What if Vice Admiral Nagumo hadn't stopped the third strike?

[waldzee]

I am sorry ,he only lost ONE battle.

I fail to see how Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz can be considered a Japanese victory.

Neither were they losses either. I judge them bloody exchanges.

Besides, My comment about "one" loss, was in context to replying , to the foolish notion that inferred that Nagumo LOST at Pearl Harbor and then at Midway, and then further inferred he lost very battle where he commanded.

Also , just to throw Fuel on the fire , let us not broach what Nagumo did to British in the interim between Pearl and Midway. Of course what self-serving, Nagumo-hating, armchair historian ,would even know/admit of the Indian Ocean Raid.

Dare I call that a Nagumo Victory?

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Chris, given that Nagumo had two Battleships & a number of heavy cruisers with him, could/ should he have followed up with a Night Bombardment?
I assume that some He shells were available,& Armor piercing shells would have devastated immobile battleships.

[waldzee]

I am sorry ,he only lost ONE battle.

I fail to see how Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz can be considered a Japanese victory.

Neither were they losses either. I judge them bloody exchanges.

Besides, My comment about "one" loss, was in context to replying , to the foolish notion that inferred that Nagumo LOST at Pearl Harbor and then at Midway, and then further inferred he lost very battle where he commanded.

Also , just to throw Fuel on the fire , let us not broach what Nagumo did to British in the interim between Pearl and Midway. Of course what self-serving, Nagumo-hating, armchair historian ,would even know/admit of the Indian Ocean Raid.

Dare I call that a Nagumo Victory?

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In any case, even armored shells woudl have penetrated to underground fortifications. I beleive that Japanese floatplanes could scout the explosions at night, land at dawn by the carrier fleet. Or even a day bombardment, guarded by the carrier CAP.

[ChristopherPerrien]

I am sorry ,he only lost ONE battle.

I fail to see how Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz can be considered a Japanese victory.

Neither were they losses either. I judge them bloody exchanges.

Besides, My comment about "one" loss, was in context to replying , to the foolish notion that inferred that Nagumo LOST at Pearl Harbor and then at Midway, and then further inferred he lost very battle where he commanded.

Also , just to throw Fuel on the fire , let us not broach what Nagumo did to British in the interim between Pearl and Midway. Of course what self-serving, Nagumo-hating, armchair historian ,would even know/admit of the Indian Ocean Raid.

Dare I call that a Nagumo Victory?

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Chris, given that Nagumo had two Battleships & a number of heavy cruisers with him, could/ should he have followed up with a Night Bombardment?
I assume that some He shells were available,& Armor piercing shells would have devastated immobile battleships.

To be honest , I was using the term "Glass Sword" for the 1st Airfleet ,on this forum, years before "Shattered Sword" came out. I really don't know if I invented the term"Glass sword" or if I read it somewhere long before,

It is in context to what the 1st AirFleet was. The two battleships you speak of , were the Kirishima and Heii, were re-vamped battlecruisers. The 1st Airfleet was never a "shore-bombarment unit" as it would have been extremely stupid to detach the only two Heavy anti-ship ships to go bombard "land", or ships in Harbor, or to bring carriers along that close to enemy shore. The 1st air fleet was the largest and most powerful carrier grouping for the 1st year of the war, and that is all it was. 6 carriers with 2 bb's and a few other ships truly was a "glass sword", very sharp but easily broken.

I think Nagumo understood that perhaps better than anybody, living or dead.

Note some of cruisers did detach and sunk some freighters, closer to shore, IIRC.

[OpanaPointer]

The IJN knew that Saratoga was on the West Coast, finishing overhaul. They knew Enterprise and Lexington were in the Pacific, but not where.

Here's a chart of the carriers' activities. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/CarrierChartE.jpg

I don't think so OP. I am busy looking through my Nagumo topic (with a zillion links to Hyperwar ) to find the carriers by name, the Japanese thought were in the Pacific. Also I have never heard that they KNEW the Sarotoga was in San-Fran either. I want to say -Enterprise, Lex, Sara, Hornet and they may have included the old Langley as the 5th

To be painfully exact, their observers in Seattle noted that Sara had left and that it was understood that she was going to San Diego to finish working up. This information is in the Magic documents.

[waldzee]

One could surmise the carrier fleet retiring while a night bombardment distracs the defences, then the battle cruisers catching up with the carriers. It woudl be a tradeoff between risk & benefits- if atacked , battle cruisers would stand a better chance than air carriers!

a night bombardment took place at Midway, I beleive?

[Kingfish]

One could surmise the carrier fleet retiring while a night bombardment distracs the defences, then the battle cruisers catching up with the carriers. It woudl be a tradeoff between risk & benefits- if atacked , battle cruisers would stand a better chance than air carriers!

My understanding is Oahu bristled with coastal artillery, some as big as 16". That, and the fact the flash from the IJN guns would be visible by observers atop the numerous hills on the island, would place the bombardment force at great risk for little gain.

a night bombardment took place at Midway, I beleive?

A submarine lobbed a few shells, but CruDiv 7 didn't make it time, and Mikuma paid dearly for it.

[glenn239]

As to your mantra about Nagumo being an incompetent coward and totally screwing up at Pearl Harbor

Incompetent – yes, at least for the command of fast carriers.
Screwed up at Pearl Harbor – Yes.
A Coward – No.

Is it really a surprise then, that IJN lost every single one of these engagements? Putting incompetent and cowardly moron again and again could only result in one defeat after another.

Yamamoto did not make command appointments. This was done at a higher level.

[glenn239]

Chris, given that Nagumo had two Battleships & a number of heavy cruisers with him, could/ should he have followed up with a Night Bombardment?

No, that would not be advisable. At most, if Nagumo stayed in the area and succeeded keeping Oahu’s airpower surpressed, he might send his BC’s to intercept non-combatant vessels trying to flee the area. But that would be more risk than he’d probably want to take – their primary purpose being to take on any night intruders that arrived unexpectedly.

My understanding is Oahu bristled with coastal artillery, some as big as 16".

Your understanding is correct – there were 4 sixteen inch guns covering the southern shore. A couple of battleships attacking Oahu is asking for trouble.

A night bombardment took place at Midway, I beleive?

No, it was ordered (for the Mikuma, Mogami, Suzuya and Kumano) and then cancelled just before it was about to start. Two cruisers collided as the ships retreated, leading to the loss of Mikuma.

[glenn239]

The tankers that supplied the Midway force were routed to the NEI before joining the carriers. I've seen their deck logs (and had them translated for me, thankfully.) The routing is also mentioned in at least one of the Monographs, a more accessible source for most of us.

Of course these were routed through the NEI before the Midway Operation. They were attached to Kido Butai throughout this period, and Kido Butai had just spent the previous months helping conquer the NEI. The tankers are Kyokuto, Shinkoku, Toho, Nippon and Kokuyo Marus have their TROMS here,

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm

The Raid on Port Darwin, the conquest of Rabaul, operations near Java, the Indian Ocean Raid and for one of them, the Battle of the Coral Sea was what they were doing in the months before Midway. Four of them transited the Bungo Strait in April 1942 after the attack on Ceylon, but I don’t think Java crude was yet “online”, so none will have stopped - and none of their TROMS show any port of call in Sumatra or Borneo in this timeframe.

One of the more interesting speculations about the reason the IJN carriers blew up so easily at Midway was that they were bunkered with "Light, Sweet Crude" oil from the NEI. This was straight from the wells and the more volatile fractions, like gasoline, hadn't been separated from the black oil. The fumes may have been the thing that detonated onboard the carriers.

You appear to be confusing the Battle of the Philippine Sea of 1944 with the Battle of Midway in 1942. At Midway in 1942 on all three carriers that were hit at 10:30 had their fires go rapidly out of control due to massive chain explosions of armed aircraft and muntions scattered about the hanger deck. On Soryu and Kaga (and no doubt Akagi too), the avgas fuel tanks exploded later as fires reached deeper in the ship.

That means the IJN fuel reserves were ~600,000 tons or 10% of your figured and about double what you have for Midway.

The 42.7 million barrels you quoted is not 600,000 tons, it’s 5,700,000 tons. Oxford companion to WW2 page 1061 states that the Japanese strategic reserve at the start of fiscal period 1942 (ie, April 1, 1942) was 38,000,000 barrels, or just over 5,000,000 tons.

[LWD]

One could surmise the carrier fleet retiring while a night bombardment distracs the defences, then the battle cruisers catching up with the carriers. It woudl be a tradeoff between risk & benefits- if atacked , battle cruisers would stand a better chance than air carriers!

My understanding is Oahu bristled with coastal artillery, some as big as 16". That, and the fact the flash from the IJN guns would be visible by observers atop the numerous hills on the island, would place the bombardment force at great risk for little gain....

Not just that but some of the battleships were still capable of firing I believe.

[LWD]

.

That means the IJN fuel reserves were ~600,000 tons or 10% of your figured and about double what you have for Midway.

The 42.7 million barrels you quoted is not 600,000 tons, it’s 5,700,000 tons. Oxford companion to WW2 page 1061 states that the Japanese strategic reserve at the start of fiscal period 1942 (ie, April 1, 1942) was 38,000,000 barrels, or just over 5,000,000 tons.

You are correct I slipped a digit. That still leaves the Barrier and Javlin reference which states that Midway used more oil than the IJN had used in any previous year. It's also odd that the IJN fuel reserves and the total Japanese oil reserves are often quoted as being almost equal.

[waldzee]

One could surmise the carrier fleet retiring while a night bombardment distracs the defences, then the battle cruisers catching up with the carriers. It woudl be a tradeoff between risk & benefits- if atacked , battle cruisers would stand a better chance than air carriers!

My understanding is Oahu bristled with coastal artillery, some as big as 16". That, and the fact the flash from the IJN guns would be visible by observers atop the numerous hills on the island, would place the bombardment force at great risk for little gain....

Not just that but some of the battleships were still capable of firing I believe.

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I gracefully concede the point on the two battlecruiser bombardment
My understanding was that the Japanese fleet had the equivelent of the RN's cordite-N, which could be used in 14" guns ( with a lot of fouling)

[ChristopherPerrien]

One could surmise the carrier fleet retiring while a night bombardment distracs the defences, then the battle cruisers catching up with the carriers. It woudl be a tradeoff between risk & benefits- if atacked , battle cruisers would stand a better chance than air carriers!

a night bombardment took place at Midway, I beleive?

I first thought you were replying as to using the 1st Airfleet's BB's and Ca's in the context of bombarding Trincomalee during the Indian Ocean Raid, not Pearl. No-one would bring ships within the range of Oahu's CDA.

[glenn239]

My understanding was that the Japanese fleet had the equivelent of the RN's cordite-N, which could be used in 14" guns ( with a lot of fouling)

The Japanese battleship fleet was optimised and trained for ultra-long range gunnery engagement. So if the task is to drop 14” shells on a ship stranded in harbour, or port facilities, from 35,000 yards away, you’ll have no better fleet in 1941 suited to the task. The problem is that the defences - in particular the 16" coastal guns and lurking carriers - were just too “hot” for two battleships attacking alone, without a rehearsed plan.

[glenn239]

That still leaves the Barrier and Javlin reference which states that Midway used more oil than the IJN had used in any previous year.

Right – Midway / Aleutians will have used more oil than during any previous peacetime year. You see, the Japanese fleet was not in the habit of sailing en mass to Midway during peacetime. That qualification means maybe 250,000 tons or 350,000 tons burned type thing, or at least 5% of the strategic reserve. 5% doesn’t seem like much, but for Japan, living hand to mouth, it was a double-disaster to have wasted that oil on a brutally abortive offensive. This, doubling down on a defeat, is one of the main drawbacks to the idea of an offensive in the eastern Pacific. An Indian Ocean offensive in the 2nd half of 1942, because it could draw oil straight from the NEI, was much friendlier to the strategic reserve than fighting in the Solomons or around Midway or Hawaii.

Now, if you want to get specific about maximum usage during Midway, then you have to add up the fuel loads of all the warships, troopships and tankers that embarked on the trip - that's the absolute maximum amount of oil that could have been used. But then, you have to assign a ‘residual’ for oil still aboard vessels when they returned to Japan. If you do, I suspect that you’ll be in the 250,000 to 350,000 tons range.

It's also odd that the IJN fuel reserves and the total Japanese oil reserves are often quoted as being almost equal.

When it is stated that the Japanese economy ran on oil, what is meant from that is that the Japanese merchant fleet ran on oil. Coal was the unit of production and communication in Japan, oil was necessary for sea trade and the small number of vehicles Japan’s economy possessed. So if the Japanese had projected, say, 3 million tons usage in the first year of a war, what that really means is about 1.5 million tons burned by the navy and 1.5 million tons burned by the merchant fleet. Note that, of all the Great Powers in the 1930’s, Japan probably had the most incentive to keep its merchant fleet, and even its battleship fleet, coal burning.