Tiger delay in favor of SP Heavy Artillery

[stg 44]

Wow that might be the most obvious strawman I've ever seen. I never said it was to be used for direct fire, not sure where you got that from.

The 'wow' factor comes from people asking you how many T34s your 'Grille' is going to take out since it is delaying the Tiger (see the title of this thread). I guess the answer is plenty...and indirectly at that. Wonder weapon!

So you just took it on yourself to make a leap of argument to something that had already been moved past? The Tiger I issue was already resolved by the fact that it really didn't have an impact on combat until Kursk and no one demonstrated that it was decisive anywhere until then. Just a handful in Africa and Southern Ukraine. What are you babbling about? No one said 'Wonder Weapon!' other than you, it is about making artillery more mobile so it can have a greater impact in it's role and a side bonus would be getting them out of harm's way in the major retreats of 1941-42 if it were ready in time.

The Tiger chassis seems to have been the only chassis that was capable of handling it out of the box prior to a purpose designed waffentrager

Again, it needs a front mounted engine/tranny...how is the Tiger chassis 'out of the box' going to do that? Even your 'Grille' had to be extended on a Tiger II chassis.

The front mounting was achieved with that and many other chassis that became weapons carriers. Why would the Tiger be special when it already had a front drive? The Grille Tiger II extended the chassis because the variety of weapons that were to be mounted on it were long and needed a bigger crew space in the rear, much like the extension for the Sturer Emil.

I'd like to know why they couldn't do a stripped down chassis to mount something like the K18 series on a 20 ton chassis.

No idea what you are talking about...

You were talking about mounting the 15cm and 17cm K18 on a stripped down Pz IV chassis, a 20ton class vehicle, I'm saying historically no one did it until the 1960s, I'd like to know why that was.

[stg 44]

At the same time that they were making efforts to mechanize divisional artillery, they were doing the same for corps and army level caliber guns, as the Grille project was initiated in 1942 along with the Wespe and Hummel (later in the year of course).

Which I would argue was about the time the Germans realized they weren't going to blitz their way to the Urals. The reality on the ground prompted them to begin looking at adding mobility to their artillery, but that mindset wasn't in play in the opening phase of Barbarossa, let alone when the Tiger was being envisioned

Having heavy artillery capable of reaching far and doing damage around the clock was needed as the Luftwaffe did not have tactical night bombing capabilities until later in the war and even then were, like that of all powers in WW2, limited.

The question is when was the need for such a gun mounted on tracks realized? Poland? Norway? Northern France?

Or by the time the Germans realized how hard it was to move the heavy guns around in Russia and the advantages of mechanization. They probably didn't think it was technologically feasible until the Tiger II chassis. Since it was still under development at that time they probably thought rather than tamper with the delayed existing Tiger I chassis it was best to get in on the ground floor with the Tiger II while still being developed. Had they done that in 1941 with the VK4501 project they could have achieved the same thing. Really it just required more forward thinking than existed historically...and my what if is based on what if they recognized the need while the Tiger I chassis was just being ordered! The realization would be in my proposed scenario after France as they were working on the VK3601/4501 project.

[Sheldrake]

There is a further question about the value of 17cm long range guns given that an aircraft could deliver a greater weight of explosive at a greater range. Guderian broke through at Sedan without any long raneg artillery. The British chose not to develop long range artillery in WW2 precisely for this reason - (but then bought american guns when they realised that there were limitations to Ww2 airpower)

Aircraft couldn't consistently deliver fire support at all times of day, in all weather, at nearly as low of a cost as artillery and without the risk a pilot would take nor with as great of accuracy without getting close to the target and risking the aircraft. While supplementary in their roles, aircraft couldn't entirely replace artillery and can't even today. If you were right, why did everyone keep making heavy artillery right to the end of WW2 and beyond? The US created a mechanized 170mm, 203mm, and 240mm weapon system post-war and used it despite having greater air support than any nation EVER.

WTF are you talking about, the Brits fielded >200mm artillery pieces in WW2.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_8-inch ... 80%93_VIII
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_9.2-inch_howitzer
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/240_mm_howitzer_M1

And some slightly smaller guns too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_7.2-inch_howitzer

I am talking about long range GUNS - such as the US 155mm gun purchased to provide a gun with something close to the range of the 17 cm German GUN. The WTF examples you linked to were HOWITZERS with a much lower range, and different purpose - hitting hardened targets. The British 8" and 9.2" howitzers were all WW1 designs and the 7.2" Howitzer a stopgap adapted from the 8" Howitzer.

You are correct to point out the limitations of Ww2 aircraft - a mantra us gunners used to chant to the supported arm. However, with clear weather the air forces could deliver kilotons of HE at ranges beyond artillery range and during 1944-45 the western allies found ways to combine aerial firepower with armoured and infantry assaults.

Long range artillery did have a role, but a secondary one. Often the heavy guns were used to suppress flak, to allow aircraft to bomb defences.

[stg 44]

I am talking about is a long range GUN - such as the US 155mm gun purchased to provide the range of the 17 cm German GUN. The WTF examples you linked to were HOWITZERS with a much lower range, and different purpose - hitting hardened targets. The British 8" and 9.2" howitzers were all WW1 designs and the 7.2" Howitzer a stopgap adapted from the 8" Howitzer.

You are correct to point out the limitations of Ww2 aircraft - a mantra us gunners used to chant to the supported arm. However, with clear weather the air forces could deliver kilotons of HE at ranges beyond artillery range and during 1944-45 the western allies found ways to combine aerial firepower with armoured and infantry assaults.

Long range artillery did have a role, but a secondary role. Often the heavy guns were used to suppress flak, to allow aircraft to bomb defences.

In that case sure, the Brits didn't develop their own long range flat trajectory guns for interdiction and counterbattery work. They largely had the US to provide that as needed or the RAF.
Though they did mess around with rail guns in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_13.5-i ... ilway_guns

Anyway they were the exception, the US, USSR, and Germans all had the long flat firing heavy guns in WW2. The Brits screwed up. Of course they were also not expecting to fight a major land war against during the interwar period and during the war period after they were ejected from the continent they outsourced that to the US...and to a degree the Royal Navy as much of their fighting was done within range of the floating heavy guns. Artillery and air power supplement one another, neither can replace the other.
Even if in FLAK suppression the long heavy guns had a role. In the 21st century things changed (maybe), but in WW2 the Brits had a serious gap in their inventory.

[Yoozername]

So you just took it on yourself to make a leap of argument to something that had already been moved past? The Tiger I issue was already resolved by the fact that it really didn't have an impact on combat until Kursk and no one demonstrated that it was decisive anywhere until then. Just a handful in Africa and Southern Ukraine. What are you babbling about? No one said 'Wonder Weapon!' other than you, it is about making artillery more mobile so it can have a greater impact in it's role and a side bonus would be getting them out of harm's way in the major retreats of 1941-42 if it were ready in time.

No, the issue of using the Tiger I is your core 'what if'. It has been largely discredited and no one but you seems to think it has merit. Why would a major weapons system like the Tiger be halted for your SP vision? So, no Tigers for Kursk? It boggles my mind. sorry but I have read some of these what ifs by you and this one is special.

It has been 'resolved' by what? You claim your SP WILL impact anything before Kursk? Is that your argument? Or has your argument basically disintegrated into what others have said?

[stg 44]

No, the issue of using the Tiger I is your core 'what if'. It has been largely discredited and no one but you seems to think it has merit. Why would a major weapons system like the Tiger be halted for your SP vision? So, no Tigers for Kursk? It boggles my mind. sorry but I have read some of these what ifs by you and this one is special.

Oh really, discredited by whom and when? The nay-sayers are the usual suspects that enjoy saying no to everything and haven't really come up with viable counter-arguments, especially yourself. I didn't say no Tigers for Kursk, I said no Tigers until then, as the first chassis go to SPing heavy artillery before making heavy breakthrough tanks. Prior to then they didn't matter and actually were either non-essential, a waste, or counter productive, as they were around Leningrad in September 1942 when all they did was tip off the Soviets about their existence, giving them time to develop countermeasures. If what ifs bother you so much, how about you stick to ones you agree with or bail out of the subforum altogether?

It has been 'resolved' by what? You claim your SP WILL impact anything before Kursk? Is that your argument? Or has your argument basically disintegrated into what others have said?

Again, what are you even trying to say? Having SP heavy artillery will matter if it happens in 1942, especially if it means the heavy guns aren't lost at Stalingrad, as per OTL, and can get into action sooner and redeploy as needed more quickly.

[Kingfish]

Really it just required more forward thinking than existed historically...and my what if is based on what if they recognized the need while the Tiger I chassis was just being ordered!

This makes no sense. In order to use 'forward thinking' to justify the mechanization the Germans would essentially have to admit their strategy for conquering Russia would be doomed to failure before it started.

[stg 44]

Really it just required more forward thinking than existed historically...and my what if is based on what if they recognized the need while the Tiger I chassis was just being ordered!

This makes no sense. In order to use 'forward thinking' to justify the mechanization the Germans would essentially have to admit their strategy for conquering Russia would be doomed to failure before it started.

How do you figure? They could be planning for a post-war army. I mean there will be a need for mechanized artillery post-Barbarossa and post-war. The US certainly continued to develop it's army even after winning WW2, creating all the mechanized versions of their heavy guns that I've already cited. I mean there was just as much reason to not make the Tiger I as of May 1941 by that logic, because it was useless in the coming campaign and wouldn't be ready in time.

[T. A. Gardner]

Really it just required more forward thinking than existed historically...and my what if is based on what if they recognized the need while the Tiger I chassis was just being ordered!

This makes no sense. In order to use 'forward thinking' to justify the mechanization the Germans would essentially have to admit their strategy for conquering Russia would be doomed to failure before it started.

The problem with the German strategy for the Russian campaign wasn't in terms of direct military objectives, but rather in the ability to support their army properly to achieve them. In that they failed pretty miserably from day one.

The OKW, etc., should have known in planning that the Russian rail and road system were crap, that the rail system needed re-gaging, that there wouldn't be sufficient coaling and watering stations, etc., etc., etc. It would take willful ignorance or disregard to not have that knowledge on hand. Therefore, they should have planned for a campaign in which most advances would be made over near roadless terrain. One where the weather could potentially be bad. That would mean providing equipment suitable to the conditions.

Instead, it seems the OKW decided that they'd win before winter and the whole issue was irrelevant. That was myopic stupidity on their part.

[Kingfish]

How do you figure? They could be planning for a post-war army.

Now we're grasping at straws.

I mean there will be a need for mechanized artillery post-Barbarossa and post-war. The US certainly continued to develop it's army even after winning WW2, creating all the mechanized versions of their heavy guns that I've already cited.

Sure, by applying the lessons learned in actual combat to these new designs. Here you are suggesting a design before the need is realized.

I mean there was just as much reason to not make the Tiger I as of May 1941 by that logic, because it was useless in the coming campaign and wouldn't be ready in time.

That's a good point, but for another thread.

[stg 44]

How do you figure? They could be planning for a post-war army.

Now we're grasping at straws.

How do you explain the Tiger then? It was initiated as a project in May 1941 as the VK4501 program. It clearly wasn't planned for Barbarossa or the war in the East.

I mean there will be a need for mechanized artillery post-Barbarossa and post-war. The US certainly continued to develop it's army even after winning WW2, creating all the mechanized versions of their heavy guns that I've already cited.

Sure, by applying the lessons learned in actual combat to these new designs. Here you are suggesting a design before the need is realized.

The what if is them realizing the need is there as they did with the Tiger itself (not that there really was as much as need as they thought).

I mean there was just as much reason to not make the Tiger I as of May 1941 by that logic, because it was useless in the coming campaign and wouldn't be ready in time.

That's a good point, but for another thread.

Not necessarily given that I'm suggesting that at the time they initiate the Tiger project in May 1941 as part of that they have the chassis also simultaneously developed for SP heavy artillery, rather than in late 1942 as part of the Tiger II program. Effectively I'm just suggesting they so what they did historically about 18 months early with the Tiger I project and allocate it higher priority.

[Yoozername]

So it's back to the Tiger?

They did not have that luxury for something as superfluous as this Super-SP that you think can be a 'side-project' to the Tiger Tank development. The program was started pre-Barbarossa, and once it began shortly after that, it was given a high priority. Largely due to the unknown enemy AFV encountered. They did not encounter roving corp artillery pieces on the Soviet side, since there were none in Russia (or the world), so it might have come across as really unrealistic to even rearrange a chassis they were trying to develop for a contract, to attempt doing what you think is so natural.

I think you are hinging your argument on 'how useless the tiger was' and somehow the Germans would even "know" (according to your thinking) what the future would bring. its getting very thin.

[Yoozername]

As far as having the 'panzer IV' chassis used to give the 15cm K18 some mobility...
15 cm K18
Weight Combat: 12,460 kg
(27,469 lbs)
Travel: 18,600 kg
(41,006 lbs)

The weight for an actual 'fixed' gun (with no ability to ground mount off the panzer IV chassis), would lose some of that 27469 pounds. As well as size. I don't believe it had the dual sliding type recoil of the 17 cm, i would want the Panzer IV to be minimally armored, no more than 20mm front and sides. The use of the Panzer III/IV chassis would work without most of the armor and sides of the Hummel. I would install a muzzle brake and a rear spade that can be dropped. Speed is not that important. It is mobility to get it somewhere so it can be ready to fire, or retreat in a rapid fashion. this would give armored corps an improvement in counter battery and reaching out to targets. it is no way an assault gun and just a superior means to bring heavy artillery into the battle area.

[Sheldrake]

I am talking about is a long range GUN - such as the US 155mm gun purchased to provide the range of the 17 cm German GUN. The WTF examples you linked to were HOWITZERS with a much lower range, and different purpose - hitting hardened targets. The British 8" and 9.2" howitzers were all WW1 designs and the 7.2" Howitzer a stopgap adapted from the 8" Howitzer.

You are correct to point out the limitations of Ww2 aircraft - a mantra us gunners used to chant to the supported arm. However, with clear weather the air forces could deliver kilotons of HE at ranges beyond artillery range and during 1944-45 the western allies found ways to combine aerial firepower with armoured and infantry assaults.

Long range artillery did have a role, but a secondary role. Often the heavy guns were used to suppress flak, to allow aircraft to bomb defences.

In that case sure, the Brits didn't develop their own long range flat trajectory guns for interdiction and counterbattery work. They largely had the US to provide that as needed or the RAF.
Though they did mess around with rail guns in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_13.5-i ... ilway_guns

Anyway they were the exception, the US, USSR, and Germans all had the long flat firing heavy guns in WW2. The Brits screwed up. Of course they were also not expecting to fight a major land war against during the interwar period and during the war period after they were ejected from the continent they outsourced that to the US...and to a degree the Royal Navy as much of their fighting was done within range of the floating heavy guns. Artillery and air power supplement one another, neither can replace the other.
Even if in FLAK suppression the long heavy guns had a role. In the 21st century things changed (maybe), but in WW2 the Brits had a serious gap in their inventory.

The official classified 1950 history of artillery in WW2 would agreed that, in retrospect, the decision not to develop a new generation of long range artillery pieces left the British out ranged by the Germans 17cm. Dunkirk left the British short of artillery, and during the western desert campaign they were short of medium guns.

I study this stuff and write about it. It isn't clear to me that the British missed out by much.

Long range counter battery and harassing fire is only as effective as the target acquisition and survey. Looking at the target effects in Normandy, much of this was wasted - by both sides. The Germans had quite good long range artillery in Normandy, but, as far as i can see, it wasn't as effective in harrassing the beachhead as the much maligned Luftwaffe. German Long range artillery seems to have had little physical or psychological effect compared to mortars, nebelwerfer or the flat trajectory 88s in the ground role. Many memoirs mention the night bombing as do the war diaries.

There was a lot of sense in the idea that aircraft were better equipped to deliver heavy concentrations of fire in depth than long range artillery. However, the British did not have the C3 to co-ordinate this at the start of the war, and the RAF saw close air support as a very low priority task. Long range heavy artillery filled in the gaps and was useful, but it wasn't a war winner in 1939-45 - thought it pains me to write these words.....

Back to the thread. Even if all 300+ of the 17 CM Guns were put onto tracks it wasn't going to make a major difference to tactical let alone operational outcomes. OTOH the same number of chassis completed as Tiger II deployed in seven heavy tank battalions could have stopped, say, Op Cobra.

[stg 44]

Long range counter battery and harassing fire is only as effective as the target acquisition and survey. Looking at the target effects in Normandy, much of this was wasted - by both sides. The Germans had quite good long range artillery in Normandy, but, as far as i can see, it wasn't as effective in harrassing the beachhead as the much maligned Luftwaffe. German Long range artillery seems to have had little physical or psychological effect compared to mortars, nebelwerfer or the flat trajectory 88s in the ground role. Many memoirs mention the night bombing as do the war diaries.

In Normandy the Germans had a severe ammo famine due to the Transport Plan chewing up their supply lines. Can't use artillery for something you don't have ammo for, plus if enemy air power will triangulate it and bomb it you'll use it sparingly. Wallied artillery dominance in Normandy was so heavy that the Germans despite the technical qualities of their weapons, couldn't compete on equal ground against the numbers, supplies, and air power of the enemy. Mortars and other weapons that you mention are the ones that actually could be used.

There was a lot of sense in the idea that aircraft were better equipped to deliver heavy concentrations of fire in depth than long range artillery. However, the British did not have the C3 to co-ordinate this at the start of the war, and the RAF saw close air support as a very low priority task. Long range heavy artillery filled in the gaps and was useful, but it wasn't a war winner in 1939-45 - thought it pains me to write these words.....

Sure, which is why it replaced a lot of the heavy guns during the war; if you control the air you can do a ton that the enemy cannot...like at Normandy or France in 1940. The Brits needed to learn a lot of hard lessons during the war, that's for sure, but they learned them. No one though is saying long range flat firing field guns of the heavy variety were war winners, but they had their role and absent them in WW2 the Brits suffered enough that they had to beg for Long Toms.

Back to the thread. Even if all 300+ of the 17 CM Guns were put onto tracks it wasn't going to make a major difference to tactical let alone operational outcomes. OTOH the same number of chassis completed as Tiger II deployed in seven heavy tank battalions could have stopped, say, Op Cobra.

Might well make a difference with counterbattery fire and help limit Soviet ability to conduct artillery bombardments, which would have cumulative tactical and with enough of those operational impact. Operation Cobra wasn't going to be stopped, certainly not by the unreliable Tiger II, due to air power:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... ive_stalls