#83
Post
by Lkefct » 07 Dec 2007, 17:45
I am not sure that the attacks in the east is going to change how the Soviets fight in the western USSR. The distances and the amount of rail transport capacity are so great, that at least for a while, the Soviets are going to have to make due with the forces on hand. Given the distances involved in the east, and the lack of effective tanks, this should be adequate. The soviets do not need to oppose the Japanese, so they can easily achieve a local superiority wherever they choose. then using a pincer attack they would encircle a sizable Japanese force, reduce the pocket and repeat as necessary. Given the woeful shortage of Japanese AT gun and artillery, there is not much the Japanese can do. In any case, if they can hold their own (or win), then the attack in Siberia is almost by definition a total failure.
FWIW, my understanding is that other then some pre-production t-34's (A-20's) and probably a handful of tanks delivered before the war, there are few if any t-34 in the east. We can be fairly sure of this as historical analysis has shown that even in 1945, the Soviet attacking force was composed mostly of t-26 and BT light tanks. The Soviets do not necessarily need a massive technical superiority, as they would have a numerical superiority at the point of contact. The other thing that ensures victory (IMHO) is that the terrain is very well suited to armored operations. It is flat and very, very open. This means that the Japanese infantry are going to be exposed to massed tank attacks with heavy artillery support in nearly western desert like conditions (at least as far s the soviets are concerned.
I am also not sure how you can think that the Soviets would retreat from the Ukraine to fall back to Moscow. While that is certainly desirable, the roads and rail in the Soviet Union mostly converge on Moscow, but the AGC advance has already cut the direct route to Moscow for the majority of the troops in the Ukraine. They would have to retreat east and then go back north. Given that many have to disengage battle with the Germans, outrace the Germans to the east, I am not sure that they are really capable of that.
One major consideration is the Soviets made a very conscious effort to engage and defeat the Germans near the border of Poland. This may have been at least in part due to all the purges where vast numbers of experienced officers where killed and not adequately replaced. Also, given the ideological and political pressures on Stalin may not have been exceptable to retreat and fight later, which was the historical response to invaders. Certainly the Germans had expected this response and where pleasantly surprised when they where able to engage and destroy the Soviet army near the frontier. In any case, the majority of the heavy losses where caused to the Germans after the weather changed. The Soviet defenses even as late as the start of Typhoon where laughable due to the uncoordinated nature and nonexistent tactical counterattacks. IF the Germans drive directly on Moscow (and the defense of the city) that determines the outcome, not the character of the fighting before hand. German losses until Moscow where very light, with around 200,000 on the whole front by late July/August (out of 3,000,000 troops initially), compared to (based on German estimates) about 1.24 million captured, and possible as many more killed and missing, with maybe that same amount more wounded (so between 2.4-3.6 million out of action since the invasion), the Soviet prewar army is basically wiped out. The Soviet won using newly mobilized units, so it really doesn't matter if they pull those initial men back or not. It also should be pointed out that the Soviet attacks in this period where not very effective in terms of causing casualties. They are one sided affairs, as Soviet communications are often in the clear, German air reconnaissance was very clear, Soviet have little or no air support.recon of their own, the Soviets have poor tactical leadership due to the purges and the tactical situation is normally quite bleak.
The last point to be made is that I am not sure that the idea of attacking the trans Siberian railroad is such a good motivation. I am not so sure it was obvious that the US would come to the Soviets aid in the lend lease. Could they have done so at the same scale had they not gone to war with Japan, and the ensuing economic mobilization? In any case, most of the initial war materials that where used by the soviets where done so via Murmansk. The more substantial supplies that the US sent came somewhat latter. This is not to suggest that even the Japanese would not anticipate some help to the Soviets, but rather the scale of it. Is it worth fighting a war over unless it occurs on teh massive scale that it did occur historically, and would they have anticipated that sort of scale.
lastly, I know LWD thinks that it must have been obvious that the Japanese would be crushed by the US, but that is not the case. After all, historically, Japan did launch their attack at pearl harbor. AS listed before, if you try to estimate how long it would take to rebuild the US fleet to attack japan based on their own industrial performance, it would be a great many years. Hitler also did the same, expecting that it would be 1943 before the US could even begin to lend any real aid to the allies and 1945 before the a majority of the economy is switched over. Using their own economic experience, these are reasonable estimates (A little long, but the US was not near as close to being in a war time economy as either axis power). The US performed a small miracle in quickly converting over to a wartime economy much faster then anyone else did. If you also include the preparations for ship construction and such that had been implemented but not finished, it gave the US an advantage that the Axis would have had difficulty foreseeing.