It is contrary to historical truth to posit a conflict between the policies of Pilsudski and Beck toward Germany.
Pilsudski regarded Beck as his disciple in foreign policy, and Beck regarded himself as the executor of Pilsudski's political legacy. Everything that Beck did was faithful to the political line laid down by Pilsudski before his death, which was one of detente with Germany after Hitler's ascent to power and abandonment of the previous anti-Polish policies of the Weimar republic.
When Beck responded favorably toward Hitler's hints at a thaw in German-Polish relations, he was carrying out Pilsudski's policy, not acting contrary to it.
As I never posited a distinction between the policies of the two statesmen, I am quite perplexed as to what these three paragraphs had to do with anything.
Pilsudski remained firmly anti-Sovit until his dying day. In fact, a couple of days before his death, he condemned the visit of Laval to Moscow for the purpose of concluding the French-soviet military alliance, telling his aide that the French cozying up to Moscow would come to no good. That was almost his last recorded statement before his death.
Not exactly true. Whilst it is true that Pilsudski was hardly enamoured with the USSR, he did not allow this to get in the way of his policies of balance. As I mentioned earlier, Pilsudski presided over very friendly relations with the USSR up until the end of 1933. It was the USSR, not Pilsudski, that was responsible for the later thaw. Regardless, Pilsudski rejected post-1933 demands for a military attack on the USSR.
That is his prerogative, but I see no good reason to reject Rauschning's claim.
Thing is Michael, there is no good reason to accept it. It was made many years after the event and there is no other indication that Pilsudski made such remarks. It isn't mentioned by any other Polish or German statesman or civil servant, and someone else who was in that meeting has denied that Pilsudski made such a statement.
The rest of your argument doesn't provide any additional evidence that the alleged remarks were made. It engages in some speculation as to why it might be, but that's hardly the same thing as evidence.
Rauschning had a personal motive for revealing what Pilsudski had intimated on 11 December 1933, a motive that was consistent with his compulsive hatred of Hitler. Essentially Rauschning was claiming that in 1933 there had been a chance for resolution of all the conflicts between Germany and Poland that could have avoided the German-Polish war that historically did break out in 1939, and possibly led to victory over the Soviet Union in alliance with Poland, thereby avoiding the disaster of 1945. However, that chance had been lost due to what Rauschning claimed (falsely) was Hitler's intransigently anti-Polish attitude.
If Rauschning had a motive for revealing a "truth" about the meeting, then he would have also had a motive for making it up. It's not as if Rauschning was beyond that. Alternatively he could have just misremembered (the meeting had taken place 18 years previously after all).
It is also interesting you point out that Rauschning claimed that Hitler had an anti-polish attitude. In fact, in 'Hitler Speaks' Rauschning gives a rather different picture of Hitler's attitude of the Poles (which I have quoted in another forum). This seems to discredit your (or Wojciechowski's) theory that Rauschning needed to hide this information for two decades, lest it show Hitler in a postive light.
by ljadw on 20 Oct 2011 20:41 
oland created at the expense of his 2 defeated neighbours.To upset this statu quo would result in a mortal danger for Poland:it would be at the mercy of Germany,or the SU .The statu quo was the best thing any Polish statesman could imagine .
