Some ??? about Woisko Polsko in 1939

[AlekBolduin]

How many horses (for the riders, for the artillery , for supply convoys) was in WP-at mobilization plan in 1939.
How many transport vehicles (cars, trucks etc.) was in WP-at mobilization plan in 1939.
How many reservists called up for training each year, before the war?
WP used old mortar wz18? why always given total mortars without wz18?
Why Poland general headquarters refused of "corps" system in wartime (but there are 10 corps area in peacetime)? There were only the «Army» and «Army Group» (Grupa Operacyjna)?

[AlekBolduin]

there is not any one answer ?

[Steve]

Motorcycles
Sokol 1000/Sokol/600/Sokol200
A total of about 6,000 built not all for the army, when war came many in civilian use drafted into army.

Cars
Polski/Fiat 508/518
About 7,300 of all types built ranging from staff cars to a light gun tractor version
Not all for army but when war came many in civilian use drafted into army

Lorry
Polski/Fiat 621about 13,000 built, most for the army those in civilian use probably drafted at start of war.
9,300 heavy version
2,870 bus version
330 field hospital or workshop
400 half track
Ursus A - several hundred.
Polski Fiat 618 about 600
Plus a small number of imported types.

Also gun tractors, half tracks, an all terain light vehicle, fully tracked transport vehicles. All in small numbers

I would recommend "The Polish Campaign 1939" By Zaloga and Madej which could provide much of the sort of detail you want and from where the above numbers came.

[gebhk]

Just some very quick off the top of head comments for now.

Re numbers of horses, vehicles - it's a very good question to which I don't recall seeing an answer. When Szubanski, Tarczynski and Jonca were compiling their book on Polish military vehicles (publ 1990) this information was not available. If something has changed since then, I've not heard. Clearly thse stats were compiled contemporaneously (the head of provisions had to know how many cars/horse he had to 'feed'!) but after the front rolled over Poland 3 times and the archives were destroyed by several retreating armies and pilfered by several victors we have to accept that some information may never be found, alas.

Another approach is to work through the mobilisation plans (recently published by Rybka and Stepan) and multiply by known unit organisations (and there's the rub not all are known) you will end up with a reasonable approximation. As a starter an infantry division had a theoretical strength of 6,939 nags and 76 motor vehicles; a cavalry brigade 5194/6291 horses (depending on whether it was a 3 or 4-regiment brigade) and correspondingly 65 or 66 motor vehicles. Thus just for the regular infantry divisions 208,170 horses would have been required.

Re mortars - my understanding is that all three types (wz 18, 27 and 31) were considered much of a muchness as far as allocation was concerned ie all were considered as suitable to fill the relevant slots for 81mm mortar in the OdeB, although clearly divisions were allocated the same type as far as possible to facilitate logistical support. Thus I'm not sure why you believe stats do not consider the wz 18? Konstankiewicz gives the following numbers available in August 1939: 640 wz 18, 590 wz 1928 and approximately 900 wz 31.

I would be very interested in the reasons for eschewing the Corps system (and, perhaps more importantly, all levels of command between division and commander in chief). I suspect the answer may lie in gen Stachiewicz's (Chief of staff in 1939) writings but I have been too lazy to read through this thick tome as thoroughly as I should!

Steve - Polski Fiat 508, Polski Fiat 518 and Polski Fiat 508/18 were three different albeit related vehicle types.
The PF 508 III was used by the armed forces in 4-seater personnel car (Lazik), saloon, pickup and ambulance versions.
The PF 518 as 7-seater personnel car (Lazik), 5-seater staff car and 5/7 seater saloon
The PF508/18 was an 'all terrain' construction on the PZInz 302 chassis, utilising parts from both of the above. It appeared in a large range of versions including radio, telephone, FOO, machine gun carrier, anti-tank gun tractor and pickup.

[AlekBolduin]

О
Большое спасибо для тебя, gebkh
Я читал Zaloga –но не могу сказать что он очень детальный. Очень хороший обобщающий материал, ноне детальный.
Я читал что WP имело
2142 81-мм миномет (899 - wz. 31, 595 - wz. 28 , 648 - wz.18.). Это большие цифры .Нарпимер если сделать по 3 миномета(не 2) на каждый пехотный батальон в дивизии, по 2 на каждый стрелковый батальон для ON (не как 1 в большинстве сулчаев), и по 4 миномета на кавалерийский полк –это будет :
36 кавалерийских полков (по 4 миномета)
130 стрелковых батальонов ON (по 2 по 2 миномета )
~580 пехотных батальонов (по 3 миномета) –или ~64 дивизии вместо реальных 39 дивизий.
То есть была возможность вооружить минометам в 1.5 раза больше пехотных подразделений (и в 1.5 раза больше на 1 батальон), чем реально было…
Здесь какая то большая ошибка .
По поводу резервистов – я читал что было много солдат-резервистов. И еще больше -было не призвано, чем по плану мобилизации. Много было офицеров резерва -60 тысяч и 39 тысяч «подхорунжий».
Мне интересно –какой был ежегодный лимит тренировки? Например финнская армия имели очень большой лимит тренировки для резервистов, За 5 лет 1934-39 тренировали 200 тысяч -почти все мужское население. И отбились от советского нападения.
А в Польской Армии – большой пул резервистов был не использован.
В сентябре 1939 запасных батальонов (Ośrodek Zapasowy ) было много солдат и офцеров –и очень слабое вооружение. Ośrodek Zapasowy для 16 DP – было больше офицеров (резерва) - 518 офицеров, чем было в регулярной дивизии -515 офицеров.
Очень большая была мотивация. Много резервистов в запасных батальонов. И нет организации.
Это большая ошибка для мобилизации.


Oh
thanks to you, gebkh
I read Zaloga of course
But….
I can not say that it is very detailed. Very good to summarize, but noot detailed.
I read that WP had
2142 81-mm mortar (899 - wz. 31, 595 - wz. 28, 648 - wz.18.). It's a large number. For example if done by three mortar (not 2) for each infantry battalion in the division, 2 for each infantry ON battalion (not as in most only 1 per btn), and 4 mortars at Cavalry Regiment, it would be:
36 cavalry regiments (4 mortars)
130 infantry battalions ON (for 2 mortars)
~ 580 infantry battalions (3 mortars), or ~ 64 divisions instead of the actual 39(-) divisions.
That is, had the opportunity to arm mortars 1.5 times more infantry (and 1.5 times more for one battalion), than the really was ...((((((
Here is what a big mistake somebody (((((
As for the reserve - I've read that there were many reserve soldiers pool. What's more, it was not intended, than the plan of mobilization. There were many officers of the reserve -60,000 , and 39,000 "podhorunzhy" warrant officers.
I wonder, what was the annual limit for the per-year reservists training?
For example finish army had a very large limit training for reservists, for 5 years 1934-39 it trained 200,000-almost the entire male population. And fought off the Soviet attack (sometimes).
And in the Polish Army - a large pool of reservists was not used!
In September 1939, the reserve replacement battalions (Ośrodek Zapasowy) had a lot of soldiers and officers , and very poor use for service. For example «Ośrodek Zapasowy» of 16 DP - there were more officers (reserve) - 518 officers than it was much than in the regular division TOE - 515 officers.
Large numbers of very motivated reservists (solders and officers ) in reserve replacement battalions. And no one organization and poor arms.
This is a big mistake to mobilization plan . I think…