If Poland had become Germany's ally rather than its enemy

[michael mills]

An explanation of some of the points made by Hitler to Gafencu.

The "tripartite agreement on Slovakia" was Hitler's suggestion, made after the Munich Conference, that Slovakia should be detached from Czechia and partitioned between Poland, Hungary and Romania.

In that way, the long-standing Polish aim of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier would have been attained. By making that suggestion, Hitler had shown a pro-Polish attitude, a willingness to help Poland achieve the aims it had in common with Germany, one being the elimination of Czechoslovakia, which had supported Soviet Russia in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.

The reference to "Ukraine" is actually to Ruthenia, the third, easternmost, component of Czechoslovakia, which had become autonomous after the Munich Conference, and had adopted the name Carpatho-Ukraine (Podkarpatska Ukraina) for itself, thereby indicating a desire to unite with other Ukrainian territories in Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.

Between the Munich Conference and the occupation of Bohemia-Moravia on 15 March 1939, Hitler was toying with the idea of supporting an independent Carpatho-Ukraine, which would become the "Piedmont" for a future Great Ukrainian state. However, that policy was incipiently anti-Polish, since the Ukrainians wanted to separate from Poland those of its territories inhabited by Ukrainians, East Galicia and Volhynia, which was contrary to Hitler's crucial aim of achieving a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, Hitler abandoned the idea of an independent Carpatho-Ukraine, and immediately after the German occupation of Bohemia-Moravia he allowed Hungary to annex that territory, thereby creating a short Polish-Hungarian frontier. In so doing, Hitler was again signalling his pro-Polish attitude.

In his talk with Gafencu, Hitler is expressing his regret that he had allowed Hungary to annex Carpatho-Ukraine, rather than protecting it as as independent state, since that pro-Polish move had not had the desired affect of inducing Poland to adopt a pro-German attitude. Instead, Poland had joined Britain and France in encircling Germany.

As a result, Hitler had lost out. He had sacrificed Carpatho-Ukraine, which could have been an independent mini-state allied to Germany and providing direct access to Romania, perhaps by the railway mentioned by him, but he had not gained the friendship of POland, which was the sole purpose for which he had made that sacrifice.

it was that defeat for Hitler's foreign policy that caused him to abandon his previous pro-Polish attitude and switch to the anti-Polish policy of the conservative Prussian elements in the German officer corps and Foreign Office. His later vindictive attitude toward Poles can be explained by his strong sense of having been betrayed by Poland, to which he had shown nothing but friendship, to the extent of abandoning almost all of the German claims to its former territory which had been annexed by Poland in 1920.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The Hewel document is therefore more trustworthy than the post-war memoirs of French former premier Daladier,

No it was Daladier's speech from 21 September 1939. Not his memoirs.

one being the elimination of Czechoslovakia, which had supported Soviet Russia in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.

Polish aim was never to eliminate Czehoslovakia, rather to organize a fair plebiscite in the Teschen region which had been taken by Czechoslovakia by force in 1920 and on which Czechoslovakia didn't want to agree.

In 1938 Poland even offered help against Germany to Czechoslavkia but condition was that Czechoslovakia agrees on Polish proposition of plebiscite. Czechoslovakia initially disagreed and Poland changed its policy.

[michael mills]

Polish aim was never to eliminate Czehoslovakia, rather to organize a fair plebiscite in the Teschen region which had been taken by Czechoslovakia by force in 1920 and on which Czechoslovakia didn't want to agree.

In 1938 Poland even offered help against Germany to Czechoslavkia but condition was that Czechoslovakia agrees on Polish proposition of plebiscite. Czechoslovakia initially disagreed and Poland changed its policy.

Apologetic falsehoods.

Poland's aim throughout the interwar period, particularly as pursued by Beck, was to achieve a common Polish-Hungarian border.

Since Poland and Hungary were separated by Czechoslovakia, which stretched all the way to Romania, a common Polish-Hungarian border could only be achieved by dismembering Czechoslovakia and partitioning Slovakia and/or Ruthenia.

In 1938, the Polish Government told the German Government that it supported the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany and of Hungarian-inhabited regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary, and asked for German support of its claim to Cieszyn, which it received. It also told the German Government of its preference that Slovakia and Ruthenia should be annexed either by it or by Hungary.

Poland might have been prepared to tolerate the continued existence of an independent Czechia, a smaller state shorn of Slovakia, Ruthenia and the Sudetenland. But then again, Hitler himself might have been prepared to have tolerated such a state, if it had agreed to the German demands submitted to Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Janaury 1939, which included the disbandment of the Czecho-Slovak armed forces and the subordination of Czech foreign policy to that of Germany.

[Boby]

Hitler on conversation with Cincar-Markovic on 26 April 1939:

He, the Fuhrer, had been accused of pursuing a wrong policy towards Poland, but in his opinion one must also know how to give way in a reasonable manner in order to avoid great bloodshed when such was not really necessary.

DGFP, D/VI, Nr. 271, pp. 339-343

Hitler on conversation with Csaky, Teleki and Sztojay on 29 April 1939, 16.00 - 17.35 Uhr

As to Poland, he was convinced that she would one day see reason,
and he again described his offer to Poland. His attitude was that
without access to the sea Poland was an absurdity and he could not
understand why agreement could not be reached on the lines of cold
reason. Moreover, it was madness to regard the extra-territorial high-
way as a military danger; for the Corridor was no military problem at
all, at the most a question of six hours.

At our first conversation with the Polish gentlemen they had said
that they had certain territorial interests in the Teschen area. The
Ukraine did not interest them. Poland had more right than Hungary
to -Slovakia, the Slovak language was only a Polish idiom as Polish
was practically the same language. But Slovakia under Polish rule
was intolerable for us.

However, nothing was unalterable and relations with Poland must
also be settled one way or another. If Poland participated in the
policy of encirclement, he would draw his own conclusions. A non-
aggression pact must be free from all other encumbrances, otherwise
it would be a deception. Referring to the British policy of encircle-
ment, he said that he was on his guard; for caution was the mother of
all wisdom. If Poland took part, she must accept all the risks involved
in such a policy; as for him, he would arm.

DGFP, D/VI, Nr. 296, pp. 376-380

Note the moderation of Hitler with polish megalomaniac hysteria.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Yet in March 1939 Hitler issued verbal outlines to his generals saying that Poland must be invaded by the end of August. In early April Hitler also ordered preparation of the "Fall Weiss" plan. Keitel's directive designating the date of the invasion of Poland as "no later than 01.09.1939" was issued yet on 03.04.1939.

This Keitlel's directive was later signatured by Hitler on 11.04.1939. It can be found in documents used during the Nuremberg Trials ("Weisung fur die einheitliche Kriegsvorbereitung der Wehrmacht", Nuremberg 1949).

On 15.06.1939 the German operational plan of the invasion ("Fall Weiss") was already fully finished.

First guidelines concerning the prospective invasion of Poland were issued yet in 1938:

"(...) In previous military-historical literature, following the German historiography, a common opinion was accepted, that "Fall Weiss" directives were issued on 3 and 11 April 1939. However, recent studies, especially of operational documents of Luftwaffe and General Staff of the OKH, confirm our previous hypothesis regarding this.

In the primary operational document of OKL codenamed "Planstudie 1939" and dated 7 February 1939, there is a plan of using Luftwaffe as part of the "Fall Weiss", which clearly indicates, that general guidelines of this plan existed already before and that codename "Fall Weiss" was already in circulation [2]. Thus it can be assumed with large degree of probability, that "Fall Weiss" was compiled yet in 1938 (...).

In the light of above mentioned facts, there are grounds to state, that Hitler's verbal outlines from the end of March of 1939 directed to the commanders in chief of the three branches of armed forces regarding preparation of the operational plan against Poland, were only precising the tasks accordingly to current political conditions and mobilization capacities of the Wehrmacht and were setting the time of readiness to start the invasion as the end of August 1939 [6]. (...)

[2] Elaboration of Department I of the General Staff of OKL from 7 II 1939, titled "Planstudie 1939", (...)
[6] Official chronicler of the Wehrmacht writes that this ordinance was issued by Hitler between 27 and 31 III 1939"

Source: "Wojna Obronna Polski 1939", pages 230 - 231.

[Sid Guttridge]

Michael,

To paraphrase:

I suggest that instead of imagining, you do some research.

Try looking up and examining all Hitler's actions in regard to Poland in the period from mid-1939 up until the end of 1944, at which point he lost all power over Poland, consulting non-biased historical literature.

If you do that, instead of relying on Nazi chauvinistic and apologetic literature, you will come to the realisation that all of Hitler's actions were directed towards wiping Poland from the map.

We have two Hitlers - First the one you want to concentrate on from before March 1939, who had no power over Poland and had, therefore, to publicly accommodate himself to the fact of its existence.

Secondly, there is the Hitler who was absolute master of Poland after September 1939. This Hitler, if he had so wished, could have continued to accommodate himself to the existence of some Polish political entity, but instead chose to wipe out all trace of Polish identity. There was a time scale on this worked to by VOMI, the German reettlement organization for volksdutsche - twenty years. He began to expel Poles by the million, replacing them with German settlers. His gauleiter in West Prussia forced German identity papers on Germanic-looking Poles by the hundreds of thousand. Germanic-looking children were taken from their Polish families and fostered out to German couples, etc., etc.

Why, when we have the hard evidence of what Hitler actually did once he had absolute power over Poland after 1939, should we believe that the impotent Hitler of the earlier 1930s was the real deal?

The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

[Steve]

There is no doubt Poland could have done a deal with Hitler and avoided the German invasion. As late as March 25 Hitler said he did not want to settle the Danzig question by force. On the previous evening he had told Goebbels he hoped the Poles would respond to pressure. On March 26 the Poles rejected the German proposals over Danzig and the corridor. The window of opportunity closed on March 31 when Hitler heard of the British offer of a guarantee to Poland.

From Hitler 1936-1945 by Ian Kershaw

Once the British decided Hitler had to be stopped before he secured European hegemony then Poland became important to them. If Poland moved into the German camp Eastern Europe and the Balkans would probably also follow into the German camp. The pass had to be held at Poland. The guarantee was given to stiffen the Poles in resisting Hitler and hopefully stop them reaching an agreement with him. There was no expectation Poland could successfully resist Germany it was important Poland did resist. In 1939 a factor the British had to take into account was their massive defence spending which would soon lead to economic problems if they continued with it. They did not go to war because of this but a war in 1939 meant they could go over to a war time economy. If there was going to be a war it was better the war came sooner rather than later. Chamberlain was not a man who would deliberately provoke a war.

Hitler started off in January 1939 looking for an agreement. If Poland had done a deal on what was a good offer maybe Hitler would have applied pressure later for more concessions. Quite likely if the Polish government had accepted Hitler’s offer it would have been overthrown by a military coup.

[Sid Guttridge]

Steve,

You write: "There is no doubt Poland could have done a deal with Hitler and avoided the German invasion."

Very likely. So could any country if it had merely submitted to Hitler's will and allowed him to occupy any parts he chose. But then it would be surrendering its independence in the process.

Czechoslovakia, for example, did such a "deal" with Hitler in September 1938. Yet it was occupied by him in March 1939.

Is this the sort of outcome you are advocating the Poles risk or accept?

Because it is the example that was before them in the summer of 1939.

[Steve]

Once the Poles had accepted Hitler’s terms they would be part of a German dominated Eastern Europe. Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia all reached agreement with Germany. Hitler seems to have had a special dislike of the Czechs probably because he was brought up in the Austrian Empire. Slovakia was given a sort of independence and if it was not for a possibly British organised coup Yugoslavia may have stayed like the other Balkan states. He also tried to reach agreement with the USSR on his terms of course in early 1941. As long as you did what Hitler wanted you were probably safe.

If Poland had become a client state of Germany then no war in 1939. Eastern Europe would have fallen into Germanys arms and there was nothing the British and French could do. The worry was that after Poland did a deal Rumania more important than Poland because of oil would also do a deal. The allies had to have a reason to declare war on Germany and a country agreeing to ally itself with Germany was not a reason. What Hitler would have done next and how he would have been stopped if Poland had done a deal who knows.

[Tim Smith]

Surely if Poland makes a deal with Hitler in early 1939, then the Nazi-Soviet Pact becomes impossible. In which case a Franco-Soviet alliance would become possible, since France no longer needs to show any loyalty to or concern for Poland, since Poland has sided with Germany. Stalin would be motivated toward a deal with France since he is now facing Germany and Poland, which put together pose a severe threat to the USSR. If a Franco-Soviet Pact becomes reality, then Britain is also allied to the USSR by default, through her alliance with France.

This effectively takes Europe back to 1914. Germany and her weaker ally facing the threat of a war on two fronts, and unreliable Italy in the south waiting for a chance to join the winning side.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

then the Nazi-Soviet Pact becomes impossible.

Why? After Poland was already crushed, the Nazi-Soviet Pact continued to be valid for the next 20 months.

So it seems that lack of Poland on the side opposing Germany would not be an obstacle for them to sign a pact.

You also seem to forget that Poland was not the only purpose of signining that pact. There were still Besarabia, Finland, Baltic states and other areas where both powers wanted to demarcate their spheres of interests.

facing Germany and Poland, which put together pose a severe threat to the USSR.

Add to this Romania which had a defensive alliance against the USSR signed with Poland.

Hungary would also side with Germany in such scenario, just like in reality.

In case if German-Soviet agreement didn't take place, the Soviet Union would also not be able to "peacefully" annex Baltic states and "peacefully" invade Finland, because Axis states would for sure intervene.

So Baltic states and Finland also side with Germany and Poland in such scenario.

[bolchevik]

Surely if Poland makes a deal with Hitler in early 1939, then the Nazi-Soviet Pact becomes impossible. In which case a Franco-Soviet alliance would become possible, since France no longer needs to show any loyalty to or concern for Poland, since Poland has sided with Germany. Stalin would be motivated toward a deal with France since he is now facing Germany and Poland, which put together pose a severe threat to the USSR. If a Franco-Soviet Pact becomes reality, then Britain is also allied to the USSR by default, through her alliance with France.

What you describe is pretty close to what happened : 1934 Poland and Germany signed a pact of non agression ; which was followed by USSR France pact in 1935. Following that, the french alliance to Czech and Poland became less important, so came the Munich's agreements (1938) which gave Czech to Hitler and opened the way of Poland to Hitler.

Reading Beck's memories on this time makes everybody understand that alliances between 2 states which had borders' conflicts as Germany*Poland, Poland*Czech, Germany*Czech or USSR*Poland were simply impossibles.

[ljadw]

then the Nazi-Soviet Pact becomes impossible.

Why? After Poland was already crushed, the Nazi-Soviet Pact continued to be valid for the next 20 months.

So it seems that lack of Poland on the side opposing Germany would not be an obstacle for them to sign a pact.

You also seem to forget that Poland was not the only purpose of signining that pact. There were still Besarabia, Finland, Baltic states and other areas where both powers wanted to demarcate their spheres of interests.

facing Germany and Poland, which put together pose a severe threat to the USSR.

Because,the aim of the M-R pact was to make the attack on Poland possible :without the pact,no Fall Weiss .
If Poland was an 'ally' of Germany,Hitler had no reason to attack Poland .
Finland,the Baltics,etc were the result of the Pact,not the aim (from a German POV)
Add to this Romania which had a defensive alliance against the USSR signed with Poland.

Hungary would also side with Germany in such scenario, just like in reality.

In case if German-Soviet agreement didn't take place, the Soviet Union would also not be able to "peacefully" annex Baltic states and "peacefully" invade Finland, because Axis states would for sure intervene.

So Baltic states and Finland also side with Germany and Poland in such scenario.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

What you describe is pretty close to what happened : 1934 Poland and Germany signed a pact of non agression ; which was followed by USSR France pact in 1935.

Poland also signed a non-agression pact with the USSR in 1932 (for 3 years) and prolonged it in 1934 until 1945:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet%E2% ... ssion_Pact

The Soviet Union violated that pact on 17 September 1939.

Beck's policy was to "appease" both neighbours of Poland - Germany and the USSR. Not just Germany.

So Beck's policy was the policy of appeasement of both but also the policy of no alliances with either.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Steve,

What you write is pure speculation.

What we know for a fact is what happened to Czechoslovakia after it had done a deal with Hitlerin September 1938 - it ceased to exist as an independent state in March 1939.

This is the reality the Poles had to deal with from March 1939. They could either surrender their independence as a state to Nazi Germany or defend themselves. They chose the latter course. It was entirely justified.