Tiger delay in favor of SP Heavy Artillery

[Kingfish]

How do you explain the Tiger then? It was initiated as a project in May 1941 as the VK4501 program. It clearly wasn't planned for Barbarossa or the war in the East.

The seeds for VK4501 were planted during Fall Gelb, but the real impetus (and urgency) came from combat experience against the T-34 and KV-1, so it can be argued that the Tiger was addressing a real need on the battlefield.

I really can't see OKW telling the Panzerwaffe their request is being postponed in favor of shaving off some of the deployment time of the Corp artillery.
It would be like telling the Luftwaffe the Fw190 is being postponed to allow drop tanks to be added to the Storch.

Not necessarily given that I'm suggesting that at the time they initiate the Tiger project in May 1941 as part of that they have the chassis also simultaneously developed for SP heavy artillery, rather than in late 1942 as part of the Tiger II program. Effectively I'm just suggesting they so what they did historically about 18 months early with the Tiger I project and allocate it higher priority.

Which it is, in lieu of or simultaneously?
The title of your WI suggests the former

[Sheldrake]

Long range counter battery and harassing fire is only as effective as the target acquisition and survey. Looking at the target effects in Normandy, much of this was wasted - by both sides. The Germans had quite good long range artillery in Normandy, but, as far as i can see, it wasn't as effective in harrassing the beachhead as the much maligned Luftwaffe. German Long range artillery seems to have had little physical or psychological effect compared to mortars, nebelwerfer or the flat trajectory 88s in the ground role. Many memoirs mention the night bombing as do the war diaries.

(POINT A) In Normandy the Germans had a severe ammo famine due to the Transport Plan chewing up their supply lines. Can't use artillery for something you don't have ammo for, plus if enemy air power will triangulate it and bomb it you'll use it sparingly. Wallied artillery dominance in Normandy was so heavy that the Germans despite the technical qualities of their weapons, couldn't compete on equal ground against the numbers, supplies, and air power of the enemy. Mortars and other weapons that you mention are the ones that actually could be used.

There was a lot of sense in the idea that aircraft were better equipped to deliver heavy concentrations of fire in depth than long range artillery. However, the British did not have the C3 to co-ordinate this at the start of the war, and the RAF saw close air support as a very low priority task. Long range heavy artillery filled in the gaps and was useful, but it wasn't a war winner in 1939-45 - thought it pains me to write these words.....

Sure, which is why it replaced a lot of the heavy guns during the war; if you control the air you can do a ton that the enemy cannot...like at Normandy or France in 1940. The Brits needed to learn a lot of hard lessons during the war, that's for sure, but they learned them. No one though is saying long range flat firing field guns of the heavy variety were war winners, but they had their role and absent them in WW2 the Brits suffered enough that they had to beg for Long Toms.

Back to the thread. Even if all 300+ of the 17 CM Guns were put onto tracks it wasn't going to make a major difference to tactical let alone operational outcomes. OTOH the same number of chassis completed as Tiger II deployed in seven heavy tank battalions could have stopped, say, Op Cobra.

(POINT B) Might well make a difference with counterbattery fire and help limit Soviet ability to conduct artillery bombardments, which would have cumulative tactical and with enough of those operational impact. Operation Cobra wasn't going to be stopped, certainly not by the unreliable Tiger II, due to air power:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation ... ive_stalls

RE A You are missing the point. Long range artillery is principally a weapon for counter battery fire and harassing supply routes and ; heavy howitzers are there to destroy hardened targets such as bunkers and deep dug outs. The Germans did not have enough artillery tubes, ammunition or logistic support to win the counter battery battle on any front. Diverting industrial production to put several hundred heavy guns on tracks was going to exacerbate rather than solve that problem.
not going to solve that shortage. I think even you might agree that the ability to hit deep dugouts and concrete bunkers was a luxury after 1942. In delivering harrassing fire long range guns offered no morale impact over Nebewerfers, 88s or air craft which all had a specific psychological effect on those under fire. Even at Anzio where the Germans did have ample ammunition, the feared Anzio Annie had little tactical impact.

RE B Let me get this right. You believe that that Op Cobra could have succeeded had the Germans had 300 Tiger II tanks in depth behind the 7th Army positions in July 1944? Utter rubbish.