What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

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What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#1

Post by stg 44 » 25 Jul 2016, 23:02

I've been reading Stephen Bungay's "Most Dangerous Enemy" recently amid the revival of the Bf110 debate on this subforum and seeing his lavishing of praise on the fighter-bomber version of the Bf110 and criticism of the Do17 there and other places. Apparently the Do17 was supposed to be phased out pre-war for the Ju88, but the redesign for dive bombing meant it wasn't introduced until later, so the Do17 stayed in production until 1940, while the Do215, a Do17 fitted with Db601 engines, also was produced until 1940. What if in recognition of the similar bomber role that the Bf110 would eventually fill anyway in lieu of continuing to make and adapt the Do17 the RLM instead opted to make more Bf110s, using the DB601 engines that would have been fitted to the Do215s as well as the He111P series (DB601 engined He111s) to make more Bf110 fighter-bombers? Bf110s were cheaper, easier to make, had similar range, and could do more accurate low level attacks at higher speed and were less vulnerable to enemy fighters than the Do17 was. They also required half the crew members. Historically nearly 500 Do17s/215s were made in 1939-40, probably over 500 if you have the Do17 wound down in 1938 and the Bf110 air frame ramped up during that time frame.

So saying that from 1938-40 there are an additional 500 Bf110s, no additional Do17s, and all the new Bf110s are fighter-bombers, night fighters, or recon aircraft (i.e. more than double the historical number of total units in 1940) would they have made much of a difference as more capable fighter-bombers/ground attack aircraft than the aging Do17/215? I'd think they'd be more surviveable as they were faster than the Hurricane Mk.1 and able to out dive the Spitfire prior to the Battle of Britain (I think even after they were as fast as the Spit Mk.1 with 100 octane fuel and could out dive them due to the fuel injection system). They'd likely be more accurate with their more limited payload and be capable of ground attack once they dropped their load. During the Battle of Britain they could also do the hit and run raids on radar stations and airfields that Bungay talked about as their ideal use.

Examples of when the Bf110 would have been more surviveable than the Do17:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... n_Campaign
However, Allied fighter resistance on the first day was severe, and KG 2 and KG 3 of Fliegerkorps II lost a total of 19 Do 17s between them on 10 May.[22]

However, over Dunkirk, the RAF fighters inflicted a high loss rate. On 2 June, 30 German aircraft were destroyed, including 16 Do 17s (4 from KG 2 and 12 from KG 3).

During the Polish campaign, the Do 17Z could use its 427 km/h (265 mph) maximum speed to stay away from most enemy fighters, and its light armament was effective. It also fought with success during the Battle of France and losses were relatively light, although when facing modern fighters like the Hawker Hurricane, the bomber proved slow in comparison and more vulnerable. When it faced British fighters during the Battle of Britain, it was shown that fast, well-armed monoplane fighters had changed the balance between bomber and fighter decidedly in favour of the latter. The Do 17 suffered in early raids.

Losses mounted and on 15 September 1940, the three Dornier-equipped Kampfgruppen suffered heavily, losing 20 shot down and 13 damaged.[26]

The losses for the Do 17 in August and September were considerable. In August 1940, 54 Dorniers were lost and another 20 written off due to technical problems and accidents. In September 50 more were lost, with 31 Do 17s and crews missing in action. In October another 36 Dorniers were lost.[29] Dorniers had improvised armament of eight machine guns installed to increase defensive firepower, but still were unable to counter fighter attacks.[30]
Clearly this is not a 'win the war' what if, so please don't drop in that line, that's assumed. Would it make a difference to the 1940 campaigns, including the Battle of Britain?

Edit:
Based on the November 1938-mid-1940 numbers for the Do17/215 that was probably closer to 1000 aircraft. So for the sake of argument that would be 1000 additional Bf110 from November 1938-July 1940 at a minimum not factoring in economies of scale. They would have to fill the recon, night fighter, and bomber roles that the Do17 did historically and would be more surviveable in all due to being faster.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#2

Post by T. A. Gardner » 26 Jul 2016, 01:28

The only downside to this would be if Dornier does not build the 217. That is a pretty big hit as the 217 is really the only "heavy" bomber the Luftwaffe has in any numbers until very late in 1943 when the He 177 finally becomes operational in some numbers. It is also the only plane they have that really works with the Fritz X and Hs 293. The He 111 was tried with these but it struggled with the weight and didn't have the altitude and speed necessary when loaded with them (usually 2) it really needed to be effective.
The Do 217 proved relatively successful against Allied shipping using those weapons and without it the Allies would have lost quite a few less ships sunk or heavily damaged.

The Bf 110 / Me 110 in the E / F model carrying 500 kg or so of bombs wouldn't have been a bad alternative in 1940 - 41 at all. It could always jettison the load and at least reasonably defend itself against enemy fighters. With a 109 escort it would have been a decent light-medium bomber.


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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#3

Post by Sheldrake » 26 Jul 2016, 02:09

This counter factual assumes that the Germans knew some lessons of the Battle of Britain in advance.

The only Me110 fighter bombers in the Battle of Britain were from Eproberungsgruppe 210, formed 1st July 1940. The Germans only switched to using fighter bombers because they failed to win air superiority over South East England and their daylight bombers, in particular the Stukas, the Germans only precision bomber were too vulnerable.

Of course the British could have enhanced their technology if they had a crystal ball. Reliable cannon armed fighters would have shot down a lot more bombers. A lot of Dorniers got back to France riddled with bullets and earlier AI radar would have stopped the Blitz dead. Early adoption of finger four would have saved a lot of fighter pilots.

Stephen Bungay pointed out a number of other reasons why the Luftwaffe failed to win the Battle of Britain, starting with a lack of professionalism and the naive calculations that led them to believe their were winning when they were losing.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#4

Post by stg 44 » 26 Jul 2016, 02:17

T. A. Gardner wrote:The only downside to this would be if Dornier does not build the 217. That is a pretty big hit as the 217 is really the only "heavy" bomber the Luftwaffe has in any numbers until very late in 1943 when the He 177 finally becomes operational in some numbers. It is also the only plane they have that really works with the Fritz X and Hs 293. The He 111 was tried with these but it struggled with the weight and didn't have the altitude and speed necessary when loaded with them (usually 2) it really needed to be effective.
The Do 217 proved relatively successful against Allied shipping using those weapons and without it the Allies would have lost quite a few less ships sunk or heavily damaged.

The Bf 110 / Me 110 in the E / F model carrying 500 kg or so of bombs wouldn't have been a bad alternative in 1940 - 41 at all. It could always jettison the load and at least reasonably defend itself against enemy fighters. With a 109 escort it would have been a decent light-medium bomber.
The Do217 wasn't really a significant bomber until 1942. There is nothing here that prevents the Do217 from getting made. It is just that the Do17 and 215, neither of which are related to the 217, are not made beyond 1938. By 1941 the Do217 can start phasing in as it historically did. It required the BMW801 engine to be ready in sufficient numbers to go around, as the Fw190 got first claim on them. Really though having fewer Do217s early on eliminates the near useless Do217 night fighter and is a bigger savings if anything. The Fritz-X and Hs293 weren't available until 1943, so again there is no problem here with a later Do217 if needed.
Sheldrake wrote:This counter factual assumes that the Germans knew some lessons of the Battle of Britain in advance.

The only Me110 fighter bombers in the Battle of Britain were from Eproberungsgruppe 210, formed 1st July 1940. The Germans only switched to using fighter bombers because they failed to win air superiority over South East England and their daylight bombers, in particular the Stukas, the Germans only precision bomber were too vulnerable.

Of course the British could have enhanced their technology if they had a crystal ball. Reliable cannon armed fighters would have shot down a lot more bombers. A lot of Dorniers got back to France riddled with bullets and earlier AI radar would have stopped the Blitz dead. Early adoption of finger four would have saved a lot of fighter pilots.

Stephen Bungay pointed out a number of other reasons why the Luftwaffe failed to win the Battle of Britain, starting with a lack of professionalism and the naive calculations that led them to believe their were winning when they were losing.
Not necessarily. The Kampfzerstoerer concept included being a fighter-bomber with the capability of fitting bombs. Really all that would be required is realizing the Bf110 would be better at delivering those bombs more accurately and having the speed to survive more than the Do17. Granted though it would require more foresight than the Luftwaffe under Udet displayed in the pre-war period.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#5

Post by Sheldrake » 26 Jul 2016, 09:38

stg 44 wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:This counter factual assumes that the Germans knew some lessons of the Battle of Britain in advance.

The only Me110 fighter bombers in the Battle of Britain were from Eproberungsgruppe 210, formed 1st July 1940. The Germans only switched to using fighter bombers because they failed to win air superiority over South East England and their daylight bombers, in particular the Stukas, the Germans only precision bomber were too vulnerable.

Of course the British could have enhanced their technology if they had a crystal ball. Reliable cannon armed fighters would have shot down a lot more bombers. A lot of Dorniers got back to France riddled with bullets and earlier AI radar would have stopped the Blitz dead. Early adoption of finger four would have saved a lot of fighter pilots.

Stephen Bungay pointed out a number of other reasons why the Luftwaffe failed to win the Battle of Britain, starting with a lack of professionalism and the naive calculations that led them to believe their were winning when they were losing.
Not necessarily. The Kampfzerstoerer concept included being a fighter-bomber with the capability of fitting bombs. Really all that would be required is realizing the Bf110 would be better at delivering those bombs more accurately and having the speed to survive more than the Do17. Granted though it would require more foresight than the Luftwaffe under Udet displayed in the pre-war period.
Firstly, The fighter bomber was not seen by the Luftwaffe as a more accurate way of delivering bombs than a bomber. The Germans were interested in precision bombing. In the absence of a stabilized bomb sight the policy was to deliver bombs by dive bombing, The Me110 with a dive technique could not deliver bombs with the same precision as a specialist diver bomber. It could survive a contested air space better than a Do17 or Ju87. With the Loft 7, first introduced in January 1941 the Germans had the potential to bomb with precision from a level bomber.

The Do17 was an early 1930s aircraft, obsolescent in 1940 when production ceased. Design work stated in August 1932 under von Papen's government before Hitler took power! The same year the Avro 504 finally ceased production and Doolittle set a world speed record of 296 mph. It was a contemporary of the He70 and Bristol Blenheim. Had Europe gone to war in 1935 the Do17 would have been the DH Mosquito of the time and the Bomber would always have got through. By 1940 there were faster fighters and bombers that could carry a bigger payload and deliver it more accurately.

Yes the Luftwaffe would have been better off with a modern aircraft than the Do17 in the Battle of Britain. So would the RAF. Had the RAF embraced the fighter bomber concept earlier they could have gone to war with Hurricane II fighter bombers rather than the Fairy battle. This might have made a different to the Battle for France as well as the Battle of Britain. Had the British had as much faith in the Do17 concept of the fast bomber they could have built the Mosquito earlier.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#6

Post by stg 44 » 26 Jul 2016, 11:38

Sheldrake wrote: Firstly, The fighter bomber was not seen by the Luftwaffe as a more accurate way of delivering bombs than a bomber. The Germans were interested in precision bombing. In the absence of a stabilized bomb sight the policy was to deliver bombs by dive bombing, The Me110 with a dive technique could not deliver bombs with the same precision as a specialist diver bomber. It could survive a contested air space better than a Do17 or Ju87. With the Loft 7, first introduced in January 1941 the Germans had the potential to bomb with precision from a level bomber.
I didn't say dive bomber, I said better than the Do17.
Sheldrake wrote: The Do17 was an early 1930s aircraft, obsolescent in 1940 when production ceased. Design work stated in August 1932 under von Papen's government before Hitler took power! The same year the Avro 504 finally ceased production and Doolittle set a world speed record of 296 mph. It was a contemporary of the He70 and Bristol Blenheim. Had Europe gone to war in 1935 the Do17 would have been the DH Mosquito of the time and the Bomber would always have got through. By 1940 there were faster fighters and bombers that could carry a bigger payload and deliver it more accurately.
Sure, which is what I am suggesting as an alternative. The Bf110 was effectively the Mosquito of 1940 if used as such.
Sheldrake wrote: Yes the Luftwaffe would have been better off with a modern aircraft than the Do17 in the Battle of Britain. So would the RAF. Had the RAF embraced the fighter bomber concept earlier they could have gone to war with Hurricane II fighter bombers rather than the Fairy battle. This might have made a different to the Battle for France as well as the Battle of Britain. Had the British had as much faith in the Do17 concept of the fast bomber they could have built the Mosquito earlier.
This isn't about the RAF what if. I'd be happy to comment on that if you want to start a thread based around the RAF having an early fighter-bomber. The British did have the Blenheim...didn't live up to the Mosquito though.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#7

Post by Tim Smith » 26 Jul 2016, 19:17

The Bf 110 uses the same engines as the He 111P and the Do 215. But not the same engines as the Do 17Z (Bramo radial). So cutting Do 17Z production won't boost Bf 110 production.

He 111P production would have to be cut instead. About 800 He 111P's were produced. If that number is cut in half to produce Bf 110's instead, it means that the Luftwaffe would be forced to use the older He 111B and He 111E variants in the Polish campaign, and probably the French campaign too.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#8

Post by stg 44 » 26 Jul 2016, 19:54

Tim Smith wrote:The Bf 110 uses the same engines as the He 111P and the Do 215. But not the same engines as the Do 17Z (Bramo radial). So cutting Do 17Z production won't boost Bf 110 production.

He 111P production would have to be cut instead. About 800 He 111P's were produced. If that number is cut in half to produce Bf 110's instead, it means that the Luftwaffe would be forced to use the older He 111B and He 111E variants in the Polish campaign, and probably the French campaign too.
It would boost Hs123 production as an alternative...
Henschel made about half of the Do17Zs
What about using more Jumo 211s to make He111Hs instead of the Ps? Having the older He111s for Poland doesn't really matter, but I think Jumo 211 production was high enough to make He111Hs to replace the Ps. Also the He111P was made from late 1938 well into 1940, so all 800 weren't around in 1939 or even for France.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#9

Post by Sheldrake » 26 Jul 2016, 21:21

stg 44 wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: Firstly, The fighter bomber was not seen by the Luftwaffe as a more accurate way of delivering bombs than a bomber. The Germans were interested in precision bombing. In the absence of a stabilized bomb sight the policy was to deliver bombs by dive bombing, The Me110 with a dive technique could not deliver bombs with the same precision as a specialist diver bomber. It could survive a contested air space better than a Do17 or Ju87. With the Loft 7, first introduced in January 1941 the Germans had the potential to bomb with precision from a level bomber.
I didn't say dive bomber, I said better than the Do17.
Sheldrake wrote: The Do17 was an early 1930s aircraft, obsolescent in 1940 when production ceased. Design work stated in August 1932 under von Papen's government before Hitler took power! The same year the Avro 504 finally ceased production and Doolittle set a world speed record of 296 mph. It was a contemporary of the He70 and Bristol Blenheim. Had Europe gone to war in 1935 the Do17 would have been the DH Mosquito of the time and the Bomber would always have got through. By 1940 there were faster fighters and bombers that could carry a bigger payload and deliver it more accurately.
Sure, which is what I am suggesting as an alternative. The Bf110 was effectively the Mosquito of 1940 if used as such.
Sheldrake wrote: Yes the Luftwaffe would have been better off with a modern aircraft than the Do17 in the Battle of Britain. So would the RAF. Had the RAF embraced the fighter bomber concept earlier they could have gone to war with Hurricane II fighter bombers rather than the Fairy battle. This might have made a different to the Battle for France as well as the Battle of Britain. Had the British had as much faith in the Do17 concept of the fast bomber they could have built the Mosquito earlier.
This isn't about the RAF what if. I'd be happy to comment on that if you want to start a thread based around the RAF having an early fighter-bomber. The British did have the Blenheim...didn't live up to the Mosquito though.
stg44 There was no short cut to building me110s. The number of Me110s built had very little to do with the number of Do17 or HE111 the germans built, but the availability of the DB601 engine.

The Do17 and He111 were in production two years before the me110. Factories were toolede up and these were the bombers that flew reasonably reliably.

The choice was not Do 17 or Me110 but Do17 or nothing like as many bombers.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#10

Post by stg 44 » 26 Jul 2016, 21:59

Sheldrake wrote: stg44 There was no short cut to building me110s. The number of Me110s built had very little to do with the number of Do17 or HE111 the germans built, but the availability of the DB601 engine.
For air frames in fact the Do17 and He111 did suck up the resources in terms of metal, labor, factory space, etc., but engines were also a component. There were plenty of Db601 engines if they were denied to the bombers would have allowed for hundreds more Bf110s. The question was whether there were enough Jumo 211 to replace taking the DB601s away from the He111Ps.
Sheldrake wrote: The Do17 and He111 were in production two years before the me110. Factories were toolede up and these were the bombers that flew reasonably reliably.

The choice was not Do 17 or Me110 but Do17 or nothing like as many bombers.
The Bf110 entered production in 1937 and by late 1938 the DB601 was available enough to issue them for Do215s and He111Ps, so the engines were there if wanted and the Bf110 had been in production for a year at that point, phasing out the Do17 and never making the Do215 would have enabled the production of many more Bf110s. No one is suggesting making fewer He111s, just that they all are made with Jumo 211s instead, as they were from Summer 1940 on. Meanwhile the Do17 was supposed to be phased out anyway in 1938, but soldiered on due to the delay in the Ju88 program due to Udet's dive bombing order. Now here I am just suggesting that the phase out of the Do17 happens as planned, rather than phasing in the Do17Z, and the resources that went into maintaining the Do17 long past it's point of usefulness instead go into fighter-bomber versions of the Bf110 that could do largely the same mission that the Do17 ended doing, but more inaccurately with much less survivability, low level tactical strikes. In this scenario the Bf110 fighter-bomber would be the bomber replacement of the Do17 instead of waiting for the Ju88 to get into mass production and fix its wing issues.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#11

Post by T. A. Gardner » 26 Jul 2016, 22:25

Sheldrake wrote: stg44 There was no short cut to building me110s. The number of Me110s built had very little to do with the number of Do17 or HE111 the germans built, but the availability of the DB601 engine.

The Do17 and He111 were in production two years before the me110. Factories were toolede up and these were the bombers that flew reasonably reliably.

The choice was not Do 17 or Me110 but Do17 or nothing like as many bombers.
Yes, engines were a major bottleneck, but a lot of that falls on how Germany ran production and what they allowed corporations to do. Daimler Benz held the production rights and didn't give that up except to foreign countries that got licenses. Now, had Germany found suitable other manufacturers and basically told DB "They're making it too under a license you will give them. That didn't happen.

The RLM also didn't utilize available production space well. For example, Henschel was a pariah with them. Much of Henschel's production capacity went unused or under used because the RLM didn't think they could build airplanes efficiently.

Had the Germans utilized available resources better they might have not had the bottlenecks they did. But, the Nazi leadership wasn't exactly a brain trust of intellectual paragons. It was more a bunch of petty, in-fighting, empire building minions vying for Hitler's favor.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#12

Post by Takao » 26 Jul 2016, 23:03

The whole problem I see with this what-if is that we have not touched on the Me-110's capabilities as a medium-altitude bomber.

stg 44 predicates this whole thing on the Me-110 remaining on low-level bombing runs. Which is how the Do-17 started out the BoB and did quite well on low level bombing attacks. However, the changing situation demanded that the Do17 be pressed into service as a medium altitude bomber, and there it suffered.

Now, when the Me110 is taken off it's low level attacks, how will it fare? Like the Do17, it will lose the advantages that made low level strikes so successful - namely surprise and relatively small strike formations.

I would hazard to guess that the Me110 will suffer the same way the Do17 did when it had to change roles, especially if the Me110 is carrying her maximum payload.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#13

Post by stg 44 » 26 Jul 2016, 23:13

Takao wrote:The whole problem I see with this what-if is that we have not touched on the Me-110's capabilities as a medium-altitude bomber.

stg 44 predicates this whole thing on the Me-110 remaining on low-level bombing runs. Which is how the Do-17 started out the BoB and did quite well on low level bombing attacks. However, the changing situation demanded that the Do17 be pressed into service as a medium altitude bomber, and there it suffered.

Now, when the Me110 is taken off it's low level attacks, how will it fare? Like the Do17, it will lose the advantages that made low level strikes so successful - namely surprise and relatively small strike formations.

I would hazard to guess that the Me110 will suffer the same way the Do17 did when it had to change roles, especially if the Me110 is carrying her maximum payload.
Why would it need to be? A problem the Luftwaffe had was that the forced their medium bombers into all roles, including operational and tactical bombing, the latter requiring low level strikes. By having a dedicated low level striker you can leave the medium bombers like the He111 and Ju88 do to medium altitude strikes against relevant operational targets, rather than more tactical ones that the Bf110 would be better for. The Do17 wasn't that great at low level strikes relative to the Bf110, it was just more maneuverable than the He111 and Ju88 at low altitudes and speeds. The Bf110 was more accurate and faster, while the slowness of the Do17 made it very vulnerable to ground fire and enemy fighters, a major cause for losses in France and over Britain, which is why it was withdrawn from production; it was simply too slow to survive even at low altitudes. Actually the Bf110 at medium altitudes have the advantage of height and ability to dive away from a threat, which it would not have a low levels, which is actually one of the most vulnerable places to be vs. enemy fighters.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#14

Post by Takao » 26 Jul 2016, 23:40

stg 44 wrote: Why would it need to be?
For the same reasons that the Do17 was taken off low level strikes...You have introduced no PoD to change this.
stg 44 wrote: A problem the Luftwaffe had was that the forced their medium bombers into all roles, including operational and tactical bombing, the latter requiring low level strikes. By having a dedicated low level striker you can leave the medium bombers like the He111 and Ju88 do to medium altitude strikes against relevant operational targets, rather than more tactical ones that the Bf110 would be better for.
There were not enough bombers to do the job/s that Germany was demanding of them. This what-if does not change that fact.
stg 44 wrote: The Do17 wasn't that great at low level strikes relative to the Bf110, it was just more maneuverable than the He111 and Ju88 at low altitudes and speeds. The Bf110 was more accurate and faster, while the slowness of the Do17 made it very vulnerable whato ground fire and enemy fighters, a major cause for losses in France and over Britain, which is why it was withdrawn from production; it was simply too slow to survive even at low altitudes. Actually the Bf110 at medium altitudes have the advantage of height and ability to dive away from a threat, which it would not have a low levels, which is actually one of the most vulnerable places to be vs. enemy fighters.
Odd the that more Me110s were lost in the BoB than were Do17s. Of course, if the Me110 failed as a fighter, I suspect it will do little better as a bomber. Further, IIRC, the Me-110 also suffered heavy losses in the North African Campaigns of 1941.

Needless to say, I am far from convinced that the Me-110 is a quantum leap beyond the Do17.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#15

Post by stg 44 » 27 Jul 2016, 00:35

Takao wrote: For the same reasons that the Do17 was taken off low level strikes...You have introduced no PoD to change this..
Which was?
Takao wrote: There were not enough bombers to do the job/s that Germany was demanding of them. This what-if does not change that fact..
In fact there were, they ran out of operational targets and ended up using ill suited He111s for low level tactical strikes for wont of more things to do.
Takao wrote: Odd the that more Me110s were lost in the BoB than were Do17s. Of course, if the Me110 failed as a fighter, I suspect it will do little better as a bomber. Further, IIRC, the Me-110 also suffered heavy losses in the North African Campaigns of 1941..
Because the Do17 was not used that much due to it's short range and limited suriveability. There were a lot more Bf110s used and they were badly misused. Most of the losses of the Bf110 was early on in the campaign when it was still thought the defensive circle worked and that the Bf110 could maneuver against a Spitfire. Once tactics evolved and they stopped using them as the sole escort for missions loss rates went down drastically. You might want to check out the Mediteranean 1941 loss rates. BTW the Bf110 was faster than the Hurricane, it ran into trouble when it tried to turn and burn with them though.
Takao wrote: Needless to say, I am far from convinced that the Me-110 is a quantum leap beyond the Do17.
In terms of speed it was, as well as dive ability. It stayed in the skies over Britain until October 1940, while the Do17 was only used on a limited basis until September.

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