On 11 December 1933, the new National Socialist President of the Danzig Senate, Hermann Rauschning, arrived in Warsaw as Hitler's emissary, for the purpose of conducting negotiations leading to the later German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression, and on the same day had an audience with Pilsudski.
According to Wojciechowski, the content of the conversation between Pilsudski and Rauschning is know from three preserved sources:
1. The earliest is the record made by the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig, Papee, who was present at the meeting; it is preserved in the Archives of the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
2. The next is the account published by Rauschning in his anti-Hitler book of 1939, "Die Revolution des Nihilismus".
3. The last is the account written by Rauschning in 1951 for the German historian Richard Breyer, who published it in his book "Das Deutsche Reich und Polen 1932-1937".
It is this third account that is most interesting, and most revelatory of Pilsudki's plans. Wojciechowski, on pages 84-85 of his book, reproduces these words of Rauschning written in 1951:
Ich hatte eine lange persoenliche Unterredung mit Pilsudski, die geheim, persoenlichen Charakters war und nicht protokolliert wurde. In ihr machte der Marschall Ausfuehrungen, die mir klar darauf hinzuziehen schienen, dass er einen Krieg mit Sowjetrussland fuer unvermeidbar helt, sowohl einen Konflikt Polens mit Russland wie einen solchen Deutschlands mit Russland. Es war ein deutlicher Fuehler nach einem Militaerbuendnis und einer etwa moeglichen gemeinsamen Aktion, die eine ganz neue Lage fuer die Bereinigung der eigentlichen deutsch-polnischen Streitfragen, vor allem der Grenzfrage, geschaffen haette.
I had a long personal conversation with Pilsudski which was of a secret, personal nature and was not minuted. In it the Marshal made statements that seemed to me to be clearly indicating that he considered a war with Soviet Russia to be unavoidable, both a conflict of Poland with Russia and of Germany with Russia. It was a clear feeler for a military alliance and perhaps a possible joint action, which would have created a completely new basis for the sttlement of the present German-Polish conflicts, in particular of the border issue.
Wojciechowski points out that neither the record made by Papee, nor the earlier account given by Rauschning in 1939, contain the above statements attributed to Pilsudski. He attributes that fact to the following circumstances:
1. In 1939, Rauschning had become a staunch opponent of Hitler, and was writing an anti-Hitler book in the context of the acute Polish-German conflict that was soon to lead to war; accordingly, he a motive to conceal any previous Poish-German collusion.
2. In December 1933, when Papee wrote his record of the meeting after Rauschning had left Warsaw, Polish-Soviet relations were still very correct, so Papee would have had a motive to omit any anti-Soviet statements by Pilsudski from his record, lest they later fall into Soviet hands and cause embarrassment for Poland. (However, Wojciechowski also writes that Papee, in a letter to him of 1965, had denied omitting such an important matter from his record on the meeting).
So what is the truth? Did Pilsudski, at his meeting with Rauschning on 11 December 1933, hint at a desire for an alliance with Germany for the purpose of a milkitary confrontation with the Soviet Union, as claimed by Rauschning in 1951?
The official record made by Papee contains no such words by Pilsudski, and in 1965 Papee denied having omitted them from the record.
On the other hand, Papee may well have had a motive not to besmirch Pilsudski's reputation by admitting that in 1933 he had considered making an alliance with Hitler against the Soviet Union, which later had been one of the Allies which defeated Hitler.
It was certainly consistent with Pilsudski's proven strong anti-Russian and mildly pro-German outlook for him to have considered an alliance with Hitler against the Soviet Union. It is a documented fact that Pilsudski shared Hitler's anti-Bolshevism, and that he considered Hitler, as an Austrian, to be not an enemy of Poland but a potential ally. It is also a documented fact that Pilsudski always desired an eastward expansion of Poland at the expense of the Soviet Union, which provided a common interest with Hitler.
It appears that Wojciechowski considers that, on the balance of probabilities, Pilsudski did in 1933 desire an alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union, and made hints to Rauschning to that end.