Did Pilsudski plan an alliance with Hitler against Stalin?

[Musashi]

The issue here is whether a decision made by the Polish Government in 1928, ie after Pilsudski had returned to power, to build fortifications along the Polish eastern border, was incompatible with his long-term aim of Polish expansion to the East by absorbing territory that was formelrly part to build fortifications ofof the Russian Empire and now part of the Soviet Union.

You keep posting your lies, that you tried to present in different topics on this forum.
Pilsudski did NOT intend to seize more lands in the East, apart from the territories, that were ceded to Poland in 1921 after the Treaty of Riga. His purpose was to create independent states that would have been friendly towards Poland and acted as a buffer between Poland and the USSR. You can read about it in each Pilsudski's biography. However, you are still desperated to misinform the users of this forum about it.
This situation was analogic to the situation of Poland and Moldavia in 15-17 centuries. Poland could have conquered Moldavia very easily, if it had intended to do it, but was not interested in that. Moldavia acted as a buffer between Poland and the Ottoman Empire and Poland was happy about it. On another side, Poland was meddling in Moldavia's affairs a lot as it was interested in having a pro-Polish Moldavian ruler.
Coming back to the topic, Endecja had totally different plans. It wanted to assimilate/Polonise Ukrainians and Belarussians and did not intend to seize more territory at the expense of the USSR, either. The reason was, that political party estimated, as ethnic Poles made up 69% of the total population of the II Republic, it would have been too dangerous to lessen that percentage, that was low enough, and slow the process of Polonisation. So, they rejected Bolsheviks' offer to cede more territory of Belarus to Poland, as it would have been too much than Poland was able to "eat". Pilsudski wanted to create an independent Ukrainian state east of the Zbruch River, with a capital in Kyiv, however Endecja rejected that proposal, as it was afraid of a possible Ukrainian-German alliance against Poland and besides Poland would have acted as a guarantor of Ukraine's independence, while Poland could not have afforded it. The Polish intelligence belonged to the top of intelligence services during the WWII, regardless how much you don't like it, and it was able to successfully spy in the USSR before WWII. It noticed an enormous expansion of the Red Army in the 20s and 30s and concluded Poland was not able to win a war against the USSR, anymore. The disproportions in population, resources, industry, area, etc. were too big. The only possibility when Poland could have achieve it was a total chaos in the USSR, as it happened during the Polish-Bolshevik War. So, again, you have two different political factions and neither of them was interested in conquering a territory in the East. Endecja - because of nationalism and its aspirations to making Poland as Polish as possible (and unlike the German Nazis there were not any plans of exterminating a local population after conquering a territory), and Pilsudski - because Poland could not have afforded to guarantee Ukrainian and Belarussian independence as a war against the USSR would have been a suicide.

Pilsudski had started the eastward advance of the Polish armed forces in 1919, pushing back the Bolshevik forces, such that by May 1920 the Polish Army had occupied Kyiv.

First of all, it's very disputable if the war was started by the Poles or the Bolsheviks, who tried to occupy the cities in the East, that had predominant Polish population.

However, then the Red Army pushed the Polish forces all the way back to Warsaw. After the successful defence of Warsaw in August, Pilsudski led another advance of Polish forces deep into Belarus. Pilsudski had wanted to advance much further, to conquer all of Belarus and Ukraine, but the Endecja elements in the Polish Government were opposed to the eastern advance, and finally brought about a border agreement with the Soviet regime that fell considerably short of the border that Pilsudski wanted to reach (and could have reached if he had been allowed to continue his advance).

Again, Pilsudski did not intend to conquer these territories for Poland, but to create an independent Ukraine and Belarus, what you conveniently "forgot", (as I don't believe a man with so extensive knowledge about that period and Poland's history as well could not know about it, so I know you keep misinforming our readers on purpose ) while Endecja stated it had not been Poland's business to help Ukraine and Belarus to become independent. Moreover, Endecja saw a threat in that as a large territories with a predominant Ukrainian and Belarussian population had been belonging to Poland so both Ukraine and Belarus could have become allied with Germany to conquer them. As simple as that. Apart from that, after the successful Polish offensive the Polish side was nearly as exhausted as the Soviet side and Poland could not have survived another Bolshevik counterattack, after pushing the troops too deep in Russia (btw, do you have any idea where to stop the offensive, taking into consideration Russia's territory? The Bolsheviks could have been withdrawing hundreds of kilometres, as Russia's territory was huge, regrouped and counterattacked, as they did in 1920). Poland was heavily dependent on other countries help (weapon, ammunition, resources) and did not have many friendly neighbours, with a single exception of Romania, to transfer that help.

Accordingly, the way was now open for Pilsudski to abandon the defensive posture, and resurrect his ambition for eastward expansion, in alliance with a Germany that was now intensely anti-Soviet rather than anti-Polish. That would explain Pilsudski's broad hint to Rauschning in December 1933 about the possibility of a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union.

As I wrote above, he did not have any plans for eastward expansion as he did not want any more territory for Poland in the East and any war against the USSR to create independent Belarus and Ukraine would have been like bungee jumping with a poor rope, taking into the cosideration growing disproportions between Poland and the USSR.

As for the plans for a joint Polish-French attack on Germany, they date from the 1930s, after the death of Pilsudski, at a time when Rydz-Smigly, as the supreme head of the POlish armed forces, was moving away from the pro-German line begun by Pilsudski and continued by Beck, toward the anti-German, pro-French line expoused by Endecja and that part of the Polish officer corps derived from the former Blue Army of General Haller.

A plan of a preemptive joint Polish-French attack against Germany was presented when Pilsudski was living, so you are way off the target.

[michael mills]

As I wrote above, he did not have any plans for eastward expansion as he did not want any more territory for Poland in the East and any war against the USSR to create independent Belarus and Ukraine would have been like bungee jumping with a poor rope, taking into the cosideration growing disproportions between Poland and the USSR.

Musashi,

You are merely quibbling about the form that would be taken by the Polish expansion to the East desired by PIlsudski.

Certainly Pilsudski's vision was for a federation of East European states led by Poland, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. But is was still a form of eastward expansion; the territories east of Poland would be excised from the Russian Empire and become de facto dependencies of Poland.

Unlike Endecja, Pilsudski had no objection to a multi-ethnic state, and that was why, in contrast to Endecja, he was not hostile to the existence of German and Jewish minorities within that state.

Much of what you have written actually supports the points I was making. For example, you wrote:

Endecja had totally different plans. It wanted to assimilate/Polonise Ukrainians and Belarussians and did not intend to seize more territory at the expense of the USSR, either. The reason was, that political party estimated, as ethnic Poles made up 69% of the total population of the II Republic, it would have been too dangerous to lessen that percentage and slow the process of Polonisation.

I agree with you entirely. In 1920-21, Pilsudski wanted the Polish Army to continue advancing to the East and conquer even more territory from the Bolshevik regime. It was indeed Endecja that prevented him from doing so, and agreed to a settlement with the Bolshevik leaders that limited the eastward expansion of Poland. That is precisely why I wrote that Pilsudski was frustrated by the Treaty of Riga.

You then wrote:

Pilsudski wanted to create an independent Ukrainian state east of the Zbruch River, with a capital in Kyiv, however Endecja rejected that proposal, as it was afraid of a possible Ukrainian-German alliance against Poland and besides Poland would have acted as a guarantor of Ukraine's independence, while Poland could not have afforded it.

I think that is not entirely correct. Pilsudski certainly envisaged the separation of Ukraine from Soviet Russia, but the Ukrainian state resulting from that separation would not be fully independent, but rather in a federation with Poland. A separate Ukrainian state had existed in 1918 under German hegemony, and Pilsudski probably had in mind a similar state, only under PoIish hegemony.

As for a German-Ukrainian alliance against Poland, that could not have occurred under the federative arrangement envisaged by Pilsudski, since Ukraine would have been bound to Poland in a federation, and under Polish leasdership. Furthermore, Pilsudski was not so paranoid about Germany as was Endecja, since he was not germanophobic, and believed that an accommodation could be reached with a Germany that was not dominated by Prussian Junkers. He saw Hitler as a German leader who could be drawn into a Polish-German alliance, since Hitler was an Austrian, not a Prussian Junker.

You also wrote:

The Polish intelligence ......... noticed an enormous expansion of the Red Army in the 20s and 30s and concluded Poland was not able to win a war against the USSR, anymore. The disproportions in population, resources, industry, area, etc. were too big. The only possibility when Poland could have achieve it was a total chaos in the USSR, as it happened during the Polish-Bolshevik War.

and:

.......any war against the USSR to create independent Belarus and Ukraine would have been like bungee jumping with a poor rope, taking into the consideration growing disproportions between Poland and the USSR.

I essentially agree with you on those points. Pilsudski was well aware that Poland did not have the strength to overcome Soviet military power on its, particularly when there was de facto military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany.

That is precisely why Pilsudski was prepared to envisage an alliance between Poland and Germany aimed against the Soviet Union, as soon as Germany came under the rule of a leader who was determinedly anti-Soviet, and was prepared to align Germany with Poland rather than with the Soviet Union against Poland. Pilsudski saw Hitler as that leader, and he was correct to do so.

If Poland and Germany had formed an alliance, their combined military strength would probably have been sufficient to defeat the Soviet Union, once Germany had fully rearmed. The available evidence suggests that is what both Pilsudski and Hitler were aiming at, but Pilsudski died in May 1935, and the factional squabbling among his successors, with one side (Beck) favouring a continuation of Pilsudski's pro-German policy and the other (Rydz) favouring a move toward the pro-French, anti-German policy of Endecja, prevented further moves toward an anti-Soviet German-Polish alliance.

[Kelvin]

Whatever Rydz 's anti-German or Beck's pro-German, it was nothing as Hitler did not care much about Poland. When demanded the return of Danzig and if Poland agreed to his term and will the replay of Czech tragedy.

[chanakya]

Why? Czechs were never independent state. They were historical part of the Reich. That's why Hitler annexed them, Poland would fared better with Hitler than against him. USA would finish Third Reich anyway, but communism would be dead by 1945.

[Kelvin]

Why? Czechs were never independent state. They were historical part of the Reich. That's why Hitler annexed them, Poland would fared better with Hitler than against him. USA would finish Third Reich anyway, but communism would be dead by 1945.

It was Hitler initiative to provoke Poland in 1939 mean Hitler did not consider Poland as potential ally. His strategy was sign non-aggression pact with you to make friends with you and then turned on you at the right moment, Poland and then Russia were victims.
And you mention Poland to provide 55 divisions to Russo-German war like WWI, and they would win the war with Russia. In a war with Russia, Hitler had already had many allies to help him , Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, altogether had 70 million population, did Hitler win the war ? ( Remark : Poland only had 35 million population in 1939). The number of divisions cannot decide the war. Who equipped that Polish army ? Hitler was incapable of equipping his Italian, Romanian , Finnish and Hungarian allies because his army also relied upon captured weapon from France and Czech.

WWII Russian army was much more different from WWI Russian army. The former had strong industrial production capability to produce their tanks, rifles, guns, bullets and shell while the latter was incapable of providing their army with bullet and shell ( They counted upon US and Japanese supply). And needless to say, strong control over their country in WWII Russia, so not revolution in 1941. Without 1917 revolution, Russian would still at war with Germany in 1918.

Wehrmacht was so superior to those of Russian, American and British forces. IMHO, I never believe US alone, or Russian alone or British alone might defeat Wehrmacht.

Without lend-Lease, allied bombing campaign, allied operation in Italian and Western front, Russian would lose the war.
But .............without Russian war effort, 150-200 German divisions would be sent to France to join with 58 divisions there in June 1944. In Normandy, both Amercian and British only met 11 German panzer and panzergrenadier divisions. Given Russian was absent in war, additional 23 Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions would be in Normandy. Did US really win in this battle ?

Not to exaggerate the effect of atomic weapon, In August 1945, US only had three atomic weapon. It had psychical effect more than physcial effect. US bombing have already destroyed many German cities like Hamburg and Dresden, did Hitler surrender ? Strong will leader like Hitler would not be brought to American knees with just several atomic bomb. Unless, the war prolonged for 5 more years, US atomic arsenal was capable of destroying three-quarter of Germany and actually did, Hitler probably surrendered but at that moment, he also had his own atomic bomb.
Not to overestimate either Amerian or Russian power. Some people always think US would finish the Third Reich anyway and other think Russian would destroy Nazi Germany anyway. Both cannot do it alone.The Third Reich was the most dangerous enemy for US in her history and one of them for Russia in her past centuries.

[LWD]

Why? Czechs were never independent state.

That seems rather at odds with history. Indeed just looking at wiki at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechs
it notes

In 880, Prague Castle was constructed by Prince Bořivoj and the city of Prague was established. Vratislav II was the first Czech king in 1085.

More recently they were clearly an independent state after WWI.

They were historical part of the Reich. That's why Hitler annexed them,

No they were part of the Reich after he annexed them.

Poland would fared better with Hitler than against him. USA would finish Third Reich anyway, but communism would be dead by 1945.

All speculation with little or nothing to support it.

[LWD]

... Not to exaggerate the effect of atomic weapon, In August 1945, US only had three atomic weapon. It had psychical effect more than physcial effect. ....

And did not Napoleon say:

The moral is to the physical as three to one

You may freely translate moral to refer to phycological.
Picking August of 45 alone to point out the US atomic bomb stockpile is rather useless as well.

[chanakya]

Hitler allied with Poland would have 150 km closer to Moscow (becouse he would attack along 1939 polish border), this combined with additional 55 divisions provide a short and quick victory in 1941.

[Kelvin]

Most of Polish army relied upon horses for transport. How to transport 55 immobile Polish divisions to Moscow. This problem was suffered from all Hitler main allies.The backward situation of Romanian army forced them to limit their fighting in Bessarbia and seige of Odessa. Hungarian only could send 44,000 motorized corps for war. Italian also sent only 60000 mobile force for war because they also have shortage of motor vehicles. If Polish had something like RAF is of high value to Hitler. With regards to ground forces, it isn't much advantage to Hitler.
Some countries such as Poland, Turkey, Romania and Hungary, being suffered from their backwardness, nothing to help Hitler. British wanted to take Turkey into war against Germany as Turkey could mobilize 45 divisions. Turkish general express serious concern over their status of their army and hestite to join with British. Nearly one million Yugoslav and Greek forces were destroyed by German within 17 days. That 55 divisions number , see on paper, great but practically, it was insignificnat !

[Artur Szulc]

Most of Polish army relied upon horses for transport. How to transport 55 immobile Polish divisions to Moscow. This problem was suffered from all Hitler main allies.The backward situation of Romanian army forced them to limit their fighting in Bessarbia and seige of Odessa. Hungarian only could send 44,000 motorized corps for war. Italian also sent only 60000 mobile force for war because they also have shortage of motor vehicles. If Polish had something like RAF is of high value to Hitler. With regards to ground forces, it isn't much advantage to Hitler.
Some countries such as Poland, Turkey, Romania and Hungary, being suffered from their backwardness, nothing to help Hitler. British wanted to take Turkey into war against Germany as Turkey could mobilize 45 divisions. Turkish general express serious concern over their status of their army and hestite to join with British. Nearly one million Yugoslav and Greek forces were destroyed by German within 17 days. That 55 divisions number , see on paper, great but practically, it was insignificnat !

I belive all this is OT, but nonetheless...

About horses. Well, the German army also relied heavily on horses for transportation. Wehrmacht invaded Soviet Union with, I think, 700 000 horses.

But this is not the main question. More important is that say 30 polish infantrydivisions, 12 cavalrybrigades and 3 armoured divisions (yes, if the Poles had concentrated all their armour in divisions the number would had been 3) then these Polish forces with rather good equipment would have released German forces and could, apart from the three armoured divisions, secure flanks.

And chanakya is right, being 150 km closer to Moscow would have given Germans and Poles great advantage. But on the other hand, when invading the Soviet Union, German forces advanced thru former Polish eastern lands in what, ten days or perhaps even one week?

------

As to the claims of Pilsudski planning a alliance with Hitler, well, I am not in to speculative history. What Pilsudski planned is irrelevant, the relevant thing is what he did. And in fact, his main concern was the security of Poland. That is why Poland sign a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932 and one with Germany in 1934. Pilsudski did confess that Poland sat on two chairs, the question was from which Poland would fall off first. The main thing was therefore to balance between Germany and Soviet Union, but never go into a alliance with one of them.

[michael mills]

I have now located in the book by Wojciechowski the information about a POlish military plan for a war of destruction against Germany in alliance with france.

It is a footnote on pages 301-2, which reads:

[quote]Diese Worte sagte Rydz [am 30. Juni 1936] in dem Augenblick, als er schon ueber die erste Akte des polnischen Operationsplans gegen das Reich, die Studie "Deutschland", verfuegte. Die Arbeiten an dieser Studie begannen in der Abteilung II und III des Generalstabs Mitte Maerz 1936 unmittelbar nach der Remilitarisierung des Rheinlandes und wurden Anfang Juni d. J. abgeschlossen. Die Studie "Deutschland" bot u.a. eine strategische Beurteilung der Lage Polens und Deutschlands sowie die sich aus dieser Lage ergebenden Wirkungsmoeglichkeiten beider Seiten. Als politische Voraussetzung ging man davon aus, dass Polen im Buendnis mit Frankreich bleiben und die CSR eine wohlwollende Neutralitaet Polen gegenueber bewahren wuerde und dass die UdSSR und Litauen als Gegner Polens nicht beteiligt sein wuerden. Die Studie setzte ferner voraus, dass das endgueltige Ziel Polens eine Offensive gemeinsam mit Frankreich sein werde, um Deutschland zu vernichten. Diese Offensive sollte nur gleichzeitig mit einer Grossoffensive Frankreichs gefuehrt werden.

My translation:

These words were spoken by Rydz [on 30 June 1936] at the moment when he had possession of the first file of the Polish operational plan against the Reich, the study "Germany". Work on this study began in Departments I and III of the General Staff in the middle of March 1936, immediately after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and were completed at the beginning of June of that year. Among other things, the study "Germany" offered a strategic assessment of the positions of Poland and Germany, as well as of the operational possibilities arising from those respective situations. The starting point was the political precondition that Poland would remain in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia would maintain a benevolent neutrality toward Poland, and that the USSR and Lithuania would not be involved as opponents of Poland. Furthermore, the study assumed that Poland's ultimate goal would be an offensive together with France for the purpose of destroying Germany. This offensive was only to be conducted simultaneously with a large-scale offensive by France.[quote]

Wojciechowski states that the above information was based on a copy of the study "Niemcy" provided to him by L. Moczulski, who had obtained it in full from the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London.

So the situation was that in the period from end 1933 until Pilsudski's death in May 1935, there was a clear possibility of a military alliance between German and Poland aimed against the Soviet Union. Hitler stated openly that he wanted such an alliance, and there are indications that Pilsudski also wanted one.

The problem was that in order for such an alliance to be attained, the strong anti-German elements in Poland needed to be overcome. As Pilsudski stated, the barrier to German-Polish cooperation was the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany, which meant that there was no popular sentiment for such co-operation, which would have to be based purely on cool rationality.

As long as Pilsudski lived his prestige was sufficient to keep the fanatically anti-German elements in check, but after his death his successors were not strong enough to resist the pressure from those elements and maintain Pilsudski's pro-German policy, the so-called "line of 26 January". As a result, the Polish Government began to drift toward the anti-German position of Endecja ano other oppositional elements, and the Polish General Staff, which contained many anti-German elements who had served in General Haller's Blue Army during the First World War, was free to commence planning an offensive war of destruction against Germany under the existing alliance with France.

It was the planning for war with Germany, commencing in 1936, which led eventually to the disaster that befell Poland in September 1939. Polish military planning since 1936 was based on a simultaneous major French offensive against Germany; in September 1939 the Polish Government found it had miscalculated, and the expected French offensive did not occur.

[Kelvin]

Most of Polish army relied upon horses for transport. How to transport 55 immobile Polish divisions to Moscow. This problem was suffered from all Hitler main allies.The backward situation of Romanian army forced them to limit their fighting in Bessarbia and seige of Odessa. Hungarian only could send 44,000 motorized corps for war. Italian also sent only 60000 mobile force for war because they also have shortage of motor vehicles. If Polish had something like RAF is of high value to Hitler. With regards to ground forces, it isn't much advantage to Hitler.
Some countries such as Poland, Turkey, Romania and Hungary, being suffered from their backwardness, nothing to help Hitler. British wanted to take Turkey into war against Germany as Turkey could mobilize 45 divisions. Turkish general express serious concern over their status of their army and hestite to join with British. Nearly one million Yugoslav and Greek forces were destroyed by German within 17 days. That 55 divisions number , see on paper, great but practically, it was insignificnat !

I belive all this is OT, but nonetheless...

About horses. Well, the German army also relied heavily on horses for transportation. Wehrmacht invaded Soviet Union with, I think, 700 000 horses.

But this is not the main question. More important is that say 30 polish infantrydivisions, 12 cavalrybrigades and 3 armoured divisions (yes, if the Poles had concentrated all their armour in divisions the number would had been 3) then these Polish forces with rather good equipment would have released German forces and could, apart from the three armoured divisions, secure flanks.

And chanakya is right, being 150 km closer to Moscow would have given Germans and Poles great advantage. But on the other hand, when invading the Soviet Union, German forces advanced thru former Polish eastern lands in what, ten days or perhaps even one week?

------

As to the claims of Pilsudski planning a alliance with Hitler, well, I am not in to speculative history. What Pilsudski planned is irrelevant, the relevant thing is what he did. And in fact, his main concern was the security of Poland. That is why Poland sign a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1932 and one with Germany in 1934. Pilsudski did confess that Poland sat on two chairs, the question was from which Poland would fall off first. The main thing was therefore to balance between Germany and Soviet Union, but never go into a alliance with one of them.

Hello,Artur, German had 625,000 horses for Russian campaign. German, ldid relied upon horses for transport but she also had 600,000 motor vehicles. OK, based upon your calculation, Polish had 3 armored divisions and 12 cavalry brigades. But German had 19 Panzer divisions, 14 motorized divisions, 1 cavalry division and several motorized brigades. Total 35 motorized divisions as spearhead for that campaign. For horse-drawn infantry divisions, German also had many, they only for mop up operation after the panzer troop won the battle.

Despite the fact that German-Polish alliance would shorten the distance between Polish border and Moscow, but you should remember that when Stalin annexed part of Polish territories in Sept 1939, it was became burden to Soviet military planning,as Russian had fortified its border with Poland for a decade. Although Russian received more space in the western border, Stalin needed to build new fortifcation among it and on the eve of German invasion, Russian soldiers resisted the invader without strong fortification because most of defence work was incomplete and thsi made their failue so easily in June 1941.

On the other hand, with old fortification existed ( Polish border with Russia remained unchanged) , Russian might have better chance of delaying both German and Polish advance.

[Artur Szulc]

But German had 19 Panzer divisions, 14 motorized divisions, 1 cavalry division and several motorized brigades.

Sure, but you have to rembember that 1 panzer division in 1939 was not the same as 1 panzer division in 1941. Many panzer divisions had their numbers cut to form other panzer divisions.

Russian soldiers resisted the invader without strong fortification because most of defence work was incomplete and thsi made their failue so easily in June 1941.

Well, the old russian fortifications along the old Soviet-Polish border did not halt the German offensive for any long time.

A Polish-German military alliance probaly would also have produced a different warplanning then the one Germany designed on its own.

[LWD]

Leg infantry divisions were quite important. They didn't just "mop up". They secured the flanks, defended captured positions, and assaulted fixed positions. The 600,000 motor vehicles can also be a bit misleading as they was nothing like a standard truck and I believe this total includes cars and motorcycles as well. Because of the wide mix of vehicles military, civilian, foreign, and domestic there were also significant availability problems. It would be interesting to know how many trucks for instance the Poles had though.

[Musashi]

Musashi,

You are merely quibbling about the form that would be taken by the Polish expansion to the East desired by PIlsudski.

No, that issue is more complicated.

Certainly Pilsudski's vision was for a federation of East European states led by Poland, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. But is was still a form of eastward expansion; the territories east of Poland would be excised from the Russian Empire and become de facto dependencies of Poland.

My impression is, you are trying to convince our readers that Poland tried to conquer all the Ukraine and Belarus by force, what is not true.
The concept of Miedzymorze (Intermarum) was voluntary and nobody forced anybody to accept it. It did not concern just the Ukraine and Belarus. Its pure purpose was to avoid either German or Russian domination by Central European countries. That concept failed due to disputes amongst its potential members (for example Polish-Lithuanian and Polish Czechoslovakian border disputes or Hungarian-Yugoslavian, Hungarian-Romanian or Hungarian-Czechoslovakian border disputes, etc.). After the Polish-Ukrainian War in 1919, it become evident Ukrainians did not like being ruled by Poland. The more of them had joined the state, the more problems they would have caused for Poland. Maybe Pilsudski planned it in 1918, but not in the 30s, after the big tensions in the Voivodeships predominantly inhabited by the Ukrainian minority.

Międzymorze (Polish pronunciation: [mjɛnd͡zɨˈmɔʐɛ]; also known in English as Intermarum) was a plan, pursued after World War I by Józef Piłsudski, for a federation, under Poland's aegis,[1][2][3][4][5] of Central and Eastern European countries. Invited to join the proposed federation were the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Finland, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mi%C4%99dzymorze

Unlike Endecja, Pilsudski had no objection to a multi-ethnic state, and that was why, in contrast to Endecja, he was not hostile to the existence of German and Jewish minorities within that state.

This statement is true.

You then wrote:

Pilsudski wanted to create an independent Ukrainian state east of the Zbruch River, with a capital in Kyiv, however Endecja rejected that proposal, as it was afraid of a possible Ukrainian-German alliance against Poland and besides Poland would have acted as a guarantor of Ukraine's independence, while Poland could not have afforded it.

I think that is not entirely correct. Pilsudski certainly envisaged the separation of Ukraine from Soviet Russia, but the Ukrainian state resulting from that separation would not be fully independent, but rather in a federation with Poland. A separate Ukrainian state had existed in 1918 under German hegemony, and Pilsudski probably had in mind a similar state, only under PoIish hegemony.

The purpose was creating a buffer between Poland and Russia/the USSR as Pilsudski considered them a major threat to Poland. If his purpose had been ruling the Ukraine or Belarus, the concept of buffer would not have made any sense. Needless to say, that concept was really not stupid. Apart from pushing the USSR from the Polish border it did not increase the tensions between the national minorites, that were high enough.

As for a German-Ukrainian alliance against Poland, that could not have occurred under the federative arrangement envisaged by Pilsudski, since Ukraine would have been bound to Poland in a federation, and under Polish leasdership.

Again, Pilsudski's purpose was not ruling the Ukraine but preventing her from being ruled by Russia/the USSR. Let me remind you, again, an example form Poland's history about Moldavia: it was less problematic to border with Moldavia than the Ottoman Empire.

Furthermore, Pilsudski was not so paranoid about Germany as was Endecja, since he was not germanophobic, and believed that an accommodation could be reached with a Germany that was not dominated by Prussian Junkers. He saw Hitler as a German leader who could be drawn into a Polish-German alliance, since Hitler was an Austrian, not a Prussian Junker.

Pilsudski came from the part of Poland that had been occupied by the Russian Empire, while a vast majority of Endecja members came from the part of Poland that had been occupied by the German Empire. Using pure logic the former had the right to consider the USSR a bigger threat to Poland while the latter had the right to consider Germany that. There's nothing paranoid about it.
Let's imagine a hypothetic situation: if a strange guy expelled you from your house and took it over, then he was battered by other guys, and you took that chance to get your house back, but he's recovering now and claims a part of your house is still his house, would it be so strange if you felt endangered by him? Or would it be just your paranoia?

If Poland and Germany had formed an alliance, their combined military strength would probably have been sufficient to defeat the Soviet Union, once Germany had fully rearmed. The available evidence suggests that is what both Pilsudski and Hitler were aiming at, but Pilsudski died in May 1935, and the factional squabbling among his successors, with one side (Beck) favouring a continuation of Pilsudski's pro-German policy and the other (Rydz) favouring a move toward the pro-French, anti-German policy of Endecja, prevented further moves toward an anti-Soviet German-Polish alliance.

Not entirely. Pilsudski was not interested in attacking the USSR, but keeping it away from the Polish border and he liked it being in chaos as it would not have been dangerous for Poland in that case. That's the reason he signed the non-aggression treaty with the USSR in 1932 and Poland is not famous for breaking military treaties.