June 1944: a better Luttich

[Von Schadewald]

Rommel wanted to destroy the D Day invasion force at the water's edge.

Von Rundstedt wanted to wait until they were inland.

In OTL was there any realistic way that the Allies could still have been thrown off the Continent after the first week, or dealt a severe defeat up to 6 weeks from the landing, before the Breakout?

[Kingfish]

Thrown into the sea? No.
The divided German command structure ensured that the Allies would not have to deal with any meaningful counterattack before they were firmly ashore.

As for serious defeat, there was a small window when the combined forces of 12th SS and 21st could have delivered a telling blow against the Sword/Juno landing beaches, but again the German command simply couldn't quite get there act together when they needed to.

[T. A. Gardner]

Rommel, well for that matter, the Germans, really had no good conception of what it'd take to defeat an amphibious assault as it occurred, and certainly not one on the scale of Overlord. Rommel had the right idea, but couldn't conceptualize what it'd really take to accomplish that mission.

For starters, the Germans never came even close to producing coast defense systems capable of dealing with a large scale amphibious assault of the sort the Allies were making. They needed a means to deal a severe blow to the shipping and naval forces off shore. They didn't have one. If you can't defeat the naval forces off shore, you can't defeat a serious attempt to make a landing.
As the Japanese discovered, you really can't stop the landings cold on the beaches. Once the invaders get ashore, they're going to stay if they want to stay.
There was absolutely no way the Wehrmacht could have tossed any of the landings back into the sea. They simply couldn't muster the forces fast enough to even come close to doing that.

[maltesefalcon]

Actually the Wehrmacht already had considerable land troops in France and if they had been able to concentrate them in the landing area immediately following the invasion, the Allied forces would be outnumbered.

However the combination of allied air power and sabotage efforts by the Underground slowed progress or prevented that tactic.

Germany would need to regain air superiority first. Then as already pointed out they needed to prevent Allied naval forces from pounding the beachheads and bringing reinforcements.

Germany had neither the air nor naval strength to do either by then, so they had no real hope of crushing the invasion no matter how well the ground element was used.

[Carl Schwamberger]

One other consideration is that the Allies had planned on a larger counter attack, or counter attacks, during the first 16-48 hours. The German response was less than expected (which is not the same as the beach front defense, which was also a bit different from expectations.) The likely result is the counter attack forces take losses faster than OTL, when they were more used as blocking forces in subsequent weeks. Faster German losses lead to a earlier collapse. From the first day German replacements of men and materials lagged far behind losses. Rommels plan executed is liable to accelerate those losses and eventual collapse. So, what happens if the 7th Army reaches its breaking point 15th July vs 30th, or even better the tenth or fifth of July?

[T. A. Gardner]

Salerno is the best example of just how bad a fail the Germans had in store for trying to stop an invasion after it got ashore. The Allies put 3 infantry divisions ashore at Salerno. The Germans pushed in a half dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions to counter that invasion and got stopped dead in their tracks by a combination of stubborn defense ashore and off shore NGFS. That's much better odds than they ever got in Normandy.

If you can't defeat the forces off shore you aren't going to defeat those that get ashore. They're there to stay.

Even if the Germans somehow managed to throw hundreds of aircraft against the invasion fleet, they'd fail. Look at Okinawa. The Japanese threw nearly 4,000 Kamikaze at the USN there and they still lost. Normandy would be no different.

Quite frankly, the Germans didn't know squat about how to stop a major amphibious invasion and never did figure it out.

[BDV]

Beached whale, for a while, is probably the best the Germans can hope for.

[Kingfish]

The German response was less than expected (which is not the same as the beach front defense, which was also a bit different from expectations.) The likely result is the counter attack forces take losses faster than OTL, when they were more used as blocking forces in subsequent weeks.

I can see the opposite being true.

Consider that 12th SS arrived in batches, with some units being thrown into the fight direct off the march, and it still managed to maul two Canadian battalions that had time to establish defensive positions. A stronger and better coordinated effort, with 21st PD in support, would have knocked the Canadians on their heels, and thereby stabilizing the front north of Caen at least for a while.

[BDV]

Consider that 12th SS arrived in batches, with some units being thrown into the fight direct off the march, and it still managed to maul two Canadian battalions that had time to establish defensive positions. A stronger and better coordinated effort, with 21st PD in support, would have knocked the Canadians on their heels, and thereby stabilizing the front north of Caen at least for a while.

A more concentrated arrival of SS panzergrenadiers would have entailed and received a more focused and sizeable response from WAlly airsupport. As Canadians fall back on the beaches (let's say) naval shells also will also make felt their unpleasant presence.

[Kingfish]

A more concentrated arrival of SS panzergrenadiers would have entailed and received a more focused and sizeable response from WAlly airsupport. As Canadians fall back on the beaches (let's say) naval shells also will also make felt their unpleasant presence.

More concentrated means earlier arrival, since by dawn of 6/7 12th SS Pz already had 4 battalions on the line north of Caen. That move would have occured at night, when both allied air and NGF would lend little support.

Once the battle commences it becomes too fluid to employ either at the tip of the sword.

[T. A. Gardner]

Consider that 12th SS arrived in batches, with some units being thrown into the fight direct off the march, and it still managed to maul two Canadian battalions that had time to establish defensive positions. A stronger and better coordinated effort, with 21st PD in support, would have knocked the Canadians on their heels, and thereby stabilizing the front north of Caen at least for a while.

A more concentrated arrival of SS panzergrenadiers would have entailed and received a more focused and sizeable response from WAlly airsupport. As Canadians fall back on the beaches (let's say) naval shells also will also make felt their unpleasant presence.

A tactical solution to a strategic problem. No matter how well or concentrated this unit might get, it won't throw the landing forces off the beachhead. If it can't, and the Germans in general can't, do that then all that's gained is a tactical victory of very limited value. The Germans still lose in Normandy.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
More concentrated means earlier arrival, since by dawn of 6/7 12th SS Pz already had 4 battalions on the line north of Caen. That move would have occured at night, when ... and NGF would lend little support.

Once the battle commences it becomes too fluid to employ either at the tip of the sword.

Thats completely wrong that NGF could not be used at night. Also NGF was as flexible and prompt as any other Allied artillery in this battle. NGF liaison teams were provided to every US regiment or British Brigade & for the opening spotting teams were available at close to a 1-1 ratio for the infantry battalions.

[Gooner1]

Consider that 12th SS arrived in batches, with some units being thrown into the fight direct off the march, and it still managed to maul two Canadian battalions that had time to establish defensive positions. A stronger and better coordinated effort, with 21st PD in support, would have knocked the Canadians on their heels, and thereby stabilizing the front north of Caen at least for a while.

If 21st PzD is supporting 12th SS then 3rd British ID gets Caen?

[Kingfish]

Thats completely wrong that NGF could not be used at night. Also NGF was as flexible and prompt as any other Allied artillery in this battle. NGF liaison teams were provided to every US regiment or British Brigade & for the opening spotting teams were available at close to a 1-1 ratio for the infantry battalions.

I never said it couldn't be used at night - i said it could lend little support.

To be clear I am talking about a more rapid and better coordinated tactical move at night by 12th SS Pz from its pre-invasion deployment area to the front line, all of which occurs in a time and place that is outside of allied observation. In that situation the best that NGF can provide is blind H&I on select routes of advance.

[Kingfish]

Consider that 12th SS arrived in batches, with some units being thrown into the fight direct off the march, and it still managed to maul two Canadian battalions that had time to establish defensive positions. A stronger and better coordinated effort, with 21st PD in support, would have knocked the Canadians on their heels, and thereby stabilizing the front north of Caen at least for a while.

If 21st PzD is supporting 12th SS then 3rd British ID gets Caen?

Support would mean advancing in line with the 12th SS, something Meyer noted the 21st PD did not do during the counterattack.