No Panther until mid-1944

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History of the 23. Panzer Division. This unit received one of the Panther Battalions.

Zetterling has a book about the Korsun pocket that covers the panther battalions involved. There is also Hell's Gate by Nash.

Barrett's Zhitomir Berdichev is excellent and covers the offensive pre-Korsun.

Before this, Leibstandarte III (a book that I don't have) has 50-60 pages on the Nov-Dec Counterattacks. They are also discussed in memoirs Panzer Battles (mellanthin) and Order in Chaos (balck). Another book that I don't have is the Das Reich volume that covers the Battle for the Dnepr.

In the Spring of 1944 there is the first Jassy offensive against Rumania. Glantz' Red Storm over the Balkans covers the various operations. Among these, the Panzerkorps GD volumes and History of PR-GD cover the GD Panther Battalion in these battles.

[Stiltzkin]

I did find something out. That the data in your source saying the highest number of Panthers lost in a month was 347 is incorrect. This impacts on all the calculations based on that number.

You post it you defend

Wheres your calculation?
Its not my point, you can call the Swedish Defense College or the dupuy institute, your call.

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Overall, what I got from reading these books is that the Panther was good in combat but it had problems sustaining an attack. The numbers just fell off too fast, and making the battalion into a rather defensive outfit. Having the requisite numbers was important for attacks. A battalion that originally 70 or 90 something would be fielding a couple to twenty or thirty most of the time.

Its main strength was not the armor but the main gun, which allowed it to snipe tanks and AT guns easier than the Pz IV. When caught in a bad situation (eg. ambushed) it suffered just as badly as the Pz IV.

The PZ IV was better but not by much.

The issue the Germans had in 1943 was they kept on running into Soviet tank destroyer brigades. They would set up a mass of 20-60 AT guns to seal of areas. These were difficult to destroy.

[stg 44]

The final drive problem was only for the Panther in 1943, the Pz IV was fine, same with Pz 38t chassis units.

The belief the transmission problem was confined to the Panther is widespread. However the source clearly shows the problem was with all tanks. I bet if I did not have that source you would be claiming the Pz IV had no such problems.

Sure by late 1944 when resources were at a historical crunch. Spain/Portugal, Turkey, and Finland, plus the Donbass and iron mines of Ukraine west of the Dnepr had been lost by then and Germany burned through their raw material stocks; their armor too was also going way down in quality due to lack of access to the necessary metals. By the 2nd half of 1944 German production quality, such as it remained, dropped off a cliff due to consuming all their remaining stocks of whatever they had in a desperate bid to stave off defeat when they lost access to their resource base.

[Richard Anderson]

Figures of the same quality are not available for tanks of other nations but
the US Army suffered losses of medium tanks in Normandy of 26.6 per cent in June, 24.4
per cent in July and 25.3 per cent in August. Both the percentages and absolute numbers
were greater than that of any month for the Panther (July 1944 was the peak with 347 lost
tanks, resulting in a percentage of 16.4). Figures are taken from Ruppental, US Army in WW
II: Logistical support of the Armies, Vol I. pp. 522–3.

I knew I should have taken the time to help Chris with the proofreading. I suspect he didn't read Ruppenthal's footnote when he wrote that, since there are quite a few problems with his statement. For one thing, the First Army loss wasn't reported for "June", it was reported for the period 6 June-1 July 1944. For another, the percentage was calculated against the "average First Army TO&E strength", but at the time the army was actually slightly overstrength and averaged 764 operational, so the loss was 24.48% of operational strength. Thereafter, the corrected figures were reported by the AFV&W Section ETOUSA and the 12th Army Group Armored Section as "months" recorded from the 21st to the 20th of the following month, with "June" being 6-20 June, and use losses to the average on hand for the period. Those percentages, which appear the most correct and are most comparable to the German "stocks" figures used by Chris, are:

June - 7.58%
July - 5.78%
August - 21.78%

You see, the problem is, the German figures are calculated as losses versus "stocks" - on hand - and not "average TO&E". Such a percentage for the Germans would of course be nearly meaningless, since they rarely approached TO&E strengths - the percentages would be artificially lower instead of artificially higher as in the U.S. First Army example.

Quite simply, you are comparing apples to orangutans.

[Michael Kenny]

Its not my point, you can call the Swedish Defense College or the dupuy institute, your call.

Anyone posting a source has to defend that source when challenged. Saying 'take it up with the author' will not work.

I knew I should have taken the time to help Chris with the proofreading. I suspect he didn't read Ruppenthal's footnote when he wrote that, since there are quite a few problems with his statement.

Which I had already figured out ( 26% M4 losses in June) but I saw you were reading the thread so thought you should be the one to issue the correction.

[Michael Kenny]

Sure by late 1944 when resources were at a historical crunch. ............

I am not really concerned about the reasons for the problem. I provided a link to the information and all are free to use it any way they see fit. My final word on the subject,

[Richard Anderson]

Which I had already figured out ( 26% M4 losses in June) but I saw you were reading the thread so thought you should be the one to issue the correction.

"Clarification" not "correction" since the statement is - more or less - correct. That is the loss of medium tanks reported by First Army versus their unit TO&E, completely different from M-H's figures.

[Stiltzkin]

Quite simply, you are comparing apples to orangutans.

I am not comparing anything. I am relying on data provided by analysts (skeptical nontheless but there isn't much you can really work with), but thank you for elaborating, I should ask Mr.Lawrence myself.
However this was not about the Sherman, its about the comparison between Vs and IVs.

[Richard Anderson]

Quite simply, you are comparing apples to orangutans.

I am not comparing anything. I am relying on data provided by analysts (skeptical nontheless but there isn't much you can really work with), but thank you for elaborating, I should ask Mr.Lawrence myself.
However this was not about the Sherman, its about the comparison between Vs and IVs.

Be that as it may, the premise is flawed, since it apparently presumes manufacturer can be switched from one to the other willy-nilly. The Panther was produced by Daimler-Benz Marienfeld, MAN, and MNH in 1943. DEMAG and MBA were added to the production pool in 1944. Of those, Marienfeld previously produced the Panzer-III, MAN had produced Panzer I, II, and III, prior to the changeover to Panther production in 1943. MNH was converted to tank production in late 1941, beginning operations in 1942 assembling Panzer-III before going over to Panther production.

Krupp-Gruson and Miag did Panzer-IV production, with VOMAG added, while Nibelungen was planned for Panzer-IV and VI production from its inception. You can get more Panzer-IV by tooling DB, MAN, and MNH for them in 1943 rather than for Panthers, but then you have to retool in 1944 when you finally decide to build Panthers.

It is robbing Peter to pay Paul, yet again.

[stg 44]

Krupp-Gruson and Miag did Panzer-IV production, with VOMAG added, while Nibelungen was planned for Panzer-IV and VI production from its inception. You can get more Panzer-IV by tooling DB, MAN, and MNH for them in 1943 rather than for Panthers, but then you have to retool in 1944 when you finally decide to build Panthers.

Exactly, just like every other power did in WW2 when they opted to make a new model AFV. If the war situation is too bad they can just not convert except for a few factories. The exception is that factories already producing the Pz III probably should just convert to Stug III production rather Pz IV.

It is robbing Peter to pay Paul, yet again.

Not really an applicable phrase here, its just converting industry when you opt to phase in a new type, which was done by all powers when they start phasing in a new weapon system.

[Stiltzkin]

The 347 July total is not the highest number, September 1944 shows 681 Panthers lost.

[Richard Anderson]

The 347 July total is not the highest number, September 1944 shows 681 Panthers lost.

Yes, I'm not sure how M-H managed to bollix it up so badly postwar, since the wartime documentation is quite clear. He also fails to count the loses of Befehlspanzer V.

[Michael Kenny]

I think the problem was touched on in this post that has the same Panther totals for July and August

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 09#p774909

I presume MH forgot to include the warning about partial totals.

[Stiltzkin]

Yes, I'm not sure how M-H managed to bollix it up so badly postwar, since the wartime documentation is quite clear. He also fails to count the loses of Befehlspanzer V.

Not sure, theres a bracket for Befehlswagen I-VI.
Do you have a document with the correct numbers?