Did Pilsudski plan an alliance with Hitler against Stalin?

[michael mills]

Led125,

You wrote:

Slavomir has brought more compelling counter evidence which I for one believe you have not adequately responded to

"Compelling counter-evidence"?

Slavomir made these substantial statements:

Even on the meeting with the top level of Polish generals he was still asking about which country (Soviets or Germany) was more dangerous for Poland and moreover which one would become a threat sooner....... that particular one 12 April 1934.

The fact that Pilsudski asked the opinion of his military leaders about possible future sdoes not negate the well-documented fact that he personally had always regarded the Soviet Union as the main enemy of Poland. Neither does it negate the possibility that his personal preference was for an alliance with Germany against the country he regarded as the main enemy of Poland.

We also need more information about why, in April 1934, Pilsudski asked this particular question of his military leaders. Perhaps he wanted to ascertain whether they shared his view of the Soviet Union as the main enemy, and whether they shared his views regarding the possibility of an alliance with Germany. Perhaps Slavomir could give us more information about what was discussed at the meeting he referred to, and what decisions were made. For example, which country did the military leaders identify as the main threat? Did they agree with Pilsudski's views or oppose them?

A simple reference to a meeting, without any information of what its conclusions were, is hardly "compelling evidence".

Pilsudski planning an alliance with Germany at the same time not issuing orders for preparations for such alliance, no preparations for invasion on Soviets,.....

I do not dare to claim that I know what was in Pilsudski's mind, but assuming it was true, why there was no military preparations for such aggression? When you look closer, you would find that up to early 1939 main Polish effort was put on fortifications on eastern border. If we would talk about aggressive preparations, why bother to spend such sums on bunkers and so on?

As I have stated, the mere fact that during the 17 months that elapsed between the date when Pilsudski may have thrown out a feeler about a military alliance between Poland and Germany (December 1933) and the date of his death (May 1935), there was no actual planning for a Polish invasion of the Soviet Union does not mean that Pilsudski never considered the idea of such an invasion, in pursuit of his well-documented ambition to create a federation including territory then part of the Soviet Union, an ambition that could only be realised through the dfeat of the Soviet Union.

Again as I have pointed out, initiated no planning for an invasion of the Soviet Union until July 1940, despite his continually expressed hostility toward that country and his repated approaches to Poland suggesting joint anti-Soviet action.

It may simply have been that Pilsudski wanted to wait until a firm Polish-German alliance had been obtained before issuing orders to his military leaders to begin actual planning for anti-Soviet action. But if that was his goal, he died prematurely before reaching it.

Furthermore, the mere fact of building border fortifications does not rule the possibility of considering offensive action. Hitler ordered the building of fortifications along the German border with France, and again along the post-1939 bordfer with the Soviet Union; but the investment of money in such fortifications did not prevent his decision to invade France and later the Soviet Union.

In my opinion in coming Hitler to power Pilsudski saw opportunity that German - Soviet cooperation resulted from Rapallo agreement would diminish (which in fact happened). And to strenghten that trend was one of the reasons he entered into negotiations with Germany.

That is a quite reasonable opinion. And I would agree that a prime aim of Pilsudski was to end the military co-operation between germany and the Soviet Union that had resulted from Rapallo. However, the existence of such a desire on the part of Pilsudski does not prove the non-existence of a desire to replace German-Soviet military co-operation aimed against Poland with German-Polish military co-operation aimed against the Soviet Union.

would treat Wojciechowski's revelations with caution. We should remember when the book was written. During 70's and 80's Pilsudski was the main black character for the communist regime.

Slavomir was quite right to point out Wojciechowski's pro-Soviet bias, resulting from his position as a member of the post-war Communist Establishment in Poland. I too had noticed that very obvious bias.

But the fact that Wojciechowski was biassed does not mean that everything he wrote was untrue, in particular the claims for which he provides documentary evidence. All historians are biassed one way or another, and the art of deading history is to determine what the particular historian's bias is and to make allowances for it, seeking to sort out the relaible material from the material that may have been affected by that bias.

In my opinion, agreement with Germany was not a step towards formal alliance, but rather an opportunity to reassure weakening of German - Soviet ties, Polish intelligence was well aware of.

That is a reasonable opinion on the part of Slavomir, but it is only an opinion. The fact that Pilsudski was seeking to weaken German-Soviet ties, which is undisputed, does not of itself rule out the possibility that he wanted to go further and establish an alliance with Germany.

[michael mills]

PS

Smitty,

If you want to examine the text of the agreement of 6 April 1939 between Britain and Poland, I have posted it here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1438981

That post also contains my reasons for the conclusion that the agreement amounted to a Polish alignment with Britain hostile to Germany.

I do not intend to regurgitate that argument on this thread; I am posting the link merely for your information, and in explanation of the points I was making.

[Sid Guttridge]

Michael,

One doesn't have to "wax indignant" to see that Germany's renunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1939 was both unilateral and illegal. It is a simple statement of fact which, if one reads your posts carefully, you have not so far denied.

What you are offering is a reason why Germany acted unilaterally and illegally, not disputing the fact of the matter.

Neither Poland nor Germany gave up the right to self defence against each other under the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact. Neither party attacked the other until Germany assaulted Poland on 1 September 1939 - an operation planned many months before.

Nor did the Non-Aggression Pact preclude either coming to agreements with third powers.

The terms of the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact are quite clear. It was to run for a minimum of ten years and would only lapse thereafter if either party gave six months notice. (Indeed, I suppose it is technically still in force today, because, as far as I am aware, neither party renounced it in the required terms!)

However one cares to spin it, the simple fact is that Germany could not legally have unilaterally renounced the 1934 Non Aggression Pact with Poland before 1944.

As has been quoted to you before, your interpretation that Poland could pitch an unwilling or unwitting Britain into a war with Germany under the agreements of 1939 was not shared by Chamberlain or the British Cabinet!

In any event, war did not break out as a result of any Polish activity short of invading German territory, despite the illegal German military build up in the Free City of Danzig. It broke out because Germany attacked Poland directly.

[buba01]

The study "Niemcy" prepared by the Polish General Staff in the first half of 1936, providing for a combined French and Polish offensive to destroy Germany, is an indication of the anti-German course being prepared by certain elements in POland, in opposition to the official policy of friendship with Germany.

Mr Mills, I don't know what sources you have been reading about Study "Niemcy" but this is complete rubbish.

The operational plan outlined in the study was based on the assumption of a three-pronged German aggression against Poland:

1. from Pomerania in the direction of Kutno and Skierniewice

2. from East Prussia in the direction of Modlin and Dęblin

3. from Silesia in the direction of Częstochowa and Piotrków

Poland was supposed to fight a defensive war, offensive operations into East Prussia were envisaged only if circumstances were really favorable. In the third week of the war France was supposed to hit Germany in the West. Ultimately, the German army would be overburdened by a two-front war and Poland could mount offensive operations against Germany proper. The war would, of course, end with an Allied victory.

How can anybody present this as a "combined offensive to destroy Germany"?

BTW. Study "Niemcy" was not prepared by the General Staff, its autor was Lt-Col. Stefan Mossor, working under the guideance and supervision of Gen. Kutrzeba. It was a pretty high-level document, not a proper war plan.

[michael mills]

Mr Mills, I don't know what sources you have been reading about Study "Niemcy" but this is complete rubbish.

Buba01,

I advise you, when you join a thread, to read back through it and see what has been written previously. That would save you from asking unnecessary questions like the one above.

If you had read the earlier posts on this thread, you would have seen that my source was the book by Marian Wojciechowski on Polish-German relations from 1933 to 1939. In my post of Wednesday 5 January on page 2 of this thread, you will see that I posted an excerpt from Wojciechowski's book describing the study referred to.

Read my post, and then comment. If you think Wojciechowski misrepresented the study "Niemcy", then that is his fault, not mine.

This is what Wojciechowski wrote (in the German translation of his book):

Die Studie setzte ferner voraus, dass das endgueltige Ziel Polens eine Offensive gemeinsam mit Frankreich sein werde, um Deutschland zu vernichten.

My translation:

Furthermore, the study assumed that Poland's ultimate goal would be an offensive together with France for the purpose of destroying Germany.

Buba01, according to Wojciechowski, the sudy "Niemcy" stated that Poland's ultimate objective was to destroy Germany. That is why I used the word "destroy" in the passage that you quoted from my post.

If you think Wojciechowski has misrepresented the purpose of the study "Niemcy", and that it did state the POlish aim of destroying Germany, perhaps you could quote from the study to show what it really says.

However, the bottom line is that in 1936, elements in the Polish military were making contingency plans for fighting Germany in alliance with France. As of that date, Germany had no plans for invading POland, and Hitler had not ordered the Wehrmacht to make any.

Thus, at a time when Hitler was consistently trying to preserve peace with Poland, and draw it into an alliance with Germany, parts of the Polish military were working on the assumption that peace could not be preserved, and there would be war with Germany. In 1936, who was more set on a German-Polish war? Hitler? Or the Polish military?

[michael mills]

Smitty,

The subject of this thread is whether in 1933 PIlsudski seriously considered a military alliance with Germany aimed against the Soviet Union.

You then introduced into this thread the historical fact that in April 1939, Hitler denounced the Declaration of Non-Aggression that he had negotiated with Pilsudski at the end of 1933 and beginning of 1934, ie at the time when Pilsudski may have sent out a hint about a Polish-German military allliance.

Since that historical fact, dating from 1939, does not directly relate to Pilsudski's intentions in 1933, I came to the conclusion that you were trying to make the point that a true relationship of friendship between Germany and Poland, and an alliance between them, was always impossible since in the end Hitler would inevitably have torn up whatever agreement existed between the two countries and adopted a position of hostility toward Poland, regardless of whatever Poland did.

Is that if fact the point you were trying to make?

In your post of Friday 7 January you wrote:

Germany had frontier disputes with Poland as surely as the USSR did, so it was hardly a reliable partner. Indeed, Germany's unilateral and illegal withdrawal from the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1939 proves that point unequivocally.

That seems to be suggesting that Hitler's action in April 1939 demonstrated that Germany could never have been a relaible partner for Poland.

In your post of Saturday 8 January, you wrote:

The fact that it could unilaterally tear up a treaty in defiance of terms it had itself negotiated is a damning indictment of Nazi Germany's integrity in matters of international diplomacy.

That seems to be making the same point, that an alliance between Germany and POland was impossible right from the outset because of Germany's lack of integrity.

Smitty, is it indeed your belief that an alliance between Germany and Poland was impossible from the outset because Hitler always had the intention of "tearing up" any such alliance when it suited him, just because he wanted to invade Poland, and regardless of any action by Poland that could cause Germany to become hostile?

If that is the case, could you please provide reliable and hard evidence of any intention by Hitler, dating from before the end of March 1939, to adopt a hostile attitude toward Poland and make war on it, regardless of POland's own attitude.

If it is not the case, can you please show how an action by Hitler in April 1939, taken in response to Poland's having changed its attitude toward Germany and having joined a de facto alliance hostile to that country, has any relevance to the question of whether Pilsudski desired in 1933 to enter into an alliance with Germany, and whether such an alliance could have been possible.

[buba01]

If you think Wojciechowski has misrepresented the purpose of the study "Niemcy", and that it did state the POlish aim of destroying Germany, perhaps you could quote from the study to show what it really says.

Mr Mills,

I cannot grant your wish because it is simply impossible. Study Niemcy was a document prepared by the military for the military and it focused on military issues. Destroying a state is a political goal, such issues are largely absent in the study, the question whether Poland had such goals in 1936 must be answered by looking at different sources.

Let's just think about this for a few minutes. Destroying a state means that that state ceases to exist. So the assumed Polish goal of "destroying Germany" de facto equates to the goal of a franco-polish frontier on the Elbe or whereabouts. Can you provide any evidence that such goals were seriously contemplated by Polish and French politicians of that period? Do you seroiusly believe that Poland could convince France, Britain, Italy and the rest of Europe that liquidation of Germany is a good idea for Europe's future? Or a good idea in general? Do you believe Polish politicians thought they could obtain agreement from other European states for such a move?

Maybe this is a language issue. Wojciechowski writes in Polish, you are using a German translation. It could be a careless one.

However, the bottom line is that in 1936, elements in the Polish military were making contingency plans for fighting Germany in alliance with France.

And that surprises you? Such plans existed since 1919.

As of that date, Germany had no plans for invading POland, and Hitler had not ordered the Wehrmacht to make any.

So what? In the 1930's the US had plans for wars with Brazil, Canada and several other, quite surprising from today's perspective, candidates. In fact, the largest interwar exercise conducted by the US Army (and, if I am not mistaken, the largest peacetime US military exercise ever) was a rehersal of an invasion of Canada. Does this tell us anything about US political goals?

You systematically ignore the fact that the Polish plans were defensive in nature, the underlying assumption being a German invasion of Poland, not vice versa.

Thus, at a time when Hitler was consistently trying to preserve peace with Poland, and draw it into an alliance with Germany, parts of the Polish military were working on the assumption that peace could not be preserved, and there would be war with Germany. In 1936, who was more set on a German-Polish war? Hitler? Or the Polish military?

Mr Mills, as you wrote earlier, these were contingency plans. You do not need 100% probability of an event happening to prepare a contingency plan. In fact, the company where I work has contingency plans in case of a natural disaster, even though the written history of mankind is silent about any such disasters at our location. Then again, there is always a chance that some meteorite will decide to fall on our heads. We even have insurance against that. We also have contingency plans in case of terrorist attack, even though, again, our location, the nature of our business, etc, suggest that such an attack is highly unlikely.

[Artur Szulc]

Michael Mills argues in a peculiar way. His technique in argumentation ressembles those who asks questions like:

- When did you stop beating your wife?
- I have never beaten my wife.
- I did not ask if you have ever beaten your wife, only when did you stop beating her...

There are no factual proofs that Pilsudski planned a alliance with Hitler against Stalin.

Thus, him planning such a alliance is a speculation which need not to be refuted with any substantial counter-evidence since the claim itself is based on non-substantial evidence. One can not make all kinds of statements and then expect others to refute it if the statement itself is based on circumstantial evidence.

On the other hand, Mills is only formulating a hypothesis. The thread is named: Did Pilsudski plan an alliance with Hitler against Stalin? It is merely a rhetorical question.

[Led125]

Mr Mills, Slavomir provided evidence that Pilsudski asked his generals for advice whether Germany or the USSR was more dangerous to Poland (Akta Instytucji Wojskowych, 296/III, t. 21 Odpowiedzi generałów i wyższych oficerów WP na ankietę 'Rosja czy Niemcy' (skąd grozi Polsce niebezpieczeństwo), from the manner in which Slavomir provided it, the inference can be made that this was not Pilsudski asking for opinions, but rather for advice. The rest of your post seems quite reasonable counterarguments to Slavomir, however it being mere speculation it hardly proves that Pilsudski sought a Polish-German alliance aimed against the USSR. Let's look at it another way; the historical consensus appears to be that Pilsudski was more moderately pro-German than pro-Russian, but in his diplomacy he sought to achieve an equilibrium to balance out the two powers. The sum total of your evidence otherwise is a questionable source and speculative counter-factuals.

Smitty,
Michael Mill's hypothesis over whether or not Poland had actively associated itself with a coalition hostile to Germany in 1939 was fleshed out and thoroughly debunked last year. Specific responses were made to his take on the April Agreement.

[Sid Guttridge]

Michael,

If your point is that, apart from all the occasions Hitler was not a man of integrity, he was otherwise a man of integrity, then one can only agree, but it doesn't seem a very substantive point.

Certainly it is only a subsidiary fact that Hitler unilaterally and illegally tore up the Non-Aggressiion he signed with Pilsudski in 1934, but it is relevant here because it is, as far as I am aware, the only formal agreement Pilsudski came to with Hitler.

As you do not deny this fact, I am quite happy to leave this point alone and let you pass on to other matters, if you wish.

I remain agnostic as to whether Pilsudski considered an alliance with Hitler, but retrospectively we can say with some certainty that it would certainly have been unwise.

It is the nature of politics and war that planning takes place for an enormous range of contingencies that never actually take place. Pilsudski would have been unwise, on pragmatic grounds, never to consider the possibility, but I am still waiting for you to convince me that it was anything more than one of a range of options he may have considered.

Incidentally, the first concrete military plan for action hostile to Poland was for the occupation of Danzig. It was made in late 1938 at the same time as plans were drawn up for the occupation of Memel.

If you are looking for some possible collusion between Poland and Germany, it might be worth looking at Poland's confrontation with Lithuania earlier in 1938.

If I remember rightly, Poland's foreign minister passed through Vienna (coming back from Italy) very soon after the Anschluss and I believe Poland was the first country to recognize the Anschluss. Possibly in return, Germany ignored the Polish military build up against Lithuania that forced Lithuania to recognize the existing Polish-Lithuanian border and thereby drop its claim to Vilnius. (This is somewhat speculative and I would be interested to have other posters' thoughts on this).

[buba01]

If you are looking for some possible collusion between Poland and Germany, it might be worth looking at Poland's confrontation with Lithuania earlier in 1938.

If I remember rightly, Poland's foreign minister passed through Vienna (coming back from Italy) very soon after the Anschluss and I believe Poland was the first country to recognize the Anschluss. Possibly in return, Germany ignored the Polish military build up against Lithuania that forced Lithuania to recognize the existing Polish-Lithuanian border and thereby drop its claim to Vilnius. (This is somewhat speculative and I would be interested to have other posters' thoughts on this).

The issue of the Polish-Lithuanian confrontation in 1938 is somewhat clouded. The ultimatum did not require Lithuania to drop its claims to Vilnius, only to restore diplomatic relations with Poland, with no strings attached. You must remember that, after Poland incorporated the Vilnius region, Lithuania declared war. Allthough this declaration was not treated seriously by Poland and did not result in any military action, formally the two countries were at war, the border was sealed to any human or commodity traffic, there were no direct post/telegraph/telephone links, etc.

Since 1929 the two countries had been conductiong secret talks about normalising their relations. By 1937/38 both sides had reached an agreement in principle but the Lithuanian side indicated that they cannot enter an official agreement just like that. They feared the reaction of the population, fed by 15 years of anti-Polish propaganda, and the political opposition. So the two sides agreed to organise a "show", whereby Poland would "force" Lithuania to accept an agreement, protecting the Lithuanian government from loss of face.

What I wrote in the above paragraph is speculative, it is a theory subscribed to by some historians. Others are more cautious about this, particularly mainstream Polish historians who claim that there is nothing in surviving Polish documents that supports such a deal was indeed made.

However, there is quite a lot of circumstantial evidence. For me the most convincing is what happened after the ultimatum was accepted. The only direct result was an exchange of diplomatic representatives, as stipulated by the Polish ultimatum. Openning the border, establishing economic relations, restoring telecomms, etc, were different issues, requiring the negotiation of detailed "technical" agreements and, in some cases, modification of internal laws and regulations. If the Lithuanians had been really forced into these negotiations at gun-point they could easily stall them for years, raising numerous technical, financial and legal issues. Nothing of the sort happened, in fact pretty much everything was up and running by the time Germany invaded Poland. Even the militaries had signed an officer exchange/secondment programme, something one would hardly expect from countries treating each other with hostility.

[michael mills]

Smitty,

You wrote:

It is the nature of politics and war that planning takes place for an enormous range of contingencies that never actually take place. Pilsudski would have been unwise, on pragmatic grounds, never to consider the possibility, but I am still waiting for you to convince me that it was anything more than one of a range of options he may have considered.

I am not claiming that Pilsudski did not consider a number of different options for action to achieve his goals.

What I am asking is whether an alliance with Germany aimed against the Soviet Union was one of those options, and whether Pilsudski, in December 1933, sent out a subtle feeler to Germany that it was an option for him.

I am also suggesting that, if indeed Pilsudski was considering the option of an alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union, it was his preferred option, the one he most wanted to implement.

I make that suggestion because it is supported by some of the things we know about Pilsudski and his essential political and ideological orientation.

In the first place, he saw Russia, now in the form of the Soviet Union, as the most dangerous and continuous enemy of Poland. For that reason, an alliance with a stronger power like Germany would be beneficial for the purpose of countering the enormous power of Russia.

Furthermore, PIlsudski did not only want protection against the power of Russia. He wanted to push that power back to the east, so that it did not border on Poland. He wanted to detach White Russia and Ukraine from Russia and turn then into separate states in a federation with Poland, de facto under Poland's hegemony. Achievement of that goal would require the defeat of Russian (or Soviet) military power, something that Poland could not achieve by itself. Accordingly, an alliance with another power was necessary, and germany was the most suitable such power. Wojciechowski believes that Pilsudski's goal of eastward expansion in the form of a Polish-led federation was the reason for his openness toward the idea of an alliance with Germany.

He did not see all the German-speaking peoples as hostile to Poland, only the Prussian land-owning aristocracy, whose hostility toward Poland was the product of historical rivalries in the German-Polish borderlands. For that reason he had had no qualms about about co-operating with the Austrian Empire, even though it was ruled by ethnic Germans. Accordingly, A Germany ruled by a non-Prussian, a person of Austrian origin, without any traditional animus toward Poland, ie a Germany ruled by Hitler, was in Pilsudski's eyes a state with which Poland could have friendly relations and even an alliance.

From the point of view of achieving the essential political aims of Pilsudski, an alliance with Germany aimed against the Soviet Union was preferable to the existing alliance with France, which was aimed specifically against Germany. While that alliance suited the anti-German political ideology of Pilsudski's predecessors and rivals, it ran counter to his own anti-Russian orientation. For that reason, I consider it highly likely that it was his wish to replace the anti-German alliance with France with an anti-Soviet alliance with Germany, but until 1933 the Rapallo policies pursued by the German republican governments prevented that; with the advent of Hitler and the repudiation of the Rapallo policies of his predecessors that obstacle was removed. However, Pilsudski's illness and death, only 15 months after the conclusion of the first agreement with Germany ending the hostility between that country and Poland, prevented his making further substantial moves toward achieving a military alliance, if that indeed was his intention.

I remain agnostic as to whether Pilsudski considered an alliance with Hitler, but retrospectively we can say with some certainty that it would certainly have been unwise.

Why do you say it would have been unwise?

Are you claiming that Hitler had indeed entered into a full alliance with Poland aimed against the Soviet Union, eg if Poland had joined the Anti-Comintern Pact when that was first suggested in 1937, then he would have invaded Poland anyway, regardless of what that country did?

It seems to me that you are projecting back from the historical fact of the German invasion of Poland in 1939, without taking into account the actions by Poland which made a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union impossible.

Incidentally, the first concrete military plan for action hostile to Poland was for the occupation of Danzig. It was made in late 1938 at the same time as plans were drawn up for the occupation of Memel.

That is correct. Hitler ordered the preparation of plans for the military occupations of Danzig and Memel on 28 November 1938.

That was immediately after Poland had publicly reaffirmed the 1932 Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, an indication that it was intending to use its relationship with that country as a counter to German pressure.

But a plan to send German forces into Danzig was quite different to a plan to invade Polish sovereign territory. Danzig was a self-governing entity, in which Poland had certain economic rights reflecting that city's role as a port for Poland's overseas trade. If German forces were sent into Danzig at the request of the elected Government of the Free City, then that would not constitute a hostile act against Danzig itself or its population.

A German occupation of Danzig could be construed as an act hostile to Poland only if Poland's legitimate economic rights in the city were thereby extinguished. But Hitler had proposed an arrangement whereby those rights could be maintained by granting Poland a free port in Danzig with extra-territorial access, similar to the arrangment that was later made with Lithuania after the transfer of Memel to Germany.

It should be noted that in 1919 the Allied and Associated Powers had concluded that sovereignty over Danzig should not be granted to Poland because of the undeniably German identity of the city and its population. The excision of the city from Germany and its establishment as a self-governing Free City under the protection of the League of Nations was a compromise designed to satisfy Poland's legitimate economic interest in the post as an outlet for its trade, while maintaining the right of the city's German population not to be under alien Polish rule.

Furthermore, Poland's need for Danzig as an outlet for its overseas trade had been greatly reduced due to the development of the port of Gdynia on Polish sovereign territory. By 1939, a bit over half of Poland's overseas trade by value was flowing through Gdynia, and access to the port of Danzig had become less vital. All the proposals made by Germany for the resolution of the Danzig issue involved Gdynia's remaining Polish sovereing terriotry with full access to the rest of Poland, coupled with access to a free port in Danzig itself.

Finally, the option of German military occupation of Danzig, which Hitler had ordered to be planned for on 28 November 1938, was only to be implemented if Poland remained obdurate in refusing all German proposals for the resolution of the Danzig issue, which would satisfy the freely-expressed desire of the city's population for reunification with the German Reich and also Poland's requirement for toll-free access to the port.

Smitty, you will note what was written by Buba01 in relation to the conflict between POland and Lithuania:

So the two sides agreed to organise a "show", whereby Poland would "force" Lithuania to accept an agreement, protecting the Lithuanian government from loss of face.

Hitler's thinking about a resolution of the Danzig issue was along similar lines. He believed that Beck and the more pro-German elements in the Sanacja regime could not agree to the German proposals because that would involve a "loss of face" for them, and weaken them in regard to the strong anti-German opposition within Poland. That was also the view of the German Foreign Office, which was traditionally more hostile to Poland than Hitler himself.

Hitler believed that if he "forced" the Polish Government to accept the reunification of Danzig with Germany, through a fait accompli by military occupation of the city, that would protect it from a loss of face, in the same way as Buba01 has suggested the Lithuanian Government was protected from a loss of face. He believed that Beck and his adherents would acquiesce in the fait accompli, and would be able to remain in power in Poland.

The possibility of a solution to the Danzig issue through a fait accompli was negated at the end of March 1939 through the British action of issuing a unilateral guarantee to Poland and the following military agreement between Britian and Poland. This new development meant that any German attempt to achieve the reintegration of Danzig through a fait accompli, if resisted by Poland with the use of military force, would also be opposed by Britain with military force, leading to hostilities between Germany and Britain, which Hitler wished to avoid.

It was that new development that caused Hitler to issue the order to his military leaders to prepare the German armed forces for possible action against Poland at any time after 1 September of that year. However, it is noteworthy that Hitler in his order stated that that plan did not replace the existing plan for an occupation of Danzig only, which was to remain in being as a separate plan.

That may well indicate that Hitler was keeping his options open. He may still have seen an occupation of Danzig alone, with Polish acceptance of the fait accompli, as a possible option, with a full invasion of Poland as the alternative to be adopted if it became certain that even the limited action of an occupation of Danzig alone would inevitably lead to war with Poland and subsequently with Britain and France.

[michael mills]

Buba01,

You wrote:

You systematically ignore the fact that the Polish plans were defensive in nature, the underlying assumption being a German invasion of Poland, not vice versa.

Were they purely defensive? Perhaps you could give us some details from the study that demonstrate that fact.

Please note that I was quoting what the Polish historian Marian Wojciechowski wrote about the sudy "Niemcy" in a published book. He did not state that the plans described in the study were purely defensive in nature. He did state that the culmination of the study was a combined Franco-Polish offensive against Germany ending in the 'destruction" of that country.

You have quibbled about the word "destruction", my translation of the word "Vernichtung" in the book I have read. Perhaps someone could consult the Polish original to see what Polish word is used therein. I presume Wojciechowski was referring to the annihilation of Germany as a military power, the destruction of its armed forces and capacity for waging war.

Wojciechowski does say that the study examined the various options open to both Germany and Poland given the strategic situation they were in. Accordingly, it may well be that the study "Niemcy" examined as one of those options an invasion of Polish territory by German forces entering from three different directions, from East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia.

But was that the only option the study considered? What options did it consider were open to Poland in the given strategic situation? Perhaps you could provide details of all the various options examined by the study.

In the meantime, I will give preference to what Wojciechowski wrote. Although he was writing from a pro-Soviet point of view, the German translation of his book was published under the auspices of a commuttee of academics from the Free University of Berlin, the University of Marburg, the Pontifico Instituto Orientale of Rome, Indiana University, Princeton University, and the Institut d'Etudes Slaves of Paris, as part of a series "Studies in East European History".

Wojciechowski's book was obviously accepted by a committee of Western academics, which gives it the status of scholarly respectability. Accordingly, I must accept his statements in preference to unsourced statements about the content of the study "Niemcy".

[buba01]

Were they purely defensive? Perhaps you could give us some details from the study that demonstrate that fact.

I already gave you the details, Mr Mills. The basic assumption in the "war plan" part of the study was that Germany attacks Poland. I gave you the directions of the German attack, as perceived by the authors of the study. There was no other scenario.

Please note that I was quoting what the Polish historian Marian Wojciechowski wrote about the sudy "Niemcy" in a published book. He did not state that the plans described in the study were purely defensive in nature.

Well thats Mr Wojciechowski's problem, and any person's who relies solely on what he wrote. Study Niemcy is not a secret, it is available in Polish archives and it was published, together with other documents, as a book over 20 years ago. I strongly suggest that you somehow procure a copy of the origanal document or that book and find out for yourself what that study was and what is was not.

I wish to repeat - study Niemcy was not a war plan. In fact, study Niemcy is not the true name of the document, its just a short name for day-to-day use. The document's full name is "Study on the military capabilities of Germany and Poland". And the document's contents focus on what it's title says - a strategic assessment of the two countries military capabilities, as of the date of writing and in the near future. A significant part of the document deals with identified deficiencies on the Polish side, Mossor/Kutrzeba formulated recommendations to address these deficiencies and even costed them.

The "war plan" part was just an add-on, a rough guide on how the Polish army should deploy in the field to face a German attack AD1936. It was not correlated in detail with the Polish army's then current mob plan, therefore, it's implementation would require a certain amount of improvisation. However, in view of Germany's fast remilitarisation, the Polish army was aware that it's previous war plans had become hopelessly outdated and wanted something in hand quickly, even if it meant implementation difficulties.

The study was just the first in a series of documents, prepared in the 1936-38 timeframe, which were intended as a basis for preparing a "proper" war plan against Germany. This plan, Plan Z, was developed in 1939, allthough it was never 100% complete.

As for Mr Wojciechowski's book. It was originally published in 1965. I suggest Mr Mills that you spend a few moments of your time and think about this date, it's significance for the book's accuracy and objectivity.

He did state that the culmination of the study was a combined Franco-Polish offensive against Germany ending in the 'destruction" of that country.

Yes Mr Mills, "culminated". It would be rather strange if the Polish army prepared plans ending with the "destruction" of Poland.

You have quibbled about the word "destruction", my translation of the word "Vernichtung" in the book I have read. Perhaps someone could consult the Polish original to see what Polish word is used therein. I presume Wojciechowski was referring to the annihilation of Germany as a military power, the destruction of its armed forces and capacity for waging war.

I also presume that is what Wojciechowski meant. But again, so what? It is a quite normal ultimate goal, even in defensive war plans. Simply beating an aggressor back across the border, in most cases, will not solve the problem. He will come back, and back again. So you aim for a more permanent solution. However, in itself, this is not an indication of aggressive intentions.

Wojciechowski does say that the study examined the various options open to both Germany and Poland given the strategic situation they were in. Accordingly, it may well be that the study "Niemcy" examined as one of those options an invasion of Polish territory by German forces entering from three different directions, from East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia.

But was that the only option the study considered?

As I wrote earlier, it was the only option.

Prior Polish war plans had two options, one defensive and one aggressive. The aggressive one envisaged an Allied "police action" against Germany, the most probable cause being flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. So, if France/Britain/anybody else had decided in 1935 that reintroduction of the draft in Germany required "corrective action" through military force, Poland would most likely join in, using this option. However, after 1935, this option was dropped from Polish war plans.

In the meantime, I will give preference to what Wojciechowski wrote. Although he was writing from a pro-Soviet point of view, the German translation of his book was published under the auspices of a commuttee of academics from the Free University of Berlin, the University of Marburg, the Pontifico Instituto Orientale of Rome, Indiana University, Princeton University, and the Institut d'Etudes Slaves of Paris, as part of a series "Studies in East European History".

Wojciechowski's book was obviously accepted by a committee of Western academics, which gives it the status of scholarly respectability. Accordingly, I must accept his statements in preference to unsourced statements about the content of the study "Niemcy".

Mr Wojciechowski's book was published under the regime of censorship and had to kow-tow to the official party line of the day, Otherwise, it would simply not be published. And the party line in Poland AD1965 was vehemently anti-German and, regarding pre-war rulers of Poland, aimed to paint them into a crypto-fascist corner. In 1965 WWII was still a personal experience for most of the Polish population and anti-German feelings were still very strong. Associating political opponents, whether current or historical, with Germany was the favorite ComParty tactic for discrediting them. Do not expect objectivity and 100% truth and nothing but the truth from a book published in any communist country.

The fact that it was published under the auspices of respected academic entities means litte. Academics place great value on "exchanging views", the question of whether they agree with these views is a different issue. It gives them something to think, talk and write about, which is the essence of academic work.

[michael mills]

Study Niemcy is not a secret, it is available in Polish archives and it was published, together with other documents, as a book over 20 years ago. I strongly suggest that you somehow procure a copy of the origanal document or that book and find out for yourself what that study was and what is was not.

Would you be so kind as to provide details of that book, and whether it is available in English.

The document's full name is "Study on the military capabilities of Germany and Poland". And the document's contents focus on what it's title says - a strategic assessment of the two countries military capabilities, as of the date of writing and in the near future.

That sounds very much like Wojciechowski's description of the study. So he did not misrepresent it.

Yes Mr Mills, "culminated". It would be rather strange if the Polish army prepared plans ending with the "destruction" of Poland.

That is not the point. The conclusions of the study, regardless of its actual name, indicate that the Polish military leaders believed that Poland was capable of waging a successful war against Germany, provided it was acting in alliance with France. That means that they were not afraid of war with Germany, since they believed they would win it, and therefore were willing to risk such a war.

That belief might explain why there was so much internal opposition on the part of elements in the Polish military and associated with it, such as General Sikorski, to Pilsudski's pro-German policy as continued by Beck as executor of Pilsudski's political legacy. Since they believed a war against Germany could be won in alliance with France, they pushed for a policy of total rejection of all German proposals for resolution of the outstanding issues between germany and Poland.

They got the war they wanted, but it did not turn out the way they expected.

Simply beating an aggressor back across the border, in most cases, will not solve the problem. He will come back, and back again. So you aim for a more permanent solution. However, in itself, this is not an indication of aggressive intentions.

A primary motivation for war with Germany on the part of the opposition to Sanacja, provided it could be waged successfully, was the seizure of German territory east of the Oder, and even to the west of it. That was a goal of many of the opponents of Sanacja; they believed Poland had not been granted enough German territory by the Treaty of Versailles.

The "Piast" variant of Polish nationalism, espoused in particular by Endecja, was to "regain" the 10th-Century border of the Polish state, which had then lain on or to the west of the Oder-Neisse Line. Although General Sikorski was not an adherent of Endecja, he was certainly a supporter of the idea of Polish westward expansion to the Oder-Neisse Line, and even before the War he openly advocated an alliance with the Soviet Union for the purpose of achieving that aim.