If Japan have attacked Russia and not the Usa?

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ThomasG
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#76

Post by ThomasG » 06 Dec 2007, 16:55

Jon G. wrote: You left out what happened in April. Japan signed a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. Something which the Germans had suggested. So much for Axis coordination of plans.
The non-aggression treaty was a piece of paper which improved the Japanese prospects of success if they decided to invade the USSR as it would increase the element of surprise. I wouldn't give it any deeper significance.
As I understand it, Matsuoka was so antagonistic towards the US that he was eventually sacked in July 1941, by which time Japan had definitely decided to strike south, rather than north.
He had enough understanding of Japan's political and military position and the fact that he advocated an invasion to the USSR in the capacity of the Foreign Minister at least proves that this was a realistic option seriously considered, IMHO.

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#77

Post by ThomasG » 06 Dec 2007, 17:29

LWD wrote: This seams to at least some extent to be counter factual. The Japanese knew how many BBs and CVs and lesser ships we were building in 41 and were committed to building in 42 it's part of the congressional record. They knew in a long war they would be over powered. Thier miscalculation had more to do with the emotional and political impact of the the attack on PH.
Yes. The point is that they miscalculated, anyway.
If the embargo remains then Japan's situation is worse in say mid 42 than it was in late 41. They have significantly less fuel and a few more ships. On the other hand the US has a bunch more ships and planes the Philipines and PH have been further fortified and the US military in gerneral is much stonger. They have lost ground and are relativly weaker. Further more the US and allies have even more reason to insist Japan relinquish her conquest, this is especially true of the war in Europe has concluded.
Yes but Japan was in no position to fight a war against the US, anyway. After the shocking attack to Pearl Harbor the US aimed to the unconditional surrender of Japan without any compromise. If there is no Pearl Harbor why would the US aim to crush the Japanese empire?

There were no vital US interests in Asia and FDR infamously neglected the Pacific theater in favor of Europe. Troops in Corregidor were left to the mercy of the Japanese and China was neglected because L&L aid to Britain and the Soviet Union took precedence. FDR's decision to start the oil embargo gave the Japanese in their majority view essentially two choices: a desperate attempt to conquer SE Asia or a "shameful" retreat to the home isles. I am arguing that a third option, an invasion the USSR, existed. The war with Japan provoked by FDR was still merely a backdoor to bring the US to the war against Germany. Pat Buchanan has written more about this in his books and articles.
http://www.amconmag.com/09_08_03/buchanan.html

The defeat of the USSR will in my opinion remove the possibilities of a successful war against Germany at least to the extent that the war would not be declared by the US if the Soviets have been defeated and Britain would make peace to preserve her empire.
Furthermore your statement "an invasion to the Soviet Union with Germany and that invasion had every chance to succeed according to the best wisdom of contemporary strategists"[b/] seams to me to be a reach unless you are using a very strange definiont of "best wisdom".

The German and Western Allied strategists both underestimated the Red Army and expected that the war in the Soviet Union would be short and the USSR decisively defeated, AFAIK.


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#78

Post by LWD » 06 Dec 2007, 19:17

ThomasG wrote: Yes but Japan was in no position to fight a war against the US, anyway. After the shocking attack to Pearl Harbor the US aimed to the unconditional surrender of Japan without any compromise. If there is no Pearl Harbor why would the US aim to crush the Japanese empire?
But attacking the Soviet Union is going to increase the probabilty of war with the US (given no PH attack) while rendering the Japanese relativly weaker. The US policy was that the Japanese should get out of China. Given the treatment of the Koreans and Roosevelts anticolonial policy I don't see much chance the Japanese keep any mainland possesions after loosing a war. Formosa might be left under Japanese control but I'm pretty sure the Chinese would ask for it and I suspect the US would have agreed with them.
There were no vital US interests in Asia and FDR infamously neglected the Pacific theater in favor of Europe. Troops in Corregidor were left to the mercy of the Japanese and China was neglected because L&L aid to Britain and the Soviet Union took precedence.
That depends on what you consider "vital". Certainly the US had important ecomic interest in Asia.
Saying FDR "infamously neglected" the Pacific is putting a rather unjustifiably negative spin on it. The US planners realised before the war that a quick thrust across the Pacific wasn't possible. If the Japanese had waited another 6 months or so the Philipines might have been defenceable but as it was they weren't. Given that and that Germany looked like the more serious threat the Europe first policy was entirely justified. LL aid to Britain and the SU had little to do with it.
FDR's decision to start the oil embargo gave the Japanese in their majority view essentially two choices: a desperate attempt to conquer SE Asia or a "shameful" retreat to the home isles. I am arguing that a third option, an invasion the USSR, existed. The war with Japan provoked by FDR was still merely a backdoor to bring the US to the war against Germany.
That is far from clear and probably incorect. I've read that Churchill was initially despondent over the Japanese attack becasuse he thought it would focus the US attention elsewhere as well as demand British assets. The German declartion of war reversed this rather spectacularly. Furthermore I believe the US policys toward Japan in regards to China predate the war in Europe.
The German and Western Allied strategists both underestimated the Red Army and expected that the war in the Soviet Union would be short and the USSR decisively defeated, AFAIK.
Some may have. I submit that this would call into question whether or not they deserve the title of "best".

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#79

Post by LWD » 06 Dec 2007, 19:21

Jon G. wrote:....
In other words, the rail network east of the Urals would be able to transport about the same amount of oil which could be found in much nearer Sakhalin....
And this assumes a relativly intact Soviet rail network. As it was the Soviets lost a lot of cars and locamotives. I suspect these losses would be even higher in a situation where they fought a war in the east as well, lost on both fronts, and didn't get much if any in the way of LL.

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#80

Post by LWD » 06 Dec 2007, 19:54

ThomasG wrote: Pat Buchanan has written more about this in his books and articles.
http://www.amconmag.com/09_08_03/buchanan.html
Let's take a look at that in some detail.
Buchanan writes:
In 1937, following a clash on the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping, Japan and China went to war. For four years they fought, with Japan controlling the coasts and China the interior. For three years of this war, America saw no vital interest at risk and remained uninvolved.

But when Japan joined the Axis and occupied Indochina, FDR sent military aid to Chiang Kai-shek under lend-lease and approved the dispatch of the Flying Tigers to fight against Japan. He ordered B-17s to Manila to prepare to attack Japan’s home islands.
but according to: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/88734.htm
n 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formalized U.S. aid to China. The U.S. Government extended credits to the Chinese Government for the purchase of war supplies, as it slowly began to tighten restrictions on Japan. The United States was the main supplier of the oil, steel, iron, and other commodities needed by the Japanese military as it became bogged down by Chinese resistance but, in January, 1940, Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States. Although this did not lead to an immediate embargo, it meant that the Roosevelt Administration could now restrict the flow of military supplies into Japan and use this as leverage to force Japan to halt its aggression in China. After January 1940, the United States combined a strategy of increasing aid to China through larger credits and the Lend-Lease program with a gradual move towards an embargo on the trade of all militarily useful items with Japan.

..... First, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940 and thereby linked the conflicts in Europe and Asia. This made China a potential ally in the global fight against fascism.
Note that US invovlment inte way of aid to China predates Japan joining the axis.

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#81

Post by Jon G. » 07 Dec 2007, 11:43

ThomasG wrote:
Jon G. wrote: You left out what happened in April. Japan signed a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. Something which the Germans had suggested. So much for Axis coordination of plans.
The non-aggression treaty was a piece of paper which improved the Japanese prospects of success if they decided to invade the USSR as it would increase the element of surprise. I wouldn't give it any deeper significance.
The Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact wasn't made simply to make the Soviets relax their guard. It was actually only a neutrality pact, since it just stipulated that either country would remain neutral in the event of war with a third party, thus giving no particular incentive for the Soviets to slim down their forces in the Far East.

Prior to Barbarossa quiet borders in mainland Asia was more of a Japanese concern than it was a Soviet aim. Barbarossa changed that of course - look up 'Axis strategic coordination' and tell me what you find in that context if you please - but by then Japan had already embarked on her 'strike south' strategy. The April 1941 treaty ensured that China was isolated from the north; Japan's incursion into - and eventual seizure of - French Indochina means that the Soviet-Japanese treaty should be seen as a defensive measure, aimed to give Japan free hands as she was striking south.
As I understand it, Matsuoka was so antagonistic towards the US that he was eventually sacked in July 1941, by which time Japan had definitely decided to strike south, rather than north.
He had enough understanding of Japan's political and military position and the fact that he advocated an invasion to the USSR in the capacity of the Foreign Minister at least proves that this was a realistic option seriously considered, IMHO.
You don't think that Matsuoka's ousting had anything to do with the American oil embargo? Or the fact that Japan de facto already was pursuing a southern strategy in SE Asia both before and after Barbarossa?

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#82

Post by webmill » 07 Dec 2007, 13:53

if Japan were to attack the Soviet Union at the start of Operation Barbarossa June 22,'41 , that the Japanese offensive would, instead, be mostly infantry div(cheap on Oil) and its goal would be to cut the Trans-Siberian railway in order to assist the Germans (which indirectly would be assisting the Japanese in their future conflict with the US.)
Controlling additional Sahilin Oil aspect has been covered previously on this thread.
Japan would carefully conserve almost all Oil reserves for the future naval war with the US.I believe.
If this scenario that becomes the new Japanese Far East Front, then much depends on how the Soviet High Command deals and reacts with the new Japanese positions on their Trans-siberian railroad, plus any (possibly foolish) Japanese probes sent further than the Rail line.. (with US help on the way when it gets there)

I would think the Soviet high Command would realize the most valuable asset the Far east army had was the two tank divs with its T-34s;The Germans were still weak in anti tank guns) The Far East mortars would be useful also. and therefore after learning of the disaster of the battle of Minsk; the Russians might make the decision to have the Soviet far east Armored divs fight their way to the East Front; trying to get around the Japanese railline blocking positions and resume the Trans siberian railline at the soonest possible point to rail on to Moscow.( the Soviet Far East armor would have to be smart about thier current fuel supplies as they fight along I would think in such move)

the effects of a Japanese front on the Soviet defense against Operation Barbarossa in my opinion should happen. The success of the Blitzkrieg onslaught during the first month and a half would be on all German Army Group Fronts; North, Center,and South, would play out the same.; the Battle of Minsk and the battle of Smolensk encirclements would take take place exactly the same.

But however, the start of a Japanese Front in June 1941, might change some Russian operational decisions during Barbarossa. For example, after the Battle of Smolensk friom July 6 to Aug 5 (with some continued Russian fighting up until (sept 10 )

because the Japanese, as part of the Axis would accept Nazi domination of Russia. Even at this stage of the war not all Russians soldiers fully comprehended the gravity of their situation--subjugation by the Nazi Armies.
Russian Generals might over react on the German Front because of this.

the Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk both disasters for the Soviet Army might not happen to the same extent. Russian Generals might over react to a Japanese invasion in the Far East, as part of their panic and pull troops out to protect the soon to be Ural factories; this would be uneccessary as it would take a year and half for a Japanese probe, if the Japanese tried and probably would not, to reach these factories but upon realizing this the Soviets would put their spared troops, now an additional reserve, back into the front after the winter gave Russia a breathing spell and relief.
As Operation Typhoon started on Sept 30. The Russians might adopt a altered strategy of giving up Moscow if necessary for a deeper and safer retreat into the hinterlands of Russia. Therefore there would not be 500,000 to 600,000 Soviet troops available for the Vyazma-Bryansk defense lines.and therefore less Soviet prisoners when the German Panzer pincers struck again.

The Russians would have relied as they did in the origanl battle,,, on the German Panzer forces overextending their supply lines; as the Germans had to covert Russian rails to German gauge. Also rains in Oct slow the Panzers and their supply with Mud. Father Winter after that will take care of the rest for Russia.in terms of a more deserted front before the Germans.on the way to Moscow.

A Russian counter offensives hitting overextended German Panzer probes would probably still take place,although on a smaller scale, but these Panzers could be in Moscow.

the costly Stalin Offensives, over the objections of Zukov for example starting in Jan 1942, would not take place due to Japanese panic and thus 600,000 to 1,000,000 Soviet casualties would be spared the Soviet Union at a time there would be critically needed later in 1942. These are all speculations.Although there would be fewer German casualties; delaying the German Campaign, in any way as the US gears up its war production sooner is in the ultimate Russian favor . Soon in the future huge attritional battles are in store for the Wehrmacht on the East Front later anyway.

This What If situation goes far enough that the US would seek to give the Russian the bazooka as early as possible because now the Russians can use it;

American/Allied pilots would now have to take the East front causing some relief in improving air combat exchanges on the Luftwaffe--which would make a difference. when it kicks in probably sometime in 42

If all this works out the Germans stand to lose at least as much as they would gain by a second Japanese front in June 1941--down the road and within two months

The Russian would take their partisan war to a higher level; and deliberately inflitrate thousands of now available soldiers to fight and attrit behind German line more effectively than they did during the actual war. Taking severe partisan causualties here, although hopefully making up for delayed casualties on the German Army.

Previous posts have been excellent on this thread: Pointing out Japans Oil situation, probability of US entry into the war because of Japan actions; and showing the Trans Siberian railway; Japan futility in taking Siberia or occupying Vladistock ; and where Japan would lose in starting a Russian Front; And on the Chinese-Japanese front

I hope my post here adds another dimesion to the discussion.
Last edited by webmill on 07 Dec 2007, 20:43, edited 1 time in total.

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#83

Post by Lkefct » 07 Dec 2007, 17:45

I am not sure that the attacks in the east is going to change how the Soviets fight in the western USSR. The distances and the amount of rail transport capacity are so great, that at least for a while, the Soviets are going to have to make due with the forces on hand. Given the distances involved in the east, and the lack of effective tanks, this should be adequate. The soviets do not need to oppose the Japanese, so they can easily achieve a local superiority wherever they choose. then using a pincer attack they would encircle a sizable Japanese force, reduce the pocket and repeat as necessary. Given the woeful shortage of Japanese AT gun and artillery, there is not much the Japanese can do. In any case, if they can hold their own (or win), then the attack in Siberia is almost by definition a total failure.

FWIW, my understanding is that other then some pre-production t-34's (A-20's) and probably a handful of tanks delivered before the war, there are few if any t-34 in the east. We can be fairly sure of this as historical analysis has shown that even in 1945, the Soviet attacking force was composed mostly of t-26 and BT light tanks. The Soviets do not necessarily need a massive technical superiority, as they would have a numerical superiority at the point of contact. The other thing that ensures victory (IMHO) is that the terrain is very well suited to armored operations. It is flat and very, very open. This means that the Japanese infantry are going to be exposed to massed tank attacks with heavy artillery support in nearly western desert like conditions (at least as far s the soviets are concerned.

I am also not sure how you can think that the Soviets would retreat from the Ukraine to fall back to Moscow. While that is certainly desirable, the roads and rail in the Soviet Union mostly converge on Moscow, but the AGC advance has already cut the direct route to Moscow for the majority of the troops in the Ukraine. They would have to retreat east and then go back north. Given that many have to disengage battle with the Germans, outrace the Germans to the east, I am not sure that they are really capable of that.

One major consideration is the Soviets made a very conscious effort to engage and defeat the Germans near the border of Poland. This may have been at least in part due to all the purges where vast numbers of experienced officers where killed and not adequately replaced. Also, given the ideological and political pressures on Stalin may not have been exceptable to retreat and fight later, which was the historical response to invaders. Certainly the Germans had expected this response and where pleasantly surprised when they where able to engage and destroy the Soviet army near the frontier. In any case, the majority of the heavy losses where caused to the Germans after the weather changed. The Soviet defenses even as late as the start of Typhoon where laughable due to the uncoordinated nature and nonexistent tactical counterattacks. IF the Germans drive directly on Moscow (and the defense of the city) that determines the outcome, not the character of the fighting before hand. German losses until Moscow where very light, with around 200,000 on the whole front by late July/August (out of 3,000,000 troops initially), compared to (based on German estimates) about 1.24 million captured, and possible as many more killed and missing, with maybe that same amount more wounded (so between 2.4-3.6 million out of action since the invasion), the Soviet prewar army is basically wiped out. The Soviet won using newly mobilized units, so it really doesn't matter if they pull those initial men back or not. It also should be pointed out that the Soviet attacks in this period where not very effective in terms of causing casualties. They are one sided affairs, as Soviet communications are often in the clear, German air reconnaissance was very clear, Soviet have little or no air support.recon of their own, the Soviets have poor tactical leadership due to the purges and the tactical situation is normally quite bleak.

The last point to be made is that I am not sure that the idea of attacking the trans Siberian railroad is such a good motivation. I am not so sure it was obvious that the US would come to the Soviets aid in the lend lease. Could they have done so at the same scale had they not gone to war with Japan, and the ensuing economic mobilization? In any case, most of the initial war materials that where used by the soviets where done so via Murmansk. The more substantial supplies that the US sent came somewhat latter. This is not to suggest that even the Japanese would not anticipate some help to the Soviets, but rather the scale of it. Is it worth fighting a war over unless it occurs on teh massive scale that it did occur historically, and would they have anticipated that sort of scale.

lastly, I know LWD thinks that it must have been obvious that the Japanese would be crushed by the US, but that is not the case. After all, historically, Japan did launch their attack at pearl harbor. AS listed before, if you try to estimate how long it would take to rebuild the US fleet to attack japan based on their own industrial performance, it would be a great many years. Hitler also did the same, expecting that it would be 1943 before the US could even begin to lend any real aid to the allies and 1945 before the a majority of the economy is switched over. Using their own economic experience, these are reasonable estimates (A little long, but the US was not near as close to being in a war time economy as either axis power). The US performed a small miracle in quickly converting over to a wartime economy much faster then anyone else did. If you also include the preparations for ship construction and such that had been implemented but not finished, it gave the US an advantage that the Axis would have had difficulty foreseeing.

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#84

Post by LWD » 07 Dec 2007, 20:04

Lkefct wrote:....
lastly, I know LWD thinks that it must have been obvious that the Japanese would be crushed by the US, but that is not the case. After all, historically, Japan did launch their attack at pearl harbor. AS listed before, if you try to estimate how long it would take to rebuild the US fleet to attack japan based on their own industrial performance, it would be a great many years. Hitler also did the same, expecting that it would be 1943 before the US could even begin to lend any real aid to the allies and 1945 before the a majority of the economy is switched over. Using their own economic experience, these are reasonable estimates (A little long, but the US was not near as close to being in a war time economy as either axis power). The US performed a small miracle in quickly converting over to a wartime economy much faster then anyone else did. If you also include the preparations for ship construction and such that had been implemented but not finished, it gave the US an advantage that the Axis would have had difficulty foreseeing.
It was obvious even to the Japanese that they could not win a long war. The whole intent of PH was to induce a moral failure in the US and end the war quickly. Look at it this way the Japanese sunk 5 BBs at PH total of ~150,000 tons. At this time the US had the following BBs under construction, ordered, or working up North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Kentucky for a total of ~480,000 tons more than 3 times the tonnage sunk at PH and an order of magnitude more than was ultimtly lost there. The 5 BB's of the Montana class were also authorized in July of 1940. At the time of PH the Japanese have only the 3 Yamato class BBs under constuction. Also note that 11 Essex class CVs were ordered prior to PH. While the magnitude of the US wartime production may not have been fully realized it was clear that it would be massive.

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#85

Post by Lkefct » 08 Dec 2007, 03:58

But how long would it take Japan to produce similar quantities of the material ordered? The US had also sold off 50 DD to the UK and Canada, sent a sizable chunk of the US fleet to the Atlantic. They are just beginning to build an air force (by most countries standards). The US has also just undertaken a massive civilian building program for Lend Lease shipping for both the US and Commonwealth merchant marine. The loss of the ships, plus the time necessary to rebuild the fleet would have been substantial. I doubt anyone in the US or Japan would have seriously contemplated seeking terms immediately. But the if the Japanese could strike the PH blow, followed by a couple of other blows, then the US has no fleet and by Japanese reckoning, a decade or more to rebuilding a new fleet, then they would probably think that the US is forced to seek terms. As a case in point, consider the US situation if they had lost Midway. Then what would have happened if the fleet was somewhat behind what the actual building was? Imagine if the Essex class carriers where built on BB or BC hulls rather then a custom hull? It might well have taken decades to rebuild the fleet to the levels desired, and the IJN might have had the chance to destory it as it was committed piecemeal. Yes, in hindsight we know, I am just suggesting that given hindsight things where very likely less obvious to people working with different base knowledge and their own prejudices of the day.

Based on how long it took everyone else to build ships, I think there is less madness to their method then some think. The US economic miracle was in large part because the US military had such a bleak situation forced upon them. I doubt any other major power (before or since) would have let the various industrial powers have nearly as much say in how the economic expansion was done.

I also suspect that one of the IJN problems was in the design of the plan. It is my understanding that the original plan allowed for more attack waves depending on how the attack progressed. Nagumo may have considered his mission done when the BB where destroyed. With another strike or 2 on the smaller ships, dry docks and tank farms, the USN might have been crippled for much longer. Did the IJN intend to target these or leave the attack to the discretion of the local commander? If it was up to him, then his decision to not wreck the base cost his country dearly.

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#86

Post by Michael Emrys » 08 Dec 2007, 09:34

Nagumo was being discrete in holding off additional attack waves for several reasons. One is that the two he had launched had already used up most of the aviation fuel and munitions onboard the carriers and there was no replenishment available in his task force. Since the location of the US carriers was unknown, and it's a sure bet that had he run into them they would have been looking for bear, it would have been folly in that circumstance to have left his force unable to meet the enemy armed. Also, check the timing. By the time the existing waves could have completed recovery, been rearmed and refueled, spotted and launched, flown to PH and engaged in an attack (against an alerted and angry defense), then returned to the carriers, darkness would have been falling. How good were the Japanese naval aviators at nighttime carrier landings?

Plus, the tank farms might not have been so easy to destroy. Damage, yes, but there were a lot of tanks and hitting one would not guarantee that its neighbors would go with it. All told, Nagumo would not consider the possible gain worth the risk of losing aircraft and hard to replace crews, as well as putting his ships at risk.

"Hindsight is a wonderful thing," but unlike us, the man on the spot was not blessed with it, and based on what he did know and could reasonably surmise, his actions do not seem to me that ill-chosen. If you want to fault someone, the top leadership of the country which was so immured in militaristic imperialism that it led the country into a futile war strikes me as a more worthy target.

Michael

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#87

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Dec 2007, 17:45

Michael Emrys wrote:Nagumo was being discrete in holding off additional attack waves for several reasons. One is that the two he had launched had already used up most of the aviation fuel and munitions onboard the carriers and there was no replenishment available in his task force. Since the location of the US carriers was unknown, and it's a sure bet that had he run into them they would have been looking for bear, it would have been folly in that circumstance to have left his force unable to meet the enemy armed. Also, check the timing. By the time the existing waves could have completed recovery, been rearmed and refueled, spotted and launched, flown to PH and engaged in an attack (against an alerted and angry defense), then returned to the carriers, darkness would have been falling. How good were the Japanese naval aviators at nighttime carrier landings?

Plus, the tank farms might not have been so easy to destroy. Damage, yes, but there were a lot of tanks and hitting one would not guarantee that its neighbors would go with it. All told, Nagumo would not consider the possible gain worth the risk of losing aircraft and hard to replace crews, as well as putting his ships at risk.

"Hindsight is a wonderful thing," but unlike us, the man on the spot was not blessed with it, and based on what he did know and could reasonably surmise, his actions do not seem to me that ill-chosen. If you want to fault someone, the top leadership of the country which was so immured in militaristic imperialism that it led the country into a futile war strikes me as a more worthy target.

Michael
Very recently I 'gamed' Nagumos third strike decsion, changing the names & other small details to mask the historical situation. All three people the situation was posed to choose to forgo the third strike. Interestinly two of the three were willing to hang around a extra day in hope of catching the remaining enemy fleet at sea, seeing that as a better payoff for the risk that striking at the fuel supply. When the larger context of supporting subsequent strikes elswhere in the theatre in short order was added to the game the players saw a third strike as a much lower payoff. They all saw the fuel supply as the priority and with enemy morale expected to colapse anyway residual fleet elements could be dealt with after the primary goal was gained.

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#88

Post by Lkefct » 09 Dec 2007, 19:31

My point is that like Adolph Hitler's invasion of Russia, senior leaders often fail to understand the primary objectives of the operations they are making. In a similar way that Hitler stopped the advance on Moscow prevented the German army from maintain the advance on Moscow during good weather may have lost the war, The IJN did not compelte the job of destroying the Pacific fleet. Nagumo did temporarily neutralize the Pacific fleet, but lacked the foresight to complete the strategic gamble. Since level bombers of the day had little success at dropping bombs on warships and the BB where not the striking arm of the USN, he really had not accomplished the true objective of mission. Had he carried out the attack , it would have improved the prospects of IJN operations in the pacific, and made the USN major base of operations the west coast, making rapid responses to IJN operations nearly impossible at a time when the IJN already had the initiative. Yes, there was a risk both to his own pilots and fleets. He was in position to achieve the objective which is to prevent and American response to Japanese moves in the south.

A Japanese attack vs Russia doesn't accomplish anything if they are successful. They gain no strategic minerals. No way of getting them back to Japan. It exposes the overstretched (even before the attack) IJA. The only way it achieves anything positive for Japan is if the Soviets let themselves be destroyed. If they choose the Soviet historical response to the invasion (which was their initial move to Japanese aggression in the past), they can retain the initiative and use their mobility to achieve local superiority and destroy the IJA using maneuver and firepower. The Soviets did not need the men that where there holding down the front, and in fact their drive on Moscow was defeated without them.

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#89

Post by LWD » 10 Dec 2007, 00:38

Lkefct wrote:But how long would it take Japan to produce similar quantities of the material ordered?
The Japanese had the 3 Yamatos under constuction and less than half dozen CVs as I understand. They had a pretty good idea that the US could build a BB or CV in less than three years and some of them were either complete or well under constuction.
The US had also sold off 50 DD to the UK and Canada, sent a sizable chunk of the US fleet to the Atlantic.
The DDs were WWI models. Many more newer ones were under construction. The Atlantic fleet wasn't porportinally that much different than earlier.
They are just beginning to build an air force (by most countries standards).
Not to speak of their army. However the US had built up their infrastructure. Not saying that the extent of the US industrial might was fully realized by the Japanese but they knew enough to know that in the long run they couldn't win.
As a case in point, consider the US situation if they had lost Midway. Then what would have happened if the fleet was somewhat behind what the actual building was? Imagine if the Essex class carriers where built on BB or BC hulls rather then a custom hull? It might well have taken decades to rebuild the fleet to the levels desired, and the IJN might have had the chance to destory it as it was committed piecemeal.
If the US had lost at Midway then they would have hunkered down at Pearl until the Essex class CVs and new BBs were ready. Since the state of (at least in general terms) ship building wasn't classified the Japanese would have had a pretty good idea what was under construction and how long it would take to complete.
I also suspect that one of the IJN problems was in the design of the plan. It is my understanding that the original plan allowed for more attack waves depending on how the attack progressed. Nagumo may have considered his mission done when the BB where destroyed. With another strike or 2 on the smaller ships, dry docks and tank farms, the USN might have been crippled for much longer. Did the IJN intend to target these or leave the attack to the discretion of the local commander? If it was up to him, then his decision to not wreck the base cost his country dearly.
A third strike on 7 December could well have cost the Japanese a great deal of their primary striking power. The targets that were left were for the most part pretty hard targets and against alert defences their losses could have been prohibitive. Especially since the third strike probably would have had to land after dark and I seem to recall hearing of a worsening weather situation that would have effected CV ops.
Lkefct wrote: A Japanese attack vs Russia doesn't accomplish anything if they are successful. They gain no strategic minerals. No way of getting them back to Japan. It exposes the overstretched (even before the attack) IJA. The only way it achieves anything positive for Japan is if the Soviets let themselves be destroyed. If they choose the Soviet historical response to the invasion (which was their initial move to Japanese aggression in the past), they can retain the initiative and use their mobility to achieve local superiority and destroy the IJA using maneuver and firepower. The Soviets did not need the men that where there holding down the front, and in fact their drive on Moscow was defeated without them.
Now that I fully agree with.

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Lkefct
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#90

Post by Lkefct » 11 Dec 2007, 16:56

Ship building for most countries is about the # of hulls you can lay down at once. It really doesn't matter that much about anything else, they all take about the same length of time to build (more or less). So if Japan figures that the US is already full of ships under construction, then that's it unless the Japanese scrap them and start over (as far as the Japanese estimates are concerned). I suspect the Japanese figured the US was completely using all possibly ship building capacity to build warship and merchant ships, meaning it would be several years before the existing production can finish and new construction to offset the ships lost at Pearl can be undertaken. If you can't even start for 3 years, that puts the US way behind. In a way that proves my point. If it takes years before the replacement fleet can begin construction, and the yards are already full of ships under construction, then that tells you how long before a fleet is ready. Plus if the USN is destroyed the IJN has free run to keep attacking and destroy the new fleet piecemeal or let it languish in the Atlantic while the rest is being built.

I am not arguing what the US would do, but rather how long do the Japanese think it will take. Every other country in the world has a much, much smaller economic base to work from, and have their economic realities to face. The US economic achievements are one of the great surprises/miracles of the 20th Century. NO ONE could have anticipated how fast and how completely the US got ready for the WW2. Even initial US estimates where substantially behind what was achieved. Some of this in fact is due to the desperation caused by the rapid change of events.

If you are the Japanese, you attack anyone else in the World, hit their fleet and sink the major fighting units, it will literally take years to get them back on their feet. Even the US with a 2nd fleet to fall back on (Atlantic) where at a grave disadvantage until the new construction comes up. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that the war with the US was hopeless, but my argument has always been that the Japanese view may not have been that way given what they thought/knew. That has NOTHING to do with what the US capabilities actually are. It is based on the Japanese perception of those capabilities.

Considering the Japanese did no real significant damage to units that affected the USN ability to project power, the attack at Pearl was a waste. The US inability to respond to Japanese aggression had almost nothing to do with the damage at Pearl. It had everything to do with their insufficient forces to begin with. The Army is only a few divisions, the Air force is only starting to build up, and the Fleet is split in the Atlantic and the Pacific. If the Entire US battle fleet had sailed against Nagumo's strike fleet, it would have been a slaughter of epic proportions. The US BB are dated and obsolescent as a means of projecting power. So the Japanese strike would have been better off hitting the dry docks and fuel storage. That would have interrupted future operations far more then any loss the BB would have. That was the point of Pearl harbor, not destroying older ships that could be easily taken out by naval aviation. Even had the USN fleet carrier shown up, Nagumo had a superior force available. From the Japanese standpoint, it would have been better to have taken out the US carriers. Besides, why did the Japanese send so many of their aircraft to attack the US ground based aviation if they weren't confident they had destroyed it. After risking everything on a massive surprise blow to not finish the deal off was a sign of complete stupidity. THe Japanese had already risked far more in their attack against another major navy to not finish off the ability of the USN as an offensive force, which as stated before has a lot less to do with ships and more to do with the bases there.

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