Turkey joins the Axis in 1940-41

[Ironmachine]

The Soviets did not stop List's historical advance from northern Caucasus with ease.

As Tim Smith said, it is a completely different situation. List did not have to cross the Caucaus Mountains. From Turkey you would have to do it.

[Christian W.]

List did not have to cross the Caucaus Mountains

Excuse me? :roll:

[Tim Smith]

List did not have to cross the Caucaus Mountains

Excuse me? :roll:

Would you please, please learn how to read maps, Christian?

http://encarta.msn.com/map_701511584/Ca ... tains.html

Now, Germany got as far as Maikop (Maykop on the above map) and Mozdok.

See:

http://www.germanwarmachine.com/campaig ... front4.htm

Those towns are on the northern edge of the Caucasus Mountains.

The Germans did not CROSS the Caucasus Mountains. They did not reach Tbilisi in Georgia, and they certainly did not get anywhere near Baku, in Azerbaijan. (Which is where the bulk of the oilfields were.) They were on the other side of the Caucausus Mountains.

As for Turkey, the Turks would have to fight their way across Armenia and Northern Iran to reach Baku. And that territory was occupied by the Soviets. Which means the Turks have to attack, in mountainous terrain, forces much better equipped than they are.

Look how badly the Italians did against the French Army in the French Alps in June 1940. The Italians outnumbered the French 5 to 1, and still failed, suffering 20 times as many casualties as the French.

See:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=114973

This does not bode well for Turkish efforts against the Soviets in that region, even with a massive local numerical advantage I think they would still struggle.

[Christian W.]

I could swear that I have seen plenty of photographic and video material that show German forces fighting ON Caucasus Mountains. My intention was not to imply that List's forces CROSSED the mountains, but that they FOUGHT on them.

The Germans actually scaled the highest mountain on Caucasus.

Look how badly the Italians did against the French Army in the French Alps in June 1940

The Italian offensive against France was very poorly planned and organized. Mussolini (literally) ordered the army to attack without warning time and any sort of planning. Amusingly, the cooks in the army did not even have enough pots and other cooking material to make meals properly because of Mussolini. I strongly doubt that the Turkish high command would act like Mussolini did.

[Paul Lakowski]

This is just plain silly. The German mountain troops were among the best in the world at that time.Certianly by mid 1941 they were the most combat experienced. They would have little trouble defeating the inexpericenced Russian troops , mountain armored or otherwize.But if a war game is the yardstick that things are measured by perhaps this speaks volumes about the POV.

The Germans biggest problem would be to establish reliable line of supplies.But don't kid yourself , one way or another they WOULD have gotten throough. The Turkish rail network was sufficently advanced by then to get to within 100km of the soviet rail road net. And motorised troops could get through to Baku from the Turkish/Soviet boarder.

One army should be more than enough to complete the task although the timing could be altered to either draw Russian armies away from the Drive on Moscow or to wait until Russian Armies are drawn into the Central Cauldron and the launch in to the Caucasus , depending on taste of CinC.

It seems that westerners look at these military problems and mostly just search for technical excuses why they can't be done.I guess they are covering their asses if they fail. By that same standard the Germans/Central Europeans of that period figured out how best to do it, and just get on with it. Different mindset I guess.

Van Creveld observed that the allies seemed to set the bar too low and the troops lived down to that level of expectation. By that same token it can be observed that the Nazi probably set the bar too high for their troops....but as long as they could, the Wehrmacht troops lived up to that level of expectation, which probably explains why they did so well for so long.

BTW Christian is right, they got into the Caucasus, but technically not through. Purely a semantic exercise.

[Ironmachine]

This is just plain silly. The German mountain troops were among the best in the world at that time.Certianly by mid 1941 they were the most combat experienced. They would have little trouble defeating the inexpericenced Russian troops , mountain armored or otherwize.But if a war game is the yardstick that things are measured by perhaps this speaks volumes about the POV.

The German mountain divisions that fought in 1941 in the far north of the Soviet Union and advanced on Murmansk were repulsed, so it seems they have troubles defeating the inexperienced Soviet troops. And if you use the mountain divisions in the Turkish front, you have to replace them in other places; this is just the main problem the Germans had: not enough troops to cover all their objectives. A Caucasian front would only mean further dispersion of efforts.

The Germans biggest problem would be to establish reliable line of supplies.But don't kid yourself , one way or another they WOULD have gotten throough. The Turkish rail network was sufficently advanced by then to get to within 100km of the soviet rail road net. And motorised troops could get through to Baku from the Turkish/Soviet boarder.

One way or another! That's a solid argument. A pity that, one way or another, they did not reach Moscow or take Leningrad.
Did the Germans have enough vehicles and fuel to support a campaign in the Caucasus that had to be supplied across Turkey? As I have said previously, all the needed trasportation equipment and POL would had to be obtained from the main front of Barbarossa. Given the logistical situation in the historical campaign in 1941, the forces in the main front could hardly tolerate this decrease in its supplies and still obtain the results that they did, and even these results were not enough to defeat the Soviet Union.

One army should be more than enough to complete the task although the timing could be altered to either draw Russian armies away from the Drive on Moscow or to wait until Russian Armies are drawn into the Central Cauldron and the launch in to the Caucasus , depending on taste of CinC.

This one army had to come from some place; so you have one army less for the drive on Moscow or the central cauldron, and with less forces attacking them, the Soviets also would need less forces to defend themselves, and could send reinforcements to the Caucasus if needed.

It seems that westerners look at these military problems and mostly just search for technical excuses why they can't be done.I guess they are covering their asses if they fail. By that same standard the Germans/Central Europeans of that period figured out how best to do it, and just get on with it. Different mindset I guess.

Van Creveld observed that the allies seemed to set the bar too low and the troops lived down to that level of expectation. By that same token it can be observed that the Nazi probably set the bar too high for their troops....but as long as they could, the Wehrmacht troops lived up to that level of expectation, which probably explains why they did so well for so long.

It seems that the Soviets set the bar in the impossible level, and then they achieved it. Do this add something to the debate? By the way, the Germans of the period figured out how best to defeat the Soviet Union, get on with it... and failed. The westerners approach of technical excuses for which it can't be done seems to be a better way.

BTW Christian is right, they got into the Caucasus, but technically not through. Purely a semantic exercise.

Putting a flag in the peak of Mt. Elbrus may be good for the moral of the troops, but is not equal to fighting and winning in the Caucasus. This is more that a semantic difference.

[Tim Smith]

Look how badly the Italians did against the French Army in the French Alps in June 1940

The Italian offensive against France was very poorly planned and organized. Mussolini (literally) ordered the army to attack without warning time and any sort of planning. Amusingly, the cooks in the army did not even have enough pots and other cooking material to make meals properly because of Mussolini. I strongly doubt that the Turkish high command would act like Mussolini did.

I agree. The Turks didn't act like Mussolini did. That's why they didn't enter the war!

[Christian W.]

You clearly failed to see the point of my post.

[Paul Lakowski]

"Ironmachine" you clearly have not read the thread. The thrust is how Turkey as an Axis partner could have evolved the strategy in the Med and USSR. It was proposed that Africa korps/Panzer Armee Africa was instead routed through Turkey and Palestine to take the Suez from the East and then how could this be expanded upon. Move in to the ME? An alternative suggestion was to use this vantage point to turn the corner on the USSR and how Turkey could contribute to such actions.

If they need mountain troops to do so, they would exchange some of their motorised/Panzer korps to achieve the desired operational mix. Mountain division[s] were routed through Veliki Luki Railway hub, were they needed there. My 1942 Russian army maps of the Veliki Luki-Toropets region don't indicate much in the way of mountains.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v329/ ... ropets.jpg


They might have been exchanged for Motorized troops instead. This avenue also has a usefull role for airborne/air landing troops.

They were stalled by Soviet troops but didn't alter the out come, they got through. If your suggesting that the Russian troops in the Cacusus would fair any better than their brothers in the Ukraine or Belrus in 1941, well we are all abit puzzled???? What ,there was some kind of mythical reserve elite Soviet mountain army there?

[Andy H]

Indeed, if it were the Turkish who would get into trouble and not the Italians, it would not take long until the Germans would intervene. Supplying this expeditionary force would also be much more easier than one to North Africa, because ships bringing supplies would only need to cross the narrow strait of Bosphorus.

It maybe intailly better, but the internal transport infrastructure/logistics in Turkey, especially as you travel east are woeful. They were woeful in 1914-1918 to Turkeys cost, and little had changed in the meantime.

Nobody, unless I've missed it has tole me what happens when the Turks/Germans reach the Syrian border?

Regards

[Ironmachine]

"Ironmachine" you clearly have not read the thread. The thrust is how Turkey as an Axis partner could have evolved the strategy in the Med and USSR. It was proposed that Africa korps/Panzer Armee Africa was instead routed through Turkey and Palestine to take the Suez from the East and then how could this be expanded upon. Move in to the ME? An alternative suggestion was to use this vantage point to turn the corner on the USSR and how Turkey could contribute to such actions.

So you are supposing that two German divisions (the Afrika Korps) could take Suez from the east while being supplied from Turkey, and then control Syria and Iraq? Or that they could be used to destroy the Soviet forces in the Caucasus? As I have said before, the Germans would need a fair amount of troops and equipment to sustain an attack through the Caucasus, and this they could ill afford, as they would have to obtain them from the main front of Barbarossa. The only "advantage" of this scenario is the Turkish Army on the Axis side. But fighting with Allied troops covering their flanks usually meant disaster for the Germans. Plainly speaking, the Turkish Army was in no shape to fight the Soviets, while at the same time they would have all of South Turkey open to British operations.

If they need mountain troops to do so, they would exchange some of their motorised/Panzer korps to achieve the desired operational mix. Mountain division[s] were routed through Veliki Luki Railway hub, were they needed there. My 1942 Russian army maps of the Veliki Luki-Toropets region don't indicate much in the way of mountains.
They might have been exchanged for Motorized troops instead. This avenue also has a usefull role for airborne/air landing troops.

The problem is that the Germans would not been exchanging troops, but spreading them fairly thin.
I really do not understand the reference to Veliki Luki and the lack of mountains in the area. Would you please explain it to me?
Regarding airborne troops, how many airborne divisions would be available to Germany for Barbarossa? That is, even supposing that Hitler would allow their use after the fiasco of Crete, and that the Germans could find and use the necessary number of transport planes to support massive drops.

They were stalled by Soviet troops but didn't alter the out come, they got through. If your suggesting that the Russian troops in the Cacusus would fair any better than their brothers in the Ukraine or Belrus in 1941, well we are all abit puzzled???? What ,there was some kind of mythical reserve elite Soviet mountain army there?

I am suggesting that if the Soviet troops in the Caucasus perform just as well as the Russian forces did in World War I, then the Turkish Army would be unable to advance in this area. But if you are suggesting that German mountain troops in the Caucasus would do any better than their brothers in the Petsamo-Kirkenes area in 1941, then it is me who is also a bit puzzled. There was, of course, no reserve elite Soviet mountain army in the Caucasus; there were just Soviet forces used to the conditions of the territory. But considering that you have stated that the Germans "one way or another they WOULD have gotten through", I suppose it is you who believe in some kind of "mythical" ability of the Germans. The Germans were good in this bussiness, but even them could not achieve the impossible. As I have told you before, in one way or another, figuring out how best to do it, and just getting on with it, the Germans failed in 1941 to destroy the Soviet Army or the Soviet Union, and they even failed to take Moscow and Leningrad. They did remarkably well, but still it was not enough. The Caucasus would just add more problems to the very overstretched Heer and Luftwaffe.

[Paul Lakowski]

Getting back to an assesment of possible launching of operations from Turkey into USSR.

In any Axis war it would make most sense to occupy the UK after the defeat of the Allies in France and then roll the RN/RAF forces in the Mediterranean up prior to switching to the Eastern Front. Occupying the UK would trigger Spain’s addition to the Axis and triggering ‘Operation Felix’ to occupy Gibraltar in late 1940 early 1941, there by unhinging British naval presence in the Western Mediterranean Sea. So the obvious next step for Axis would be to roll up the Eastern Mediterranean Sea by occupying the naval RN Port of Alexandria and the Suez Canal thereby denying the British the use of the Mediterranean to sustain the war on the Soft Under Belly of Europe [as Churchill put it] . This could be done launching a drive from Turkey due south through Syria –Palestine to ‘The Canal’. That should close down the Western Front in Europe, before they turn east. It is proposed that the Axis strategic effort that was directed through the Balkans /Greece and Crete into North Africa, be instead redirected through Turkey into Syria , Palestine and the Suez Canal and driving the British west through Egypt -Libya to met a smaller force working from Gibraltar N Africa bridge moving east. But such efforts would surely take through the bulk of 1941, pushing the Invasion of Russia solidly into 1942.

Another year of preparation for Barbarossa would be extremely valuable to the Germans especially if they are not locked into a war of attrition. If that is the case the improving armaments production situation could stockpile significant fuel, provisions and ammo, in advance of the invasion. It had been hoped that major war would not happen until German stockpiles of fuel reached 3-4 million tons Diesel/Gasoline/Aviation Gas, but by 1941 these stocks had only reached 1.6 million prior to Barbarossa. As long as the Germans could mask their preparations in the East from the Soviets under there Non Aggression Treaty, this should work and the USSR rearmament would only be another peace time year along on its conversion.

However even if the UK is knocked out, they had always planned to continue the war from Canada/USA and the Mediterranean Axis, exploiting what Churchill referred to as the ‘Soft underbelly of Europe’. So efforts like the Ultra decrypt would continue, but be set back a year or two. There is then a good chance that if the Germans are careful, such a deception could work. If this is not the case then the Mediterranean Axis has to be by passed for the time being ,while the Soviets are brought to there knees. The Soviet Union can’t be allowed to arm to war time levels for a year prior to any invasion.

Redirecting the DAK/Italian strategic effort from North Africa to Turkey through the Caucasus, assuming Soviet war .
In North Africa the German –Italian alliance amassed an army of ~12 divisions by the end of 1941, of which all but 4 were Italian. The Italians had colonies in North Africa, so they could not completely abandon them , like wise most of these divisions were infantry & motorized which would not all be suitable for operations in the Caucasus Region, although to be fair the region is ½ rugged mountain terrain. The logistical effort directed by the Axis into N Africa, amounted to an average of about 70,000 tons supplies per month including supplies for army ,air force and shipping to get there [roughly 8,000 tons shipping; 8,000 tons air force & 54,000 tons army].

The Italians had to divert 100,000 tons warships to escort 20,000 tons merchant shipping to achieve this which turned the RN into Commerce raiders and forced the Italians into costly escort missions. The Italian navy did alright considering they were fighting the RN, with about 90-95% of these supplies getting through to N Africa. However the portage in North Africa was very poor and became a critical choke point slowing, what Axis supplies could be offloaded and potentially dictating when campaigns could begin and end. But the problem was immensely compounded by the poor cross land transport system ,that consumed the bulk of this tonnage in critical petrol strategic fuel. In the worse cases it allowed only ¼ of these supplies to get through. It appears Rommel’s neglect of the rail network was to blame here, as he could have doubled his supplies at destination by exploiting, investing and expanding the railway network. However had he a suitable port nearer , that could have also aided the fuel/provisions/ammo situation.

We don’t have as much of that problem with the Turkey-Caucasus direction since most is railway , but it does constitute a 1500km extension from the Eastern Front start line. That means any logistics diverted from the eastern front to the Turkish -Soviet boarder has to count on getting only 2/3 of that tonnage to start with, due to the need to transport coal to move the extra distance by train. Since Germany is self sufficient in coal, this is not as much of strategic concern as the fuel to the DAK was.

If we leave 8,000 tons shipping supplies to give the Italians Navy a better fighting chance in Med and divert 80% of the rest through Turkey [ the last 20% going to Italian N African colonial commitments]; we have around 50,000 tons month supplies to work with. Given 8, 000 tons for air force, we are left with 42,000 tons for army needs. The Eastern Front armies in 1941 functioned with a logistical line of about 450,000 tons fuel/provisions/ammo per month, although the deeper they got into Russia, there inability to exploit the Russian rail network , meant they suffered the same problem as Rommel - ending up with something like ¼ of the supplies by the time they reached Moscow. Had they kept the railway line conversion at the pace of advance, that could have increased to 2/3 supplies reaching front lines by Moscow.

In any event, the start line allowed that 450,000 tons supply to support an advance of roughly 150 divisions for ~ 5 months. By point of comparison a Turkey-Caucasus axis @ 45,000 tons per month ,should be able to support 1/10th of this or about 15 divisions base. Baku is about 500km from the Turkish Soviet boarder, so at that distance, the overland supply system should support ¾ of this force or 12 divisional equivalents. With that many divisions two invasion directions could be exploited , one due east to Baku and the other north 500km along the Black Sea coast towards Maikop – Krassnodar, while a mountain army could work north east .

Italy can contribute a mountain Korps with 3 alpine divisions and a motorized Korps with two tank divisions [Tank regiment with 185 light tanks + 24 x 75mm howitzers and an motorized regiment with 2 truck and one motorcycle infantry battalions] plus a infantry division with 3 motorized infantry Regiments with two battalions each and a motorized artillery Regiment with roughly 24 x 75mm howitzers and a dozen 47mm ATGs and a dozen 20mm AAA.

Turkey would have to leave the bulk of its forces to defend its frontiers against possible British military action, but it should be able contribute 6 ‘mountain Brigades’ and maybe 3 x ‘field artillery’ regiments, provided the Germans could supply fuel and provisions and upgrade their weaponry ? These should work through existing German Korps.

”Country's armed forces were composed of 20 infantry divisions, three brigades of mountain troops, one fortress brigade, and five cavalry divisions (including two reserve cavalry divisions) - altogether 132 regiments (60 infantry, six mountain troops, 21 cavalry, eight reserve cavalry, 20 field artillery, 10 heavy artillery, and seven fortress artillery). In early 1941 Turkey established 17 corps headquarters, 43 divisions and three independent infantry brigades, two divisions and one independent cavalry brigade, as well as two mechanized divisions.”

http://members.tripod.com/~marcin_w/index-2.html

The Germans have 4 DAK motorized /Panzer divisions and could form 2 panzer Korps. Since Crete doesn’t happen [since its not needed] they have access to the 7th Parachute Division & 22nd Landing Division [ this was being transformed into a light infantry divisions] & 5th Gebirgs [Mountain] divisions at that time. In theory they have the 6th Gebirgs division which was paired with the 5th Gebirgs in the Balkans fighting under the XXXIX mountain Korps. In addition the XLIX mountain Korps with the 1st and 4th Gebirgs Division are also available but would have to be swapped with other forces, since they were part of the Southern Front.

That’s up to 16 division equivalents to work with. The XLIX German mountain corps & 6th Gebirgs division could be swapped for an Italian Alpine division and two Italian infantry divisions [“Pavia” & “Brescla”?] .Since the Italians already formed a corps to fight in the East for 1941, this in turn could be expanded.

This Axis force ends up with three armies . One mountain army formed with the two German and one Italian Mountain Korps, each with 2 mountain divisions. Meanwhile the Italian XX mechanized Korps “Ariete” “Trieste” tank divisions , and the 6 Turkish mountain brigades, plus 4 x DAK divisions ; two Para/ Air landing division , could be split into three Korps .

Each Korps would be a composite with a Turkish field Artillery Regiment plus pair of Turkish mountain brigades; 1 x panzer division and either a 1 x German motorized infantry Division or one of the Italian armored divisions , plus a special corps with the 7th Para division plus the 22nd Air landing division. One Panzer Korps supported by the special Airborne Korps would leapfrog south east through Tbilist , Kirovabad to Baku , while the other two composite Panzer Korps, should head north along the coast to Maikop-Krassnodar. The mountain army should fight through the mountain passes to Grozny & Malgobek .

The Soviet trans Caucasus Army was mostly new and in the process of being split to form the 44th & 45th Armies . The 40th corps was in Smolensk in June 1941 with the 68th and 108th Rifle, but one month later it was in Caucasus with 31st Rifle & 9th Mountain divisions. The 9th Mountain Division was a veteran unit formed in 1918 and manned the Turkish Soviet Boarder in 1941 , so it should make a good showing. However the 31st was another new divisions having only just been formed in 1940.

The 28th Mechanized corps had just been formed in June 1941 and by July 1941 it was in the process of forming the basis of the 47th Army, so it would not last long. The 23rd Rifle corps was possibly the best unit there having been through Polish invasion and Finland, but it too was just being split to become the basis of the 45th Army in July 1941 in the Tran Caucasus. In fact by July 1941 ,the 138th Mountain Division was whisked off to the 22nd army facing the Southern Front. The 3rd Mountain corps was newly formed in 1940 so it too is unlikely to survive first impact either, but its constituent divisions were all veterans . The 4th Rifle and 47th Mountain divisions were formed in 1920/21 , while the 20th Mountain division was one of the 4 best divisions in the army in Aug 1940. So the 3rd Mountain Corps could turn out to be the toughest Unit to crack.

http://niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41 ... sasus.html

Like the Trans Caucasus Army the North Caucasus 19th Army was reforming with new divisions and corps right in the middle of the Summer of 1941, so should not be effective as a fighting force. The 26th Mechanized corps was newly formed in June 1941 with 2 tank and one motorized division , but by the end of the year it had been disbanded, so it was clearly low quality and should not last long, even with 800 plus tanks. The 64th Rifle Corps was just formed in June 1941 along with its constituent divisions the 165th and 175th Rifle, but by July 1941 had been all shifted to the Kiew military district to shore up front their. The 28th Mountain division was formed in 1935 , but was shifted to RVGK facing Army Group South in July-Aug 1941, so it should account well for itself if its still there .The 157th Rifle division was raised in 1939 and transported with 28th Mountain in July, so if its still there it should do well.

http://niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41 ... casus.html

Generally speaking the unevenness of the Soviet defensive forces suggests some tough fighting for the Axis campaign, however given German infiltration Doctrine, these divisions will be worked around , isolated, contained and pushed into a retreat or disintegrate situation. These Soviet divisions should suffer mostly from poor corps/army command and supply, but the better ones could hold out for weeks or months in the mountains. The Initial line up would pit the roughly 1000 soviet tanks , mostly older T-26 and some BT models, spread out across the Caucasus . Of the 16 soviet divisions , ½ would be mountain divisions, immediately in the Axis path and a second echelon formed with another 6 divisions in the North Caucasus.

The 16 Axis divisions would also be ½ mountain and could likely count on 600-700 tanks in support . About ½ of these Axis tanks should be modern Pz-III/IV, while the rest would be older Panzer-1/II or lighter Italian tanks. Faced with more difficult odds on the other Eastern Fronts [more that twice as many Soviet tanks] , the Germans divisions/Korps , blew right through the Soviet forces and dashed 400km within a 2 week period. Only in the south where the Soviets out numbered the Germans nearly 4:1 did the advance rate slow, getting about 200km advance after a 2 week period. In those encounters the Germans may have achieved exchange ratios of up to 7:1 in tank battles. With that back drop, its mostly likely the Germans will blast right through the soviet divisions/corps and have Panzer Korps in Baku & Maikop after about ~2-3 weeks.

If redirected after Balkans and instead of Crete and N Africa, the Luftwaffe should be able to muster the following aircraft for an operation launched into the Caucasus .These would include Fliegerkorps X & VIII, amassing
400 x He-111 & Ju-88 medium bombers
300 x Stuka dive bombers
90 x Me-109 fighters
130 x Me-110-C4 long range fighters
60 x Me-110-C5? Recon patrol planes
In addition up to 500 Ju-52 transport planes could be channeled out of Lufthansa/Luftwaffe to fill temporary transportation needs.

There is an airfield at Van on the Van Gola lake , which is about 600km west of Baku , that places it within striking radius of Luftwaffe long range bomber and transport missions. There is also an airfield at Erzurum, which is also about the eastern extent of the Turkish railway network . The Erzurum airfield is about 750km north east of Baku which means its outside even long range Ju-52 transport radius. On route to Baku there are also soviet airfields at Tbilist and Kirovabad that could be seized from the line of march and converted for Luftwaffe usage later in the campaign. Given the small size of the Turkish air force, their airfields would most likely require some extensive construction work before they could be made ready for campaign usage. This most likely would proceed from the start of Axis participation ,with or without the planned Soviet mission, since they would be also well placed for any campaign launched south through Syria-Palestine axis.

Soviet frontal Aviation counted something like 1000-1200 aircraft over ½ of which would be obsolete short range fighters only good for point defense. In addition ¼ would have been long and short range bombers with few modern bombers, while the rest would be recon and transport. Of these 10% would be none operational and most of the pilots for the rest had few hours training . Some sources site only 18 flying hours average in some front line aviation units. Given the qualitative superiority of the German tactical planes, pilot training [200-250 flying hours] and sheer accumulated combat experience its little doubt what the out come of such a battle would be. Even with a numerical superiority in the western front ranging from 2:1 to 5:1 depending on source, most aviation units were wiped out during Barbarossa. They lost 17,500 planes in 1941 of which over ½ were lost in the first couple of months in the western front. In fact 1489 planes were lost in strikes on the first day, which represented about 20% of the Aviation strength in Western Russia at that time. Within a week this figure would reach 4000 , over ½ the front line strength. Soviet air power is unlikely to play any significant role in this operation.
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay ... a/AP21.htm


Baku oil raid
http://www.geocities.com/hjunkers/ju_ju52_a1.htm
Ju-52/3m4ge has a 1500km range and can carry 17 troops or 2.4 tons at speed up to 195mph. Under extreme conditions this should allow for a 600km round trip to drop paratroopers , however at that range they are unlikely to be able to carry more than 1/3 payload or ~6 paratroopers /800kg payload. If the Crete Ju-52 invasion fleet is instead redirected into Turkey to launch a paratrooper drop into Baku ,an attempt can be made to seize the oil fields from the start to prevent or at least limit the destruction of the precious fields . This could allow an armada of about ~200 Ju-52/3m4ge escorted by the 130 x Me-110 twin engined fighters to drop a 600 troop parachute battalion and 80 tons weaponry/ammo, in one wave. This would be enough for a paratrooper battalion equipped with 1x 75mm LG40 gun ; 4 x PzBsh 41 ATR ; 30 x HMG/LMG ; 9 x 50mm Mortars & 6 x 81mm Mortars plus 3 days of combat and a weeks provisions.

To help this force get through unmolested, it would be helpful if the entire 400 Bombers force launched preemptive strikes on known Soviet air fields and mount raids along the route to Baku attacking know troop concentrations. It would be best if these sortie were conducted before and during the transport armadas trip to divert Soviet air forces . Meanwhile the drop tank equipped Me-109 should be able to seize control over the forward battlefield , allowing the Stuka to strike soviet troop concentrations and supply lines ahead of the rampaging Panzer columns.

The Ju-52 transport armada should be able to fly the 600km from the Van airfield , straight to Baku, provided they get Me-110 fighter sweeps and escorts. Since the Me-110 fighter has endurance of 5-6 hours @ 250mph econocruise, this should not be as much of a problem. At @ 150mph cruise speed , it should take the Ju-52/3m4ge about 3 hours to reach the oil fields and drop the paratroopers.

In Each of the following 3 days, additional battalions from the 7th Parachute Divisions would be dropped in, each equipped the same , while the force establishes control over the oil fields and then the airport. Once an airfield can be established fuel could be stored to refill Ju-52 and extend their payload , thus speeding up deployment. Each flight @ ¾ of max distance should consume ¾ fuel, but would require 2 tons aviation gas for the return trip, airlifted ahead to Baku. That should take ~8 drops @ 800kg payload , to stockpile enough fuel for 3 return fights @ 2.4 tons payload. Since however 11 direct flights @ 0.8 tons a piece, could drop more payload [8.8 tons vs 7.2 tons ], such a method may not be worth the effort.

One thing such an ‘airhead’ could do, would be to allow return trips for wounded and damaged equipment, which could make a morale difference. Another would be to fly in Oil experts to assess damage and what repairs would be needed. After a week the advancing Panzer troops should occupy Tbilist and Krovabad anyway, offering opportunities to shorten the air bridge to Baku, allowing a second paratrooper Regiment to be airlifted in the second week . In addition supplies to sustain both Regiments for another couple of weeks could also be airlifted. By the end of the third week the panzer spearhead should be approaching Baku making any further airlifts redundant.

[AloneWolf]

Well, I just wanna add my opinions and give some further info about Inonu and Turkey's political situation in WW2... Inonu was a fox who was into status quo , thats why Ataturk chose him as his successor , Ataturk wanted someone who wouldn't risk his reforms, plainly save the country as it is.. Inonu was not a Great Leader, who could make policies, could change destinies but he was trustworthy and good at political games to preserve his position...
Meanwhile you shouldn't miss the chance of his replacement. There were very strong local pan-turkist movements and leaders at that moment (like this guy : Huseyin Nihal Atsiz http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%BCsey ... Ats%C4%B1z )
and Inonu couldn't act against them with the fear of Wermacht till the end of war.. Than he jailed them all..

BTW, never underestimate Turkic ties of Turkey, Local pan-turkists were working very hard to coordinate all Turkic world from Azerbaijan (not only the current azerbaijan state but also iranian Azerbaijan with 30 million additional population) to Chinese wall (Uighurs) including Central Asia for a possible campaign.. Uighur Turks even founded a state called Sarki Turkestan (Eastern Turkestan) between 1944-1949 which was occupied later by Han Chinese ...

There were also a lot of special envoys of Hitler who were working in Turkestan (Central Asia) mainly in Alma-Aty, Tashkent etc.. There were an organization called Cultural Society of German-Turkestan Friendly Relations founded with the order of Hitler himself ... And also local Turkish Pan-Turkists were related with this organization..

So I can simply say, if joined, Turkey's priority target would be passing Caucasia to Asia with an offensive against Russians... and would stay in defensive, or limited offensives to the regions where Turkish minorities lives in M.E. and Balkan...

[Baltasar]

You clearly failed to see the point of my post.

You clearly and repeatedly fail to formulate your point(s) of view in a way for others to follow. Just writing a single sentence or two doesn't contribute to a topic in any way.

[LWD]

Getting back to an assesment of possible launching of operations from Turkey into USSR.

In any Axis war it would make most sense to occupy the UK after the defeat of the Allies in France ....

This only makes sence if there is some reasonable way to do so. Sea Lion was never going to succeed and it's doubtful that the much of the German high command ever really planned on trying it. So this variant is DOA.