What if Vice Admiral Nagumo hadn't stopped the third strike?

[OpanaPointer]

I've got the Army-Navy discussions around here somewhere, and the agreement that was generated by those talks. Find those will be a matter of spotting it when I'm looking for something else.

[glenn239]

Of course, glenn239 will likely respond that this is only a reconstruction of the order and not an original, and that the memory of the Japanese officers is faulty and that the reconstructed order is incorrect. Just as likely, glenn239 would be correct, given the contradictory use of "attack";

The basis of the reservation is always the same, and is not what you outline. On the 23rd November Nagumo cut his orders to 1st Air Fleet,

‘If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack subsequent attacks will be directed against it.’

So, the question is the same as it has been on the dozen other occasions we have discussed this excerpt. If, as you interpret, Yamamoto’s order meant automatic withdrawal after the recovery of the 2nd Wave around noon on 7 December, then what accounts for this paragraph in Nagumo's orders to Kido Butai?

[OpanaPointer]

Yamamoto's orders override Nagumo's, it's call the chain of command.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I supose my next question, were I asking them here, would be what subsequent orders or tasks for the carrier group Nagumo was cognizant of? Was Nagumo aware of a date/operation his command had to support soon?

A related question I might have is if there is anything indicating Nagumos guidance if he finds the US battle fleet at sea. The orders cited here do not seem to specify attacking only if the fleet is in port. Does the complete text clarify if the reconissance reports the US main fleet absent from PH, then is Nagumo reqired or allowed to spend another day stalking it at sea? Or must he give it up as a bad job & withdraw on the 7th?

[glenn239]

Yamamoto's orders override Nagumo's, it's call the chain of command.

As Takao stated, Yamamoto’s orders are ambigious. As I stated, Nagumo’s orders were cut after receiving Yamamoto’s. Therefore, you are arguing that you know what Yamamoto actually meant and Nagumo did not. And, since Yamamoto had from 23 November to 26 November to countermand Nagumo’s orders (already issued), you are actually arguing that you know what Yamamoto meant and Yamamoto did not.

Or, you have Yamamoto's countermanding order to Nagumo issued after 23 November. Recall also that Yamamoto’s command was stunned to hear that Nagumo was withdrawing and debated whether to order him to return to the fight.

supose my next question, were I asking them here, would be what subsequent orders or tasks for the carrier group Nagumo was cognizant of? Was Nagumo aware of a date/operation his command had to support soon?

Obviously, from Nagumo’s own operational order, these factors were not important to his decision to stay or retreat from Hawaii. I posted the relevant excerpt from his order, and it states very clearly that the determining factor is the status of enemy land based airpower. Not the invasion of Rabaul, (which was his next task, in January 1942).

[OpanaPointer]

And you can cite the overall plans for the Southern Advance that he saw, and the parts of those plans that concerned the carriers?

[glenn239]

Nagumo's operational order is posted. Anyone who can read English can read what it says.

Genda relates in some excerpts from Pearl Harbor Papers,

The next day many pictures were collectoed from all the ships showing greater results than were expected. As it was too far from Oahu and fuel was not sufficient, the second attack could not be hoped for (44).

That is, by the time it was proven to Nagumo that pre-existing incination to run was wrong, the TF had already made an egress run at 24kt for 24hrs.

If discovered prior to X-1, return, otherwise, attack anyway. If making an assault, the two waves would be combined into one so that the 81 Zeros could take control of the air (16)

At Darwin in February 1942 Kido Butai rendezvoused it's two waves into one before the attack. Here, Genda is saying the same technique would have been used at Pearl Harbor if an assault were necessary. I presume the launch point would have been closer.

Genda's summary of the operational order (31),

5. In case the following happens, carry out the second phase of attacks. In case the result is very good or very bad.
6. In case no information....send the 8th Cru Div out two days ahead...
7. Depending on situation, take the southern route as a return....by way of west side of Oahu Search for surviving American ships and destroy...
9. In case of an assault, send the entire fighter unit to Oahu in the first phase, then start the attack after we get air supremacy.

Prange outlines Genda's proposals on the journey on 426-427. No. 7 was Genda's preferred option, sailing down the west coast seeking the US carriers and pounding Oahu. As Genda relates, Nagumo had no intention of making a follow up strike.

[OpanaPointer]

I posted the damn orders, I saw them before you did. And I have read the rest of the material, which you haven't because it's not on the web yet. Your problem right now is to persuade me that I should take the time to work on it out of my planned order.

[bf109 emil]

was a third strike ever planned or drawn up in the initial Pearl Harbor attack plans? I can see how a third strike would have benefitted, but had the USN carriers had been at Pearl to begin with as was sought and desired by the IJN...would plans or strikes would Nagumo had carried out had this different scenario had taken place...was the oil tanks and submarine pens and naval repair yards ever a priority target should the USN carriers had been caught at Pearl as had been hoped when the initial plans had been drawn up?

[waldzee]

War is to be continued to either defeat your enemy in detail, or 'render his centre of battle helpless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz
Nagamo , haviNG cast the dice at Pearl Harbour, shoULD have been prepared to put his air fleet,& perhaps even his battlecruisers, at risk in order to devastate Pearl Harbour's infrastructure.
Then offered a fair peace.

[OpanaPointer]

War is to be continued to either defeat your enemy in detail, or 'render his centre of battle helpless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz
Nagamo , haviNG cast the dice at Pearl Harbour, shoULD have been prepared to put his air fleet,& perhaps even his battlecruisers, at risk in order to devastate Pearl Harbour's infrastructure.
Then offered a fair peace.

He was under much the same order as the US admirals at Midway, "calculated risk". He was also supposed to be helping the IJA in the SWPA as soon as he could after the strike.

[Takao]

Devastating Pearl Harbor, but suffering crippling damage to Kido Butai will not win Japan the war. After all, Pearl Harbor was but one battle...most wars consist of many, many battles. Nagumo was keenly aware of Japan's numerical deficiency against the United States Navy, and that the IJN would be hard pressed to make good on any losses suffered. He was also aware that there would be further battle that the Kido Butai would need to fight before all was said and done.

The Americans could put Pearl Harbor back into full operation in six months, more likely a lot less. Japan needed two to three years to complete a carrier. Now, if Nagumo loses two, three carriers, or, heaven forbid, he loses four carriers, along with a good portion of the aircrews, are they really better off?

[waldzee]

War is to be continued to either defeat your enemy in detail, or 'render his centre of battle helpless.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_von_Clausewitz
Nagamo , haviNG cast the dice at Pearl Harbour, shoULD have been prepared to put his air fleet,& perhaps even his battlecruisers, at risk in order to devastate Pearl Harbour's infrastructure.
Then offered a fair peace.

He was under much the same order as the US admirals at Midway, "calculated risk". He was also supposed to be helping the IJA in the SWPA as soon as he could after the strike.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Uncle Fritz put it into blunt terms earlier. "calculated risk' means the war is lost.
the itnelligent 'calculated risk ' would be for the IJN to occupy Tarakan & then bare their teeth at the USN.
'Crisis of Mediocrity' best defines
Japan's path to war.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarakan_Island

[waldzee]

Devastating Pearl Harbor, but suffering crippling damage to Kido Butai will not win Japan the war. After all, Pearl Harbor was but one battle...most wars consist of many, many battles. Nagumo was keenly aware of Japan's numerical deficiency against the United States Navy, and that the IJN would be hard pressed to make good on any losses suffered. He was also aware that there would be further battle that the Kido Butai would need to fight before all was said and done.

The Americans could put Pearl Harbor back into full operation in six months, more likely a lot less. Japan needed two to three years to complete a carrier. Now, if Nagumo loses two, three carriers, or, heaven forbid, he loses four carriers, along with a good portion of the aircrews, are they really better off?

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Takeo, Japan had the old Empire, Manchuko, the Pacific islands,& effectively, Indochina.
As Farago puts it in The Broken Seal " No heros, no villians, just a pack of Damned fools".

[glenn239]

was a third strike ever planned or drawn up in the initial Pearl Harbor attack plans?

No. Combined Fleet's management of the operation was very hands off. Nagumo's command had free reign across the board, incudling all aspects of aerial tactics. The directive was pretty straightforward, and stated the minimal aims and target list for the first attack. After this was achieved, further action was left to the discretion of the commander on the spot because it was deemed unwise to order more attacks without knowing the results of the first strike.

That being said, it was understood that if the first attack was a raging success that more attacks would follow. This is why Yamamoto’s HQ was stunned by Nagumo’s signal that he was withdrawing. They were on the horns of a dilemma; their radio intel of the battle suggested Nagumo should be either ordered to return or relieved of command and replaced by Yamaguchi. But there must have been some factor they didn’t know of. Hence, the decision not to countermand Nagumo’s order, and then the crushing sense of disappointment much later when it was determined beyond any doubt that Nagumo had no good reason to withdraw.

Earlier I posted Nagumo's operational order on follow-up attacks. This order will have fooled Yamamoto completely. Yamamoto will have read it and thought that Nagumo would act as per Nagumo's own operational directive as to the conditions upon which he would hit Oahu (and the ships near it) again and again. In fact, according to Prange (via Genda), Nagumo had no intention of acting beyond the absolute minimum to fulfil his missio orders. Genda drafted 4 plans for follow-up attacks en route to Hawaii, Nagumo rejected them all.

Note in the light of this incident Yamamoto’s precipitous decision to relieve Nagumo at Midway. After Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto was gunning for Nagumo, but Yamamoto had no official say in such matters.

Devastating Pearl Harbor, but suffering crippling damage to Kido Butai will not win Japan the war.

Japan’s opportunities for large-scale battles on favourable terms were few and far between. Throwing one away made no sense, and stating that it was wiser to lose the war for certain rather than take a risk takes scant account of the reality Yamamoto faced in 1941. It was all well and good for the idiots in Tokyo to make war on the US, but they left it to Yamamoto to fight out their turkey of a decision.

The Americans could put Pearl Harbor back into full operation in six months, more likely a lot less. Japan needed two to three years to complete a carrier. Now, if Nagumo loses two, three carriers, or, heaven forbid, he loses four carriers, along with a good portion of the aircrews, are they really better off?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway

You tell me.