Polish-soviet war

Discussions on all aspects of Poland during the Second Polish Republic and the Second World War. Hosted by Piotr Kapuscinski.
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tigre
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#16

Post by tigre » 27 Jun 2015, 14:16

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

At the conclusion of the operation at Kiew, the Polish troops took up a defensive position (see Sketch No.3). The Poles were short of reserves, especially after several divisions had to be sent to the north front. During the second part of May the Russians reorganized, received reinforcements, and awaited the arrival of Budennij.

The Russian plan was to have its Twelfth Army and the Group Jakir advance on 28 May against the north flank of the Polish Third Army. At the same time the Russian Fourteenth Army was to attack the Polish Sixth Army. The cavalry forces of Budennij was to effect a breakthrough south of the Russian Group Jakir, then turn north and complete the encircling, of the Polish Third Army. This plan was unsuccessful. The attack of the Russian Twelfth Army was repulsed on 28 May. Group Jakir advanced as far as Bjelaja Cerkow, but a Polish counterattack on 30 May drove this group back. The Russian Fourteenth Army apparently did not attack at all.

The commander of the Polish troops opposite Budennij ordered the Polish 13th Division to advance, but recalled this order later; this latter order was received only by parts of the division. So, on 29 May we find several Polish battalions with artillery advancing in an easterly direction, when Budennij's cavalry, without having any information of the Polish troops, advanced on a broad front (see Sketch No.5). His 6th Cavalry Division successfully attacked parts of the Polish 13th Division and succeeded in creating a large gap in the Polish front and then advanced to the vicinity of Lipowiec. The 11th Cavalry Division was unsuccessful in its attack on Dzionkow. The 4th Cavalry Division took Nowe Chwastow, but a Polish counterattack drove the cavalry back again. The remainder of Budennij's cavalry (14th Cavalry Division and a reinforced brigade) was in reserve.

Instead of exploiting the success of the 6th Cavalry Division, Budennij attacked on the front: Dzionkow-Nowe Chwastow.

Source: Review of Military Literature. December 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#17

Post by tigre » 29 Jun 2015, 15:19

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

Using all available reserve, the Poles were successful in driving back the 6th Cavalry Division on 31 May (see Sketch 6). The Russian 11th Cavalry Division, however, was able to break through the Polish lines on 31 May and advanced on Kozatin.

During the night, 31 May-1 June, the commander of the Polish 13th Division moved his reserves and forced the Russian 11th Cavalry Division to withdraw. The Polish Cavalry Division Karnicki attacked in a southerly direction, but was forced back by the Russian 11th and 14th Cavalry Divisions (see Sketch No.7).

Budennij, having concentrated all his mass (unnoticed by the Poles) on his right flank, attacked during the early hours of 5 June with three divisions in front, and one-half division echeloned to his left rear and broke the Polish front. A counterattack by the Polish cavalry brigade was unsuccessful.

In the meantime the Russian Twelfth Army had crossed the Dnjepr River at and south of Czernobyl. This situation placed the Polish Third Army in a precarious position, especially if Budennij followed orders and moved north, but he moved on the railroad center Kozatin and then via Berdyczew,on Zytomir, where a Polish Army had its headquarters.

The Russian Twelfth Army advanced very slowly and on 8 June Budennij moved east and instead of meeting Polish forces, ran into the Russian group Jakir. Budennij now decided to move on his own and advanced in a southwesterly direction on Starokonstantinow. The Polish high command decided on 8 June to withdraw via Malin-Korosten and take up a new defensive position.

The Russian forces did not press the encircling of the Polish Third Army and a radio message to Budennij to change direction and advance against the withdrawing Polish Third Army was executed too late to be effective. The Polish Third Army was therefore able to withdraw in three columns from its position between 11 and 13 June. On 13 and 14 June the south column met units of Budennij's cavalry, but the Polish 7th Division was successful in driving the Russian cavalry off. Budennij ordered a rest for 16 June.

Source: Review of Military Literature. December 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#18

Post by tigre » 03 Jul 2015, 22:42

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

On this day the Polish Third Army took up a position in the vicinity of Korosten, having contacted on the north with the Polish Group Polesie and on the south with the Polish Group Slucz. South of this group was a large gap. The Polish Sixth Army did not start its withdrawal until 13 June, when it withdrew to the line: Mogilew-Bar-Leticzew-Ljubar (see Sketch No.4). The Russian Fourteenth Army closely followed the Polish Third Army. Budennij's cavalry being reinforced by two infantry divisions, moved on the Polish Group Slucz.

The Russian Twelfth Army took Owrucz on 20 June and crossed the Slaweczna on 22 June and on 23 June drove the Poles about 12 miles south of Mozyr. On 24 June Budennij drove the Polish Group Slucz back, which forced the Polish Third Army to withdraw in rear of the Ubort. Budennij kept on pressing the Poles, who withdrew to the Goryn. The Polish Sixth Army withdrew its north flank to Starokonstantinow. On 26 June the Russian Twelfth Army attacked Mozyr in conjunction with gunboats, which took the town under fire. On 28 June the Polish Group Polesie withdrew in rear of the Ubort and Ptycz.

The Polish high command now replaced General Listowski with General Rydz-Smigly, and command of the group Slucz was given to" General Raszewski. Sketch No.4 gives .the situation at the end of June. Pilsudski notified the army commanders and front groups that no more reserves were available and that they had to depend on their own strength.

Source: Review of Military Literature. December 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#19

Post by tigre » 05 Jul 2015, 23:49

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Situation on the White Russian Front During the Latter Half of June (See Sketch No. 10).

Following the failure of the first Russian offensive in the northern front sector, the Polish counteroffensive reached the line as shown on Sketch No. 10. The condition of the troops and the acute situation on the Ukranian front prevented a continued advance. In the meantime the Russians had captured Kiev and by the end of June had reached Ubort and Goryn, thereby compelling the Group Polesie, to withdraw.

In the meantime, during the latter half of June, quiet prevailed on the north front from Bobrujsk to the Düna River. On 28 June, General Stanislaus Haller, the Chief of Staff of commander-in-chief, requested General Count Szeptycki, the commander of the northern front, to withdraw to the vicinity of the German permanent position of 1917-18. The withdrawal did not take place, because on 2 July Pilsudski called a council of war at Warsaw, which was attended by Szeptycki, and no definite decisions resulted.

"The fate of the world revolution will be decided in the West; the road to general world destruction lies over the corpse of Poland. Forward to Wizna, Minsk, and Warsaw." These were the words used in the daily order of Tuchatschewskij on 2 July. (See Sketch No. 10 for comparative strength and situation as of 2 July.)

In judging the following military events it must be noted that in Wolhynia both sides were comparatively equal: (Polish: 9 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry brigades. Russian: 7-8 infantry divisions and 5-6 cavalry divisions) whereas, on the White Russian - Lithuanian front the Russians had almost double the strength: The Polish had exactly 13 infantry divisions with a few squadrons of cavalry (100,000-120,000 men), opposed by the Russian 20-21 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions (200,000-220,000 men).

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#20

Post by henryk » 06 Jul 2015, 20:08

In the meantime, during the latter half of June, quiet prevailed on the north front from Bobrujsk to the Düna River. On 28 June, General Stanislaus Haller, the Chief of Staff of commander-in-chief, requested General Count Szeptycki, the commander of the northern front, to withdraw to the vicinity of the German permanent position of 1917-18. The withdrawal did not take place, because on 2 July Pilsudski called a council of war at Warsaw, which was attended by Szeptycki, and no definite decisions resulted.
To the contrary, Piłsudski countermanded the order and instructed his Generals to avoid trench warfare, as counterproductive. In his book:
YEAR 1920 And Its Climax BATTLE OF WARSAW During the Polish Soviet War
Pilsudski Institute of America / Pilsudski Institute of London 1972
he presented his arguments against this concept of Modern War, pages 106-117.
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#21

Post by tigre » 18 Jul 2015, 18:56

Hello to all :D; thanks for your complement henryk :wink:. Now something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Beginning of the Second Russian Offensive in the North (4-11 July).

The Russians used the same plans for the second offensive as they had used for the first: Attacking the over-extended Polish front by enveloping and destroying the hostile north flank by the Russian main forces. The cavalry corps was assigned to the envelopment with instructions to permit the engaged troops no rest and wherever possible, force them to the south. The Russians held to this tenaciously because of its simplicity and former successful experience.

The Red troops energetically forced their attack since 1 July. Reconnaissance planes circled over the Polish First Army. The Polish Fourth Army reported hostile preparation for a river crossing. In addition to this, Minsk was subjected to aerial bombing.

The Russian offensive started at dawn of 4 July. Following heavy artillery preparation the infantry advanced, accompanied by tanks and armored cars. The Russian main attack, consisting of 12 1/2 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions of the Fourth, Fifteenth, and Third Armies and the III Cavalry Corps, was directed against the 5 1/2 divisions of the Polish First Army whose morale was not so good. At this decisive location the Russians utilized 80,000 rifles (sabers) in addition to 440 field pieces against 35,000 rifles and 140 field pieces of the Poles.

Tactically the Red troops followed the principle of concentrating their forces, for on the north flank and in the center of Zygadlowicz's army they attacked with overwhelming strength. The Poles, who had but 1 1/2 divisions in reserve, could not withstand this double attack. As early as the night of 4-5 July, during which the Russians pressed their attack, the Polish First Army, suffering heavy casualties, was forced back 10 to 15 miles. Simultaneously the Polish Fourth Army became heavily engaged by attacks on Borisow and Bobrujsk. Under these circumstances at noon, 5 July, the army commander, General Szeptycki, ordered the withdrawal of his north flank to the line along Budslaw-Miadziol. On the same day the Polish Army Headquarters ordered the retaking of the north front as far as the former German position by absolute retention of Wilna and Pinsk, but it was left to General Szeptycki to designate the time for this movement.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#22

Post by tigre » 25 Jul 2015, 16:24

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Beginning of the Second Russian Offensive in the North (4-11 July).

On 6 July the commanding general of front-line troops realized that, he must carry out this delayed order, as the retreat of the Polish First Army was becoming more disorderly. In many cases the commanders were separated from their troops. Men fleeing from the front arrived as far back as Swencjany, in fact, as far as Wilna, and created a feeling of panic.

While the Polish First Army was withdrawing its north flank on KobyInjk and the center and south flanks dropped back toward Molodeczno, the Russian III Cavalry Corps followed closely and occupied Swencjany on 9 July. During the night 6-7 July, the Russian Sixteenth Army captured the entire Berezina River line.

On 10 July the Poles reached the Wilija River as well as the line: Wilejka-Minsk while the Red forces increased their pressure along the line: Dünaburg Railroad-Wilna-Borisow-Minsk. During these days the hostile pursuit, especially against the Polish First Army, greatly diminished due to the hostility of the populace and the swampy terrain.

On 11 July the Russians occupied Molodeczno and Minsk. In the meantime, on 9 July, the Polish high command decided to halt the retreat along the line: Zbrucz-Styr-Luniniec-the old German positions and to launch "a strong counteroffensive on the entire front" from this line.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#23

Post by tigre » 28 Jul 2015, 17:41

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Advance of the Russians up to the Njemen and Szczara and the Entry of Europe (12-20 July) .
(See Sketches Nos. 11, 12, and 14.)

On 12 and 13 July the Polish forces were grouped as shown in Sketch No. 11. The badly demoralized First Army in its new location released 2 1/2 divisions as reserves. Its combat strength: had diminished to 15,800 rifles and 300 sabers; in 8 days it had suffered a loss of more than half its
strength. The Fourth Army, which by forced marches withdrew to the former permanent German position, and the Group Polesie, had not suffered in their combat strength.

On 12 July the Russians resumed their combat activities but were unable to make any noteworthy gains on this date or on 13 July. They did succeed on 14 July to penetrate the Polish First Army at Smorgon and south thereof and with their Lithuanian allies, capture Wilna.

It was now impossible for the First Army to stem its retreat. Due to hostile pressure General Zygadlowicz withdrew to the southwest during the night of 15 July.

The high command then ordered a new concentration of troops in the strong but narrower sector of Grodno-Pinsk. General Szeptycki accordingly issued orders for the Polish First Army to halt behind the Njemen River from Grodno (inclusive) to the junction of the Szczara River and for the Polish Fourth Army to halt behind the Szczara River while the Group Polesie was to make a stand along the Oginski Canal and Pinsk.

The disastrous military events of the early July days compelled the Polish government to appeal to the Allies, especially Great Britain, for help and intervention against the Soviets. On 10 July at Spaa, where the Allied Supreme Council sat, an agreement was reached between the Polish Premier Grabski and Great Britain's representative, Lord Curzon. On 11 July England presented to the Soviet ambassador at London, Krassin, the request that Moscow call an immediate one-week armistice. The British suggestion called for the withdrawal of the Polish forces behind the so-called "Curzon Line" [along the general line: Lemberg-Grodno (see Sketch No. 14), and for the Russians to halt their advance about 30 miles east of that line, and that Wilna be turned over to the Lithuanians.

Luck was with the hard pressed Poles, because the Soviets, who had received the British proposals on 12 July, were sure of victory and therefore turned down the armistice proposals. It was not until 18 July that Moscow notified London by wireless that it would not consider intervention but would consider direct negotiations with the Poles. At the same time the Soviet Supreme War Council decided to relentlessly push the operations to counteract the possibility of Rumania's entry into the war. After 18 July the Poles were faced with direct negotiations with the Russians, a doubtful help from other countries - and above all their forces would have to be taxed to their extreme limit.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#24

Post by tigre » 31 Jul 2015, 18:27

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Advance of the Russians up to the Njemen and Szczara and the Entry of Europe (12-20 July) .
(See Sketches Nos. 11, 12, and 14.)

During these days not only the Polish government but also the Polish General Command were confronted with a serious situation. Unless reserves could be found somewhere, serious consequences could be expected on both fronts; in the north there was the relentless pressure on the exhausted First Army and in the south the advances by the mounted hordes of Budennij's. On the one hand the Russians had assumed the initiative and pursued the Poles without rest; on the other hand the Polish high command failed in decision as to the manner of warding off the enemy. A change of command seemed inevitable. About mid-July this change of command took place; the Chief of the General Staff, General Stanislaus Haller, was replaced by General Rozwadowski.

One of the first measures taken by Rozwadowski was an order that the line: Njemen-Szczara-Oginski Canal be held at all costs, the north flank of the First Army be made strong, and under no conditions to evacuate Grodno.

In face of this, on 19 July the Russian General Tuchatchewskij ordered the following for 21 July: the capture of the entire Njemen-Szczara position; the capture of Grodno by the III Cavalry Corps; the crossing of the Njemen above Grodno by the Fourth and Fifteenth Armies at Lunno, and by the Third Army at Mosty, while the Sixteenth Army was to open the Szczara front at Slonim.

Grodno would be the focal point in the battles ensuing as a result of this order. This former Russian fortress was very weakly manned by the Poles, having but 3,000 men and about 20 field pieces, thus being much too weak to repel a determined attack. On the evening of 18 July Gais-Khan appeared with his horsemen and with the infantry, which was brought forward on peasant carts and he attacked the city on 19 July. He drove the Poles over the Njemen and captured numerous prisoners and most of the field pieces, as well as most of the food supplies, which the Poles were unable to remove. The Polish reinforcements which were on their way to Grodno came too late to prevent the fall of this key position. General Szeptycki then ordered the Polish First Army commander to recapture Grodno at all costs. The troops assigned to this mission, after having gained a foothold in the southern portion of Grodno, were driven back due to the vigorous Russian resistance.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#25

Post by tigre » 03 Aug 2015, 20:02

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Forward Movement of the Russians from the Njemen Up to and Across the Bug River (21 July-6 August)
(See Sketches Nos. 12 and 13.)

The importance of the line: Njemen River-Szczara River-Oginski Canal to the Poles was that it represented the-last strong position in front of Warsaw. The next natural position, the Bug River line, could easily be turned via Ostrolenka-Ostrow. The condition of the First and part of the Fourth Armies was such that it promised very little success, due to the fatiguing retreat, unsuccessful combat, considerable casualties, and many desertions. Fresh troops fit for combat were not available for the disorganized front which sorely needed them.

During the night of 21 July the Russians penetrated the line of the Fourth Army at Slonim, driving a wide wedge into it. On 23 July the Russians crossed the Njemen sector of Grodno as far as Mosty and forced the Polish First Army back to the southwest. On 24 July General Szeptycki ordered a general retreat for the First Army via Tykocin-Gorodok and for the Fourth Army via Swislocz and Nowy Dwor.

The Russian morale was very high due to their victorious advance of the decisive north flank of more than 190 miles in 16 days. They were ready for greater efforts. Tuchatschewskij ordered an energetic pursuit and directed that the line: Ostrolenka -Ostrow -Kossow -Drogiczin -Biala -Wlodawa be reached by 3 August.

The Russian III Cavalry Corps was ordered to capture the fortress Ossoviec into which General Romer, the new commander of the Polish First Army, had ordered one infantry regiment.

On 26 July the fighting was resumed. On 27 July Gais Khan captured the weakly defended Ossoviec Fortress and opened the way to Lomza and Ostrolenka. On 28 July the Russians, after occupying Bialystok, reached the Narew River, and on 31 July they moved into Lomza. Due to these Russian successes the north flank of the Polish First Army was virtually in the air. Up to the present time it had to withstand the hardest pressure.

The Polish military leaders decided, after having failed to stop the Russian advance on the Njemen-Szczara River line, that they would endeavor to do so on the Bug River, and, simultaneously with the forces assembled at Brest-Litowsk, start a counteroffensive in a northeasterly direction.

At the end of July General Haller, who had replaced General Szeptycki as commander of the North front, received instructions accordingly. This order, which in its basic Idea was the forerunner to the battle of the Vistula of a few days later, was not carried out due to the unexpected sudden fall of Brest-Litowsk, something neither General Sikorski nor Pilsudski had expected.

Sketch No 12 shows the line reached by the Polish forces on 31 July. The newly organized detachment of General Roja was to cover Ostrolenka while a brigade of volunteers from Warsaw was moved forward to the Narew as a reserve for the First Army.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#26

Post by tigre » 06 Aug 2015, 15:55

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULy-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The Forward Movement of the Russians from the Njemen Up to and Across the Bug River (21 July-6 August)
(See Sketches Nos. 12 and 13.)

In the meantime the Russian avalanche rolled relentlessly toward the Vistula River and the capital of Poland. On 2 August, Brest-Litowsk fell. General Sikorski, by counterattacking, succeeded in stopping further advances in this area. In spite of this, the Bug line had been opened for the Russian troops at a most opportune place. During the next days' fighting the Russian Sixteenth Army crossed the Bug River at Janow and the Third Army at Drogiczin, while the Fifteenth Army advanced toward Ostrow, and the Fourth Army in conjunction with the III Cavalry Corps captured Ostrolenka after steady fighting. Sketch No. 13 shows the location of forces of both sides on 6 August.

Tuchatchetskij intended that the line: Przasnysz-Wyszkow-Siedlec-Parczew be reached by 8 August and set the capture of Warsaw for 12 August.

While these military events took place the diplomatic conferences between the Poles and the Russians dragged on from 22 July until 30 July without results.

The Polish delegation which arrived behind the Russian lines on 30 July had to return without accomplishing anything because the Russians demanded impossible conditions. It can be realized that the Soviet Powers, who figured they had won the war, did not desire to conclude a peace by compromise, especially as they were only about 65 miles from Warsaw. It is also understandable why the Poles desired at this time to evade a further military decision.

Historical as well as military crises often take the most incomprehensible turns. Such a "miracle" took place two weeks later.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#27

Post by tigre » 09 Aug 2015, 20:44

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULY-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The July Events in Volhynia, Podolia, and East Galicia.
(See Sketches Nos. 10 and 13.)

After a short respite Budennij, on 3 July, forced the crossing over the Goryn at Ostrog and captured Rowno on 4 July . The Polish Second Army withdrew in two groups from here. one group composed of 3 infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, which had been sent from the north, withdrew in the direction of Kowel; the other group with one cavalry division and an infantry group withdrew toward Dubno. To the north of the Second Army as well as in the vicinity of the Third Army and also in the area of the Group Polesie, there was almost no combat activity.

The Russian Fourteenth Army under Proskurow reached the south flank about this time.

In order to offer resistance to the aggressive Budennij, the Polish Second Army was ordered to recapture Rowno. After surprising the Red cavalry divisions it forced its way into Rowno during the night of 8-9 July, secured the war materials stored there, and withdrew the following night toward Luck.

The Polish Third Army, which had been ordered to move behind the Stucz River, had barely reached it, when, on 8 July, it was attacked along the railroad line: Rowno-Sarny. After a short halt at Goryn, it took position first behind the Styr River, then behind the Stochod River to avoid further contact with the enemy. Naturally this withdrawal greatly influenced the situation of the Group Polesie.

The Polish Sixth Army withdrew to the line: Zbrucz-Woloczisk-Kremenec-Dubno to secure closer contact with the Second Army. In doing this the Sixth Army encountered considerable difficulties, because the Russian cavalry had already raided behind its lines, interfering with the Polish trains and destroying the bridges along the line of retreat.

On 12 July Budennij captured Dubno but on the next day had to withdraw toward Olyka due to an attack by Polish cavalry, some of whom came from the Second Army from Luck and a division from the Sixth Army, which came from Kremenec, thus forming a pincer. This event did not alter Budennij's determination of breaking through the Dubno-Brody line to attack Lemberg. On 18 July the Red 4th Cavalry Division broke through the Polish lines between Dubno and Luck and moved toward Brody. Simultaneously the Russian troops increased the intensity of their attacks on Dubno and captured this town. By 22 July they forced the Poles back to Radziwilow.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#28

Post by tigre » 22 Aug 2015, 05:27

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

III -THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIANS OVER THE BUG RIVER (BEGINNING OF JULY-6 AUGUST, 1920)

The July Events in Volhynia, Podolia, and East Galicia.
(See Sketches Nos. 10 and 13.)

Similar to their efforts at Dubno, the Poles intended to encircle Budennij at Brody-Beresteczko by a combined attack of the north flank of the Sixth Army with that of the south flank and the cavalry of the Second Army.

The execution of this plan during the last days of July was not successful, especially as the fall of Brest-Litowsk on 2 August forced the Third Army to withdraw behind the Bug River, which in turn forced the Second Army to do likewise. Nevertheless the fighting at Brody gave the Poles one advantage: Budennij did not continue his attacks but withdrew his forces and remained quiet for the next few days. This made it possible for the Poles to reinforce the north front with troops from the south front (18th Infantry Division) in order to bring about a decision at the north.

Worth mentioning is the fact that during the month of July the Poles were also compelled to retreat on the south front even though they out-numbered the enemy in infantry and had about an equal number of cavalry as the Red mounted forces.

On the Russian side, Lemberg greatly attracted Budennij, a circumstance which prohibited a strategic cooperation of both Russian Army fronts during July.

It seems as if the headquarters of the south front could not control the hard-headed Budennij sufficiently. After the capture of the capital, Rowno, on 4 July, it was no doubt the intention of this headquarters to combine the mass of the mounted army with the Russian Twelfth Army to create a force of 5 infantry divisions and several cavalry divisions for a drive through Kowel-Lublin against Warsaw, and to use a smaller group (the Sixth Army reinforced by detachments of the cavalry army) as a flank protection for the main force and the eventual occupation of Lemberg.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1935.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#29

Post by tigre » 23 Aug 2015, 14:23

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

IV.-THE BATTLE OF THE VISTULA (6-25 AUGUST).

The Russian Plan.

The decision to annihilate the Polish North Front with the mass of the Russian forces and to continuously harass the Poles in order to prevent them from offering any definite resistance, made it possible for the Russians to advance within a month from the Berezina and Duna rivers to the Bug River, a distance of from 250 to about 300 miles. It can be readily understood that the commander of the Russian North Front, Tuchatschewskij, intended to bring about a final decision based on his original plan, especially as he did not consider himself strong enough to take Warschau (Warsaw) which was secured by a Polish bridgehead. The existing grouping of the Russian forces, as well as the fact that an advance on both sides of the Weichsel (Vistula) in a southerly direction would cost the Poles the capitol and cut off their communications with Danzig, made it advantageous to have the main effort be made on the north.

In view of this, Tuchatschewskij on 8 August ordered a general attack for 14 August.The III Cavalry Corps was to cross the Weichsel (Vistula) at Wloclawek, then turn north and ,cut off communications with Danzig. The Fourth Army with its mass was to cross the Weichsel (Vistula) at Plock. The Fifteenth Army was first to advance to the area: Wyszogrod-Modlin, and in conjunction with the Third Army envelop the Poles near Warschau (Warsaw). The Sixteenth Army was to attack frontally the Poles between Radzymin-Gora Kalwaria; the Group Mozyr was to advance via Deblin. Tuchatschewskij also intended to use the Twelfth Army and Budennij's cavalry, but this failed to materialize. The commander-in-chief of both Russian fronts did not approve of this plan; he wanted the Third and Sixteenth Armies to attack frontally near Warschau (Warsaw), placing the main effort on the south instead of on the north.

On 10 August he sent a telegram to Tuchatschewskij to the effect that if he (Tuchatschewskij) believed that the mass of the Polish forces were north of the Bug, the attack should take place as soon as possible and as planned by Tuchatschewskij. This Plan was faulty in that all Russian forces were used without reserves being kept in rear, and that the III Cavalry Corps was used for a mission which could easily have been given to patrols.

The Polish Plan.

The Commander-in-chief of the Polish forces, Pilsudski, the French General Weygand, the Chief of Staff Rozwadowski, and the Polish Minister of War Sosnkowki, prepared the Polish plan.

The plan for which Pilsudski took full responsibility, was (1) that the Polish forces on the north should withdraw to the line: Orshyz-Narew-bridgehead at Warschau (Warsaw) along the Weichsel (Vistula) to Deblin for a regrouping of these forces. This line was to be held until the effect of a flank attack become known; at which time the troops on this line were to participate in the attack in order to drive the Russians. to East Prussia.
(2) An attack group was to be organized on the Wieprz River, in order to attack the Russians east of Warschau (Warsaw) in flank and rear.
(3) The South Front was to contain the Russians on that front.

This plan was issued in the form of an order on 6 August to all armies. According to this order, the Polish front was divided into the (a) North Front, (b) the Center, and (c) the South Front.

The North Front was commanded by General Haller, with the Fifth Army under General Sikorski on the north flank; the First Army under General Latinik at Warschau (Warsaw), and the Second Army under General Raszewski, south there-of to Deblin.

The Center Front was under the direct leadership of Pilsudski; it consisted of the Fourth Army, General Skierski commanding. This army, consisting of three divisions, was to attack from the line: Deblin-Kock on 17 August. Two Legionnaire divisions and one cavalry brigade from the Third Army were assigned to this group before 17 August. The Third Army was to protect the flank of the Fourth Army by an attack in an easterly and southeasterly direction.

The South Front extended from Brody to the Rumanian boundary and consisted of the Sixth Army under General Iwaszkiewicz, and the Ukrainians under General Pawlenko.

In spite of Russian interference on the north, the organization of the attack group was completed, but the day of the attack was advanced from 17 August to 16 August.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1936.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#30

Post by tigre » 05 Sep 2015, 15:12

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

IV.-THE BATTLE OF THE VISTULA (6-25 AUGUST).

Polish and Russian Forces.

Accordingly the Polish were numerically superior during the battle of the Weichsel (Vistula), which might have been disadvantageous to the Poles, had the Russian Twelfth Army and Budennij's cavalry executed a timely attack in the direction of Lublin.

According to Pilsudski, the Russians were numerically superior opposite the Polish Fifth Army, 2 to 1, and according to Sikorski this ratio was even 3 to 1.

At the bridgehead at Warschau (Warsaw) the Polish First Army was not only numerically superior to the Russian Sixteenth Army, but the Poles also had heavy artillery and aviation; here. According to Sikorski, the Polish Fourth Army was five times as strong as its opposing Russian Group Mozyr.

The Situation from 6 to 13 August.

In view of the advance of strong Russian forces north of the Narew, Pilsudski decided to reinforce the Fifth Army with one division, one brigade, and one cavalry brigade. During this time the Russians attacked Pultusk, and when on 11 August this important crossing over the Narew fell, it became impossible for the Poles to hold the Orshyz-Narew line. Based on the recommendation of General Weygand, Sikorski decided to withdraw to the Wkra River, placing his mass in the Modlin area and his cavalry on the north. Fighting rear guard actions, this line was occupied by 13 August. During the afternoon of 13 August, a Russian division advanced from Sachocin on Plonsk, but the Polish 8th Cavalry Brigade drove this division back across the river. General Sikorski decided on 13 August to counterattack the Russian Fifteenth Army in order to drive it east of the Narew and Orshyz. Following this, he intended to attack the Russian Fourth Army in a northerly direction.

The commander of the North Front not only approved, but, urged this, as his headquarters had intercepted a Russian radio message which ordered the Russian Sixteenth Army to advance to the line: Jablonna-Okuniew-Kolbiel on 14 August.

The situation at the bridgehead near Warschau (Warsaw) was somewhat Simpler for the Poles. The strength of the bridgehead lay in the organization of the artillery which was under French command, while its weakness lay in the fact that the, Polish troops there were considered second rate. Three divisions and one brigade were in the front line while two divisions were in reserve. The Russian Sixteenth Army, having lost contact with the Poles, regained this contact on 13 August. The three Polish divisions which were to form the Fourth Army, broke contact with the Russians and, in order to deceive them, marched to the west, then turned south and by forced marches, advanced to their concentration area at the lower Wieprz River. The success of this move was largely due to exhaustion of the Russians and their shortage of aviation and finally to their lack of cavalry with the Group Mozyr. The Russian 57th Division of this group reached Kock, but was unable to cross the Wieprz, while the Russian 58th Division was held up at Wlodawa.

The Polish 1st and 3d Legionnaire Divisions, which had been ordered to join the Fourth Army, were forced to attack the Russians. After this successful attack, the 1st Legionnaire Division marched to Sokal and entrained there for Lublin. The 2d Legionnaire Division marched overland. Opposing the Russian Twelfth Army were now two Polish divisions and a group of the Third Army.

It is of interest to note that both sides were very careless in the distribution of orders and plans. The Poles were able to intercept radio messages of the Russians, while the Russians obtained a. Polish order, to which, however, they paid no attention.

Source: Review of Military Literature. September 1936.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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