Haltebefehl

[BDV]

I have one very precise question on the Dunkirk Haltebefehl.

There is no (german) infantry help coming, not from East, not from North-East, not from South-East, for the next 5-7 days from the order. The Belgian Atlantic Coast is closer to the British Isle airbases than the German forward airfields, and significantly closer than German main airfields; significantly better for the Anglo-Franco-Belgian forces than RKKA's situation a year later.

However, even in much poorer conditions RKKA infantry was able to punishingly attack over-extended German panzers and pin them down, or even beat them back in multiple spots during 1941 (I can come up with at least 10 off the top of my head).

So my question is:

What proof, beyond panzer-jockey's say-so, is there that this (2 panzer divisions against half million infantrymen) would have been different?

[Carl Schwamberger]

A few random thoughts.

What was the actual effectiveness of the air arm for each side in this battle?

Was "2 panzer divisions".the total strength available to attempt the capture of the coast?

Was "half million infantrymen" the real strength that could have defended the coast in the first day or two?

What was the actual tank strength of this German corps?

How much partially ammunition remained with it?

I think the most important question is how many Allied combat capable brigades could arrive within 24-48 hours

[Sheldrake]

The Halt Befehl was not merely challenged by panzerjocks but by artilleryman Generaloberst Franz Halder the Chief of Staff at OKH, Germany's senior soldier.

It wasn't simply about stopping the tanks.

Halder's diary recorded on 2000hrs 24th May that he had

....again a very unpleasant interview with Hitler and at 2020 hours a new order was issued, cancelling yesterdays order and directing encirclement to be effected in the area Dunkirk - Estaires-Lille-Boubaix-Ostend. The left wing, consisting of armour and motorised forces, which had no enemy before it, will be stiopped dead in its tracks on the orders of the Führer! Finishing off the encircled enemy is to be left to the Air Force!!

On 25th May Halder's diary noted that the orders he had drafted called for von Bock's army group to merely hold the enemy, who was making a planned withdrawal, by frontal attacks. While von Rundstedt's army group, dealing with an already "whipped" enemy, cuts into their rear and delivers the decisive blow.

Halder noted that

Now political command has formed a fixed idea that the decisive battle must not be fought on Flemish soil, but in Northern France. To camouflage this political move, the assertion is made that Flanders criss crossed by a multitude of waterways is unsuited for tank warfare. Accordingly, all tanks and motorised troops will be brought up short on reaching the line St. Omer Bethune.

This is a complete reversal of the elements of the plan.

With (v Bock) as the hammer and (v Rundstedt) as the anvil, von Bock is confronted by a consolidated front, progress will be slow and casualties high. The air force on which all hopes are pinned , is dependent on the weather.

A translation is here:

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/sear ... l/conn/and

see page 36 of volume IV

The other evidence is the attitude of the allied commanders. The British thought Dunkirk was a miracle and were very grateful for the Haltebefehl. It gave them 48 hours to deploy troops on the flanks of the corridor to Dunkirk.

[T. A. Gardner]

More importantly, if from the the German point of view, which is the one that counts here, I'd say the Wehrmacht thought they had a pocket of Allied troops who weren't going anywhere any time soon and that they could deal it at their leisure. That would give them every incentive to simply wait until they had sufficient forces present to deal with the pocket, or simply keep it contained until France surrendered and then the pocket falls without a fight.

[Sheldrake]

More importantly, if from the the German point of view, which is the one that counts here, I'd say the Wehrmacht thought they had a pocket of Allied troops who weren't going anywhere any time soon and that they could deal it at their leisure. That would give them every incentive to simply wait until they had sufficient forces present to deal with the pocket, or simply keep it contained until France surrendered and then the pocket falls without a fight.

That isn't the language which Halder used. His language reflects the operational ideas of momentum, the relative merits (physical and psychological) of a small force moving fast against the fragmented rear of the enemy, compared to against the frontal attacks by an infantry heavy force. Halder understood how Blitzkrieg worked.

Its along the lines of two of Napoleon's sayings "sometimes a single battalion turns the day" and "Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never."

[BDV]

Halder, IIRC, was one of the architects of the famous dash-in-void of PzGr 4 of mid-July '41 and of PzGr 2, 3 AND 4 of October '41. I am not sure how much responsibility he shares for PzGr2 and 3's jump of mid-July '41, definitely he does not have appeared to have tried prevent it.

So his "say-so's" carry very little weight to the question asked; his incompetence to weighing in about the merits of the issue at hand (2 panzer divisionen against a mass of 750,000 infantry) is firmly established.

[Gooner1]

The Halt Befehl was not merely challenged by panzerjocks but by artilleryman Generaloberst Franz Halder the Chief of Staff at OKH, Germany's senior soldier.

It wasn't simply about stopping the tanks.

Halder's diary recorded on 2000hrs 24th May that he had

....again a very unpleasant interview with Hitler and at 2020 hours a new order was issued, cancelling yesterdays order and directing encirclement to be effected in the area Dunkirk - Estaires-Lille-Boubaix-Ostend. The left wing, consisting of armour and motorised forces, which had no enemy before it, will be stiopped dead in its tracks on the orders of the Führer! Finishing off the encircled enemy is to be left to the Air Force!!

You sure he wrote the diary at the time he said he wrote the diary?

[Urmel]

And that's really what this turns on.

The whole issue is discussed in depth in Blitzkrieg Legende

https://www.amazon.com/Blitzkrieg-Legen ... bc?ie=UTF8

I am not sure if that is still the current extent of knowledge on the topic.

[Sheldrake]

And that's really what this turns on.

The whole issue is discussed in depth in Blitzkrieg Legende

https://www.amazon.com/Blitzkrieg-Legen ... bc?ie=UTF8

I am not sure if that is still the current extent of knowledge on the topic.

Frieser appears to accept Halder's account as genuine and contemporary. I have added to the confusion by misinterpreting Halder's diary and reversed Army groups A and B. Halder wanted to concentrate the encirclement forces under Bock and leave von Rundstedt guarding the southern flank.

Halder's comments reflect Hitler over-ruling his judgement and pandering von Rundstedt and Kluge's fears. Unlike Hitler, a corporal in WW1, Halder had served as the staff officer in a higher formation fighting big battles (6th Army at Verdun and 2nd and 4th Armies in 1918. he was more familiar with how the confusion of war appears to high command.

Whoever started the ball rolling (Rommel's exaggerated reports after Arras, it was Hitler who made the final call as Supreme commander. He took credit for success and should carry the can for the results of his interference.

As in question 91 in "did you know that?100 dates in German History Kennst Du sie? ...die Daten der Deutschen Geschichte (1940). (A game for all the family Weinachtsnacht 1940 )

“When did the great defensive battle in the West begin?”
The answer: “The great defensive battle in the West, which at the same time was the greatest battle in world history, began on 10.5.1940, and revealed Adolf Hitler as the greatest military commander of all time.”

[BDV]

Halder's comments reflect Hitler over-ruling his judgement and pandering von Rundstedt and Kluge's fears. Unlike Hitler, a corporal in WW1, Halder had served as the staff officer in a higher formation fighting big battles (6th Army at Verdun and 2nd and 4th Armies in 1918. he was more familiar with how the confusion of war appears to high command.

So of course, Adolf was not the only one on the Halt side, somewhat more marinated generals like Runstedt were. "Pandering" and to some extent "fears" shows pre-judgment. Without proof such talk is rhetorical underhand.

Whoever started the ball rolling (Rommel's exaggerated reports after Arras, it was Hitler who made the final call as Supreme commander. He took credit for success and should carry the can for the results of his interference.

Which was a brilliant victory in Fall Rot and avoidance (if my simile to July 1941 and October 1941 developments in Russia is correct) of a great setback; which could have had, in extreme, thrown the whole of the 1940 Western campaign off track.

[Sheldrake]

Halder's comments reflect Hitler over-ruling his judgement and pandering von Rundstedt and Kluge's fears. Unlike Hitler, a corporal in WW1, Halder had served as the staff officer in a higher formation fighting big battles (6th Army at Verdun and 2nd and 4th Armies in 1918. he was more familiar with how the confusion of war appears to high command.

So of course, Adolf was not the only one on the Halt side, somewhat more marinated generals like Runstedt were. "Pandering" and to some extent "fears" shows pre-judgment. Without proof such talk is rhetorical underhand.......

Not at all. Post event analysis suggests that Halder and the Panzer Corps commanders were right and von Rundstedt anmd Kluge were wrong. There was no threat to the German corridor. The British thought the Halt order was a boon and part of the miracle of Dunkirk.

[BDV]

Post event analysis suggests that Halder and the Panzer Corps commanders were right and von Rundstedt anmd Kluge were wrong.

That IS my question, in fact.

Can you kindly point to sources for those analyses.

[Sheldrake]

Post event analysis suggests that Halder and the Panzer Corps commanders were right and von Rundstedt anmd Kluge were wrong.

That IS my question, in fact.

Can you kindly point to sources for those analyses.

I'll retract that comment. It is impossible to prove a counter factual. I'll accept that he arguments about the implications of the Halt orders have enriched historians and entertained the public ever a since. However, a continuation of the armoured advance on the south of the BEF was something that the allied commanders feared.

[BDV]

For Sealion, there was a semi-official war-game played with Galland controlling the German side. It ended up with German forces chocking on a thin supply line.

So such or some other type of staff study would do. Again, given what germans went through at Soltsy, Luga, Novohrad, Velikyie Luki, Smolensk, Rzhev, Bryansk, Tver, and Rostov; and that the Allied troops in Flanders were defeated but not routed, and given their performance in defending the kessel I think the Wehrmacht dodged a big one here.