design-Brit ... 075245370X

Great Tank Scandal (British Armour in the Second World War): http://www.amazon.com/Great-Scandal-Bri ... 0112904602

PS: Don’t get triggered

[SpicyJuan]

This discussion is probably only good for inducing migraines…

My advice to those interested in the Panther is:
1). Read the reports included in Jentz’s ‘Panzertruppen’ vol 2
2). Identify the problems with components mentioned in 1943.
3). Compare reliability and operational statistics with the rest of the German vehicles in the same year.
4). Identify the problems with components mentioned in winter 1943-44. Are they the same as in 1943? If not why not?
5). Compare reliability and operational statistics with the rest of the German vehicles in 1944.
6). Think about what I said previously on training, spare parts and a heavy towing vehicle.

Many of us don't really have the time to get Panzertruppen, would you please just give us a short tl;dr paragraph to work with. If I had to guess though, I'd say that Panzertruppen says that Panther of 1944 was much improved over the one of 1943, but the lack of training, spare parts, and a towing vehicle

To clear your head forget about German tanks for a minute and read up on superior Allied armor:

T-34 tank: http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... f-war.html

Superior Imperial British Engineering:

Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War: http://www.amazon.com/Death-Design-Brit ... 075245370X

Great Tank Scandal (British Armour in the Second World War): http://www.amazon.com/Great-Scandal-Bri ... 0112904602

PS: Don’t get triggered

HOW. DARE. YOU.

[paspartoo]

Many of us don't really have the time to get Panzertruppen, would you please just give us a short tl;dr paragraph to work with. If I had to guess though, I'd say that Panzertruppen says that Panther of 1944 was much improved over the one of 1943, but the lack of training, spare parts, and a towing vehicle

In 1943 the main problem is the engine. In the winter '43-'44 -early '44 the reports start to mention above average problems with the final drive. This may be in part due to the climate conditions in the Eastern front.

The reports constantly mention the need for a heavy towing vehicle for Panthers and Tigers. Often damaged vehicles had to be towed by undamaged ones thus leading to mechanical damage for the undamaged.

There is lack of spare parts, in one report they are using a Panther that cannot shift to 3d gear. The driver simply shifts from 2nd to 4th... This report is actually from another Jentz book on the Panther - report: 'The following experience was obtained during the period from 6 March to 15 April 1944 with the Panzetkamplwagen V of the I Ableilung/Panzer-Regiment 2::

.........................
'Transmissions. The transmissions also achieved an increased lifespan. However, in several cases the 3rd gear failed at about 1.500 kilometers so that a new transmission needs to be installed. This damage may be caused by overtaxing the 3rd gear during the muddy period that lasted almost a quarter year. Since there was no chance to obtain new transmissions, three Panthers with damaged 3rd gears remained in action and still succeeded in traveling an additional 250 kilometers. In this case, the driver had to shift from 2nd to 4th gear. In several cases the main clutches were damaged during the long muddy period and had to be replaced The longest distance driven without transmission failure is 1.500 to 1.800 kilometers by 4 of the 7 Panthers that are still available. The large play in the steering gear may also be traced to extensive driving in mud. Because of the comparatively complicated adjustment of the steering mechanism and short technical training, in all cases the drivers cannot be expected to correctly adjust the brakes by themselves. Since in most cases Panthers with steering problems must remain in service this results in final drive damage and increased brake wear.'

The same report says: 'The longer distances travelled and fewer breakdowns should be mostly credited to good drivers and commanders. The Abteilung wishes to mention Obergefreiter Gablewski of the 4 Kompanie/Panzer-Regiment 2. driver of Panzerkampfwagon V. Fgst.Nr.154338, Motor Nr 8322046. Kilometer 1.878. This Panther is still fully operational. With the exception of the track and roadwheels, all of the components are still in very good condition Oil consumption of the motor is about 10 liters per 100 kilometers. The Panther is still running with its original motor and transmission.'

That's why i mentioned spare parts and training.

HOW. DARE. YOU.

I didn't post it to anger the usual crowd. I just think that some people don't understand the maintenance necessary for keeping tanks in action. These were not modern cars that you take to service after x amount of km is reached. They required DAILY maintenance .

[Michael Kenny]

To clear your head forget about German tanks for a minute and read up on superior Allied armor:

T-34 tank: http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... f-war.html

That site has been debunked several times here. I note how he has cherry-picked quotes from Jentz that do not mean what he thinks it means . Like this one:

The gun sights in Russian tanks are far behind the German designs. The German gunners need to be thoroughly accustomed to the Russian telescopic gunsights. The ability to spot a hit through the gunsight is very limited.’


See if you can 'spot' his error?

[Michael Kenny]

To clear your head forget about German tanks for a minute and read up on superior Allied armor:



Superior Imperial British Engineering:

Great Tank Scandal (British Armour in the Second World War): http://www.amazon.com/Great-Scandal-Bri ... 0112904602

The Allies sidelined several promising designs because they were mechanical nightmares. The German put the same hanger-queens into front line service!

By the way could you give me a couple of quotes (with page numbers) from The Great Tank Scandal?
Just to prove you have read it and not just picking titles at random from Amazon.

[Michael Kenny]

The reports constantly mention the need for a heavy towing vehicle for Panthers and Tigers. Often damaged vehicles had to be towed by undamaged ones thus leading to mechanical damage for the undamaged.

Gosh I think you nailed it! How come no one in the German Army realised they needed towing vehicles for heavy tanks?
Laughable excuse. The fact is the Germans were putting all their effort into bright shiny wunder-waffen whilst neglecting production of 'spanners' to fix said complicated nightmares.

The excuses boil down to claiming the Panther was a victim of external factors that had nothing to do with its development and use. I say that the Panther was a symptom of the chaotic German development system and rather than being a victim of it. By not fulfilling its intended role the Panther added to the chaos. It was a perfect example of the dysfunctional tank development system that allowed the design weight to rise above the ability of the engine and transmission. The Panthers faults did not appear out of thin air they were built in from the start. In Britain of the USA such a design would have been dropped and would never have reached the front line.

[stg 44]

To clear your head forget about German tanks for a minute and read up on superior Allied armor:

T-34 tank: http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... f-war.html

That site has been debunked several times here. I note how he has cherry-picked quotes from Jentz that do not mean what he thinks it means . Like this one:

The gun sights in Russian tanks are far behind the German designs. The German gunners need to be thoroughly accustomed to the Russian telescopic gunsights. The ability to spot a hit through the gunsight is very limited.’


See if you can 'spot' his error?

Paspartoo is the author of that site

[EKB]

For those who speak German fluently, answers to your questions might be found in the archive of communication between manufacturers of the Panther tank and German government agencies. Surely those exchanged letters must contain valuable insights that identified causes of problems with supplied engines, transmissions, final drives - and special alloys used to reinforce mechanical parts, steel plating, machine tools, and tank ammunition.

It is possible that poor design choices caused significant defects with the Panther tank. However I am sure that some of the engine, transmission, and armor plate issues were caused by a shortage of special alloys and manufacturing errors. One cannot blame scientists and engineers when a factory that signs a contract to produce parts does not finish them to specs, as promised in the agreement.

It would be interesting to know what designers, factories, machine shops, and the government knew about the supply chain of metal alloys before they started work on the Panther tank. Maybe someone else has already researched that subject and published the findings in a German language book or trade magazine. The only way to end the speculations in this thread is to get many more facts.

[Alejandro_]

However I am sure that some of the engine, transmission and armor plate issues, were caused by a shortage of special alloys and manufacturing errors.

Not really. Panther's final drive was designed for a 35 ton vehicle. The final version reached ~45. it is true that later on there were material shortages, but there was not a simple way go get around this issue.

[EKB]

However I am sure that some of the engine, transmission and armor plate issues, were caused by a shortage of special alloys and manufacturing errors.

Not really. Panther's final drive was designed for a 35 ton vehicle. The final version reached ~45. it is true that later on there were material shortages, but there was not a simple way go get around this issue.

That doesn't change the outcome of not making parts to specification - the parts are likely to fail sooner.

According to R. P. Hunnicutt, the drive train used for the prototype Chrysler XM1 Abrams tank was designed for 58 tons. The last time I checked the numbers, the M1A2SEP with full upgrades weighed at least 69.5 tons. It's probably heavier today.