U-boats Unloading on Argentine Coast, 27 July 1945

[crolick]

On the other hand, because of the fuel consumption involved in the greater speed, Schaeffer must have refuelled at least twice at sea from "Milchkuh" U-boats which officially did not exist if he got to the Equator by 4 July 1945, and was off Rio de Janeiro on 10 July. From the Argentine declassified interrogations, and Schaeffer's recently published book "El Secreto del U-977" we know that the latter was true, and that is why we are certain that more information is being withheld by the Argentine authorities

The problem is that all of the 'Milk Cows' were sunk in 1943 and none of the planned 'Milk Cows' was launched so it is hard to imagine that U-977 used the services of the 'Milk Cows'.

[ohrdruf]

CROLICK

The term "Milchkuh" means any U-boat able to serve as a tanker and not necessarily a Type XIV.

SID GUTTERIDGE

Well done, Sid, as usual the only one with insight enough to make a point worth an answer. The traceable documentary source is the Argentine Naval Archive, Box 64, ask for "Interrogation of Heinz Schaeffer, U-977, 18-21 August 1945". Everything naval for the 20th century is in Box 64 - this is Argentina, for God's sake, what do you expect? Plus the book.

In the book Schäffer makes it clear that the load was vastly abnormal. Off Portugal the No 1 (eventually clapped in irons for griping) pleaded for the torpedoes to be jettisoned to get the boat back to "a humanly tolerable level" - only 32 crew members so what was taking up all the space? At page 203: "si bien han desembarcado 16 hombres, el espacio sigue siendo aún muy reducido" ("even though 16 men had gone ashore, the space was still very reduced") and, apart from the officers, "everybody slept at his post except for the twelve men bottled up in the junior NCO's mess which measured 3.6 x 2.2 x 2 metres". The boat was extremely tender: "one could not leave the place where he happened to be without a prior consultation and calculation being made" (p.203). Now you may continue to insist, Sid, that all this was perfectly typical of a Type VII with only 32 men aboard, but I doubt if you would find many to agree with you.

Now if in your opinion I am making too much of "provisions" there might be an alternative explanation. Hitler had made it a cardinal rule that: "No person shall know anything which it is not absolutely essential for him to know for the performance of his duty, and only then at the latest possible moment." The following passage from Schäffer's book (p.184) is therefore very interesting: "In March 1945...I was invited to Waffen-SS HQ to be shown some extraordinary new weapons. I was introduced to the commanding officer and the demonstration began. In photographs I saw the strangest apparatus. One of these was called "the death ray". I was scheduled to see this in action the next day, but it was not possible because I did not have any more time." In Nazi Germany, nobody simply "popped into Waffen-SS HQ" to be shown advanced new weapons unless he was going to be in some way involved with them. And so my question is: Was U-977 to carry away these new weapons to safety? To what extent might these new weapons have protected U-977 in her long voyage southwards? And were they very heavy?

As regards the logs and charts you are becoming confused between Schäffer and Wermuth. Please keep taking the tablets, or your next boat will be commanded by Oberleutnant Alzheimer. Wermuth arrived with no books and documents, Schäffer had two of everything, one set of books and charts for the slow voyage, the other for the fast voyage. Not all of these documents have been declassified, but in the interrogation of Schäffer the Argentines criticized the practice of keeping two different sets of navigation charts all in pencil for the same voyage. Some of the fast voyage documents were admitted into evidence by the Brazilian Navy during its 1945 investigation into the sinking of their light cruiser "Bahía" of which Schäffer was believed to be guilty with some justification: see Almirante Saldanha da Gama: "A tragedia do Bahía", Vol 5 Part II (Servicio do Documentacao Geral da Marinha, Rio de Janeiro 1985, p.412 et seq.)

The insult by Professor Newton related specifically to an incident off San Antonio del Oeste in the Bay of San Matías on 18 July 1945. The Professor was anxious to discredit the possibility that U-977 was further south than he had sworn was the case in his official report. Thus he accused the Argentine Navy of incompetence. In fact, the sighting of a periscope from the torpedo boat "Mendoza" was confirmed by sonar and hydrophones both aboard ship and ashore and a depth charge attack made: this was probably against U-977 (officially it cannot have been any other boat) and the fresh damage to the bow seen when U-977 was surveyed at Mar del Plata was thought to have been caused by this attack: however no charts or logs have been declassified to cover the period between 10 July and 17 August 1945 for U-977 and so we still do not know.

The evidence of Schäffer's widow, though hearsay and secondary, is simply useful to bear in mind.

*******************************************************************************************************************************************
In response to an enquiry elsewhere about authors living or temporarily in Argentina who have written factual U-boat books while there I would respond as follows:
(1) The late Heinz Schäffer as a best-selling author (the censored version of "U-977") I have already mentioned in this thread.
(2) Ohrdruf is the author/editor of two U-boat books published in the UK.
(3) Professor Ronald Newton: "Actividades clandestinas de la Marina alemana en aguas argentinas con referencia especial a la rendición de dos submarinas en Mar del Plata en 1945" (Proyecto de Investigación de la CEANA, February 1998). This turgid title ("Clandestine activities of the German Navy in Argentine Waters with special reference to the Surrender of Two Submarines at Mar del Plata in 1945") promises a lot but offers nothing, for according to Professor Newton there were no clandestine activities.
(4) Helmut J Kraft: Submarinas alemanas en Argentina (Ed. Puma, Buenos Aires, 1998). Here we have the hard-line pro-Allied approach with no surprises except a forged Crossing the Line Certificate to back up Schäffer's "slow voyage". A collaborator with Professor Newton.
(5) Jorge Camarasa: Puerto Seguro, Grupo Norma 2006. Fairly well researched and supported by declassified naval archive material with no drastic claims and no Hitler wandering the backstreets of Bariloche.
(6) Salinas and de Napoli: Ultramar Sur - La fuga en submarinas de 50 jerarcas nazis a la Argentina, Ed. Norma 2002. A fat book, far too long but very good research material indeed all gone to waste with the conclusion in the sub-title- "The Escape in Submarines of more than 50 of the Nazi Hierarchy to Argentina". Not a shred of evidence to support it, but for the naval research alone the book belongs on every enthusiast's bookshelf.
The actual body of published U-boat writers presently living in Argentina is therefore five - Camarasa, Salinas, de Napoli, Kraft and Ohrdruf. Of these I do not know Kraft.

[LWD]

....
(4) Helmut J Kraft: Submarinas alemanas en Argentina (Ed. Puma, Buenos Aires, 1998). Here we have the hard-line pro-Allied approach with no surprises except a forged Crossing the Line Certificate to back up Schäffer's "slow voyage". ....

Are you saying that Kraft presents a forged document as true or as an example of something else? If the former is the case that's a pretty serious charge. I assume you have some reason to doubt its authenticity that you can share with us.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ohdruf,

I have both Schaeffer’s book and the Saldanha da Gama article, so at last we have something that can be checked.

And what do we find? You have misrepresented both!

1) The Saldanha da Gama article.

Firstly, you have incompletely given the source of the Saldanha da Gama article, as a result of which it would be virtually impossible to trace by anyone not already aware of it. Fortunately, I actually have the book the article is in. It is in Historia Naval Brasileira, Volume V/II.

More seriously, you misrepresent the contents of Saldanha da Gama’s article. You offer it as a source for the proposition: “Some of the fast voyage documents were admitted into evidence by the Brazilian Navy during its 1945 investigation into the sinking of their light cruiser “Bahia” of which Schaffer was believed to be guilty with some justification…”

Not true. Firstly, Saldanha da Gama’s article does not mention either Schaeffer or U977 at all. Nor do the chapter notes.

Secondly, the Brazilian enquiry into the Bahia’s sinking concluded it was an accident. I have given you details of this in the original Portuguese from Saldanha da Gama’s article in the past. Why have you not mentioned this?


2) Schaeffer’s book.

No, Schaeffer nowhere makes clear that U977’s load was “vastly abnormal”, presumably because it wasn’t.

The conditions Schaeffer describes are entirely compatible with the situation he describes, and which, incidentally, you do not. For instance. while you accurately quote that the crew were sixteen men short and “the junior NCO’s mess measured 3.6 x 2.2 x 2 metres”, you entirely fail to mention what is written before and after this in the same paragraph. This explains the particularly cramped living conditions aboard quite graphically without ever once mentioning that space was short due to excess cargo. If you don’t give the whole paragraph in your next post, I will. The choice is yours.

And yes, the senior watch keeper did suggest that the torpedoes be fired off to make space. However, you fail to give Schaeffer’s reply: “On the face of it that made sense, but I realized how important it might be to be able to prove that we had not fired any torpedoes after the capitulation by showing that we still had them all aboard.” This also gives the lie to any suggestion that U977 fired on the Bahia (see above).

You are equally selective in the March 1945 anecdote. The story as Schaeffer actually gives it is:

“It took twenty-four hours to reach Berlin (where he was going on leave to see his family)……….Next to me sat an SS officer who, in spite of my flatly contradicting him, simply would not stop talking about decisive new secret weapons. I was fed up with the secret weapons by now for I knew perfectly well from my own experience that if all the blueprints were there, so were the air-raids on our factories. “Well, of course, you aren’t in a position to judge,” he said, but he was, naturally, because he was working at some SS HQ or other and was out watching the tests every day. If I would only come and look him up I would see something that would make me sit up.

When I got to Berlin I really did look him up, and after I had waited at the HQ entrance for some time my new acquaintance appeared and started showing me around. Everybody was certain we were going to win, with a conviction I’d never seen the like of even after the fall of France. Among the fantastic contrivances of which I was shown photographs was one I called a death ray which my friend wanted me to come back and see in action next day.

But I wasn’t wasting more time. I wanted to see my mother……. “

No, Schaefer did not “simply pop into Waffen-SS HQ”, but was invited to “some Waffen-SS HQ or other” by a Waffen-SS officer.

No, there is no mention of an introduction to any commanding officer and no demonstration.

No, Schaeffer was not “scheduled to see this in action next day” but says he was invited.

No, he did not attend the demonstration for some vague reason that he “did not have more time” but for the very specific reason that he wanted to see his mother.

Schaeffer was on leave in Berlin for the very good reason that he was a Berliner and his family lived there. Furthermore, as his own words tell us, he was very much a sceptic about “fantastic contrivances” and “secret weapons” and considered the invitation to see a demonstration would be “wasting more time”.

If Schaeffer was so obviously a sceptic, it would require misrepresentation on an epic scale to use him as evidence for the smuggling of such weapons to Argentina!

3) Newton’s investigation.

For anyone interested, the Spanish text of Newton's article is on:

http://www.histarmar.com.ar/InfHistoric ... ellano.htm

Where are the insults you say Newton makes against the Argentine Navy?

4) Other.

I used the colonial military archives in Argentina in the mid-1980s. Even they have far, far more than 64 boxes! (Look at the notes in Juan Beverina’s deeply researched books on 18th and 19th Century Argentine military history if you don’t believe me). I find it unlikely in the extreme that the entire 20th Century Argentine naval history is in one box numbered “64”. This would make it the most primitive national archive in the world, which I find very unlikely in a sophisticated city like Buenos Aires. In my 20-year-old experience, Argentina was then running its archives in an archaic but efficient enough manner. I appreciate that post 1943 material is more difficult to view, but it is unlikely in the extreme that only one box is publicly available.

Anyway, I will write to the Argentine military attaché and will check out the notes in the multi-volume Argentine naval histories when I am next in the British Library. If they got all their information from “Box 64” it must be of record-breaking size!

Could you please give full details of this source. "Box 64, Argentina" isn't much help.

There are a number of other, lesser points I could take issue with in your post, but let’s leave it there for the moment.

Cheers,

Oberleutnant Alzheimer

P.S. There is no author/editor "Ohdruf" in the British Library catalogue, which contains all books ever published in the UK. If you are unable to give your proper name, then this claim is not really admissable here. We can all claim such unverifiable things.

[ohrdruf]

LWD

The U-977 Crossing the Line certificate is forged. The true date is "3 July 1945", but the date has been forged to read "23". I do not know who altered the document, nor do I suggest that Kraft knew or believed that it was forged.
The date of "3 July 1945" on this certificate is mentioned in the Argentine Navy interrogation of Schäffer. It coincided with his "fast voyage" log and chart, but it presented various problems in connection with his actual coordinates the following day.

[ohrdruf]

Oberleutnant Alzheimer

I have sent a PM with my identity. Kindly keep the information to yourself.

I do not dispute, and have never disputed, that the Brazilian enquiry concluded that the sinking of the "Bahía" was an accident. Accordingly I have no reason to refer to whatever it is you sent me in the past. It is the Brazilian admirals who dissent and they suspect U-977 with justification. The official report was published on 30 October 1945, I understood from my fellow authors that the U-977 interrogation was included, I will check with them and come back on that. You should post the Brazilian Report so that there is no doubt about what you allege.

You will observe that in his article, Professor Newton considers whether U-530 could have sunk the "Bahía", but he clearly refrains from considering whether U-977 could have done it. That the full complement of torpedoes was aboard (Schäffer arrived with 12, and the Argentines took two for themselves) is not a material fact.

Professor Newton is not working from the Argentine Navy interrogation report, which he never mentions as though it never existed, or he would have had to address all the discrepancies which I am bringing to light here. All the classified papers were made available to him and he never mentions them, and the only version of the facts he gives is that contained in the US interrogations much later. Having the Argentine declassified interrogations for Schäffer, it is untrue to say that all the armament was aboard when the U-977 docked. The inventory was incomplete, and Newton conceals that fact.

Newton says that U-530 could not have made the journey from the Equator to Mar del Plata in six days. This statement contains a falsehood. In the Argentine Navy interrogation, Wermuth admitted that U-530 arrived at Mar del Plata in the early hours of 9 July. Thus the true statement for Newton to have made was that U-530 could not have made Mar del Plata from the Equator in a run of FIVE days from 4 July when the "Bahía" was sunk. U-530 did not surrender for 24 hours, but went down the coast to Miramar, during which period the boat's whereabouts are unaccounted for, a fact which Professor Newton is anxious to conceal.

Regarding the insults by Newton I did not allege that they appeared in this 1998 document, I will provide the source tomorrow. The "Mendoza" depth-charging incident is mentioned in the section "San Clemente del Tuyú" of the report. This is a false statement, for the actual location of the depth-charging was nowhere near San Clemente, but 800 kms further south in the roadstead at San Antonio del Oeste in the Bahía San Matías, and not "mar afuera" - "the open sea".

Newton even manages to misstate the facts at footnote 55 when he says that "Geheimis um U-977" - (the volume "El Secreto del U-977" which you have just acquired), "was published later in Germany...". Certainly a censored version was published later in Germany under the title "U-977 - 66 Tage Unter Wasser", but this book was not "Geheimnis um U-977", or we would have had this argument decades ago.

*******************************************************************************************************************************************

The point is made repeatedly in Schäffer's book, and all the quotations you propose to make are merely your attempt to gloss over the fact that the living conditions aboard U-977 were particularly cramped. This is not explained, and must have been caused by more than the provisions for 32 men for three months. Despite my requests for your opinion, you are unable to venture a reason, and that is because it can only be explained by an abnormal load in the interior of the boat, and you do not like where that will lead you.

If you have read through Schäffer's book you will have noticed that Schäffer was inventive. Essentially it is the "fast voyage" and the "slow voyage" interwoven so that the reader has to extract the two and see how Schäffer was in two places at the same time. The Waffen-SS officer underneath the railcar in an air-raid inviting Schäffer to see all Germany's most advanced weaponry is pure theatre. To obtain such an invitation, Schäffer must have been SS or SD himself. Can you imagine a similar situation where a scientist you met on a train invited you into Aldermaston or wherever to see Britain's nuclear arsenal? I suggest that not even in peacetime would this be possible.

Actually Schäffer went to Waffen-SS HQ immediately after his interview with Dönitz and that important fact is cloaked by the air-raid pantomime. Supposedly he was sceptical about wonderful new weapons. Naturally he turns down the chance to see one being demonstrated. Any military man would, wouldn't he? "Would you like to see a demonstration tomorrow of the German death ray, Herr Oberleutnant?" "Nah-boring, I'd rather see my Mum."

I assure you that at the Argentine Naval Archive - a man of your 20 years' experience must certainly know where that is - Box 64 is where you will find the material as I said, if they let you in, and I look forward ever so much to your reply from the attaché or whoever. While awaiting this letter, for your amusement I will post an extract from two books about this Argentine archive business.

What I am waiting for, meanwhile, is your explanation
(1) as to why the boat was so cramped and inhospitable with only 32 men aboard it,
(2) why Schäffer says that he was always 1000 miles further south than has been accepted hitherto, and
(3) why he does not say where he was between 10 July and 17 August 1945.

[ohrdruf]

I have now checked on the points referred to.

You should re-read page 184 of Schäffer's book, keeping an eye out for the sentence which reads "..me presentó al jefe y comenzó la demostración." I think this has the translation I gave it.

The UFO comment is "La probabilidad de que alguna vez se haya producido un desembarco de submarinos alemanes en las costas argentinas es del mismo orden de magnitud que la parobabilidad de que seres extraterrestres hayan aterrizado con éxito en la Tierra y se hayan ido de nuevo sin morirse de risa." It appears in Newton's 1988 CEANA Report and is indicative of the arrogance and contempt in which the Argentine public was held by President Menem and Professor Newton.

I am informed that the reason for the Argentine Navy's pique was not the comment I mentioned but "for not consulting the Navy for the 1998 Report. Because Newton lied in it, they partially declassified the Wermuth and Schäffer papers to prove the lie."

Lt Torres Dias, the only officer-survivor of the "Bahía", stated in an interview for "Revista do Club Naval" by Odyr Buarque de Gusmao that in the course of the official investigation the possibility of a torpedo by U-530 and U-977 was considered but discounted. This would indicate that the Brazilians knew that both boats might have been close to the position where "Bahía" sank. Captain Gomes Cándido wrote in "O Naufragio do cruzador 'Bahía' e a hipótese de seu torpedeamento" in "Revista Marítima Brasileira" No 4-6 that the US Navy advised the Brazilian Navy to discount the possibility of submarine attack as a possible cause. This indicates that the US Navy had an undue influence on the Brazilian Navy's internal affairs.

SID GUTTERIDGE wrote: "In my 20 year-old experience, Argentina was then running its archives in an archaic but efficient enough manner. I appreciate that the post 1943 material is more difficult to view, but it is unlikely in the extreme that only one box is publicly available."

This is a man who knows his way around the Argentine archives, and at least in his 20 years there he managed to keep warm...

QUOTE: "In a blaze of publicity in 1992, the Peronist Government of Carlos Menem announced the opening of Argentina's Nazi-files to researchers. The international Press descended on Buenos Aires...Reporters and researchers found a batch of dog-eared "intelligence"dossiers containing mostly faded Press clippings. In Buenos Aires, much of the vital documentation had reportedly been destroyed back in 1955, during the last days of the Peron Government, and again in 1996, when the burning of more confidential dossiers seems to have been ordered."
(Uki Goñi: The Real Odessa)

QUOTE: "Holger M Meding, author of "La Ruta de los Nazis", looked in Box 64 at the Archivo General de la Armada unsuccessfully for Malleas' reports on the interrogations of Wermuth and Schäffer, and decree 19.160, five days previously, which transferred U-977 to the United States. After confirming for ourselves that Box 64 contained nothing but reports on the Graf Spee crew, we lost hope of finding any Second World War naval documentation, which reaffirmed our belief that the Argentine Navy would declassify nothing until the US Navy or Government gave them permission.
"In mid-June 2002, when we were on the point of submitting our manuscript for publication, without any great expectations we applied through the President of the Defence Commission of the Chamber of Deputies - Miguel Ángel Toma - to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Joaquín Stella, who directed us to an office where we were allowed to consult various files and photocopy the Spanish language translations of the Mar del Plata interrogations of the two U-boat commanders, jealously guarded for 57 years."
(Salinas and De Napoli, Ultramar Sur, 2002 at page 421/422.)

All in one box, Sid, all in one box. Looking forward to that letter from the naval attaché too.

[JTG]

Fascinating exchange,

but, as you continue to remind us, the labythrine information sources of Sothern America can be manipulated, no?

****
I am informed that the reason for the Argentine Navy's pique was not the comment I mentioned but "for not consulting the Navy for the 1998 Report. Because Newton lied in it, they partially declassified the Wermuth and Schäffer papers to prove the lie."
*****
Ergo, the more lies told against the administration, the more truths will be revealed..

Welcome to the real world..

<grin>


An object lesson for historians vs the Latin temperament. (Anyone who thinks that i am joking, try archaeology in the Middle East or Egypt..)


Best,

John

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ohdruf,

I have been trying to find confirmation of what you say Newton wrote regarding incompetence in the Argentine Navy and Mendoza’s reported sighting, but I can’t. Your interpretation seems to differ markedly in several places from what Newton actually wrote. This is consistent with your misrepresentation of both Saldanha da Gama and Schaeffer (see above).

What Newton actually wrote (the translation is mine, but feel free to correct any glaring errors) is:

“The most intriguing sightings took place off the coast of San Clemente del Tuyu, Buenos Aires Province, between 17 and 23 July. On the 17th a “submarine” that was traveling towards the south at some 3,000 metres from the coast was seen, at one time or another, by at least two dozen people, from the shore. However, it was misty at the time of the sightings and the “submarine” was not seen by the trained observers at the lighthouse near Cabo San Antonio, nor by an unidentified aircraft circling over the area. At dusk on the 17th, the torpedo-boat Mendoza, which was patrolling out at sea, spotted a periscope and detected submarine sounds in its hydrophones; it pursued the objective for an hour and forty minutes, launching eight depthcharges, until the darkness obliged it to abandon operations, without apparent result. During the following days isolated sightings were made in the area. In one case, it appears that at nightfall an observer confused the mizzen mast of a fishing boat with the conning tower of a U-boat.

The sighting of “U-124” reported on 29 July was, however, pure fantasy, given that it was the German practice not to carry numbers on U-boats in wartime. The incidents were investigated by the police and naval officers but they were unable to arrive at a definitive explanation.”

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

So, let’s look at how your version of Newton’s description measures up to the original. You wrote:

“The insult (1) by Professor Newton related specifically to an incident off San Antonio del Oeste in the Bay of Matias (2) on 18 July 1945 (3). The Professor was anxious to discredit (4) the possibility that U-977 was further south than he had sworn was the case in the official report. Thus he accused the Argentine Navy of incompetence (5). In fact the sighting of a periscope from the torpedo boat (6) Mendoza was confirmed by sonar (7) and hydrophones both aboard ship and ashore (8) and a depth charge attack was made..”

(1) No, there was no insult to the Argentine Navy. Newton reports the Mendoza incident entirely without criticism of the Argentine Navy. He expresses his skepticism about civilian submarine sightings by putting them in “inverted commas”, but he does not do so with Navy reports.

(2) No, Newton did not “relate specifically to an incident off San Antonio del Oeste in the Bay of Matias”. He makes no reference to San Antonio del Oeste at all. He does mention an incident near Cabo San Antonio, but this does not relate to the Argentine Navy. Furthermore, Cabo San Antonio is a good 500 kilometres north of San Antonio del Oeste. Newton does not specifically locate the Mendoza sighting anywhere.

(3) No, Newton reports the incident as at dusk on 17 July, not on 18 July as you claim he does.

(4) No, you have absolutely no grounds to state that Newton was anxious to discredit any version. However, by introducing this, which is purely your completely unsubstantiated opinion, I would suggest you are deliberately trying to shift attention away from facts that do not suit your conspiracy theory onto the integrity of Newton. This is a standard conspiracy theorist ploy. Newton’s integrity is not in question, but yours becomes so by using this dubious tactic. Let’s just stick to the facts.

(5) No, (a mistake both you and Newton make) Mendoza was a destroyer (contratorpedero), not a torpedo boat (torpedero).

(6) No, the Argentine Navy did not then have sonar. Newton accurately only mentions hydrophones, a much more limited WWI-vintage detection system it did possess.

(7) No, at no point does Newton “accuse the Argentine Navy of incompetence”. That, again, is your invention.

(8) No, there was no mention of confirmation of the Mendoza’s sighting from the shore. Newton says she was out at sea (“mar afuera” – though I wonder whether this shouldn’t perhaps read “más afuera” or “further out”) and mentions no shore sightings in connection with this.

Thus you have misrepresented what Newton wrote or other facts eight times in just five lines! Newton may or may not be correct, but your representation of what he wrote definitely is consistently incorrect.

I have now looked at three specific sources you give (Saldanha da Gama, Schaeffer and Newton) and in all three cases you multiply misrepresented what they actually wrote, all consistently in favour of the conspiracy theory you prefer.

I would suggest that this shows a systematic pattern of attempting to misrepresent the work of others and thereby distort the historical record.

I am prepared to believe anything provided it is backed by substantive evidence, but no case, good or bad, is helped by repeated misrepresentation of sources.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ohdruf,

I have received no PM containing your identity. Moreover, I have not asked for your identity and do not consider it of importance. We are all judged here by the accuracy of what we write. You have offered three sources, none of which actually conforms with what you claimed it contained and it is in this that you appear to be seriously wanting.

As you have failed to answer all bar one of my numerous points about your dubious representation of Schaeffer and Saldanha da Gama, I presume you are in agreement with them.

The only one you have answered is the least significant about, "..me presentó al jefe y comenzó la demostración." "Demostración" of what? Photographs? This is evidence of nothing.

The Brazilians certainly did consider the possibility that Bahia was torpedoed - and dismissed it. But that was not my point. My point was that you were claiming a source as an authority for propositions of yours when it wasn't. You certainly misrepresented the contents. I put it to you that you have never personally seen this source.

The collective position of Brazilian admirals is expressed in Volume V/II of their Historia Naval Brasileira, as cited above. Numerous of them contributed to this and the official version was and is that Bahia was lost in an accident for reasons given. Your contention that Brazilian admirals collectively doubt this conclusion is untrue.

The Bahia was actually engaged in working for the US as a rescue ship on the South Atlantic air bridge and the depthcharges that exploded aboard were of US origin. The USA was therefore involved in the Bahia affair from the start. Furthermore, as they held the two U-boat and their crews prisoner, they were the unavoidable authority on whether it was possible that either had torpedoed the Bahia. They advised not. This is not evidence of untoward US interference, but of the thoroughness of the Brazilian enquiry.

All in one box? Not according to your own quote from Salinas and De Napoli.

Nowhere in my version of Schaeffer's book does he say that conditions were unusually cramped for a submarine. If he does, what does he actually say? All submarines are cramped. It is the nature of submarines. The real problem was not unusual cramping but horrible conditions due to the exceptionally long period submerged.

Secondly, I pointed out to you that the paragraph before and after your selective quotation contains a good explanation as to why conditions were bad aboard, and I invited you to post it here. You have not done so. One reason Schaeffer gives is that because the U-boat did not surface for two months it had to store all its garbage aboard. Does your version not say that?

I see no trace of fast voyage/slow voyage inventiveness by Schaeffer. The positioning description is pretty sparse to concoct one accurate voyage itinerary, let alone two! Remember, the voyage to Argentina takes up only a about quarter of what is a relatively short book in the first place.

You have changed your tune on the Waffen-SS officer and his tour of "some Waffen-SS HQ or other". Now it is a "pantomime". Earlier you were using it as substantive evidence!

What evidence do you have that "Schäffer went to Waffen-SS HQ immediately after his interview with Dönitz"? Funny how this surfaces now!

You write "Schäffer must have been SS or SD himself". What is your evidence for that?

It seems unlikely in the extreme that if Shaeffer really was part of a plan to smuggle secret weapons to Argentina he would even touch on the subject in his publicly available book. It is also unlikely in the extreme that, on a "need to know basis" he would have been told anything about these wonder weapons!

In reply to your last three questions:

1) The cramped and inhospitable conditions on Schaeffer's submarine are explained in his book, in a paragraph I have already directed you to. I ask you again to put it up so that others can read it. If you don't, I will.

2) I don't know. How does "Schäffer say(s) that he was always 1000 miles further south than has been accepted hitherto"? What was the original version and source and what is the new version and source?

3) Who knows why Schaeffer does not say where he was between 10 July and 17 August 1945? He doesn't say where he was in dozens of other five week periods in his book either. Besides, when he was writing, he presumably didn't have access to his own log books, which can't have helped.

Absence of evidence is not evidence. I don't have to to explain where Schaeffer was as I am not disputing his original version. However, YOU do have to provide evidence that he was up to whatever nefarious activity it is you claim he was, if it differs from his original account. So far you haven't.

Cheers,

Sid.

[LWD]

....P.S. There is no author/editor "Ohdruf" in the British Library catalogue, which contains all books ever published in the UK. If you are unable to give your proper name, then this claim is not really admissable here. We can all claim such unverifiable things.

Interesting. He could easily have given the correct name and no one would have associated it with Ohdruf. This seams to be an attempt to claim authority and avoid substantaiting it. Makes one wonder what the books are and what value they have.

[LWD]

I asked why you thought it was forged and you respond with:

...The U-977 Crossing the Line certificate is forged.

Repeating it does not make it so and does nothing to prove your case. Then you follow up with:

The true date is "3 July 1945", but the date has been forged to read "23". I do not know who altered the document, nor do I suggest that Kraft knew or believed that it was forged.

This is just more details on your theory. It still does little to prove or disprove forgery.

The date of "3 July 1945" on this certificate is mentioned in the Argentine Navy interrogation of Schäffer. It coincided with his "fast voyage" log and chart, but it presented various problems in connection with his actual coordinates the following day.

So 3 July is mentioned in an interrogation report. But then you cast some doubt on it.

In any case the 3 July date may be incorrect for a number of reasons. A misstatment or missrecording for instance. It looks like you are saying that the document does not support your position and thus is a forgery. That simply doesn't work on a board where one is expected to support ones case with logic and data.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Ohdruf,

I have found the following about the improbability of the Mendoza story on the veery good Argentine naval site "Histarmar". You can follow it through the link I gave above:

"El ARA "Mendoza" ¿ataca?

Un informe del CEANA (Comisión de Estudio de Actividades Nazis en la Argentina) de mediados de los años ´90 y otras publicaciones posteriores han mencionado que el día 17 o 18 de julio de 1945 el torpedero ARA "Mendoza" atacó, en el Golfo de San Matías a un submarino en inmersión. Ello habría sido a la 17,30 -en pleno invierno no hay mucha luz a esa hora- luego de avistar un periscopio frente al fondeadero de San Antonio. A consecuencia del avistaje de "submarino cierto" (*) el torpedero lo habría perseguido y atacado con ocho bombas de profundidad hasta cerca de las 19 -ya noche cerrada-.

Pues bien, ante estas afirmaciones se pueden indicar dos elementos que inducen a dudar de tal historia:

1ro: La profundidad media del Golfo de San Matías es de 10 a 15 metros con algún bolsón limitado donde alcanza los 25. Con esa profundidad no puede navegar en inmersión ningún submarino ni oceánico ni costero.

2do: El torpedero "Mendoza" y sus gemelos "La Rioja" y "Tucumán", naves de fines de los años ´20, no estaban equipados con jaula lanza cargas aunque es posible que tuvieran algún rudimentario equipo de hidrofonía. La historia sería más creíble si se hubiera tratado de alguna de las naves de la clase "Buenos Aires" incorporadas una década más tarde."

In essence, point 1) contends that the waters of the Golfo de San matias were too shallow for a submarine to travel submerged and point 2) contends that Mendoza and her sister ships were not fitted with depth charge launchers, although they might have had rudimentary hydrophones.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Bernd R]

Hi dear colleagues,

Fascinating exchange

Really ! What a powerful discussion, what a lot of arguments and details !

Just from an objective point of view and to take away any off-topic pressure which might arise here.

I have sent a PM with my identity. Kindly keep the information to yourself.

...

I have received no PM containing your identity. Moreover, I have not asked for your identity and do not consider it of importance. We are all judged here by the accuracy of what we write

The last sentence by Sid absolutely is the AHF policy. Just to emphasize it and thanks for pointing out this - but I think it's clear and not a problem here.
No member is and should be forced to get into a situation which hurts his privacy, whatever the reason is. Not said that Sid or LWD did anything in that direction ! - it's up to you, Ohrdurf to handle that.

We are through the "Oberleutnant Alzheimer" episode I think.. thanks.

regards
Bernd / Mod

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

I have been doing some number crunching on the sinking of the Bahia (which others might do well to double check):

The Brazilian light cruiser Bahia sank approximately 3,750 miles (3,262 nautical miles) from Mar del Plata (See map opposite p.416 of História Naval Brasileira, Volume V/II). The maximum speed of a Type IX U-boat on the surface was 18.2 knots. At this speed it would take U530 some 179 hours (seven days and eleven hours) to cover this distance.

Bahia was lost on 4 July 1945 at 0910. U530 surfaced at Mar del Plata on 10 July at 0700. The time elapsed between the two events was 142 hours. (Five days and twenty-two hours)

It was thus impossible for U530 to have both sunk Bahia at 0910 on 4 July and reached Mar del Plata at 0700 on 10 July even under the most favourable of circumstances.

When it is also considered that the other U-boat still at sea, U-977, later surrendered with a full load of torpedoes aboard, it is apparent that neither she nor U530 can have torpedoed Bahia.

The overwhelming probability is that the Brazilian board of enquiry was correct in concluding that German U-boats were not involved and that Bahia’s loss was accidental.

Cheers,

Sid