Festung Tikhvin

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BDV
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Festung Tikhvin

#1

Post by BDV » 25 Jan 2016, 20:13

Historically AGN forces got to Tikhvin, but were pinned down by persistent Soviet counterattacks, and found themselves dangling at the end of a long supply chain. In the end, after holding out for a month, AGN had to withdraw from Tikhvin, anyway.

I was wondering whether an option would have been to bring forth one or two infantry divisions and place them in Tikhvin, and pull out the armored forces from the Budogosh-Tikhvin Salient, and attack Volkhov. Tikhvin Festung will either delay Soviet reinforcements to the Volkhov area, weaken them, or both, depending on the details of the Soviet response.
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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#2

Post by Konig_pilsner » 28 Jan 2016, 05:51

Hi BDV,

To be honest I can't say if your proposal is feasible or not, although I do agree that Volkhov and then Staraya Lagoda were better targets. Considering much of AGN's offensive power was given to AGC before Typhoon, limiting the objectives in such unfavourable terrain seems more prudent. I'm not even clear on why Tikhven was even a target.

In the end at this time AGN had to many fronts to deal with, (Leningrad, Novgorod, Volkhov), with the infantry spread on to many axis and without sufficient offensive power to really break free. In my opinion the Germans shouldn't have gone past the Volkhov river and been content with holding the line from Staraya Lagoda (had they taken it) to Novgorod. Once AGC takes Klin or Kalinin Russian resistance will crumble at Novgorod and Straya Russa which opens the door for a link up between the two army groups. After that AGN is free to push North or assist AGC by covering its left flank as it pushes on Moscow.

Cheers,
KP


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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#3

Post by AJFFM » 28 Jan 2016, 19:24

BDV wrote:Historically AGN forces got to Tikhvin, but were pinned down by persistent Soviet counterattacks, and found themselves dangling at the end of a long supply chain. In the end, after holding out for a month, AGN had to withdraw from Tikhvin, anyway.

I was wondering whether an option would have been to bring forth one or two infantry divisions and place them in Tikhvin, and pull out the armored forces from the Budogosh-Tikhvin Salient, and attack Volkhov. Tikhvin Festung will either delay Soviet reinforcements to the Volkhov area, weaken them, or both, depending on the details of the Soviet response.
Here is the question, from where would these two divisions come from?

By early August 41 all the German reserves were deployed to the front way ahead of schedule. The Germans had to abandon Velkiye Luki in late July because they were so overstretched and indeed the counter-offensive at Smolensk was powerful the Germans drew forces from AGN to support AGC's struggle.

Not to mention the fact that based on the general counter-offensive later that Autumn those two divisions would have been lost and would have caused the Germans huge problems elsewhere.

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#4

Post by BDV » 30 Jan 2016, 23:01

It would be an attempt to do more with the same.

But instead of having to hold the entire salient out to Tikhvin, a 'festung' could reduce german force requirement, while simultaneously relieving the XXXIX corps to strike towards Volkhov and cutting off the 54th Soviet Army from reinforcements.

It would be a dangerous gambit, allowing the enemy to fragment ones forces. Still it could/would be preferable to AGN's offensive force stuck out on a limb to get its brains bashed in as historical.
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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#5

Post by BDV » 01 Feb 2016, 21:47

I did some more digging, AGN did receive two divisions as reinforcement, the 61st, that was actually deployed to Tikhvin; and the 250th (the Blue Division of Spanish volunteers) that was used to strengthen the Chudovo-Novgorod line, and allow some german units to be pulled back.

In this ATL, the 61st would be moved to Tikhvin as historical, the 250th would be deployed to Budogoshch. Of the four armored divisions in the Tikhvin operation, the 2 more potent armored divisions would be withdrawn and moved through Kirishi to join the 1st Infantry Corps in its attack on Volkhov (~November 15). Of the 2 remaining ones one would be left to defend the Tikhvin-Ovino-Lipnaya Gorka triangle and the other the Budogoshch - Lipnaya Gorka road.

......................

Of course, there's always the option to forget Tikhvin, wait for the weather to improve and give the "ol' college try" towards Volkhov with the 1st Infantry Corps and the 39th Panzer Corps in the two weeks between November 10th and 25th, before setting down for the winter defense. Historically, it can be argued that the Tikhvin adventure cost Germans almost all their gains on the East bank of Volkhov (they held to Kirishi, but barely), although vLeebs insistence on withdrawing the XXXIXth corps saved AGN from a possibly much worse fate.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#6

Post by AJFFM » 02 Feb 2016, 20:14

While the idea of a Tikhvin "Festung" is tempting, my conclusions however of my readings of the Operations North of Smolensk and east of Leningrad is that the best Soviet troops during Operation Barbarossa were those troops in the group of armies facing AGN that would eventually form the Volkhov and Kalinin fronts. A Tikhvin festung would have a similar fate as the Kholm and Demyansk pockets. The Soviet steamroller was simply too powerful against extended German lines.

The Germans needed a field army at least to fill the gap between AGN and AGC both to support Operations on either side, block Soviet offensive and support any holdouts. They realised this in 42 after the May offensive which saw 2nd Shock Army penetrate into German rear before it was sealed off and decided to move 11th Army North instead of leaving it as reserve for AGS during Operation Blau. A decision they later came to regret because there was no danger in the North or the center (after Vlasov's gamble) but there was a need for troops to support AG A and AG B during Blau.

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#7

Post by BDV » 02 Feb 2016, 21:59

AJFFM wrote:While the idea of a Tikhvin "Festung" is tempting, my conclusions however of my readings of the Operations North of Smolensk and east of Leningrad is that the best Soviet troops during Operation Barbarossa were those troops in the group of armies facing AGN that would eventually form the Volkhov and Kalinin fronts. A Tikhvin festung would have a similar fate as the Kholm and Demyansk pockets. The Soviet steamroller was simply too powerful against extended German lines.
Well, both Cholm and Demyansk HELD, but that's one mighty gamble. The Tikhvin maneuver could possibly give germans just enough room to push successfully to the Volkhov railjunction - the 1st Infantry Corps got within 10 km by itself. Two motorized divisions, with Soviet reinforcements blocked due to the Finnish attack that was going on at the time and the "Tikhvin Festung" may do the trick. One thing is that Tikhvin does not need to held as such, defenders can "allow" to let themselves be "pushed" either westwards or southwestwards about 20 km before the highway and railroad to Volkhov is opened. But with Tikhvin, Budogoshch, and Malaya Vishera in German hands, it is very difficult for Soviets to bring forth sufficient force (men and materiel) for a decent encirclement ring; also, if Volkhov falls, the highway linking Tikhvin and Volkhov may become open.

The Germans needed a field army at least to fill the gap between AGN and AGC both to support Operations on either side, block Soviet offensive and support any holdouts. They realised this in 42 after the May offensive which saw 2nd Shock Army penetrate into German rear before it was sealed off and decided to move 11th Army North instead of leaving it as reserve for AGS during Operation Blau. A decision they later came to regret because there was no danger in the North or the center (after Vlasov's gamble) but there was a need for troops to support AG A and AG B during Blau.
There was the Siniavino Offensives that consumed the German reinforcements, and the Rzhev Meatgrinder ground both sides. So pretty much everywhere there was need for reinforcements.
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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#8

Post by Konig_pilsner » 05 Feb 2016, 08:46

I don't know, from an operational stand point what does this really achieve?

The only reason to go to Tikhvin in the first place is to link up with the German/Finnish forces pushing on Lodeynoye Pole to the North. That was the plan and it didn't work. Had it been successful there were many strategic advantages; Leningrad is isolated, the Volkhov front collapses, Murmansk is cut off, and the army group is free to move east.

In your scenario your jeopardizing two infantry divisions on an attack that will net you a single rail junction (if successful) while burning out your panzers in terrible tank country. The possible victory at Volkhov doesn't eliminate that front, it just pushes it further east. The rail lines cut at Chudova, Kirishi, and Tikhvin doesn't eliminate the reinforcements, it just shifts their strength to your right wing. In the end very little if anything is gained for driving as far as Tikhven if the only objective is Volkhov.

In my opinion if there is any noodling to do with AGN it has to be with getting linked to AGC.

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#9

Post by BDV » 05 Feb 2016, 18:11

Konig_pilsner wrote:I don't know, from an operational stand point what does this really achieve?
Does it achieve just enough breathing room for the capture of Volkhov; ergo at some point Leningrad has to fall no??!?

The only reason to go to Tikhvin in the first place is to link up with the German/Finnish forces pushing on Lodeynoye Pole to the North. That was the plan and it didn't work. Had it been successful there were many strategic advantages; Leningrad is isolated, the Volkhov front collapses, Murmansk is cut off, and the army group is free to move east.
That may have been the most optimistic hope. Plan is too strong a word for the AGN improvisations of October-November. If books are to be believed, Tikhvin-41 was a bit of Kursk-43; alternatively Grofaz and vLeeb vacillating on the plan and execution.

In your scenario your jeopardizing two infantry divisions on an attack that will net you a single rail junction (if successful) while burning out your panzers in terrible tank country. The possible victory at Volkhov doesn't eliminate that front, it just pushes it further east. The rail lines cut at Chudova, Kirishi, and Tikhvin doesn't eliminate the reinforcements, it just shifts their strength to your right wing. In the end very little if anything is gained for driving as far as Tikhven if the only objective is Volkhov.
Tikhvin might've been a bridge too far. Possibly, threatening TIkhvin; shifting across to Lipnaya Gorka-Ovino (from where they threaten in three directions Tikvin, mouth of Svir, and city of Volkhov); then proceed as the situation allows might've been a better option. I am not worried about burning panzers, but about burning them for nothing (or worse). Pushing the Soviets further East is not necessarily a bad thing if RKKA cannot support the Leningrad forces - thus relieving some of the blockading forces, and if a defendable line (Volkhov River) is achieved.

Fall of Leningrad and a defensive line on the Volkhov would be worth sacrificing a weak panzer corps.



In my opinion if there is any noodling to do with AGN it has to be with getting linked to AGC.


I agree wholeheartedly.

BUT! that means post completion of Vyazma 3rd Panzer's available forces swing north to close the trap at Rzhev, and then continue North to support 1st Panzers' drive on Torzhok. No dispute there, that would be the best option, but is a much earlier and much bigger departure point from OTL.





P.S. I presume that yet another option would have been AFTER the Soviet counterattack towards Budogoshch petered out, THEN switch the 39th Panzer (or the more hearty parts thereof) to the attack on Volkhov. The terrain in close proximity of Volkhov is much more open, and conducible to tank operations compared to the terrain between Budogoshch and Tikhvin; and Soviets had tipped their hand.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#10

Post by BDV » 08 Feb 2016, 15:57

After a little digging around, there were some strategically significant resources around Tikhvin - Bauxite (the primary material for aluminum production). This would explain why the Fuhrer wanted Tikhvin; it is speculative, but in line with historical knowledge about GROFAZ.

From the Army Group commander POV it makes sense because the armor is in the center, able to help either right flank or left flank, and actually the 8th Panzer did turn left to help the 1st Infantry Corps.

I presume that there was a window of opportunity to switch the 39th to Volkhov, from about November 6th to 12th, and Tikhvin attack should in hindsight been postponed until Volkhov (and Leningrad) falls.

From Budogoshch to Sviritsa (mouth of Svir, linkage with Finns) it is 180 km through Volkhov, 240 km through Tikhvin, with the extra 60 km through Russia's marshy forested terrain; but he who chases two rabbits - three in this situation.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#11

Post by Konig_pilsner » 10 Feb 2016, 06:10

Hi BDV,

I'm glad you started this thread, and although I'm not able to respond promptly I've been thinking about it.

While I'm not a fan of any operation with "festung" in the title, I am going to retract what I said in my first post critizing the advance to Tikhven. We know of the coming winter offensive so it's easy to advocate limiting the operations and seeking defensive positions on favourable terrain at this time.

Without hindsight, and with the mindset that the enemy was about to collapse, the thrust towards Tikhven makes a lot of sense. Not only does it cut three rail lines, but it provides the attacker with many avenues of advance to threaten multiple sectors. Turning north envelops the Volkhov front, links up with the Fins, and ensures Leningrads capitulation. South would re-establish contact with AGC and threatens the destruction of the 11th Army.

Von Leeb has been justly critized for his handling of AGN, although I tend to give him some breaks for various reasons. But one of his big failings, which was often remarked by Halder, was his reluctance to concentrate weight to achieve a breakthrough. This timidness against an inferior opponent, and failure to capitalize on his opportunities were no doubt his unmaking.

The 18th army's frontal attack on Volkhov was pointless and incurred little gains for tremendous casualties. The correct strategy was to put everything into its right wing and push to Tikhven with stronger forces. This plays to the German strength, and while I doubt how much of a difference it would have made, it was the proper course of action.

Cheers,
KP

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#12

Post by BDV » 11 Feb 2016, 17:22

Konig_pilsner wrote: Without hindsight, and with the mindset that the enemy was about to collapse, the thrust towards Tikhven makes a lot of sense. Not only does it cut three rail lines, but it provides the attacker with many avenues of advance to threaten multiple sectors. Turning north envelops the Volkhov front, links up with the Fins, and ensures Leningrads capitulation. South would re-establish contact with AGC and threatens the destruction of the 11th Army.

Von Leeb has been justly critized for his handling of AGN, although I tend to give him some breaks for various reasons. But one of his big failings, which was often remarked by Halder, was his reluctance to concentrate weight to achieve a breakthrough. This timidness against an inferior opponent, and failure to capitalize on his opportunities were no doubt his unmaking.
Historically the handling of AGN in the four weeks after November 10 was pretty deplorable, allowing the striking force to get bogged down in unfavourable terrain, while forces of lower mobility and firepower pushed an attack in a distinct direction. If nothing else, rotate the infantry forces facing Volkhov to protect the Budogoshch- Tikhvin line instead so that the mechanized units can strike the left flank of 52nd Army - with or without a Festung at Tikhvin.


The 18th army's frontal attack on Volkhov was pointless and incurred little gains for tremendous casualties. The correct strategy was to put everything into its right wing and push to Tikhven with stronger forces. This plays to the German strength, and while I doubt how much of a difference it would have made, it was the proper course of action.
Do you have any online resources on 1st Infantry Corps' advance on Volkhov? The funny thing is that 41st Panzer Corps and 1st Infantry Corps had cooperated to great effect in a tremendous July victory, the fall of Pskov. Their failure to do so here helped Soviets to push for a great victory. May it be because Hoepner had moved to AGC?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#13

Post by AJFFM » 11 Feb 2016, 20:38

Konig_pilsner wrote:Hi BDV,

I'm glad you started this thread, and although I'm not able to respond promptly I've been thinking about it.

While I'm not a fan of any operation with "festung" in the title, I am going to retract what I said in my first post critizing the advance to Tikhven. We know of the coming winter offensive so it's easy to advocate limiting the operations and seeking defensive positions on favourable terrain at this time.

Without hindsight, and with the mindset that the enemy was about to collapse, the thrust towards Tikhven makes a lot of sense. Not only does it cut three rail lines, but it provides the attacker with many avenues of advance to threaten multiple sectors. Turning north envelops the Volkhov front, links up with the Fins, and ensures Leningrads capitulation. South would re-establish contact with AGC and threatens the destruction of the 11th Army.
I beg to differ.

The resistance in the Volkhov and Tikhvin regions was brutal and local reverses were far more common than any other front. With the Finnish refusal to go beyond what they considered "Finnish Territory" which would have diverted Soviet attention and resources away a counter offensive was bound to happen. That was the modus operandi of the Red Army in 1941 whenever a lull in the fighting occurs. And I am not even counting the powerful Kalinin Front and how close it was to the Soviet front lines and the fact that supply routes were still intact between Kalinin and Tikhvin.

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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#14

Post by BDV » 12 Feb 2016, 00:22

AJFFM wrote: I beg to differ.
What are you differing on?
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Re: Festung Tikhvin

#15

Post by AJFFM » 12 Feb 2016, 17:02

On the quote above the comment.

The mindset of the impeding Soviet collapse ended by the time the battle of Smolensk began (when the last strategic German reserves were deployed to the fronts 2 months ahead of expected).

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