Did Pilsudski plan an alliance with Hitler against Stalin?

[Njorl]

So the situation was that in the period from end 1933 until Pilsudski's death in May 1935, there was a clear possibility of a military alliance between German and Poland aimed against the Soviet Union. Hitler stated openly that he wanted such an alliance, and there are indications that Pilsudski also wanted one.

Mr Mills, statistically it is also possible that a glass of water will boil when put into refridgerator. Could you please show these 'indications' that Pilsudski wanted alliance with Germany?

As Pilsudski stated, the barrier to German-Polish cooperation was the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany, which meant that there was no popular sentiment for such co-operation, which would have to be based purely on cool rationality.

Mr Mills, you still stick to this 1000-year-old hatred? I thought we're already through its symbolic meaning here.

It was the planning for war with Germany, commencing in 1936, which led eventually to the disaster that befell Poland in September 1939. Polish military planning since 1936 was based on a simultaneous major French offensive against Germany; in September 1939 the Polish Government found it had miscalculated, and the expected French offensive did not occur.

Mr Mills, I suggest you should stop writing chauvinist-driven nonsense and check when real plan of war with Germany was created by Polish General Inspectorate of Armed Forces. A hint - look up for "Plan Zachód".

MJU

[Musashi]

I have now located in the book by Wojciechowski the information about a POlish military plan for a war of destruction against Germany in alliance with france.

It is a footnote on pages 301-2, which reads:

These words were spoken by Rydz [on 30 June 1936] at the moment when he had possession of the first file of the Polish operational plan against the Reich, the study "Germany". Work on this study began in Departments I and III of the General Staff in the middle of March 1936, immediately after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and were completed at the beginning of June of that year. Among other things, the study "Germany" offered a strategic assessment of the positions of Poland and Germany, as well as of the operational possibilities arising from those respective situations. The starting point was the political precondition that Poland would remain in alliance with France and Czechoslovakia would maintain a benevolent neutrality toward Poland, and that the USSR and Lithuania would not be involved as opponents of Poland. Furthermore, the study assumed that Poland's ultimate goal would be an offensive together with France for the purpose of destroying Germany. This offensive was only to be conducted simultaneously with a large-scale offensive by France.

Very nice try, Michael, but the concept of a joint Polish-French strike against Germany was proposed in 1933, bearing in mind Pilsudski died in 1935. So you cannot say it was "first" in any case. That proposal was rejected by the French, who suffered tremendous human losses during the WWI and were afraid of starting another war.
Some people like Pilsudski, and some not, but he was not an idiot and he was able to make a clever international policy predicting possible threats.
You claim he was pro-German, while I claim he saw Germany a lesser threat than the USSR to Poland, what is a big difference, and he cannot be considered "pro-German". He suffered from the Russians, not from Germans, so his attitude was very logical.

The problem was that in order for such an alliance to be attained, the strong anti-German elements in Poland needed to be overcome. As Pilsudski stated, the barrier to German-Polish cooperation was the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany, which meant that there was no popular sentiment for such co-operation, which would have to be based purely on cool rationality.

Your interesting concept is not supported by any logical evidences.
Maybe Mr. Mills can answer why the Polish western border had been one of the most peaceful borders in the world, for a few centuries in a row, till 1795. I could paste a few maps with changes of the Polish western border from the 15 century till the the 18 century and propose a popular task "please find 10 differences" and you would struggle to find many of them. As a contrast you can try to do the same with Franco-German border, to see the difference.
Poland did not not have any problem with the German nation and Germany as a whole, but with Prussia and its militarism. It's a big difference. Poland used not to be a kind of country as it is now, it was one of the most powerful countries in the world between the 15 and 17 century, a lot more powerful than partitioned Germany at that time. Somehow we were not interested in attacking Germany (like Brandenburg) at that time, conflicting with other neighbours a lot although they were much more powerful than Germany.
Why did Polish rulers invite so many ethnic Germans to become Polish citizens and establish new towns in Poland throughout our history? Because of hatred? If you hate somebody, you do not invite them. I can predict your answer and I expect you to answer me "they were considered useful". OK, do you imagine Palestinians inviting Israelis to settle in the Palestinian territory, sell them lands, etc.? If you were a Palestinian and you attempted to sell some land to an Israeli, you would learn what the word "hatred" REALLY means. Simply if you hate somebody, you do it regardless if they are useful or not. As simple as that.

As long as Pilsudski lived his prestige was sufficient to keep the fanatically anti-German elements in check, but after his death his successors were not strong enough to resist the pressure from those elements and maintain Pilsudski's pro-German policy, the so-called "line of 26 January". As a result, the Polish Government began to drift toward the anti-German position of Endecja ano other oppositional elements, and the Polish General Staff, which contained many anti-German elements who had served in General Haller's Blue Army during the First World War, was free to commence planning an offensive war of destruction against Germany under the existing alliance with France.

Was Pilsudski's plan of war against Germany in 1933 really pro-German? You are trying to twist the facts claiming it was his followers' idea a few years later.

It was the planning for war with Germany, commencing in 1936, which led eventually to the disaster that befell Poland in September 1939. Polish military planning since 1936 was based on a simultaneous major French offensive against Germany; in September 1939 the Polish Government found it had miscalculated, and the expected French offensive did not occur.

The French were not as far-sighted as Pilsudski and they were not able to predict what could have happened.

[Musashi]

The problem was that in order for such an alliance to be attained, the strong anti-German elements in Poland needed to be overcome. As Pilsudski stated, the barrier to German-Polish cooperation was the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany, which meant that there was no popular sentiment for such co-operation, which would have to be based purely on cool rationality.

Let's provide one more argument against Michael Mills' nonsense claims.
Mr. Mills should broaden his very good knowledge about Poland's history and learn the Poles elected two Germans as kings of Poland in 17 century. Nobody forced them to do it.
1. Augustus II the Strong (twice!):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustus_II_the_Strong,
2. Augustus III:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustus_III_of_Poland.
Have a nice lecture
That happened, of course, because of your "the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany" :roll:
As I said, Poland's problem was Prussia, and not throught the entire history. Nobody normal had anything against, let's say, Bavarians or Saxons (both kings were Saxons).
BTW,
Please don't even tell me you imagine an Israeli being a Palestinian leader or vice versa.

[michael mills]

A lot of extraneous material has now been posted on this thread.

The issue is whether, once Hitler came to power in Germany, Pilsudski saw a chance for a German-Polish alliance againt the Soviet Union.

Wojciechowski claims that he did, and presents evidence in his book to that end. I have quoted that evidence at the beginning of this thread.

I am asking other members of this Forum to present evidence that Wojciechowski's claim is historically false.

Remember that it is Wojciechowski's claim, not mine. If you all look closely, you will see that I asked a question about that claim. Is the claim true, or is it not?

Musashi says that Pilsudski did not want war with the Soviet Union, just to push it back from Poland's eastern border and to set up Belarus and Ukraine as independent buffer states between Poland and Russia.

That may well be what Pilsudski wanted; I am not going to argue about it. But from 1921 onward, the Soviet Union was sitting on Poland's eastern border, and Belarus and Ukraine were not independent buffer states but firmly under Soviet control.

If Pilsudski wanted to "push the Soviet Union back" from the Polish border, as Musashi says, and I do not dispute him on that point, then that would require the use of military force, or at least the threat of military force, since obviously the rulers of the Soviet Union would not surrender those territories voluntarily.

However, by the end of the 1920s Poland's military strength was not sufficent to "push the Soviet Union back" by itself. Probably that is why Pilsudski was now seeking a military alliance with Germany; their combined military force might be enough to push the Soviet Union back, either by actual force or the threat of force.

As for Musashi's claim that a Franco-Polish military plan for war on Germany existed in 1933, I would ask him for evidence of such a plan. That is to say, evidence that the Polish General Staff had actually drawn up a plan for an offensive against Germany, comparable with the study "Niemcy" that was drawn up in the first half of 1936, concerning which I have posted the material from Wojciechowski's book.

Perhaps Musashi was referring the rumours that were floating around in the first few months of 1933, that Pilsudski had proposed to the French Government that Poland and France launch a preventive war against Germany with their combined forces.

But that was not a plan for an offensive, simply a vague suggestion. Furthermore, there is no documentary evidence that any such suggestion was ever made officially. Some historians, including Gasiorowski and Wojciechowski, believe that any unoffical feelers sent by Pilsudski through intermediaries were not serious suggestions for war, but rather a means of clearing the way for an approach to Germany under its new leader Hitler, which was his serious intent. The aim was to demonstrate to the elements in Poland that opposed PIlsudski's aim of a rapprochement with Germany that France could not be relied on, and therefore an approach to Germany was necessary.

The real planning for a possible war with Germany, that is, actual studies produced by the Polish General Staff, only began after the death of Pilsudski, when some of his successors began to move away from his pro-German stance and toward the anti-German stance of Endecja.

By the way, Musashi, the concept of a "1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany" is Pilsudski's, not mine. They are Pilsudski's words; have a look at the separate thread I started on that point. Pilsudski was explaining to the German Ambassador the barrier to achieving a closer relationship between Poland and Germany.

Whether such a hatred had really existed for 1000 years is beside the point; what Pilsudski was saying that there were powerful anti-German forces in Poland, mainly Endecja but also others, that stood in the way of his aim of achieving a closer relationship between Poland and Germany. Since the sentiment among a great part of the Polish people, if not all of it, was essentially anti-German, then detente between Germany and Poland, which both Pilsudski and Hitler desired, could not be based on popular sentiment but purely on cool, rational calculation of the respective national interests. is that so hard for you to understand, Musashi?

[Led125]

Wojciechowski claims that he did, and presents evidence in his book to that end. I have quoted that evidence at the beginning of this thread.

the evidence you have provided (or rather, Wojciechowski) is, as has been mentioned before, paper thin. And the rest of your statements about a anti-German shift in Polish policy remains unsupported.

I am asking other members of this Forum to present evidence that Wojciechowski's claim is historically false.

Such evidence has already been provided, however I will state that nobody aside from yourself is under any duty to provide evidence.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophi ... n_of_proof

To everyone else pointing out Wojciechowski's possible bias; the fact that he is biased doesn't necessarily mean that what he writes can be discounted out of hand (and going by past experience, the fact that Michael Mill's attributes certain arguments to him doesn't necessarily mean Wojciechowski makes them). But there have been more recent biographies of Pilsudski published in Poland since 1990. Perhaps some of our Polish friends can see what they say of Pilsudski's foreign policy?

[Sid Guttridge]

Pilsudski's first response to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 was to approach the French about a possible pre-emptive strike.

Once the French proved luke warm, he then decided to buy time through the 1934 Non-Aggression agreement with Germany which, had Germany kept to its terms, would have guaranteed Poland against German intervention until at least 1944.

Might Pilsudski have cut some sort of deal with Germany to counter a later Soviet threat?

Who knows? Force of circumstance might possibly have driven him to it, but Pilsudski's earlier actions indicate it was neither his first instinct, nor his favoured option.

And why would it be? Germany had frontier disputes with Poland as surely as the USSR did, so it was hardly a reliable partner. Indeed, Germany's unilateral and illegal withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1939 proves that point unequivocally.

Pilsudski's preferred option was an alliance with France, which had no claims on Poland.

[chanakya]

The problem was that in order for such an alliance to be attained, the strong anti-German elements in Poland needed to be overcome. As Pilsudski stated, the barrier to German-Polish cooperation was the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany, which meant that there was no popular sentiment for such co-operation, which would have to be based purely on cool rationality.

Let's provide one more argument against Michael Mills' nonsense claims.
Mr. Mills should broaden his very good knowledge about Poland's history and learn the Poles elected two Germans as kings of Poland in 17 century. Nobody forced them to do it.
1. Augustus II the Strong (twice!):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustus_II_the_Strong,
2. Augustus III:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustus_III_of_Poland.
Have a nice lecture
That happened, of course, because of your "the 1000-year-old hatred of the Polish people for Germany" :roll:
As I said, Poland's problem was Prussia, and not throught the entire history. Nobody normal had anything against, let's say, Bavarians or Saxons (both kings were Saxons).
BTW,
Please don't even tell me you imagine an Israeli being a Palestinian leader or vice versa.

I'm sorry but this is completely demagogue argument. Comparing modern nation-states with their mass-media and nationalism to early modern period in which nobility was everything, and british prince as a general in prussian king's service was ordinary thing, is deliberate falsifying.

Hatred is perhaps a too strong word, but clearly in medieval polish chronicles there is an anti-german sentiment. Howewer it was modern nationalism with its stereotypes that was most damaging. Pseudo-writers like Sienkiewicz ingrained black-and-white image of Germans in social consciousness, and polish society was strongly into panslavism around 1900.

[michael mills]

Pilsudski's first response to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 was to approach the French about a possible pre-emptive strike.

At the time, ie in early 1933, there were a lot of rumours swirling around that Pilsudski had made such an approach to France.

In fact, there is absolutely no documentary evidence of any such approach having been officially made, neither in the French archives nor in the Polish. In ither words, there is no reliable record of any meeting between French and Polish officials at which a proposal for a preventive war against Germany was discussed.

Some historians believe that it was Pilsudski himself who spread the rumours, for the purpose of testing the waters prior to making an approach to Hitler for a detente between their two countries.

According to Wojciechowski, Pilsudski had two motives for spreading the rumours about a preventive war against Germany by Poland and France. The first was to provide an excuse for making an approach to Germany for a closer relationship and eventually ab alliance, by demonstrating that france was an unreliable ally. The second was to apply pressure on Hitler, by giving him the impression that Poland had the alternative of combining with France against him if he did continued the anti-Polish policies of the German republican governments that had preceded him.

Who knows? Force of circumstance might possibly have driven him to it, but Pilsudski's earlier actions indicate it was neither his first instinct, nor his favoured option.

According to Wojciechowski, Pilsudski's preferred option was an alliance with a Germany ruled by Hitler against the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation, Pilsudski always regarded Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevik, as Poland's deadliest enemy, far more so than Germany. Pilsudski regarded Germany as hostile to Poland only so long as it was dominated by the Prussian Junkers, and with the coming to power of Hitler, an Austrian who had no quarrel with Poland, he considered that Germany could now be won over to a friedlier relationship with Poland.

In 1933, Pilsudski was acting in a highly conspiratorial manner, possibly so as to throw his internal opposition, mainly the essentially anti-German Endecja, off the scent. So it is impossible to be totally sure of what his intentions were; one can only draw inferences from the feelers he threw out to Rauschning among others.

And why would it be? Germany had frontier disputes with Poland as surely as the USSR did, so it was hardly a reliable partner.

The territories in dispute between Germany and Poland were not regarded by Pilsudski as all that important. For him, Poland's future lay in the East. All the indications are that when he first came to power in Poland, in November 1918, he was prepared to renounce any claims on then German territory and seek a Polish access to the sea through Lithuania, which he intended to incorporate into the new Polish state.

Furthermore, Hitler was prepared to abandon claims to former German territory that had been annexed by Poland, in exchange for an alliance with Poland against the Soviet Union, which was where Hitler desired to conquer territory. The only modification he suggested to the Polish Corridor, a suggestion he made a number of times from 1933 onward, as Wojciechowski demonstrates, was an extra-territorial link to East Prussia; to lessen the impact on Poland, he commissioned Fritz Todt to design a raised highway on pylons, providing free access under it to Polish roads and railways to Gdynia.

Indeed, Germany's unilateral and illegal withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1939 proves that point unequivocally.

I beg to differ. The mistake made by Smitty here is to ignore the circumstances in which Hitler denounced the 1934 Declaration of Non-Aggression near the end of April 1939. At the beginning of April, Poland had entered into a de facto military arrangement with Britain that was obviously aimed against Germany, and shortly thereafter it had renewed its military copnvention with France, again aimed against Germany. It was obvious to Hitler that Poland had unequivocally joined with Britain and France in a de facto military alliance encircling Germany, and was now hostile to Germany; that is why he denounced the Declaration of Non-Aggression.

Pilsudski's preferred option was an alliance with France, which had no claims on Poland.

That is extremely unlikely. Pilsudski always mistrusted France because of its tendency to compact with Russia, which Pilsudski saw as the main enemy.

The 1921 Franco-Polish alliance and the 1923 military convention had both been concluded before PIlsudski came to power in 1926, and were a reflection of the policies of Endecja, not of Pilsudski.

Furthermore, the French moves to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935 convinced Pilsudski that France could not be trusted to support Poland against the Soviet Union. However, by that time he was dying, and he had to leave it to Beck to carry on with his policy of allying with Germany against the Soviet Union. Pilsudski's last recorded words on his deathbed were that Laval was mad for going to Moscow to conclude the Franco-Soviet alliance, and that it would end badly for France.

I suggest to Smitty that he read the book by Wojciechowski, if he can read either Polish or German. He might gain a more nuanced understanding of POlish domestic politics in the inter-war period.

[michael mills]

Led 125 wrote:

And the rest of your statements about a anti-German shift in Polish policy remains unsupported.

Again I suggest to Led125 that he read Wojciechowski's book, either in the Polish original or in the german translation, the latter of which I did.

He will find that Wojciechowski shows that after the death of Pilsudski, there developed a conflict within Sanacja between those led by Beck who wished to continue Pilsudski's policy of friendship with Germany and those led by Rydz who wanted to move away from that policy in favour of a more pro-French anti-German policy.

Beck managed to keep Polish foreign policy on its pro-German course until early 1939, in the face of intense opposition from the anti-German elements in the Polish political Establishment, both outsdie Sanacja (eg Endecja)and within it. However, during that period anti-German forces were able to keep pressing for a change in policy, and to make preparations for a future conflict with Germany, once that change of course had been effected. The study "Niemcy" prepared by the Polish General Staff in the first half of 1936, providing for a combined French and Polish offensive to destroy Germany, is an indication of the anti-German course being prepared by certain elements in POland, in opposition to the official policy of friendship with Germany.

Wojciechowski's pro-Soviet bias, derived from his membership in the post-war Communist establishment in Poland, means that he sees the anti-German course being pursued by Rydz and others after the death of Pilsudski as the historically correct one, and the pro-German course pursued by Beck as wrong and contrary to the interests of the Polish people. But that is beside the point; Wojciechowski shows that strong anti-German sentiments existed in Poland, opposed to the official pro-German policy of Beck, and that those sentiments were able to have some influence on developments within Poland, eg on the military leadership's planning for war with Germany.

....the fact that Michael Mill's attributes certain arguments to him doesn't necessarily mean Wojciechowski makes them

This sort of sneaky insinuation reflects on the integrity of Led125's character.

He has not read the book by Wojciechowski, but he presumes to make assumptions about Wojciechowski did or did not say.

I have posted excerpts from the German translation of Wojciechowski's book. If Led125 wishes to claim that I have misrepresented in some way what Wojciechowski wrote, let him demonstrate that, rather than simply insinuate it in a rather underhand manner.

[michael mills]

Here is an excerpt from the book by Wojciechowski that ought to put paid to Led 125's ill-informed criticisms.

Page 299:

Diese politischen Massnahmen aus der Gruppe um Rydz hatten zum Ziel, die nationalistischen Losungen der Nationaldemokratie aufzufangen und auf diese Weise Unterstuetzung in den Kreisen der Gesellschaft zu finden, die bisher auf die zur Sanacja in Opposition stehenden polnischen Rechtsparteien geblickt hatten. Diese Bemuehungen von Rydz, die im Fruehjahr 1936 verstaerkt wurden, haben wir schon in der zweiten Haelfte des Jahres 1935 beobachtet. Die Suche nach einer Stuetze bei dem Teil der oeffentlichen Meinung, der sich unter dem Einfluss der Nationaldemokratie und anderer rechter Splittergruppen befand, zog die Notwendigkeit nach sich, Verschiebungen in der bisherigen Linie der polnischen Aussenpolitik vorzunehmen. Hierin lag der wesentliche Grund fuer das weitere Anwachsen der profranzoesischen und antideutschen Ansichten Rydz-Smiglys. Ein bedeutsamer Faktor war auch die Wirkung der Rheinlandbesetzung auf die polnischen militaerischen Kreise. Es unterliegt keinem Zweifel, dass diese Kreise sich darueber klar sein muessten, dass die Besetzung der entmilitarisierten Rheinlandzone gegebenenfalls ein Praktizieren des polnisch-franzoesischen Buendnisses in sehr bedeutendem Masse erschwerte. Zu diesen Ueberlegungen kam noch die Furcht vor dem Anwachsen der deutschen Ruestung. Dieser Furcht gab Rydz im Gespraech mit Szembek am 30. Juni 1936 Ausdruck. "Der General stellte fest, es sei notwendig, die Verstaendigungspolitik mit Deutschland fortzufuehren - notierte Szembek - und unterstrich, man muesse sich jedoch gleichzeitig vor Deutschland vorsehen, denn die deutsche Aufruestung sei gleichzeitig gegen uns gerichtet". Rydz war damals der Ansicht, dass gerade Danzig die Ursache fuer den Ausbruch eines polnisch-deutschen Krieges sein werde.

My translation:

These political measures from the group around Rydz had the goal of taking up the nationalistic slogans of National Democracy and in that way to find support among the social circles that hitherto had looked to the Polish right-wing parties in opposition to Sanacja. We have already observed these efforts by Rydz in the second half of 1935; in early 1936 they were being reinforced. The search for support from that part of public opinion which was under the influence of National Democracy and other right-wing splinter groups brought with it the requirement to make changes in the line of Polish foreign policy pursued hitherto. In this lay the essential reason for the development of the pro-French and anti-German opinions of Rydz-Smigly. An important factor was the effect of the occupation of the Rhineland on the Polish military circles. There can be no doubt that it must have been clear to those circles that the occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland-zone impeded to a very significant degree the practical implementation of the Polish-French alliance in case of need. Added to those considerations was the fear of the growth of German armament. Rydz gave expression to this fear in a conversation with Szembek on 30 June 1936. "The general determined that it was necessary to continue the policy of understanding with Germany", noted Szembek, " and emphasised that at the same time an eye should be kept on Germany, since German rearmament was also aimed against us". At that time Rydz was of the opinion that it would be Danzig that would be the cause of the outbreak of a Poliosh-German war.

[Sid Guttridge]

Michael, When you write of Pilsudski "it is impossible to be totally sure of what his intentions were; one can only draw inferences......" I think you give a fair representation of the situation. There is wriggle room for you to draw your inferences, but they don't appear very realistic.

If Hitler had ambitions for lebensraum in the USSR that did not include Polish territory, then he had no realistic prospect of achieving a contiguous Reich.

Even East Prussia had no border with the USSR. If Poland wasn't to be deprived of territory, it required a minimum of two borders crossings to get access to the USSR from East Prussia over 1933-39. Any land route required crossing Lithuania which, as you point out, was actually on Pilsudski's possible shopping list as well. At the time Pilsudski died Lithuania and Poland had not established diplomatic relations and it required a partial mobilisation and a war threat in 1938 for Poland to get Lithuania to recognize their post WWI de facto border.

[Led125]

Mr Mills, with due respect, you have a tendency to interpret written sources in a manner most convenient for your controversial thesis even if it is contrary to what the source actually said. This has happened several times in the past and that is what I meant when I said that just because theories attributed to wojciechowski may not be what he actually said. No offence was intended and I did not mean to reflect poorly on either of our characters. You have said Wociechowski states that Pilsudski was seeking an alliance with Germany. The only evidence provided by Wojciechowski is a statement whose veracity is contested by other parties. That's all you've provided by way of evidence (aside from repeating that Wojciechowski makes this argument). Slavomir has brought more compelling counter evidence which I for one believe you have not adequately responded to. But I am prepared to conceed that Pilsudski may have been more inclined personally towards Germany than Russia. But do provide stronger evidence. It is the second part of your thesis that I object to. Again, no real evidence that these people were 'anti-german' has been provided. Your recent quotation shows that Rydz supported a continued policy of understanding with Germany but was more cautious about her aims, which of course puts the 1936 plan into an entirely different light. Likewise it is simply not true to state that Beck lost control in 1939. For one thing, he had not lost control. Anti-german demonstrations were crushed, he halted Polish mobilisation and so on. It was Germany's U turn on the danzig issue that lead to the breakdown in German-Polish relations in 1939. Not anti-German factions in Polish politics.

[Sid Guttridge]

Michael, you can "beg to differ" as much as you wish with the point that "Germany's unilateral and illegal withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1939 proves that point (German unreliability) unequivocally."

Regardless of what Hitler may or may not have thought about the developing situation by 1939, the fact remains that he could not legally renounce the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland until at least 1944.

Why? Because the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact state this.

Whether his reasoning for doing so was good or bad, the simple fact is that Hitler had himself promoted and signed the Non-Aggression Pact and had disqualified himself or any other German leader from withdrawing from it before 1944, at the earliest.

The Non-Aggression Pact with Poland was not some diplomatic relic inherited from some past German regime he considered discredited. It was no Versailles.

Hitler's regime had negotiated the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact itself.

The fact that it could unilaterally tear up a treaty in defiance of terms it had itself negotiated is a damning indictment of Nazi Germany's integrity in matters of international diplomacy.

[michael mills]

If Hitler had ambitions for lebensraum in the USSR that did not include Polish territory, then he had no realistic prospect of achieving a contiguous Reich.

Why do you assume Hitler needed a contiguous Reich?

The last time I looked, the United States did not border on Afghanistan, but that does not seem to prevent it sending its troops into that country.

Poland could have served as a base from which German troops could invade Soviet territory, ie it could have played exactly the same role as Finland and Romania did in reality in 1941. Hitler did not need to invade and conquer those two countries in order to acquire them as bases for the invasion of the Soviet Union, nor did Germany border on them.

[michael mills]

Smitty,

You can wax indignant as much as you like about whether whether Hitler's denunciation of the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression was "unilateral and illegal". Other contributors to this Forum have waxed indignant before you.

But the historical fact is that Poland had already nullified the Declaration by joining a de facto alliance aimed against Germany, under conditions that placed the trigger for war in its hands.

The guts of the declaration was contained in these paragraphs:

Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations.

Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying, if necessary, those methods of procedure in which provision is made for such cases in other agreements in force between them. In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk01.asp

The agreement reached between Poland and Great Britain in the first week of April 1939 allowed Poland to use its armed forces against Germany to counter what it perceived as an "indirect threat" to its independence. Since the Polish-British agreement defined "indirect threat" in such a way as to include actions by Germany that fell well short ofthe actual application of force against Polish territory, it allowed Poland the unilateral first use of armed force against Germany, in which case it would be aided by the armed forces of Great Britain.

That was a clear violation of the spirt of the 1934 Declaration of Non-Aggression, since Germany had not, prior to the Anglo-Polish agreement on military co-operation, threatened to use force against Poland, nor made any moves to use such force, nor compacted with any other State to allow it to use force against Poland.

The Polish Government of course resorted to the legalistic argument that the agreement it had reached with Great Britain did not violate the letter of the 1934 Declaration, since the terms of the Declaration allowed either party to enter into obligations to a third party, eg Poland's now existing obligation to come to the aid of Great Britain if that country considered its independence to be threatened by Germany. However, by its actions it had nullified the Declaration de facto, since it now had obtained for itself, through compacting with another State, the possibility of using its armed forces against Germany even in the absence of any actual German armed aggression against Polish territory, and thereby creating a state of war between Germany on the one side and Poland and its allies on the other.

Hitler's denunciation of the Declaration was simply a recognition of the objective state of affairs created by the agreement between Poland and Great Britain, which was that Poland had joined a de facto alliance hostile to Germany, contrary to the spirit of the Declaration, which was to maintain and foster peaceful relations between Germany and Poland.

Smitty, you have cited Hitler's denunciation of the Declaration of Non-Agression as proof of Hitler's "unreliability" as an ally, implying that his denunciation was unjustifiable and wanton. However, we have to ask the question; Would Hitler have denounced the Declaration if Poland had not aligned itself with Britain and France in confronting Germany? There seems to me no real evidence dating from before March 1939 to suggest that would have.