Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
thaddeus_c
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 22 Jan 2014, 04:16

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#16

Post by thaddeus_c » 31 Oct 2015, 04:29

stg 44 wrote:
thaddeus_c wrote:noted the LW losses soared in the last two months, was that due to increased Allied numbers or taking over all transport duties from RM? or both?

it wouldn't take hindsight for Germans to know they were overstretched at El Alamein, that was known at the time, what if this scenario took place before the OTL Second Battle? a fighting withdrawal all the way to Tunisia but starting from much stronger position.
Both. The Allies got a lot more aircraft into combat due to building more all weather airfields while the greater reliance on air supply for the Axis caused them to have more targets for Allied fighters in the air.

You're probably right, pulling back to Benghazi after the failure of 1st Alamein is probably the better option, which also spares the logistics of the Axis and overstretches the Brits. Plus that's before Monty is in command, so you'd have someone like Gott in command who would be vulnerable to yet another riposte. Once the US lands then they can evacuate much more readily.
frankly it would benefit the Germans to evacuate as many of their troops while sacrificing the Italian troops, based on their (accurate) calculus that once fighting moved to Italian mainland the regime would collapse. meaning they would not want to have an additional 200k tired, angry, armed Italian troops, could have changed the relative ease with which Germany was able to occupy the country. (and not be too blatant in this course)

not sure how plausible for the Germans to disengage in Libya or preemptive moves into Tunisia would be? they could certainly strip out best equipment and units back to Tripoli in preparation? or decide that Vichy regime had outlived usefulness and only important assets (French fleet and Tunisia) should be secured?

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10063
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#17

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 31 Oct 2015, 06:29

Dbble Post
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 31 Oct 2015, 06:37, edited 1 time in total.


Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10063
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#18

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 31 Oct 2015, 06:30

stg 44 wrote:The bases from Tunisia were not in range, ...
The P40E had a combat radius between 250 & 300 miles depending on the circumstances, condition of the aircraft and sources. Scaling off the map link below places the better part of Sicilly & Sardinia in range. 200 miles still places half those islands in range. The P38 had a combat radius of close to 500 miles. All the Allied twin engine bombers could cover both islands.
... the ones in Malta and the captured Italian islands off the coast of Sicily though were and IIRC provided the fighter cover that the African bases could not, but limited numbers that could reach Sicily AFAIK. One of the islands is Pantelleria.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/italy_pol96.jpg
As to Sardinia Allied fighters couldn't reach the island in 1943. Perhaps the P-38 could, but it didn't do well against Italian or German fighters.
It did very well vs Axis bombers. The bad numbers vs fighters are influenced by early use of inappropriate tactics. If the Axis air forces are to matter they are going to have to come out. If they sit tight the Allies can use the Mediterranean sea route without significant losses. If they sit tight The Allies can build up their air base structure on the Tunisian airfields unmolested. If they sit tight the Allied air forces can concentrate against one area destroy the defenders there & the concentrate against another. If the Axis air forces are active against the Allies they are recreating the same conditions as when they were active against the Allies over Tunisia & Sicily in the Spring and Summer of 1943.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pantelleria
Pantelleria's capture was regarded as crucial to Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943 as planes based on Pantelleria could readily reach Sicily. In Operation Corkscrew the Allies bombarded Pantelleria heavily from both air and sea in the days before the scheduled invasion; the garrison finally surrendered as the landing troops were approaching. Pantelleria then played a part as a vital base for Allied aircraft during the assault on Sicily.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Corkscrew
http://320thbg.org/pantelleria_1.html
Panaterlleria reduces the trip by seventy or eighty miles, useful, so it is a incentive to capture that island at the earliest opportunity.
They can play the attrition game even if they let Sicily get bombed.
How would the Afrika Korps and Italians from Libya do defending Sicily compared to the historical defenders? As it was Murray points out the LW lost over 2000 aircraft in Tunisia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tunisia_Campaign
2,422+ aircraft lost (41% of the Luftwaffe)[12]

At least 1,045 aircraft destroyed[nb 4]
600+ aircraft captured[1]
Accidents & other operational losses added another 30% minimum to those losses. Overall between 60 & 70 % of the German aircraft losses in 1943 were to the Allied AFs.
Between 22–30 November 1942 the Luftwaffe flew 1,084 sorties losing 63 aircraft including 21 planes on the ground. The Regia Aeronautica recorded the loss of 4 aeroplanes.[3] Between 1–12 December the Luftwaffe flew 1,000 sorties and lost 37 aircraft, including 9 on the ground while the Italians recorded the loss of 10.[4] Between 13–26 December the Luftwaffe flew 1,030 sorties losing 17 planes while the Italians lost 3.[5] Between 27 December 1942 – 17 January 1943 the Luftwaffe lost 47 planes while the Regia Aeronautica losses are unknown.[6] Between 18 January – 13 February the Luftwaffe lost 100 planes while the Italian losses are unknown.[7] During the remainder of February to 28 March 136 German planes were lost while the Regia Aeronautica lost 22.[8] Between 29 March and 21 April 270 Luftwaffe planes were destroyed while 46 "operational aircraft and almost their entire remaining air transport fleet" was lost.[9] Between 22 April till the end of the Luftwaffe lost 273 aircraft; 42 bombers, 166 fighters, 52 transporters, and 13 Storch. The Italians recorded the loss of 17 planes.[10]

Add to that the historical defenders:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_invasion_of_Sicily
1,400 aircraft[4]
[/quote]

The "historical defenders" reflect in part replacement aircraft & crew sent as the losses over Tunisia rose. Part were survivors that retreated from Tunisia as the situation collapsed, some were from the Balkans, others from the replacement sources in Germany. A portion of the Axis bomber units participating in the tunisian battle never based there, but flew from Sicillian airfields to their targets.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10063
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#19

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 31 Oct 2015, 06:46

Sheldrake wrote:There is a further implication of the Germans abandoning North Africa after OP Torch. The aerial and ground forces wasted in Tunisia could have been deployed at the real schwerpunkt for the Germans in November 1942: Stalingrad!

The Wikipedia entry for the Tunisian campaign says that by the end of November the axis an airlift began that carried over 15,000 men and 581 long tons (590 t) of supplies and ships brought 176 tanks, 131 artillery pieces, 1,152 vehicles, and 13,000 long tons (13,000 t) of supplies. By the end of November, three German divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division, and two Italian infantry divisions had arrived.

They also lost 1000 aircraft

These might have tipped the balance in the relief of the 6th Army in Russia
For those to make a difference there needed to be the base support for 1000 additional aircraft. The conditions at the airfields did not support the numbers sent OTL. Transporting the air base material & ground crew to the Don region, re equipped with winter equipment, and the parts, fuel, and support equipment adds to the logistical 'challenge' of the winter of 1942-43

User avatar
Kingfish
Member
Posts: 3348
Joined: 05 Jun 2003, 17:22
Location: USA

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#20

Post by Kingfish » 31 Oct 2015, 23:32

thaddeus_c wrote:frankly it would benefit the Germans to evacuate as many of their troops while sacrificing the Italian troops, based on their (accurate) calculus that once fighting moved to Italian mainland the regime would collapse. meaning they would not want to have an additional 200k tired, angry, armed Italian troops, could have changed the relative ease with which Germany was able to occupy the country. (and not be too blatant in this course)
No way this would go off as you describe.

For one, the Italians were not stupid, they would catch wind of the German intentions long before its execution. This would virtually ensure the Italian volte-face would occur not when the allies were storming ashore on the mainland, but much earlier and at the worst possible time - while the Afrika Korp was still in North Africa.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

thaddeus_c
Member
Posts: 816
Joined: 22 Jan 2014, 04:16

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#21

Post by thaddeus_c » 01 Nov 2015, 02:29

Kingfish wrote:
thaddeus_c wrote:frankly it would benefit the Germans to evacuate as many of their troops while sacrificing the Italian troops, based on their (accurate) calculus that once fighting moved to Italian mainland the regime would collapse. meaning they would not want to have an additional 200k tired, angry, armed Italian troops, could have changed the relative ease with which Germany was able to occupy the country. (and not be too blatant in this course)
No way this would go off as you describe.

For one, the Italians were not stupid, they would catch wind of the German intentions long before its execution. This would virtually ensure the Italian volte-face would occur not when the allies were storming ashore on the mainland, but much earlier and at the worst possible time - while the Afrika Korp was still in North Africa.
what I was suggesting was the Germans make a fighting withdrawal along the path IOTL but send the armor and (some) German units to make preemptive move into Tunisia, avoiding the Second Battle of El Alamein. this is instead of sending add. German units to Tunisia as was done.

not that the Germans try to evacuate from Benghazi ahead of the Italians.

User avatar
Kingfish
Member
Posts: 3348
Joined: 05 Jun 2003, 17:22
Location: USA

Re: Alternate Axis Mediterranean Strategy

#22

Post by Kingfish » 01 Nov 2015, 19:21

thaddeus_c wrote:what I was suggesting was the Germans make a fighting withdrawal along the path IOTL but send the armor and (some) German units to make preemptive move into Tunisia, avoiding the Second Battle of El Alamein. this is instead of sending add. German units to Tunisia as was done.

not that the Germans try to evacuate from Benghazi ahead of the Italians.
Whether the Germans motor off to Benghazi ahead of the Italians, or they arrive in unison, is irrelevant.

What I'm pointing out is "it would benefit the Germans to evacuate as many of their troops while sacrificing the Italian troops" is not going to fly, especially if the Germans will have to rely on Italian ships to get them to the safety of Italian ports.

But that aside, how will 2 depleted panzer divisions accomplish what it took 5 axis divisions to do?
How will the remaining troops conduct a fighting withdrawal when their most valuable asset - German armor - is sent away on a 2,000 Km road march?
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

Post Reply

Return to “What if”