What if Vice Admiral Nagumo hadn't stopped the third strike?

[Carl Schwamberger]

I wonder what the actual industrial consumption of Japans oil was? Someone drawing from Kirby 'The War Against Japan' claims 22 million barrels consumed in 1941 & 26 million in 1942. That seems a lot for just naval use. anyone have some other sources that can clarify where the oil was going to?

[LWD]

That still leaves the Barrier and Javlin reference which states that Midway used more oil than the IJN had used in any previous year.

Right – Midway / Aleutians will have used more oil than during any previous peacetime year. You see, the Japanese fleet was not in the habit of sailing en mass to Midway during peacetime. That qualification means maybe 250,000 tons or 350,000 tons burned type thing, or at least 5% of the strategic reserve. ...

Except it's also been widely reported that IJN fuel reserves were sufficient for 2 years of peace time usage which implies that Midway burned fuel equal to half the reserves held in Dec 1941. Furthermore http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm states that by the 4th quarter of 42 the IJN is burning 300,000 tons/month. Now at that time the activity level by carriers and battleships is mutch reduced compared to Midway. The implication is that your Midway estimate is a bit low.

[LWD]

I wonder what the actual industrial consumption of Japans oil was? Someone drawing from Kirby 'The War Against Japan' claims 22 million barrels consumed in 1941 & 26 million in 1942. That seems a lot for just naval use. anyone have some other sources that can clarify where the oil was going to?

Well some of the links I previously posted have some info on it and or refernces that point to more.
For instance:
http://karbuz.blogspot.com/2006/10/oil- ... wii-2.html

By September 1941, Japanese oil reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour.

That equates to a peace time usage of ~2 million barrels of oil/month (if I haven't slipped another digit) or 312,000 tons per month.
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/i/Oil.htm

When war broke out, the Japanese Navy had managed to stockpile about 42.7 million barrels of oil. This was thought to be sufficient for the first year of war, but consumption greatly exceeded prewar projections. The Army estimated it would require 5.7 million barrels per year while Navy requirements were estimated at 17.6 million barrels per year and civilian requirements at 12.6 million barrels per year. Actual consumption proved to be at least twice what had been projected.

And of course:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

I note, too, that the figures for fuel consumption I arrived at are universally higher than the figures quoted for both Allied and Japanese naval vessels by James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi's book "Victory at Sea." Having contacted Dunnagin and Nofi regarding their sources, I was told that they had used Conway's materials. I regret that I have not seen the Conway's figures. However, my figures for capital vessels (at the least) are the result of examining several different source works which specialize in the Japanese Navy, and I believe them to be as accurate as possible in the Western literature. Further, in the case of Japanese battleships, the Japanese literature also agrees with my figures. I am at a loss, therefore, to explain the apparent discrepencies between my results and Dunnagin & Nofi.

Which suggest a couple of follow up sources.

[Deans]

It is easy to criticise Nagumo, with the benefit of our hindsight. However, no one was a `Carrier Admiral' back in 1941. I would imagine even the act of successfully coordinating 2 airstrikes from 6 carriers (the USN did not manage to coordinate 3 carriers at Midway) would have required a fairly competent commander. His overall record was pretty good.

As I see it, Nagumo had caused far more damage than he had imagined, with his first 2 strikes. It was prudent of him to quit while he was ahead. If the dockyards or Oil storage facilities were attractive targets, then that should have been made clear to him by the IJN high command, before the raid and targets re-prioritized (and a possible 3rd strike possibility war gamed).

If, in the process of attempting his 3rd strike, Nagumo lost a couple of carriers, from an unexpected USN carrier based strike, we would no doubt be discussing how incompetent Nagumo was, in not withdrawing earlier.

[LWD]

One of the most serious questions is when would the third strike be launched. From what I've read meterological conditions were deteriating leading to recovery ops for the 2nd wave taking longer than expected. Given that at least a quick evaluation of the planes to be used in a third wave needs to be done then they have to be refueled, rearmed, and spotted the time line suggest that if a third wave was launched on 7 Dec it wouldn't have been recovered until after dark. Now combine that with how much additional resistance the 2nd wave met and extrapolate that a bit and the results don't look good for the planes sent out on the third wave. In several threads we've gone over the probable damage that the third wave could inflict and it's my impression that most veiw it as far from the extreme that some do. The tank farms would likely have sustained some damage but I doubt even half the tanks would have been taken out and probably even less. Buildings would have been destroyed but machinery proved rather resiliant to bombing likewise much of the other support facilities. Note that the third wave woud also likely draw a very clear arrow to the lcoation of the IJN carriers as well. Even a B-17 could cause problems if it happens on them when they are recovering aircraft especially if it's at night. Note that all this based on the weather cooperating enough to even launch a third wave on the 7th. If the Japanese don't do it on the 7th how long do they wait around to do it? Was the weather on the 8th ok? How much stronger and more coordinated do US defences get over the next few days? Lots of questions and lots of ways for the Japanese to end up with the short end of the stick IMO.

[OpanaPointer]

I wonder what the actual industrial consumption of Japans oil was? Someone drawing from Kirby 'The War Against Japan' claims 22 million barrels consumed in 1941 & 26 million in 1942. That seems a lot for just naval use. anyone have some other sources that can clarify where the oil was going to?

That should be in the Monographs, Carl.

[Takao]

With regards to the Japan's national petroleum supply, Evans & Peattie give their findings in their Japanese Naval tome "Kaigun", it is on page 412, Table 11-3: http://books.google.com/books?id=M-5feK ... -3&f=false

With regards to the targets of a "mythical" third strike, I don't see the harbor facilities receiving much attention. The only source to attacking the harbor facilities has apparently been Fuchida, and his testimony is, at best, of very dubious worth. I believe Admiral Chuichi Hara stated the Japanese position best, when he referred to land targets as "mere secondary objectives." After all, the Japanese were going for a quick victory, and were not concerned with the importance of the Pearl facilities that would come into play a year or two from now. The Japanese main concern lay with the American fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor...most of which had been missed in the first two strikes.

[glenn239]

By September 1941, Japanese oil reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour.

But by September 1941 the Japanese were into mobilization and intense training and therefore were no longer operating on a “peacetime” footing.

Except it's also been widely reported that IJN fuel reserves were sufficient for 2 years of peace time usage

No, the reserve was estimated the reserve was adequate for two years wartime use. Peacetime = 300,000 tons. Wartime = 3,000,000 tons.

The implication is that your Midway estimate is a bit low.

Let me flesh out what I meant by examining the carrying capacity of the invasion forces. This is off the top,

15 x tankers = 150,000 tons
11 x BB = 66,000 tons
8 x CV/L = 28,000 tons
8 x CL = 8,000 tons
12 x CA = 24,000 tons
80 x DD = 40,000 tons

166,000 tons aboard warships and 150,000 tons aboard tankers = 316,000 tons. That’s how much the listed ships could physically carry. How can a fleet burn more oil than it carried?

[glenn239]

With regards to the targets of a "mythical" third strike, I don't see the harbor facilities receiving much attention. The only source to attacking the harbor facilities has apparently been Fuchida, and his testimony is, at best, of very dubious worth.

Genda also recommended follow up attacks on Pearl Harbor, specifically, to smash the base in repeated attacks as Kido Butai passed by to the west. He outlined this in considerable detail with Prange two years after the war.

I believe Admiral Chuichi Hara stated the Japanese position best, when he referred to land targets as "mere secondary objectives."

Japanese officers were no more inclined to hold identical viewpoints on such matters as the officers in any military organisation. For example, Ugaki recorded in his diary within 24 hours of the attack that Nagumo should have expanded on his results to have destroyed Pearl Harbor altogether.

The Japanese main concern lay with the American fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor...most of which had been missed in the first two strikes.

The focus was mainly on the two carrier groups that afternoon. Fuchida said he wanted to hit Pearl Harbor again, but couldn’t argue to the logic of the uncertain location of the US carriers. Yamaguchi was astounded and dismayed at the decision to withdraw. Hara agreed with it. So not even Nagumo’s carrier admirals were uniform in their opinion on the matter.

[LWD]

Well perhaps it's due to missing vessels. For instance http://midway1942.org/order.shtml
lists (including the Aleutian OP)
11 BBs
4 CVs
4 CVL's
13 CAs (+1)
10 CLs (+2)
67 DDs (-13)
18 AO's (+3 tankers)
5 AV's
1 RS
4 APDs
7 AMs
1 AE
15 APs
3 SCs
5 AKs
2 ASs
21 SS
2 ACs
1 CM
Then of course it depends on when you start counting. If you include the gathering of the fleet that could account for more as well.

[Takao]

Genda also recommended follow up attacks on Pearl Harbor, specifically, to smash the base in repeated attacks as Kido Butai passed by to the west. He outlined this in considerable detail with Prange two years after the war.

That is true, Genda proposed several plans, IIRC four, prior to conducting the attack. However, immediately after the attack, what was first and foremost on Genda's mind, was finding and sinking the missing American carriers. As Prange relates

Then, too, Lexington and Enterprise were still at large. Genda considered that "Nagumo would have been a standing joke for generations if he had attacked Pearl Harbor again" without first ascertaining their location. So Genda urged Nagumo: "Stay in the area for several days and run down the enemy carriers."

Prange makes it quite clear, that Genda was little concerned, at the time, with conducting another strike against Pearl. Finding and sinking the American carriers was his first and only thought.

Also, I believe, that Genda's plans only spoke in very general terms of attacks against enemy installations. Only, Fuchida was so direct in advising that the next targets should be the dockyards and fuel tanks.(of course, if such a conversation took place the way Fuchida had related it to Prange.) Of course, one could argue that the vastly inflated Japanese pilots' claims as to damage done(bomb & torpedo hits) may have influenced Fuchida's purported decision to attack land targets.

[OpanaPointer]

Duck hunting was not allowed under the overall plan for Japan. The Kido Butai was needed elsewhere and it had to go there.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Genda also recommended follow up attacks on Pearl Harbor, specifically, to smash the base in repeated attacks as Kido Butai passed by to the west. He outlined this in considerable detail with Prange two years after the war.

That is true, Genda proposed several plans, IIRC four, prior to conducting the attack. However, immediately after the attack, what was first and foremost on Genda's mind, was finding and sinking the missing American carriers. As Prange relates

Then, too, Lexington and Enterprise were still at large. Genda considered that "Nagumo would have been a standing joke for generations if he had attacked Pearl Harbor again" without first ascertaining their location. So Genda urged Nagumo: "Stay in the area for several days and run down the enemy carriers."

Prange makes it quite clear, that Genda was little concerned, at the time, with conducting another strike against Pearl. Finding and sinking the American carriers was his first and only thought.

Also, I believe, that Genda's plans only spoke in very general terms of attacks against enemy installations. Only, Fuchida was so direct in advising that the next targets should be the dockyards and fuel tanks.(of course, if such a conversation took place the way Fuchida had related it to Prange.) Of course, one could argue that the vastly inflated Japanese pilots' claims as to damage done(bomb & torpedo hits) may have influenced Fuchida's purported decision to attack land targets.

Yep, I wish we could read Prang for Prange, Instead of the clouded visiion that pervades his work in WWI as Macarthur's Historian plus he had to observe "top-secret" resrtictions, Added on to the fact that most of his "notes" were published long after WWII, except for his "green books", and were "re-written/selective context/etc.) though 2 editors of no known note, before or since.


Prange's notes which now are both part of the official

[glenn239]

Well perhaps it's due to missing vessels.

Perhaps, but I’m going to hazard a guess that we're not going to make up an additional 300,000 tons with 7 “AM” types, or 21 “SS” types. So I’m seeing nothing in that list you posted that makes me suppose 350,000 tons isn’t enough to cover it, and perhaps less.

Prange makes it quite clear, that Genda was little concerned, at the time, with conducting another strike against Pearl. Finding and sinking the American carriers was his first and only thought…

Yes, I just indicated that Fuchida’s request to stike PH again was met with the need to find the US carriers. You’ve not included the next part of Genda’s account where he says that the strike force should pound Pearl Harbor repeatedly as it passed by to the west on its way to the Marshalls.

Also, I believe, that Genda's plans only spoke in very general terms of attacks against enemy installations.

You’d indicated before that Fuchida alone had claimed he urged follow up attacks on Pearl Harbor. But Genda did so as well. Since I do not find it credible that both men lied, the only conclusion I see as reasonable is that there really was a petition by the lower ranked staff officers on the Akagi for an extended battle, and that this was vetoed by Nagumo’s clique.

Only, Fuchida was so direct in advising that the next targets should be the dockyards and fuel tanks.(of course, if such a conversation took place the way Fuchida had related it to Prange.) Of course, one could argue that the vastly inflated Japanese pilots' claims as to damage done(bomb & torpedo hits) may have influenced Fuchida's purported decision to attack land targets.

I see no reason to suppose that when Fuchida or Genda describes missions to bomb Pearl Harbor, that we are talking other than the ships and shore facilities.

[glenn239]

Duck hunting was not allowed under the overall plan for Japan. The Kido Butai was needed elsewhere and it had to go there.

Where in the orders given to Nagumo is that stated?