Serus wrote:glenn239 wrote:If war had broken out in 1938, the likely sequence of German conquests would have changed significantly - the critical ommision being Poland in 1939.
Assuming that Germany were to defeat the Czechs, and then the French in turn (and I admit this is a big assumption), then Poland probably falls into line with the Axis after the fall of France, rather than being partitioned before it. If German forces jump off on the 1938 Soviet-Polish border with 30-40 Polish division in attendance, then Russia probably falls.
I disagree - German attack on France with Poland behind was very unprobable from German point of view (remember Polish-French alliance is still valid) - the risk is too big, French-German border is relatively short with good defensive values and Poland is weaker than France, can be conquered faster --> "Poland first" is the only logical option for Germany, fall of Czechoslowakia in 38 doesnt make any difference imo.
On topic: War with Czechs in 38 = weaker Wermacht in 39/40, great risk for Hitler of being couped by the military, if Czechs are not conquered very fast. And too many variables to point out (what is Soviet/Polish/French/British reaction, what about Hitler? Perhaps he wanted the war in 38 but General Staff was aware that army is not ready, and more...)
Hello all, I was searching for some online material concerning this very question. Since this is a very intelligent discussion using good facts and suumptions I wanted to add my voice.
Fist, let me address the statement above which further discussion overlooked. I agree with previous statements supporting the idea that the War of 38 would result, at best for the Germans, in a slow and costly victory, but more likely, in defeat. I believe that evidence presented thus far points to this conclusion. Even the mention of the "What if" book which through scholarly research comes to this conclusion (anyone actually read the book to summarize for us?). I do not believe that same fate would await CS as awaited Poland. I think we can all agree that CS had far more advanced military technology and infrastructure that would allow it to more effectively wage a total war (My father who served his compulsory training on western Czech border told me about these massive fortress structures that were impermeable by any firearms -except bunker destroying missiles- almost 40 years after). Another thing is the comparative military capabilities between Germany of 1938 and 39. As it has already been pointed out, in a matter of just a short year, Germans were able to make strides in their armament technology (thanks also to Skoda auto giant) and tactics of blitzkrieg, which would be of little use against mountainous terrain and fortresses (and these two together made the defensive structure much more effective compared to Maginot-line which was exposed on a flat plains and forests), were not yet tested out against a determined foe. Lastly, the alliance system was different. When Poland was advanced, it was attacked on two fronts and it was alone in fighting. Czechoslovakia could still fallback on USSR. Had Benes agreed to the helping hand of Russians, which in retrospect was more of a counter-NAZI defensive move than -as it might have been perceived by Benes- as an attempt to partition the land with Germans. Even without Western support, Czechoslovakia using its circumstances to its fullest advantage, could have pulled out of it a victor.
Second, there is a large misconception to how split Czechoslovakia truly was. The notion that the society was splintered between a halfdozen ethnic groups ready to explode into multiple pieces like Austria-Hungary did just 20 years earlier, is flawed. Because Czechoslovakia was a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic country, it had a legitimate claim to rule over all of its citizenry. The conditions of living in CS were higher than in any of its neighbors. It was the economic and political envy of Central and Eastern Europe, in this respect. True, there were some activities that tried to splinter CS, but the alternative for these groups seemed far worse. Germans would be the most prominent group, and most exertive, for that matter, in promoting secession. Hitler employed clandestine operations hoping that those alone could bring CS to its knees and Sudet to him. These attempts escalated into a military uprising, but almost instantly failed as Czechs installed martial law and peace in that region. Magyars would be the second group to consider. They were the ultimate losers of WW1, but if you look at the economic conditions, those that remained in Hungary were the bigger losers. Living condition of Slovak Magyars were far higher than those in the volatile Hungary which has in 20 years undergone regime changes of all variety on the left-right continuum. Slovaks might have been discontent over the Czech dominance of CS and pushed for greater equality, but separation was a dangerous prospect in a hostile fascist world and memories of Magyarization were only too fresh. Separation could only be conceived only when CS partitioning would become a real choice. If only Sudet was on the line, its life was safer with Czechs. Someone wrongfully pointed out to Ukrainians as another group. First, the only Ukrainians were the "intelligentsia" that fled Bolsheviks and Polish into a peaceful CS and its Eastern Carpathian province, SubCarpathian Rus. There they spread the slander of Greater Ukraine and have actually gained support from some portions of the populace, which explains the name Carpatho-Ukraine adopted by Rus during its brief one-day independence. The people themselves, their langauge and culture is through-and-through Rusyn. I know, because I am one. Polish call us Lemko and Ukrainians Hutsul or Boiko (people themselves think of us as non-Ukrainians, but when the elite is bent upon expansion, that becomes the agenda). The decision of Rusyns to join with CS after WW1 is in many respects surprising and complicating. At first Russia was the obvious choice as they considered themselves to be part of the Great Russian family (there were proponents for Ukraine but this was even more unrealistic). CS became the best decision. After it was made, Rusyns showed dedication and loyalty to stand by it, even when Czechs were failing to carry out their promises of greater autonomy. In fact there were Lemkos left in Poland which also voted to join CS, but as that became unrealistic because of other territorial commitments and squabbles with Poland, Romania, and Hungary, a short-lived republic of Florynka came into existence. The greatest case of Rusyn commitment to CS is exemplified by the fact that the of the exile Czechoslovak army fighting with Soviets, almost half were Rusyns.
Overall, CS had the capability to at least prevent the same that happened to Poland, and at most repel Germans. At most I agree with Peter OT.
