What if Vice Admiral Nagumo hadn't stopped the third strike?

[J.Warren]

If Vice Admiral Nagumo had proceeded with the planned third strike on Pearl Harbor, would it of changed much in the outcome of that day? Also, how did the other leadership, like Yamamoto view this decision in not launching the third stirke?

[Tom Houlihan]

A third strike, targeting oil storage facilities and the shipyard would have had a major impact. It would have been much more difficult to recover from the attack, and harder to bring the base back into operation.

Another question to ask is why didn't they land troops? Basically nobody was ready to repel an invasion. If the US lost that base completely, the ability to wage war in the Pacific would have been extremely hampered.

[Tiornu]

There was no third strike, so Nagumo didn't have to stop it and the IJN high command never had cause to comment on his failure to launch it.
The Japanese never had a capability to invade Oahu. They had no expertise in making opposed landings (Wake), and their troops were all committed to other operations. The use of slow transports would have jeopardized the Pearl Harbor attack.

[David_Aiken]

If Vice Admiral Nagumo had proceeded with the planned third strike on Pearl Harbor, would it of changed much in the outcome of that day? Also, how did the other leadership, like Yamamoto view this decision in not launching the third stirke?

Aloha Warren,
When the Pearl Harbor Attack was planned...there was NO third wave planned... after the success of the attack, there was a suggestion offered by Commander Fuchida to Commander Genda which was made to Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka and presented to Admiral Chuichi Nagumo that a third strike be considered. However, the amount of American aerial radio traffic told Nagumo that the Americans were like a bunch of bees with their hive jossled...and he determined that his planned objective was met with the least amount of casualties ...and that was that.

As to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto....that is 'monday morning quarterbacking' and "what if" will never be resolved.
HTH,
David Aiken, a Director: Pearl Harbor History Associates, Inc. http://www.pearlharbor-history.org/

[glenn239]

Another question to ask is why didn't they land troops? Basically nobody was ready to repel an invasion. If the US lost that base completely, the ability to wage war in the Pacific would have been extremely hampered.

Oahu was home to two understrength American divisions (25th and 26th?). Shipping resources were already fully allocated (including specialised Amphib ops equipmpent). Also, the coastal defense network would have presented a formidable obstacle to direct invasion.

To answer your question, the Imperial Armed Services appear not to have undertaken sufficient operational study of the Pacific Theatre before the war, hence the huge advantages of seizing Oahu were simply overlooked. The IJA was uninterested in large-scale Pacific adventures until the Doolittle Raid caused a shift in priorities. At that point 2 (then 3) divisions were earmarked for an Oahu invasion, but training was cancelled after the Midway debacle.

Without active IJA interest, an invasion was impossible.

The Japanese never had a capability to invade Oahu. They had no expertise in making opposed landings (Wake), and their troops were all committed to other operations. The use of slow transports would have jeopardized the Pearl Harbor attack.

Actually, the Imperial Japanese Army had the most advanced amphibious doctrine in the entire world in December 1941. This has often been overlooked in light of amazing American advances in this military field from 1942 onwards.

The Wake Island operation was an IJN landing, and cannot be compared to the IJA’s capabilities (this would be akin to rating an American infantry division vs the 1st Marine Division). A good example of the IJA’s abilities would be the storming of Corriegidor (sic?) in 1942.

The most dangerous IJA attack would probably bypass Oahu and land on the other islands instead, using these to institute a blockade of Oahu (which had about 300,000 people on it, IIRC). For this to work, the IJN would be required to eliminate Pearl as a fleet base, which in effect means destroying the oil tanks there. This would force the Pacific Fleet back to the West Coast, where it would be forced to project power about 2,400 miles (vs the Japanese 3600 miles).

When the Pearl Harbor Attack was planned...there was NO third wave planned... after the success of the attack, there was a suggestion offered by Commander Fuchida to Commander Genda which was made to Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka and presented to Admiral Chuichi Nagumo that a third strike be considered. However, the amount of American aerial radio traffic told Nagumo that the Americans were like a bunch of bees with their hive jossled...and he determined that his planned objective was met with the least amount of casualties ...and that was that.

Genda’s proposal concerning the third wave did not forsee another attack that day, as the planes would be landing after dark and the weather was turning for the worse during the afternoon (IIRC).

Rather, he wished to retire to the north to refuel, then come back south the next day to find and destroy the Enterprise and the Lexington (known to be at sea in the area). Pearl Harbor would be subjected to repeated raids from medium altitude (no further low level attacks), and the task force would pass Oahu to the east and south while returning to the Marshall Islands.

[Tiornu]

"Actually, the Imperial Japanese Army had the most advanced amphibious doctrine in the entire world in December 1941. This has often been overlooked in light of amazing American advances in this military field from 1942 onwards."
Japan's advanced amphibious capability is well known. However, the ability to execute opposed landings was virtually non-existent. The IJA had no doctrine for naval fire support. It's hard to find any analogy here with the attack on Corregidor, which is more akin to the shore-to-shore movements seen at various times in the Philippines and elsewhere, except that the IJA had the opportunity to apply a month's worth of artillery support onto the defenders. I see no example of the Japanese forming up an invasion fleet off a hostile shore and coordinating the movement of troops and material while under hostile fire and in the face of spirited defense--except Wake.
Much of the myth of the third wave seems to arise from misunderstandings about Japanese aerial operations, which did not have the rapid turn-around as in American operations. The Americans did not know this and thus couldn't grasp that a further attack would have to wait to the next day. Fuchida's fraudulent account of his pleas to Nagumo has confused matters further.

[Lkefct]

I think it is just a little unclear why the Japanese didn't stay in the area, and continue to smash the Pearl harbor facilities? Had they made any legitamate effort, they could have easily smashed them to the point that operations in the pacific where almost impossible. by concentrating on the battleships, they let a golden oppurtunity pass. You could probably even argue that the port facitilites maybe should have been priority #1, no the battleships. Had the battleships gone steaming out of harbor, and had the Japanese chosen to engage they would have easily destroyed the BB in deep water, and they would have been a total loss along with the base.

[General Szostak]

I see no clear reaon for the Japs to land a force on Hawaii,unless of course they stay their for a short time and retreat,obouisly if the Japs attacked Hawaii and captured it the US would retalitate and enclose the island with the remaining ships and just starve the island,but I beleive that if the Japs were to capture the island they would stay their only a few days maybe a week tops ad the reason is just to steal the oil,hawaii's food supply and any other war material then quickly retreat and return to japan

[glenn239]

Japan's advanced amphibious capability is well known. However the ability to execute opposed landings was virtually non-existent. The IJA had no doctrine for naval fire support.

Any direct landing on Oahu would probably have failed. The east and west coasts were blocked from the center section of the island by mountain ranges. In addition, vast coral reefs ranged down the length of the island on the west side. The south shore was covered by murderous defensive fires, leaving the north shore as a potential "weak point"; it too would have been heavily contested by shore batteries, and communications with the south would allow for the rapid transfer of reinforcements.

The IJA planning from 1942 called for an attack on the western coast, accepting the difficulties of terrain in exchange for an expectation of weak American defenses there.

American defenses on the other islands were virtually non-existent.

I think it is just a little unclear why the Japanese didn't stay in the area, and continue to smash the Pearl harbor facilities? Had they made any legitimate effort, they could have easily smashed them to the point that operations in the pacific where almost impossible

No, it's quite clear - Nagumo was a weak commander.

It's hard to find any analogy here with the attack on Corregidor, which is more akin to the shore-to-shore movements seen at various times in the Philippines and elsewhere, except that the IJA had the opportunity to apply a months worth of artillery support onto the defenders.

Corregidor was a fortress defended by over 10,000 personnel. The pre-invasion bombardment you mention was almost totally ineffective on account of the fact the garrison was ensconced under an impenetrable shield of rock. Hence the IJA attack waves hit the beaches under fire and had to take the island by storm. The Americans tallied 1800 dead and wounded during the seige, the Japanese assault force (IIRC) suffered more.

I see no example of the Japanese forming up an invasion fleet off a hostile shore and coordinating the movement of troops and material while under hostile fire and in the face of spirited defense - except at Wake.

Wake was an IJN operation, not the IJA. As mentioned previously, citing Wake as an example of IJA amphib capabilities is akin to writing off the US Marine Corps because of a performance by the Coast Guard.

In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Army undertook a direct amphibious assault on Kota Bharu, a fortified position on the Kra peninsula with minefields, entrenchments, pillboxes and wire defenses right up on the beach. This battle resulted in the storming of the battlefield and the airbase behind it, the capture of 27 guns and 73 machine guns for the loss of 320 KIA and 538 WIA among IJN soldiers, and two transports sunk by gunfire. These defenses were as hot as anything on Oahu (except the south shore).

obouisly if the Japanese attacked Hawaii and captured it the US would retaliate and enclose the island with the remaining ships and just starve the island,but I believe that if the Japs were to capture the island they would stay their only a few days maybe a week tops ad the reason is just to steal the oil,hawaii's food supply and any other war material then quickly retreat and return to japan.

With what would American forces "enclose" the island? Their airpower was smashed, and their navy required Pearl Harbor as a functioning fleet base in order to project power around the island. A Japanese invasion plan would require Pearl to be knocked out, of course. Without it, the USN's next stop was San Diego on the west coast.

I see no clear reaon for the Japanese to land a force on Hawaii,unless of course they stay their for a short time and retreat

I count 14 "clear reasons" to taking Hawaii:

1) It was immediately accessible to the Japanese, meaning that here, and here only, could they hit the Americans with their full might, without pause, and where the latter would have no time to gather strength.

2) At Hawaii, the United States had no strategic depth - there were no fallback positions - the front line was the last ditch. Nowhere else in the Pacific was this the case.

3) Hawaii could be isolated and made to fall by blockade.

4) The American population of Hawaii (400,000) provided a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. (read – human shields vs. strategic bombing)

5) A reduction in American offensive raid and invasion options.

6) USN submarine warfare vs. the Japanese Home Islands would force the bulk of the American submarine fleet to either transfer to Alaska (where they would be useless for campaigns in the south) or Australia (where movement to Japan's home waters would come under an enemy air umbrella).

7) Disruption of the American deployment into the South Pacific, meaning an easier advances for the Japanese there during 1942.

8) The United States Navy's primary base in the Pacific would be overrun, forcing the fleet back to San Francisco (ie, a useless location) in 1942 on account of lack of fuel, etc.

9) The United States would be forced to allocate stronger garrisons in the Eastern Pacific than it would choose to do so otherwise - these could only come at the expense of the South Pacific, or the buildup against Germany. During the 1st half of 1942, the bulk of American airpower would be pinned to the west coast, merely on the possibility of a raid from Oahu.

10) Shipping times to the South Pacific from San Francisco would increase dramatically, as the new route must hug the Central and South American coast. These lanes would still be vulnerable to carrier and submarine attack in the great Eastern Pacific void where no land based airpower could reach.

11) Japan would finally have an excellent base available for unrestricted submarine warfare along the West Coast (IMO, it was the lack of such a base which prevented more commerce campaigns by the IJN during the war).

12) A reduction in the Japanese defensive perimeter, most critically, making the Home Islands safe from raids.

13) The United States Navy would be forced to either split in two, or accept Japanese naval supremacy in either the Eastern or the South Pacific. It would be late 1943 before her naval buildup would allow the rectification of this problem.

14) The destruction of the primary USN fleet base in the Pacific would force the Americans to build another, at a time when Allied shipping resources were already stretched. This effort (probably at Samoa) would require at least 2 million tons of shipping (maybe more) simply to replace what had been lost.

[Sam H.]

"Actually, the Imperial Japanese Army had the most advanced amphibious doctrine in the entire world in December 1941. This has often been overlooked in light of amazing American advances in this military field from 1942 onwards."
Japan's advanced amphibious capability is well known. However, the ability to execute opposed landings was virtually non-existent. The IJA had no doctrine for naval fire support. It's hard to find any analogy here with the attack on Corregidor, which is more akin to the shore-to-shore movements seen at various times in the Philippines and elsewhere, except that the IJA had the opportunity to apply a month's worth of artillery support onto the defenders. I see no example of the Japanese forming up an invasion fleet off a hostile shore and coordinating the movement of troops and material while under hostile fire and in the face of spirited defense--except Wake.
Much of the myth of the third wave seems to arise from misunderstandings about Japanese aerial operations, which did not have the rapid turn-around as in American operations. The Americans did not know this and thus couldn't grasp that a further attack would have to wait to the next day. Fuchida's fraudulent account of his pleas to Nagumo has confused matters further.

This is the first account I've heard that stated there was no planned third strike. Tiornu, you never cease to amaze me with your knowledge!

[Trackhead M2]

Dear All,
Trolled this old thread up. I don't see how this went from no 3rd Air Strike on 12-7-41 to why not invade? I recall the Pearl Harbor strike was more of a "commando" raid to pin down/destroy the US Fleet while the Empire pursued its Co-Prospertiy Sphere which didn't seem to include Hawaii on the maps I've seen. If someone can show me a different map I will stand humbly hat in hand.
Strike Swiftly,
TH-M2

[Carl Schwamberger]

Trackhead... search this site, and the internet for 1. Operation Tinkerbell 2. Glen239 3. Robodab. You will find this Oahu invasion 'discussion' splattered all over the internet discussion boards. Wear your waders as the s..t is deep.

[Kingfish]

Wow, I didn't know we had a thread resurrecting wizard on retainer.

Do you think he can dredge up a 'Wittman killed by a Typhoon' yarn?

[Uncle Fritz]

I have always thought that wartime japanese leadership was somehow handicapped on IQ... beginning with their insane agression on China.

1) why start a war with the most industrialized nation on earth in the first place? Instead in july 1941 Soviet Russia was falling down and Japan could and should finish Her.

2) How hirohito could conceive that after killing defenseless US sailors the Americans will frighten and, instead craving revenge, immediately sue for peace? Nobody sane would even think of it. Yet japanese leadership was partly basing the attack on that assumption.

3) even if you are mentally instable and decided to attack USA why deciding only on one lame surgical strike? Leaving entire island and infrastructure intact? Instead Japan should go for it and simply invade Oahu - even at expense of other operations.

4) Why putting incompetent coward Nagumo in charge? Instead Yamamoto should lead the operation.

5) after Pearl Harbor Japanese didn't win one single naval battle with Americans?

[Kingfish]

5) after Pearl Harbor Japanese didn't win one single naval battle with Americans?

Do a google search for the battle of Savo Island and Tassafaronga