What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#16

Post by thaddeus_c » 27 Jul 2016, 00:37

T. A. Gardner wrote:The only downside to this would be if Dornier does not build the 217. That is a pretty big hit as the 217 is really the only "heavy" bomber the Luftwaffe has in any numbers until very late in 1943 when the He 177 finally becomes operational in some numbers. It is also the only plane they have that really works with the Fritz X and Hs 293. The He 111 was tried with these but it struggled with the weight and didn't have the altitude and speed necessary when loaded with them (usually 2) it really needed to be effective.
The Do 217 proved relatively successful against Allied shipping using those weapons and without it the Allies would have lost quite a few less ships sunk or heavily damaged.
what would be alternative engines that could be fitted on HE-111 to cope with the guided munitions?

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#17

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Jul 2016, 01:47

stg 44 wrote:
Takao wrote: For the same reasons that the Do17 was taken off low level strikes...You have introduced no PoD to change this..
Which was?
Low level bombing waqs an expert role. It took very high standards of navigation and disciplined flying to approach below radar coverage and find a target. 9./ KG 76 were the low level bombing experts, and had some success in the battle of France where IIRC they destroyed a british bomber squadron on the ground. The staffel lost four out of nine bombers on the low level raid on RAF Kenley on 18th August 1940, and a further two crash landed in France.

Eproberungsgruppe 210 were the other low level attack specialists responsible for developing fighter bomber techniques. They were an experimental unit only formed a month before the battle.

The Luftwaffe as a whole were not trained to carry out low level formation flying, nor were they practised in low level bombing - a specialised skill in itself.

The idea that Bungay floated assumes that the Germans could have learned the lessons of the Battle of Britain before the battle had started.


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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#18

Post by stg 44 » 27 Jul 2016, 03:09

Sheldrake wrote: Low level bombing waqs an expert role. It took very high standards of navigation and disciplined flying to approach below radar coverage and find a target. 9./ KG 76 were the low level bombing experts, and had some success in the battle of France where IIRC they destroyed a british bomber squadron on the ground. The staffel lost four out of nine bombers on the low level raid on RAF Kenley on 18th August 1940, and a further two crash landed in France.

Eproberungsgruppe 210 were the other low level attack specialists responsible for developing fighter bomber techniques. They were an experimental unit only formed a month before the battle.

The Luftwaffe as a whole were not trained to carry out low level formation flying, nor were they practised in low level bombing - a specialised skill in itself.

The idea that Bungay floated assumes that the Germans could have learned the lessons of the Battle of Britain before the battle had started.
Its not like there wasn't plenty of time to train pre-war and before France. The Luftwaffe was the best trained air force in the world in 1940 and really could have just trained to fly low if they wanted.

Edit:
EprG. 210 was formed after the Battle of France and before the Battle of Britain, a very short training period, but was thoroughly trained and successful in their job pretty early on, so it doesn't sound too hard to learn.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#19

Post by T. A. Gardner » 27 Jul 2016, 06:42

stg 44 wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: Low level bombing waqs an expert role. It took very high standards of navigation and disciplined flying to approach below radar coverage and find a target. 9./ KG 76 were the low level bombing experts, and had some success in the battle of France where IIRC they destroyed a british bomber squadron on the ground. The staffel lost four out of nine bombers on the low level raid on RAF Kenley on 18th August 1940, and a further two crash landed in France.

Eproberungsgruppe 210 were the other low level attack specialists responsible for developing fighter bomber techniques. They were an experimental unit only formed a month before the battle.

The Luftwaffe as a whole were not trained to carry out low level formation flying, nor were they practised in low level bombing - a specialised skill in itself.

The idea that Bungay floated assumes that the Germans could have learned the lessons of the Battle of Britain before the battle had started.
Its not like there wasn't plenty of time to train pre-war and before France. The Luftwaffe was the best trained air force in the world in 1940 and really could have just trained to fly low if they wanted.

Edit:
EprG. 210 was formed after the Battle of France and before the Battle of Britain, a very short training period, but was thoroughly trained and successful in their job pretty early on, so it doesn't sound too hard to learn.
Operationally, I agree. Logistically, strategically, and in terms of R & D, not so much. For example, the Luftwaffe kept pulling all the instructors and advanced students out of flight schools to fly transport missions because of a shortage of pilots. They did this in Norway, then in France and the Low Countries. They did it after that too. That totally disrupted flight training and ensured a shortage of replacement pilots. Many of the students and instructors were shot down only making the problem worse.

There was little target planning for these battles too. In the BoB, then in Russia, the Luftwaffe often misidentified targets and their significance.

Sure, the Luftwaffe pre-war could have trained for the low level bombing mission on a wider scale. But, once the war started that would have been very difficult to attain on a large scale.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#20

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Jul 2016, 09:50

stg 44 wrote:Its not like there wasn't plenty of time to train pre-war and before France. The Luftwaffe was the best trained air force in the world in 1940 and really could have just trained to fly low if they wanted.

Edit:
EprG. 210 was formed after the Battle of France and before the Battle of Britain, a very short training period, but was thoroughly trained and successful in their job pretty early on, so it doesn't sound too hard to learn.
However you phrase it the idea is assumes that the Germans had a crystal ball and could foresee that the Me110 used en mass for a role for which it had not been ordered, would be more effective than one of their main medium bombers. All based on a throw away comment by Stephen Bungay.

How do you think any senior Luftwaffe officer would react to advice to re-equip and retrain the DO17 Gruppes to use the Me110 as a bomber before WW2 on the basis that a: only fighter bombers using hit and run tactics could survive British Air defences and b; the Me110 was useless in its designed role of air superiority and escort. I would imagine that anyone offering those views would be taken as a defeatist.

There was no sensible pre 1940 reason to switch kampfgruppe to flying the Me110 as a low level fighter bomber.

Do 17 had been proven in combat in Spain, Poland and France. The Do17s of VB/88 had put its bombs accurately around the bridge at Guernica. 9./KG76 were the lead unit in delivering precision low level attacks in France. The DO17 was obsolescent but would be replaced with the Ju88, wunderbomber which could carry a heavier bomb load faster and further and deliver them by level bombing or dive bombing.

No air force before 1940 had given consideration to the idea of using interceptor aircraft as fighter bombers. High performance fighters such as the Me109 and Me110 were a novelty in themselves. Eproberungsgruppe 201 was, as the name suggests, an experimental unit to develop techniques to be used by the Me210 a high speed multi role aircraft that was far from ready from combat in an untested role.

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Last edited by Sheldrake on 27 Jul 2016, 13:23, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#21

Post by stg 44 » 27 Jul 2016, 11:17

T. A. Gardner wrote: Sure, the Luftwaffe pre-war could have trained for the low level bombing mission on a wider scale. But, once the war started that would have been very difficult to attain on a large scale.
ErpG. 210 trained for their role in about 10 days before going combat operational. Doesn't seem like much was needed to train a fighter-bomber unit.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#22

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Jul 2016, 11:45

stg 44 wrote:
T. A. Gardner wrote: Sure, the Luftwaffe pre-war could have trained for the low level bombing mission on a wider scale. But, once the war started that would have been very difficult to attain on a large scale.
ErpG. 210 trained for their role in about 10 days before going combat operational. Doesn't seem like much was needed to train a fighter-bomber unit.
You don't know what criteria was used to select pilots for this formation. When the RAF formed 617 squadron for precision low level flying they picked the best.

Given that the role was to develop techniques for using fighter bombers, much of their initial combat would have been trial and error in combat.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#23

Post by T. A. Gardner » 27 Jul 2016, 17:22

Sheldrake wrote:
stg 44 wrote:
T. A. Gardner wrote: Sure, the Luftwaffe pre-war could have trained for the low level bombing mission on a wider scale. But, once the war started that would have been very difficult to attain on a large scale.
ErpG. 210 trained for their role in about 10 days before going combat operational. Doesn't seem like much was needed to train a fighter-bomber unit.
You don't know what criteria was used to select pilots for this formation. When the RAF formed 617 squadron for precision low level flying they picked the best.

Given that the role was to develop techniques for using fighter bombers, much of their initial combat would have been trial and error in combat.
You missed my point. Picking a handful of skilled pilots and giving them a brief training course might work but you can't do that with ones having low hours, little operational time, and unfamiliarity with the aircraft. It's one thing to pick a couple dozen pilots with hundreds of hours of flying time, lots of combat experience, etc., and give them brief training in low level flying. Taking someone who barely has a hundred hours of flying time, if that, and none of it operationally, and training them will take a lot longer.

The Western Allies generally had lots of pilots available. Training early in the war was shorter than later on. But, those new pilots were rarely committed directly to units in combat. Instead, they went to units in backwater locations where they got additional time to practice and gain hours flying before being transferred to units in combat areas.

The Germans had no such luxury once the war started. They sent low hour new pilots straight to combat units where their chances of survival and success were quite low. Their system never let them catch up with losses and their quality declined while Allied quality improved with time.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#24

Post by stg 44 » 27 Jul 2016, 22:23

How much training and experience is necessary for a pre-war force to learn how to glide bomb from medium altitude? As it was historically most Do17s were flying low level missions in 1940 to survive, so apparently it wasn't that hard to but together a force to do that job.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#25

Post by Takao » 28 Jul 2016, 13:40

stg 44 wrote: In fact there were, they ran out of operational targets and ended up using ill suited He111s for low level tactical strikes for wont of more things to do.
Are you talking about early in the battle, during the "kanalkampf", or later in the battle, when the Germans had more than plenty of targets?
stg 44 wrote: Because the Do17 was not used that much due to it's short range and limited suriveability. There were a lot more Bf110s used and they were badly misused. Most of the losses of the Bf110 was early on in the campaign when it was still thought the defensive circle worked and that the Bf110 could maneuver against a Spitfire. Once tactics evolved and they stopped using them as the sole escort for missions loss rates went down drastically.
The 110 was used exactly as intended, however, it did not live up to the German's very high expectations.

IIRC, the 110's losses were relatively light early in the battle - With only some 18 being destroyed in July. Their losses would go up drastically during August, September, and October.
stg 44 wrote: You might want to check out the Mediteranean 1941 loss rates. BTW the Bf110 was faster than the Hurricane, it ran into trouble when it tried to turn and burn with them though.
From what I gather from discussions on other forums, the exchange rate the in Med & NA between the 110 & Hurricane was mostly even . Perhaps, you are thinking of the Battle of France where that exchange rate was more favorable to the 110.
stg 44 wrote: In terms of speed it was, as well as dive ability. It stayed in the skies over Britain until October 1940, while the Do17 was only used on a limited basis until September.
IIRC, the Do17 was used on a limited basis from mid-September onward.

Still the Do17 was being phased out by and replaced with the Ju-88.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#26

Post by Sheldrake » 28 Jul 2016, 21:09

stg 44 wrote:How much training and experience is necessary for a pre-war force to learn how to glide bomb from medium altitude? [1] As it was historically most Do17s were flying low level missions in 1940 to survive,[2] so apparently it wasn't that hard to but together a force to do that job.
stg 44, Do you do any research before you post?

Re 1. Very little - which is why this technique was used by the Germans when they fitted bombs onto Me109s in the Autumn of 1940. However, , as Adolf Galland readily admitted with this technique you can't hit anything much smaller than a city. This is not what Stephen Bungay was arguing. He suggested that the right way to hit airfields was with low level precision bombing by fast fighter bombers. Sprinkling bombs over SE London was not going to win the Battle of Britian.

Re 2. This is simply untrue. One squadron 9./KG76 practiced low level attacks. The rest of that Geschwader, and the other Kampf Geschwader flew in formation at 10-20,000 ft. That is apart from the Ju88 formations trained to dive bomb. Individual aircraft might fly for home at low altitude - but usually as a means of escaping combat. Converting altitude into speed is a way to closing the distance to home with a damaged aircraft and wounded crew. Low flying is only a defence as long as surprise can be maintained. Flying a low level attack profile gives the defence an energy advantage that they can trade for speed aiding interception.

Delivering weapons accurately is a skill that takes practice. Ditto low level navigation in the pre GPS world or flying in formation at low level. Go try it. Take up Aces High, Warbirds or IL 2 or Microsoft CFS. Form a squad/clan and see how easy or hard it is.

Even in the virtual world it takes practice to hit a point target with a fighter bomber. Maybe 10-20 practice missions to get the hang of mud moving. You have to be able to judge the right moment to pull up and roll onto the target, how to align the aircraft with any yaw or side slip quickly so the bomb releases in the direction the aircrat flies, how to judge where the bomb will land from your release height and speed. There is also the matter of learning how long you can delay the release and pulling out of the dive. Abd in a vrtual world mistakes arenlt fatal. ;)

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#27

Post by stg 44 » 29 Jul 2016, 00:12

Let's define terms, what are low and medium altitudes to you? Plenty of German aircraft were able to fly low or dive bomb from medium altitudes and it wasn't hard to train them to do so. Spotting a target from medium altitudes (1-4km) and descending to tactically bomb isn't a hard skill. Bombs then would be released from a dive. Ju88s effectively did that from the beginning of their service and after ErpG. 210 paved the way the Bf110 crews acted as fighter-bombers doing low level attacks or even just descending from medium altitudes and attacking. Its not a hard skill to teach and learn.

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#28

Post by Takao » 29 Jul 2016, 01:42

It is not a hard skill to teach and learn...Though, it is a hard skill to master so that you are hitting the target consistently.

Just because you might read this: http://aviationshoppe.com/manuals/navy_ ... mbing.html
Will not make you a master of glide bombing.

It would be interesting to see who was hitting the target consistently, the pilots just out of flight training or the "old hands."

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#29

Post by T. A. Gardner » 29 Jul 2016, 05:00

On skip bombing... The USAAF went to what is probably the extreme in training crews to do this...

http://wonderduck.mu.nu/military_history/the_muroc_maru
http://www.weirdca.com/location.php?location=511

Image

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Re: What if more Bf110s, no additional Do17/215s after 1938?

#30

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Jul 2016, 09:51

stg 44 wrote:Let's define terms, what are low and medium altitudes to you? (1) Plenty of German aircraft were able to fly low or dive bomb from medium altitudes and it wasn't hard to train them to do so.(2) Spotting a target from medium altitudes (1-4km) and descending to tactically bomb isn't a hard skill.(3) Bombs then would be released from a dive. Ju88s effectively did that from the beginning of their service (4) and after ErpG. 210 paved the way the Bf110 crews acted as fighter-bombers doing low level attacks or even just descending from medium altitudes and attacking. (5) Its not a hard skill to teach and learn.(6)
I can be barely bothered to respond to this. You need to do a little more research.

re 1. Bungay praised the low level surprise attacks mounted by EpgG 210 on airfields. These use a low level profile to stay below rader > 100m during the approach over the sea. Read some books about WW2 aviation and the Battle of britian.

re 2. Flying dive bombers takes skill, courage and is physically draining,. Read Pierre Closterman's Big Circus about his spitfire squadron trained to dive bomb in 1943. Dive bombing attacks, the only way considered in 1940 to delivering bombs with any precision need to start their dive from 3km. Read Dive Bomber by Peter C Smith or Eric Winkle' Brown's notes on flyng the Ju87.

Re 3 Spotting a target from ANY altitude takes some skill and can be hampered by the weather. Otherwise there would not be any jokes about the US Air force. Hitting a sm,all target takes skill and practice. if you followed my advice in the last post and tried out this in a good flight simulator you would not post such nonsense.

Re 4 The Ju88 was built as a dive bomber. Modifying the "schnell bomber" to do so resulted in delays to its serv ice use and the reason why there was a substantial Do17 fleet.

Re 5. Partially True. Before EPG 210 no one thought high performance fighters could be used to deliver bombs accurately. I REPEAT these were specialist and novel skills for 1940.

Rer 6 Oh yes it was. Flying a 1940s fighter at high speed towards the ground and hitting the target with the bomb while missing the ground with the aircraft was far from easy to learn and there were no text books. It needed some specialist er "Experimental" or "testing" organisation to do this. Oh wait that's what "Eproberungs" means. Fitting bombs onto aircraft flown by fighter jocks merely results in sprinkling bombs over a wide are AKA agricultural bombing...

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