The Rapid Collapse Of The Polish Army

[Jack Carter]

I have read that in April of 1939 Halder said to other high-ranking officers that "we should finish the war with Poland in 3 weeks, if it is possible even in 2 weeks". Hitler also said something about 3 weeks.

Source for that?

[Peter K]

Source for that?

If I recall correctly - "Blitzkrieg Unleashed" by Richard Hargreaves.

But don't ask me for exact page - the book doesn't have index of surnames and it is hard to find it.

If there was an index of surnames I would just check on which pages "Halder" is mentioned and "done".

Besides - I've got a Polish edition so page in English edition would be different anyway.

[Jack Carter]

Source for that?

If I recall correctly - "Blitzkrieg Unleashed" by Richard Hargreaves.

But don't ask me for exact page - the book doesn't have index of surnames and it is hard to find it.

If there was an index of surnames I would just check on which pages "Halder" is mentioned and "done".

Besides - I've got a Polish edition so page in English edition would be different anyway.

No, you don't have to find any page. I think this is a bit irrelevant since I want to know what Case White stated and the German High Command did not finalize their report until June 1939. Do we know if this report has ever been published somewhere?

[Peter K]

No, you don't have to find any page. I think this is a bit irrelevant since I want to know what Case White stated and the German High Command did not finalize their report until June 1939. Do we know if this report has ever been published somewhere?

I don't know about any official report which mentions how long the Case White was expected to last.

I only know about those "semi-official" statements, which I already mentioned above.

Fall Weiss itself doesn't contain any exact "time schedule" of planned operations, as far as I know.

Initially Germans planned to encircle, cut off and destroy Polish army in the area west of rivers Vistula-San. This plan could not be implemented with full success in reality, due to higher than expected speed of Polish retreat and due to "interruptions" such as Polish Bzura counterattack. That's why Germans decided to extend the pincers of encirclement further eastwards. This 2nd encirclement was also not yet accomplished until the Soviet Invasion.

After the Soviet Invasion, Germans stopped execution of that changed version of Fall Weiss and limited themselves only to completing operations in Western and Central Poland. In Eastern Poland, on the other hand, few days after the Soviet Invasion they started to retreat behind the demarcation line (in places where they actually managed to cross it - because in some other places they didn't even get to it). Yet on 18 September they changed some of their previous plans regarding the conquest of Eastern Poland (which was apparently a "Plan B" - designed hastily in mid-September due to the fact that Soviets were constantly delaying their invasion), but general retreat behind the demarcation line started few days later. That retreat was interrupted in several places by Polish units which - after the Soviet invasion - were ordered to break through to Romania/Hungary & were trying to do so before the Soviet arrival (particularly the German 14th Army was forced to fight some very hard battles in the 2nd half of September).

Considering that Germans planned to narrow down military operations in Poland to a smaller area than area on which they were conducted in reality, they probably didn't expect the Polish campaign to last for a longer time - even if they anticipated a slower speed of operations / speed of advance, than they achieved in reality.

Another question is how the signature of the R-M agreement changed German temporal expectations regarding the campaign. AFAIK Germans assumed that Soviet invasion would begin shortly after their own.

In reality 16 days had to pass from the start of the German invasion until the start of the Soviet attack.

During that time Germans numerous times pushed their "allies" to finally attack Poland. With no visible results (despite numerous promises to Schulenburg, Molotov was constantly delaying the planned date of the invasion). Finally around 14 - 16 September Germans lost much of their confidence in Soviet reliability, and started to seriously consider the situation they faced - that is, the probable necessity of conquering all of Poland on their own.

Luckily for them, the Soviet invasion finally did begin.

Had the Soviets invaded in first days of September, Poland would have probably collapsed a lot faster.

To summ up - not everyhing went according to the German plan. Apart from the partial failure of "small pincers" plan (limited to areas west of Vistula-San), another operational "setback" for the Germans was the fact that German Air Reconnaissance somehow failed to detect positions of Army "Poznan" of gen. Kutrzeba for several days. This army suddenly "disappeared" from German ordnance maps after the first few days - and did not appear on them until the overextended wing of 8. Army had been suddenly attacked by "strong, unspecified enemy" at the Bzura, on 9 September 1939. One day before the Polish Bzura "offensive turn", German High Command anticipated, that Army "Poznan" had already withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Vistula across Kampinos and Warsaw. But soon that wrong German anticipation was to be verified by reality in a quite painful & problematic way.

That operational surprise could be achieved by Poles thanks to the fact that Army "Poznan" marched only at nights, while at days it was hiding in forests, etc.. But there was also some neglect from the German side - if only they made more efforts, they certainly would be able to localize Army "Poznan" before it "localized itself".

Also the fact that Germans used to overestimate their initial successes in the campaign, later did not help them (maybe even harmed them). I am talking for example about the German assessment, that practically entire Army "Pomorze" had been destroyed in the Polish Corridor in the first days of September. Combats against retreating Polish units fought by II. and III. Army Corps of 4. Army during their advance towards Warsaw along both banks of the Vistula river, had been considered by OKH / OKW as combats against just some remnants of allegedly destroyed Army "Pomorze". In reality, Army "Pomorze" lost ca. 25% of its strength in the Corridor, and later Germans had to confront this "non-existant army" - as they thought - once again, in the battle of Bzura, in which part of its forces successfully (in the 1st phase of the battle) protected the rear area of Army "Poznan" against 4. Army and another part supported counteroffensive actions of Army "Poznan" against 8. and 10. Armies.

Another issue is the siege of Warsaw - did Germans even anticipate it?

I'm not sure if Germans expected Warsaw to put up quite a long resistance or even to be defended.

It is known that - according to some German sources - when Germans were approaching the suburbs of Warsaw at the turn of the first and the second week of September, they considered Warsaw as an "open city". It is hard to explain why they considered Warsaw as such, because Poles had never declared Warsaw to be an "open city".

Maybe the entire story of Germans allegedly thinking that Warsaw had been announced an "open city" was invented only later, to justify the failure of an overconfident German attempt of seizing Warsaw by hasty attack.

On the other hand - it is true that defence of Warsaw had been organized "ad hoc" during just several days preceeding the German approach to the city. Had the Germans approached and attacked Warsaw even a few days earlier than in reality, it is very possible that they would have been able to capture the city by hasty attack.

[Steve]

Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. By Ian Kershaw, paper back by Penguin Books page 179

The directive for Case White was ready on April 3 and it was issued eight days later. Kershaw says that the aims of the campaign were given by Halder to other senior officers within two weeks. Halder said Poland had to be destroyed in record time “einen Record an Schnelligkeit” and that Poland formed “no serious opponent”. He ended by saying “we must be finished with Poland within three weeks”.

Kershaw’s source is a German work. Christian Hartmann and Sergej Slutsch, “Franz Halder und die Kkriegvorbereitungen im Fruhjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres”

I seem to recall a similar quote by Hitler about how long he expected the campaign to take but tonight I cannot remember where to find it.

[Jack Carter]

My thanks both to Domen and Steve. It is evident that the directive was issued in April 1939. However, what I am after is the finalized report which seems to be presented on June 15, 1939. I wonder if that report has been made public.

/Jack C.

[Peter K]

From the subsequent propaganda speech of Hitler:

"(...) Poles fought valiantly in many places. Their lowest command level was making desperate efforts, but their medium command level was not intelligent enough and their high command was bad, below all criticism. Their organization was - Polish! (...) I must also say that apart from courage demonstrated by many Polish soldiers, many Polish bands commited sordid acts. (...)"

[eppanzer]

The nazzi propaganda had work outstanding from the first day of the war. It is very interesting to read an old Lithuanian Army documents on the experience of the Polish campaign - too many wrong conclusions were made placing confidence to nazzi propaganda.

[Peter K]

The nazzi propaganda had work outstanding from the first day of the war. It is very interesting to read an old Lithuanian Army documents on the experience of the Polish campaign - too many wrong conclusions were made placing confidence to nazzi propaganda.

Yes.

But his "gradation" of performance (low command > medium command > high command) is quite correct.

Many of Polish high-level commanders did not exactly "distinguish" themselves in the camapign.

A few of high-level commanders even abandoned their units...

Of course later they explained their actions by things like "my HQ was cut-off from my unit by Panzers", etc.

In some cases these explanations may be true, in some other cases they may be false.

What's interesting is that examples of such cases were noted just in two Armies - "Lodz" and "Prusy".

In all other armies and operational groups such cases did not happen at all (IIRC).

There were, however, some examples of disobeying orders (although often forced by hard situation).

[Peter K]

I am surprised that some people are still claiming that Poland was betrayed

According to Polish historian (???), Eugeniusz Guz, Germans revealed the contents of the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to Western Allies. Info about the protocol was revealed by Hans von Herwarth on 24 August.

This is also written by another historian (???) - Eugeniusz Król. But Król thinks that Herwarth was a traitor to Nazi Germany (as Herwarth himself claims in his book). Guz has a different theory - he says that Herwarth was ordered to reveal that info. Everything was planned. Germans calculated that thanks to the R-M Pact they would be able to force Poland to capitulation without resistance - this is mentioned in Edwin Erich Dwinger's book "Zwölf Gespräche". In that book Dwinger describes his talk with Friedrich Werner von Schulenburg (German ambassador in Moscow).

Guz writes that informing Allies about the top-secret protocol by Herwarth was planned by Berlin. Berlin assumed that Western Allies would then inform Poland and Poland would accept Hitler's demands without resistance.

However, Western Allies did not pass on information about the top-secret protocol further to Poland.

They knew that Poland would be partitioned by Germany and Russia, but they did not warn Poland.

Had the Allies informed Poland, Hitler would have achieved another blodless victory. For the Allies partition of Poland was a better solution than delaying the outbreak of war and granting Hitler further blodless victories.

==============================================

I googled this article by Eugeniusz Guz which probably describes this:

http://ofiaromwojny.republika.pl/teksty/0344.htm

[pugsville]

What makes you think if the British told the Poles about the Russians it would have made for a bloodless victory. I dont believe they knew thus didnt tell, but even IF they did know and they DID tell, I still think the Poles would have fought anyway.

[Peter K]

I still think the Poles would have fought anyway.

I think not. They were not Kamikaze. They would accept Hitler's demands in such case.

[ljadw]

I am surprised that some people are still claiming that Poland was betrayed

According to Polish historian (???), Eugeniusz Guz, Germans revealed the contents of the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to Western Allies. Info about the protocol was revealed by Hans von Herwarth on 24 August.

This is also written by another historian (???) - Eugeniusz Król. But Król thinks that Herwarth was a traitor to Nazi Germany (as Herwarth himself claims in his book). Guz has a different theory - he says that Herwarth was ordered to reveal that info. Everything was planned. Germans calculated that thanks to the R-M Pact they would be able to force Poland to capitulation without resistance - this is mentioned in Edwin Erich Dwinger's book "Zwölf Gespräche". In that book Dwinger describes his talk with Friedrich Werner von Schulenburg (German ambassador in Moscow).

Guz writes that informing Allies about the top-secret protocol by Herwarth was planned by Berlin. Berlin assumed that Western Allies would then inform Poland and Poland would accept Hitler's demands without resistance.

However, Western Allies did not pass on information about the top-secret protocol further to Poland.

They knew that Poland would be partitioned by Germany and Russia, but they did not warn Poland.

Had the Allies informed Poland, Hitler would have achieved another blodless victory. For the Allies partition of Poland was a better solution than delaying the outbreak of war and granting Hitler further blodless victories.

==============================================

I googled this article by Eugeniusz Guz which probably describes this:

http://ofiaromwojny.republika.pl/teksty/0344.htm

Sorry,but this is irrelevant,because ,if the secret protocol was revealed to the British on 24 august,the day after,the whole world knew of the R-M pact,and any intelligent person knew,it would result in the partition of Poland:this was the only thing Germany and the SU could agree about .
An other point:to say that Poland was betrayed,would mean that F+B had given Poland concrete promises,and ,this is not true.
2 exemples who will debunk the theory that France and Poland were fervent allies betwen 1919 and 1939:
1) The Franco-Polish alliance with military convention of 1921:article 3 stated that in case of a German attack,the direct French help would consist of sending war equipment,a technical mission and of securing the lines of sea communication between F +P,but NOT of sending French troops
2) The mythical military convention of may 1939,where Gamelin promised (a.o.) a major offensive by the fifteenth day of war .
Well,this military convention was not to be considered in force unless a separate political convention was signed,but,that did not occur until september 4.
This is proving that there was no such thing as a French-military alliance between 1919 and 1939:Poland was on its own,without allies and surrounded by enemies .Till 4 september,France did not committ itself to anything concret (and even on 4 september,the French commitment was vague)
Source :User:W.B.Wilson/sandbox
The information about may 1939 is coming from :
Prazmofska pp 103-104(Britain,Poland and the Eastern Front 1939)

[Peter K]

They knew about the R-M Pact, not about the secret protocol to this pact.

this was the only thing Germany and the SU could agree about .

Was that really so obvious at that time? And why do you think so?

[ljadw]

Why would two sworn enemies make a treaty?
The survival of Poland was founded on the enmity between her two hostile neighbours(not on an illusionary alliance with a far away country as France),when this enmity disappeared,the doom of Poland was sealed .
This was perceived as such abroad:the immediate British answer was to sign the military convention with Poland,a desperate attempt to deter Hitler .