November 1943- Decision in the East

[Cult Icon]

After the Kiev debacle, Hitler loses heart and do not bother retaking the city. He relieves Manstein, rejects mobile defense, and replaces him with Model. With Model he seeks to have him be the 'fire-fighter' while a new eastern front offensive builds up.

Balck's 48.PzK mission to retake Kiev never happens and the powerful 1.SS, 25.Pz, 1.Pz (with 550 tanks) are not deployed. The Germans steadily retreat in order against soviet offensives while Model shifts units about. They give up more territory than historically and don't hold 'fortified places' or strongpoints.

Hitler modifies his Fuhrer order to build up the west front. He weakens the west front buildup to provide forces for two combined-arms armies similar in manpower to what was deployed in the ardennes. He wants to execute a 'surprise offensive' against the soviets in the south (similar to the battle of the bulge).

2 Armies with 500,000 men supported by 1,500 tanks. The full strength 1.SS , 1.Pz, 11.Pz, GD, and 16.Pz are part of this offensive and are not deployed in fire brigade roles. 25.Pz is moved from Norway to France. The 21. Pz, 12.SS, 17.SS are never formed and instead the manpower and material are deployed into refitting the veteran Panzer and assault infantry divisions.

When will this attack happen and what will happen operationally? What would the oob be? What would the situation be?

[Cult Icon]

30 divisions, 10 of them motorized.

1.SS, 1.Pz, 7.Pz, 11.Pz, 16.Pz, 24.Pz, GD with about 150 tanks each. Supported by 3 motorized infantry divisions with 50 tanks each.

[Cult Icon]

-The Axis, before the offensive, take heavier losses on their retreat towards Rumania due to not having as many 'fire brigades'. But they do not suffer Korsun, Tarnpol, or Hube pocket like fiascos due to the abandonment of the 'fortified' places policy which offsets the higher attrition losses. How much is hard to predict.

- The 30 german divisions attack and encircle some 100,000 soviet troops before being worn out themselves, taking 150,000 casualties and seeing most of their tanks and AG non-operational. The Red Army in the south experiences a temporary setback and suffer 400,000 casualties in total.

-However, the territory gained does not align ACG with the southern AGs and is only incremental. Some of the weakened german forces are shifted to the west front. The german infantry arm is in a similar (devastated) state as it was historically- having taking heavier losses in the retreat but also being able to escape from potential encirclements.

-The Red Army still executes offensives in the north, center, and south. However, they are pared down. Operation Bagration is still executed in the summer of 1944 with devastating results.

-The allies fight a somewhat smaller Panzer group west (with 2,000 tanks) and with 8 mobile divisions: 1.SS, 2.SS, 9.SS, 10.SS, 116.Pz, Pz Lehr, 2.Pz, 9.Pz. The infantry arm is pretty similar.
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[Kingfish]

30 divisions, 10 of them motorized.

1.SS, 1.Pz, 7.Pz, 11.Pz, 16.Pz, 24.Pz, GD with about 150 tanks each. Supported by 3 motorized infantry divisions with 50 tanks each.

-The allies fight a somewhat smaller Panzer group west (with 2,000 tanks) and with 8 mobile divisions: 1.SS, 2.SS, 9.SS, 10.SS, 116.Pz, Pz Lehr, 2.Pz, 9.Pz. The infantry arm is pretty similar.
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You have 1ss listed twice

I'm assuming this new offensive will occur between the time period of Tarnpol (April) and Bargration (June). Therefore, 1st SS would not have time to shift West and reconstitute its strength. The other SS divisions also fought heavily during this time period and would likewise need time to rebuild.

With no 12th SS and 21st Pz available Pz Lehr would therefore be responsible for the entire Normandy front until 2nd Pz arrives. It is fair to assume it would be deployed at the most critical part of the front-the Caen plain-which thus allows the British 50th infantry and 7th armored a relatively clear run from Gold beach down to Villers Bocage.

[Graniterail]

When will this attack happen and what will happen operationally? What would the oob be? What would the situation be?

When weather permits (Spring in the Balkans, South West Ukraine), March?

The Soviets escorted USAAF bomber raids over Ploesti with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakovlev_Yak-9#Variants Yak-9DD's OTL. By March 1944 OTL they were in Bessarabia. Early-Mid 1944 OTL was when the German fuel crisis really got going so that may be an issue.

Can the Germans retreat in (faster)good order by this stage, do they have the mobility to do it without picking one of the unpalatable options of selecting sacrificial forces in a retreat, leaving equipment behind or opening up gaps that can be exploited?

One of the factors in demoralizing the Rumanian army was the failure to evacuate their troops from Crimea. Earlier Soviet airbases and logistics for them near Odessa are going to mean earlier interception of Axis Black Sea vessels. Crimea was liberated in April 1944 OTL.

[Cult Icon]

You have 1ss listed twice

I'm assuming this new offensive will occur between the time period of Tarnpol (April) and Bargration (June). Therefore, 1st SS would not have time to shift West and reconstitute its strength. The other SS divisions also fought heavily during this time period and would likewise need time to rebuild.

With no 12th SS and 21st Pz available Pz Lehr would therefore be responsible for the entire Normandy front until 2nd Pz arrives. It is fair to assume it would be deployed at the most critical part of the front-the Caen plain-which thus allows the British 50th infantry and 7th armored a relatively clear run from Gold beach down to Villers Bocage.

The 1.SS would likely be sent to France to refit in my timeline. IIRC they were pulled out of the eastern front in april 1944 or so.

[Kingfish]

What is the timeline?

Were you envisioning this offensive being launched in the middle of the spring thaw?

[Cult Icon]

The offensive would be launched between Dec 43- Feb 1943 and perhaps last up to a month.

[Graniterail]

-But they do not suffer Korsun, Tarnpol, or Hube pocket like fiascos

The offensive would be launched between Dec 43- Feb 1943 and perhaps last up to a month.

Kamenets-Podolsky (Tarnopol-Hube) was mid March to mid April, so this will be before that (& presumably butterfly it) then.

Korsun-Cherkassy was late January to mid February, so maybe depending on more specifically when this offensive is launched.

The weather seems to been particularly poor during mid to late January, with thaws, rain and snow & associated flooding hampering the operations of both sides.

The notes on the Korsun-Cherkassy offensive list large Soviet reserves & reinforcement with Lend-Lease trucks. Their supply situation seems to doing pretty ok in that period, food for example http://bit.ly/2cAAi56

For the Germans the situation is not so great, 3rd Panzer had difficulties with lice due to not receiving soap in several months for example (P.46) https://books.google.com.au/books?id=s5 ... cs&f=false

[Cult Icon]

The korsun pocket (caused by holding an extended salient, with vulnerable flanks) was largely the result of of Hitler's policies, which didn't make military sense. So I would assume that it would not happen.

I would think that the attack would be over ground that had hardened (optimal winter weather conditions).

[Cult Icon]

The 10 mobile divisions would be placed under 3 Panzer korps HQs: 1.SS, 1.Pz, 7.Pz, 11.Pz, 16.Pz, 24.Pz, GD

Based a bit on history:

3.PzK (Breith): 1.SS, 16.Pz, 1 PzG division

48.PzK (Balck): GD, 7.Pz and 11.Pz, 1 PzG division

47.PzK (Lemelsen): 1.Pz, 24.Pz, 1 PzG division

1.Panzer Army (Hube) would control 3.PzK and 47.PzK while 4.Panzer Army (Raus) would control 48.PzK. There will be 6 army korps (3 to each panzer army) with 3 good infantry divisions each.

Luftflotte IV would provide close air support.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Reading thru this I'm wondering if there is any potiential effect on the Italian or the later NW Europe fronts.

[BDV]

A problem I see with any type of decisive Axis action in the East is the asymmetry in intelligence, with Germans almost blinded by maskirova on one hand, and UN nations aware of almost all major German preparations through Enigma and excellent SigInt.

Add some serious operational deficiencies , like dependence on air superiority for successful offensive moves, and tactical deficiencies - reluctance to patrol aggressively, and it is preciously little Axis could achieve in the East in the 43-44 timeframe.

Otherwise, put ALL the armor on the East front for the November-February timeframe (leaving only security vehicles a la H39 in France), acting like iron ribs to the German line in the East, while preparing the defensive lines for the coming summer. And during March-April rasputitsa redeployment of armor to France to stop the coming attack.

[T. A. Gardner]

-The Axis, before the offensive, take heavier losses on their retreat towards Rumania due to not having as many 'fire brigades'. But they do not suffer Korsun, Tarnpol, or Hube pocket like fiascos due to the abandonment of the 'fortified' places policy which offsets the higher attrition losses. How much is hard to predict.

I see this as extremely unlikely. The Wehrmacht was in poor shape for mobility. Many formations are virtually unmotorized. Their ability to conduct civil engineering like bridging, etc., is pathetic. This means there will be points in the withdrawal where units get pocketed. Equipment will still be abandoned wholesale at points as well.

- The 30 german divisions attack and encircle some 100,000 soviet troops before being worn out themselves, taking 150,000 casualties and seeing most of their tanks and AG non-operational. The Red Army in the south experiences a temporary setback and suffer 400,000 casualties in total.

I think this requires considerably more detail and proving than simply saying it happens.

-However, the territory gained does not align ACG with the southern AGs and is only incremental. Some of the weakened german forces are shifted to the west front. The german infantry arm is in a similar (devastated) state as it was historically- having taking heavier losses in the retreat but also being able to escape from potential encirclements.

This is only showing part of the problem. Even if the German offensive works as stated, the Germans can't get a strategic victory out of it, nor can they create a stalemate or win. Therefore, whatever they do, they're still facing eventual defeat.

-The Red Army still executes offensives in the north, center, and south. However, they are pared down. Operation Bagration is still executed in the summer of 1944 with devastating results.

Then the changes suggested mean nothing. The Germans still lose.

-The allies fight a somewhat smaller Panzer group west (with 2,000 tanks) and with 8 mobile divisions: 1.SS, 2.SS, 9.SS, 10.SS, 116.Pz, Pz Lehr, 2.Pz, 9.Pz. The infantry arm is pretty similar.
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That just allows the Western forces to break out earlier, and advance further. Let's say they're on the Rhine in December 1944. Now there's no hope of a counterattack in the West and in a couple of months the Allies will pour across the Rhine like it was a little creek. Germany loses.