I've read it in detail. The underlying data seems ok, if a bit thin. Kirklands opnions or conclusions have been challenged & seem weak.Marcelo Jenisch wrote:Carl,
About the Air Force, I know this this article:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... kland.html
It's from the 1980s, and I cannot say if it was of good quality at the time or if it's informations are still revelant for today's historiography.
One part of the story Kirkland fails to include here is Reynaud wanted to evacuate the government to Algeria, along with the critical components of the Army and Navy, specifically the skilled technicians. The Army was also starting evacuation planning on or before the 17th June. So, this was not exactly a case of the French AF cutting out on its own.Mastery of the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not protect the airfields.
[quote}]An excerpt of it has attracted my attention:
I also would like to talk about the D.520 fighter, which by what I have read make me have the impression that it stood between the latest Hurricane and the Spitfire models in performance compared to the Bf 109E. Therefore certainly better than the predominant M.S.406 of the Armée de l'air. According to the Wikipedia article of the D.520:On 10 May 1940, the operational units of the French Air Force committed to the Western Front were heavily outnumbered. The low rate of operations in the French Air Force compared to that of the Germans increased by a factor of four the French inferiority in the air during the first month of the battle. By mid-June, however, the Luftwaffe was exhausted. It had lost 40 percent of its aircraft. Its flyers had been operating above hostile territory without navigational aids and with the certainty of capture in the event their aircraft were disabled. The air and ground crews were working from captured fields at the end of lengthening supply lines. The French, on the other hand, had conducted much less intensive flight operations, were able to recover the crews of disabled aircraft, were falling back on their logistical bases, and were bringing new units on line with brand new aircraft every day. By 15 June, the French and German air forces were at approximate parity with about 2400 aircraft each, but the French were operating from their own turf, and they had the support of the RAF. Mastery of the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not protect the airfields.
By the armistice at the end of June 1940, 437 D.520s had been built with 351 delivered. After the armistice, 165 D.520s were evacuated to North Africa.[23] GC I/3, II/3, III/3, III/6 and II/7 flew their aircraft to Algeria to avoid capture. Three more, from GC III/7, escaped to Britain and were delivered to the Free French. A total of 153 D.520s remained in mainland France.
To digress slightly; I've long thought there is a over focus on hardware in these WWII discussions. Training & tactics always count for more & whatever superiority the German air force had in its interceptor units was from better tactics & starting in a better position operationally.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dewoitine_D.520
If I understood correctly, had 165 were evacuated and 153 remained in France after the armistice, at least in theory the French had 318 D.520's. However I don't know in which the state these aircraft were (i.e. if they were combat-ready). But I was wondering if this number would be considerable for 1940 against the Luftwaffe (together with the other French and maybe British fighters). Also I was wondering if defeat did not occured as historically, how the picture of D.520 production would have been, let's say, by the of 1940. Not only of the D.520 but perhaps also of other advanced fighter aircraft the French were starting to introduce (if it was the case), as well as RAF aircraft that maybe would have been brought to France in case defeated did not occured and aircraft the French were importing from the US. Also about the D.520, by what I have read about it it seems to me that the disadvantage the aircraft had in terms of combat performance against the 109 was that it was slower. Not as slower as the M.406, but still slower (hence I think calling it a mix of Hurricane and Spitfire is adequated). However according to the Wikipedia article of the aircraft I posted above, the French were working in order to install more powerful engines on the aircraft, in order to close or even outclass the gap with the 109 in this regard (emphasis: this is my impression, I don't know what Dewoitine exactly wanted to achieve with the new engines). Now of course, it's all in theory, I don't know how those things would have played out in practice.
The rest of it is interesting. I'd imagine if one dug deeply enough the productions schedules or estimates for the 520s & the rest could be found. Equally interesting might be the aircraft types contracted from the US. We know what the 600 airframes shipped out were, but there were 1,200 more contracted for delivery in 1940, 3,000 contracted for 1941 & more in negotiation. One can guess some would be the models all ready delivered, the DB7 & M167, but what else? One writer claimed the French had a high interest in a North American prototype for a four engine bomber, what became the B24. Given their existing contract with the Martin Corp & the French preference for high speed twin engined bombers the Marauder design may have accquired a French look.
