Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
the German infantry arm in 1941 was superior to that of 1943.
But the Panzer arm of 1943 was superior to that of 1941.
Infantry was more important than armor in 1941.
But the Panzer arm of 1943 was superior to that of 1941.
Infantry was more important than armor in 1941.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
Still the same outcome.
Germany needed approx. 5,000,000 Iststärke with an influx of at least 600,000 - 1,000,000 men per quarter in order to bring the USSR to its knees.
Germany needed approx. 5,000,000 Iststärke with an influx of at least 600,000 - 1,000,000 men per quarter in order to bring the USSR to its knees.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
1,000,000 replacements per quarter means a monthly loss rate of 350,000. Not even the bloodbaths of July and August 1941 saw such high rates of loss. More like 250,000 per month at the peak of fighting.Stiltzkin wrote:Still the same outcome.
Germany needed approx. 5,000,000 Iststärke with an influx of at least 600,000 - 1,000,000 men per quarter in order to bring the USSR to its knees.
But, that's where Auxiliaries come in handy. However Auxiliaries need tools to do the job and a few pointers here and there.
Also a good health system (which left a lot to be desired for the Wehrmacht and Auxilliaries) will ensure a fair fraction of the 400,000 - 600,000 losses serve as their own replacements in 3-6 months.
Overall not out of question to a competent leadership. Definitely not ASBs.
But then, a competent leadership would not have blundered their way into a position where they were buffaloed into a world war; so it's a chicken and egg situation.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
From Zetterling, The Korsun Pocket1,000,000 replacements per quarter means a monthly loss rate of 350,000. Not even the bloodbaths of July and August 1941 saw such high rates of loss. More like 250,000 per month at the peak of fighting.
https://books.google.de/books?id=s5PUAg ... e&q&f=true
"The balance of strength between the two armies opposing each other on the Eastern Front had changed considerably since the Germans invaded in June 1941. At first there had been approximate parity, but the Red Army enjoyed a massive influx of reinforcements during 1941, which the Germans did not even come close to matching. However, during the summer and early fall the Germans inflicted such immense losses on the Soviet forces that approximate numerical parity remained, despite massive Soviet reinforcements. With the advent of the fall mud and the ensuing winter, the Soviet loss rates shrank considerably and the influx of reinforcements gradually gave the Red Army an increasing numerical superiority"
Approx. replacements in the last quarter of 43
Wehrmacht 275,000 3rd - 4th quarter 43
USSR 2,020,000
"Replacements were wholly insufficient to cover the German losses, as less than 280,000 men arrived either as replacements or returning convalescents.7 Furthermore, the low German replacement rate was dwarfed by the influx of replacements to the Red Army, which must have received more than two million men as replacements, returning convalescents, and reinforcements. Had the Red Army not enjoyed this massive advantage it seems highly unlikely that it could have continued its offensives."
Hitlers racist ideology limited the recruitment capabilities, so the Heer could only rely on loyal, culturally/German speaking soldiers. Additionally, he was fighting a three front war.
If all variables are unchanged and the war of attrition emerges, the strength of the Wehrmacht continually declines relative to the Soviet strength and "build up" (by 44 they have a standing army of 6,1 million opposed by 2,5). Historically speaking he could not rely on such an inflow, Germany lacked the manpower to defeat the Soviet Union.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
The number is not as daunting as it seems. The key is if of those 600000, 50k or 250k are returning to duty after being wounded.
The former, poor healthcare service and a lot of units lost to encirclements; the latter, excellent medical services, without many encirclements.
If Auxilliaries (Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns, Slovaks, Spanish), and non-germans in WSS bring in 150k a quarter of replacements, this works out to Germany needing to raise 200k fresh recruits a quarter. Even if they can only do 150k, that's 1% loss of strength per quarter; it'll be 2 and a half years until the Axis Ostfront strength falls to 90% of the starting value.
Of course, if medical services are poor, and only 100k casualties return to service, that's a loss of 4% a quarter. Not so good long term.
The former, poor healthcare service and a lot of units lost to encirclements; the latter, excellent medical services, without many encirclements.
If Auxilliaries (Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns, Slovaks, Spanish), and non-germans in WSS bring in 150k a quarter of replacements, this works out to Germany needing to raise 200k fresh recruits a quarter. Even if they can only do 150k, that's 1% loss of strength per quarter; it'll be 2 and a half years until the Axis Ostfront strength falls to 90% of the starting value.
Of course, if medical services are poor, and only 100k casualties return to service, that's a loss of 4% a quarter. Not so good long term.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
Under optimal conditions DoWs were 17%, such as in the US Army. The conditions of the eastern front were worse and situations such as encirclements or logistical strain could have further impact on the medical system. 18% was the average for Wehrmacht DoW (or "Verstorbene") of battle deaths on the EF, from "Analyzing WW2 Eastern Front Battles" JOSMS - a good indicator for the quality of treatment.
250k fresh recruits plus returns was the (insufficient) historical value, the outcome is known.
The so called "auxilliaries" never made up a high fraction of the Axis forces in the first place, nor where they loyal to the end, as they dropped out of the conflict one by one.
What you are also ignoring is the relative build up of the Army. Ideally, in order to win a war of attrition you want a combination of inflicting higher casualties and sufficient replacements. Furthermore, the other fronts will drag more and more personnel from the EF.
250k fresh recruits plus returns was the (insufficient) historical value, the outcome is known.
The so called "auxilliaries" never made up a high fraction of the Axis forces in the first place, nor where they loyal to the end, as they dropped out of the conflict one by one.
What you are also ignoring is the relative build up of the Army. Ideally, in order to win a war of attrition you want a combination of inflicting higher casualties and sufficient replacements. Furthermore, the other fronts will drag more and more personnel from the EF.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
OTOH, there are other indicators, that suggest otherwise. Soviets had a 26% mortality rate for the "heavily wounded" (DoW+discharged due to wounds) while Germany had a 38% mortality rate for such.Stiltzkin wrote:Under optimal conditions DoWs were 17%, such as in the US Army. The conditions of the eastern front were worse and situations such as encirclements or logistical strain could have further impact on the medical system. 18% was the average for Wehrmacht DoW (or "Verstorbene") of battle deaths on the EF, from "Analyzing WW2 Eastern Front Battles" JOSMS - a good indicator for the quality of treatment.
For the "smash and grab" 1,2,3, 4 (Barbarossa, Taifun, Blau, Kursk) style of confrontation that was pursued. Other confrontation style would result in other outcomes.250k fresh recruits plus returns was the (insufficient) historical value, the outcome is known.
They surrendered only when victorious Soviet Army units decisively entered their territories. Same like Germany did. They were loyal exactly to the same standard that Germany was loyal. Which included 10-14 quarters of heavy fighting and taking 40-70% casualties of their armed forces. It is not some fault of Romania and Hungary that to get to Germany the RKKA had to pass through them first.The so called "auxilliaries" never made up a high fraction of the Axis forces in the first place, nor where they loyal to the end, as they dropped out of the conflict one by one.
Nice of you to blame the victims, the very countries Nazi Germany let down with its strategic incompetence.
Agreed. That's why once smash-and-grab 1 failed (obvious by July 20 1941) waging attrition warfare is a must.Ideally, in order to win a war of attrition you want a combination of inflicting higher casualties and sufficient replacements. Furthermore, the other fronts will drag more and more personnel from the EF.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
P.S. Adolf's statement that "blitzkrieg is a stupid word" uttered on November 8th 1941 was about 15 weeks too late, and his decision to prepare to "fight to the last battalion" -i.e. attrition- was about a year too late.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
Again. A War of attrition does not emerge voluntarily, especially not in this case, there is no "we are going to conduct a war of attrition", that is not desireable, even if your Army has large divisional slices and is focused on less maneuvering.i.e. attrition- was about a year too late.
I would never trust a single Soviet source on this one. Their medical system was catastrophic, that can be easily derived from life expectancy in Soviet republics, very contradictory. The German average is known and presented in the Journal of Slavic military studies, showing that Western countries were able to provide better treatment, hence DOW, HW numbers must have been lower, except for extreme situations under prevalent logistical strain and encirclements.OTOH, there are other indicators, that suggest otherwise. Soviets had a 26% mortality rate for the "heavily wounded" (DoW+discharged due to wounds) while Germany had a 38% mortality rate for such.
No, neither in terms of mobilization nor politically did the Axis Allies commit to the conflict in a way the Soviet allies did. Finland never took part in offensive operations other than holding their former borders. Italy never truly mobilized for total war and the replacements from Ukraine or Belorussia alone dwarfed the numbers of Axis Allied personnel.They surrendered only when victorious Soviet Army units decisively entered their territories
That is to say the Romanians did very well, but their forces were insufficient before the war even started, not to mention that after switching sides they recruited a similar amount of soldiers, which they could have done before, a good indicator for insufficient political cohesion.
Last edited by Stiltzkin on 16 Jan 2017, 18:20, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
That's based on what data? How does soviet civilian and military health system compare?Stiltzkin wrote:Their medical system was catastrophic, that can be easily derived from life expectancy in Soviet republics.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
Based on Staff Officer treatment and GDP correlation. There is a correlation between GDP per capita and treatment of civillians and soldiers alike.That's based on what data? How does soviet civilian and military health system compare?
Samuelson's book on Stalins War machine is decent literature, he demonstrates that plan failures in the defense sector may have been just as large as in the civilian sector despite the overwhelming priority of defense. It is one administrative system. Failures in the civil sector also translate into the military sector, even if their expenditures were disproportionate (hint: partially still present today).
Richer nations can spend more on the medical sector, plus medical staff (elite education/technology/hygene/higher amount of paraphernalia).
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
OTOH, there are other factors in play, namely the purging of Axis members' healthcare systems of Jews; and the fact that a large fraction of Axis OstFront soldiers hailed from economies not significantly richer than the Sovjet.Stiltzkin wrote:
That's based on what data? How does soviet civilian and military health system compare?
Based on Staff Officer treatment and GDP correlation. There is a correlation between GDP per capita and treatment of civillians and soldiers alike.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
I would really like to see this "large fraction", as over 97% of the Wehrmacht were ethnic germans. Hiwis/Freiwilligen only made up a small fraction and if you are specifically talking about Romanians then you would have to point it out seperately. We also have to distinguish between internal lazarets (MASHs) and rear service hospitals.a large fraction of Axis OstFront soldiers hailed from economies not significantly richer than the Sovjet
However, everything indicates that Western Nations soldiers enjoyed far better medical treatment than developing systems personnel, compare North and South Korea for example, you can easily guess which one will have a better system, resulting in more returns.
There are other good indicators such as looking at sanitary products, the Wehrmacht had more soap or serum.
Compare:
Grif Sekretnosti Sniat (for all its worth)
We have to keep in mind that a large fraction of fighting occured while the Axis was overextended on Soviet soil, which would indicate that they had an advantage when evacuating wounded soldiers.
Still, over 1,1 million DoW with 5,2 million KIA, that is, on average over 21% and I highly doubt this number.
The harsh conditions of the eastern front and the unpreparedness for the winter increased the DoW value. Barbarossa until the counteroffensives in the Moscow sector: 158,773 KIA with 188,982 Tote, i.e. 30,209 (DOW) or 19%.
Overall from June 41 to Dec 44 on average 18% DoW (278,480) of combat casualties, which indicates that Soviet DoW was percentually higher.
With 17%, the american soldier received the best treatment.
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
However Americans had a tiny fraction of POW/MIA. That's why ratios like DoW/discharged due to wounds are better statistics.Stiltzkin wrote:Overall from June 41 to Dec 44 on average 18% DoW (278,480) of combat casualties, which indicates that Soviet DoW was percentually higher.
With 17%, the american soldier received the best treatment.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Wehrmacht of 1943 invades Russia in 1941?
the war in the east was not really characterized by MIAs either. MIA increased for the Wehrmacht at the end of the war, with more and more people surrendering (W. front).
The problem is, DoW are always measured in proportion to KIA/HWs, the missing ones are irrelevant.
The problem is, DoW are always measured in proportion to KIA/HWs, the missing ones are irrelevant.