Operation Hercules - would it have worked?
- Graf von Dracula
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Operation Hercules - would it have worked?
http://www.comandosupremo.com/Hercules.html
Do you think that an airborne assault against Malta by the Axis would have been decisive in the outcoming of WWI (at least in North Africa?).
Best regards!
Do you think that an airborne assault against Malta by the Axis would have been decisive in the outcoming of WWI (at least in North Africa?).
Best regards!
Yes, instead of taking the rather unimportant island of Crete they should have gotton Malta.
With Malta taken it would have created a lot of havoc for British shipping, if not destroying that route. North Africa might have been won with Malta, though I don't know how.
How was Malta a threat in the real world? Was just being there a threat?
Regards,
Zachary
With Malta taken it would have created a lot of havoc for British shipping, if not destroying that route. North Africa might have been won with Malta, though I don't know how.
How was Malta a threat in the real world? Was just being there a threat?
Regards,
Zachary
Not taking Malta was a Strategic Blunder by the Nazis they could have taken it and it would have been easier than taking Crete. They needed to take both and they would have had plenty more dead paratroops, but they would have a lot less dead seamen and transport pilots than they got by leaving the English in control of Malta. Crete was not rather unimportant, if the English placed heavy bombers there the Axis oil supplies would be threatened. General Freyberg who was in charge of the defense of Crete was forbidden to destroy the airfields because Churchhill wanted to use Crete as a base to bomb the Rumanian oilfields and this compromised his defense.
If 70 grains of IMR 4064 in a 7.92x57 case behind a 197 gr. fmj is too much then 85 grains should be just right.
- Mighty_Akuma
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- R-Bob The Great!
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Malta
It would have helped Germany to take Malta, or at least reduce the airbase there.
The only problem would be the farther distance and smaller size of Malta. A further distance would increase the British chances of discovering the invasion and increase the chanses that troop-transports would get lost on the way to their target. A smaller island is easier to defend, and gives the attacker less mobility once landed. Suprise and mobility are key to any paratroop attack.
The only problem would be the farther distance and smaller size of Malta. A further distance would increase the British chances of discovering the invasion and increase the chanses that troop-transports would get lost on the way to their target. A smaller island is easier to defend, and gives the attacker less mobility once landed. Suprise and mobility are key to any paratroop attack.
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Malta, an area vital to British shipping, was regarded as an air base of strategic importance. Without it, the british RAF could not have conducted strategic bombing raids and the fighters could not destroy/support convoys and ground units in Africa. Although Malta held out, it was bombied not because of its importance, but because of its refusal to back down.
- Conacher1941
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Had Malta been taken by the Axis after the fall of Tobruk in the summer of 1942, then Rommel could start the invasion of Egipt in September of 1942 without any worries at all of being cut of supplies, while at the same time the British would have a hard time supplying their own troops there. The outcome of the battle of El Alamein could have been completely different.
Rommel's logistical problem was not getting supplies across the Mediterranean. The Italian navy had no real problem delivering supplies to Tripolis from Naples even in late 1942, even though Malta was near the sailing route. Continous air cover flying out of Sicily was available, and Malta could be suppressed quite well from the air.
However, delivering supplies to Benghazi and Tobruk was a much bigger problem, chiefly because they were within range of the RAF's bases in Egypt, but also because these ports, also combined, are a lot smaller than Tripolis. Ironically, Malta had little bearing on the low survival rate of Italian shipping destined for Benghazi and Tobruk.
There's a good 1200 miles to cover from Tripolis to Alamein, and only the Via Balbia as a means to deliver those supplies; there were no railroads of note west of Alamein.
Conversely, British oil supplies came from the other end of the Med area - Iraq, Persia and also some small wells in Egypt. There was a pipeline from Iraq to Haïfa, and a big refinery there. Only in real emergencies was it necessary to sail British supplies through the Western Mediterranean; the route south of Africa was always available as an alternative. Even most troops fighting in the North African theatre came from the east - India, Australia and New Zealand. So for supplies delivered to North Africa, the British had the perpetual upper hand.
The only way Rommel could have solved his own logistical problems would have been to 1) expand the harbours of Benghazi and Tobruk (and he couldn't even take Tobruk in 1941) while making sure air cover was available at all times; 2) build a railroad of some proportion from Tripolis to at least Benghazi and/or 3) take Alexandria, which would have given him a big port close to the operation area while - again, ironically - relegating Malta to a patch of land with the Union Jack on it.
However, delivering supplies to Benghazi and Tobruk was a much bigger problem, chiefly because they were within range of the RAF's bases in Egypt, but also because these ports, also combined, are a lot smaller than Tripolis. Ironically, Malta had little bearing on the low survival rate of Italian shipping destined for Benghazi and Tobruk.
There's a good 1200 miles to cover from Tripolis to Alamein, and only the Via Balbia as a means to deliver those supplies; there were no railroads of note west of Alamein.
Conversely, British oil supplies came from the other end of the Med area - Iraq, Persia and also some small wells in Egypt. There was a pipeline from Iraq to Haïfa, and a big refinery there. Only in real emergencies was it necessary to sail British supplies through the Western Mediterranean; the route south of Africa was always available as an alternative. Even most troops fighting in the North African theatre came from the east - India, Australia and New Zealand. So for supplies delivered to North Africa, the British had the perpetual upper hand.
The only way Rommel could have solved his own logistical problems would have been to 1) expand the harbours of Benghazi and Tobruk (and he couldn't even take Tobruk in 1941) while making sure air cover was available at all times; 2) build a railroad of some proportion from Tripolis to at least Benghazi and/or 3) take Alexandria, which would have given him a big port close to the operation area while - again, ironically - relegating Malta to a patch of land with the Union Jack on it.
So, if the Italian Navy had no real problems supplying North Afrika and the British had more than enough with the middle east, What was was the value of Malta????????Shrek wrote:Rommel's logistical problem was not getting supplies across the Mediterranean. The Italian navy had no real problem delivering supplies to Tripolis from Naples even in late 1942, even though Malta was near the sailing route. Continous air cover flying out of Sicily was available, and Malta could be suppressed quite well from the air.
However, delivering supplies to Benghazi and Tobruk was a much bigger problem, chiefly because they were within range of the RAF's bases in Egypt, but also because these ports, also combined, are a lot smaller than Tripolis. Ironically, Malta had little bearing on the low survival rate of Italian shipping destined for Benghazi and Tobruk.
There's a good 1200 miles to cover from Tripolis to Alamein, and only the Via Balbia as a means to deliver those supplies; there were no railroads of note west of Alamein.
Conversely, British oil supplies came from the other end of the Med area - Iraq, Persia and also some small wells in Egypt. There was a pipeline from Iraq to Haïfa, and a big refinery there. Only in real emergencies was it necessary to sail British supplies through the Western Mediterranean; the route south of Africa was always available as an alternative. Even most troops fighting in the North African theatre came from the east - India, Australia and New Zealand. So for supplies delivered to North Africa, the British had the perpetual upper hand.
The only way Rommel could have solved his own logistical problems would have been to 1) expand the harbours of Benghazi and Tobruk (and he couldn't even take Tobruk in 1941) while making sure air cover was available at all times; 2) build a railroad of some proportion from Tripolis to at least Benghazi and/or 3) take Alexandria, which would have given him a big port close to the operation area while - again, ironically - relegating Malta to a patch of land with the Union Jack on it.