Guaporense wrote:While the WAllies would need to mobilize enormous armies of ca. 250 divisions and given their manpower slice of 64,000 men per division,
Yet again using the methodology of simply recycling claims previously rubbished by waiting a month or so before repeating them in the hope no one might notice. As I posted the last time this ignorant claim was made by the same poster a month ago.
"Further to spouting ignorant nonsense, Mr. G uses the 66 division total in the Axis History Factbook compiled by my late friend Ron Klages and a fictitious "1,860,000 men" figure pulled from who know where, 1,873,000 as of 5 May 1944 is the closest strength report for Ob. West to 6 June. The problem with Ron's figure is it is difficult to know what he included. In fact, as of 1 June 1944, there were 12 Panzer and Panzergrenadier, 2 Fallschirmjaeger, and 46 Infanterie divisions in Ob. West - 60 divisions. Of those, one Panzer and six Infanterie were actually Reserve divisions and technically part of the Ersatzheer - it is unlikely their strength was included in the 5 May count or the 1 June count of 880,000, which was actually recorded on 7 September in OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abtl. Nr. I/18941/44 g.Kdos. v.7.9.44, NARA RG242, T78, R414.
So then, actually 53 divisions...except another one, 19. LW-Sturm-Div., although still in the Ob.West AO, was actually assigned to and in route to Ob.Suedwest. So 52 divisions. Which would yield a "divisional slice" of about 16,923...except that isn't what a divisional slice is - it's the average strength of the Heer combat divisions, brigades, and non-divisional combat battalions, plus the Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground troops (the two Fs.Jg. divisionen plus some troops formed for 1. Fallschirm Armee). The total of course includes divisional and unit service support troops - the Tross - but not the army service forces, which likely totaled at least 250,000 or more (especially if the service support functions of the OT, RAD, and NSKK are counted). Which would yield a divisional slice of 21,731...gee we seem to be going back to square one! Meanwhile, if we take the 50-odd divisions actually part of Ob. West on 5 May and divide that into the theater total, we get an actual "divisional slice" (using a method similar to counting all US Army personnel in the ETOUSA and dividing by the number of divisions) measure - 37,460.
Again, your claim is a perfect example of spouting ignorant nonsense."
The same can be extended to the ignorant "64,000 men" "divisional slice" argument. For example, as of 31 May 1945, the strength of the US Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces was 5,980,900 with 89 divisions. So a divisional slice of 67,201. Except, Army Service Forces also supported the Army Air Forces. If we actually look at the strength of Army Ground Forces tactical units, i.e., Ground Forces units plus the ASF units supporting them, we get 2,502,000 and a divisional slice" of "only" 28,112.
For the Germans in May 1944, there were 291 divisions and the Heer strength was roughly 6,510,000, so a "divisional slice" of "only" 22,371, right? :roll: Except, of course, 12 of those divisions were Feld-Divisionen (Luftwaffe) and 4 were FJD, so Luftwaffe personnel. Another 22 were Waffen SS. So it is really "only" a "division slice" of 25,731, right? Oh, except we're forgetting HiWi, another 358,830 as of 22 July serving with the Feldheer alone. So it is really "only" a "divisional slice" of 27,149. Except, of course we're forgetting the foreign "volunteers" serving with the Heer, so another 350,000 and "only" a "divisional slice" of 28,730. Except, of course, much of the functions of the US Army Service Forces were subsumed in the Wehrmacht into organizations such as the OT, NSKK, RAD, and other Wehrmachtgefolge. So add somewhere around another million or so, and you have only a "divisional slice" of 32,485.
So you could of course conclude the "answer" is the German divisional slice was larger than the American.
Or, better still, you could conclude the whole business of "divisional slice" is a red herring used by the ignorant to obfuscate real issues.