Polish Foreign Minister Beck a German agent

[Jack Carter]

It's obvious that the Germans were quite willing to give Stalin much more than the British and French could do and would do, which Stalin also pointed out according to Dimitrov's diary.

I have gone through Dimitrov's diary and Stalin do not point out anything of the kind there. Or has there been released other versions of this diary?

[Bojns]

Well, he did suggest that the British and the French wanted to use the Soviet Union as farmhands and at no cost & that this was unacceptable. (bottom, image 2). So I don't think it's unfair to conclude that he found the German offers superior. (Edition is Yale University Press, 2003)

Dimitrov1.jpg

Dimitrov2.jpg

[Jack Carter]

Well, he did suggest that the British and the French wanted to use the Soviet Union as farmhands and at no cost & that this was unacceptable. (bottom, image 2). So I don't think it's unfair to conclude that he found the German offers superior. (Edition is Yale University Press, 2003)

This is what was said:

"We preferred agreements with the so-called democratic countries and therefore conducted negotiations.
But the English and the French wanted us for farmhand [v batrakakh] and at no cost!
We, of course, would not go for being farmhands, still less for getting nothing in return."

How anyone can conclude that "the German offers were superior" is beyond me.

[Bojns]

Well, he did suggest that the British and the French wanted to use the Soviet Union as farmhands and at no cost & that this was unacceptable. (bottom, image 2). So I don't think it's unfair to conclude that he found the German offers superior. (Edition is Yale University Press, 2003)

This is what was said:

"We preferred agreements with the so-called democratic countries and therefore conducted negotiations.
But the English and the French wanted us for farmhand [v batrakakh] and at no cost!
We, of course, would not go for being farmhands, still less for getting nothing in return."

How anyone can conclude that "the German offers were superior" is beyond me.

Well, my conclusion is this: Stalin was unhappy with the British and the French because they, in his opinion, offered nothing and because they wanted the Soviet Union to do the heavy work. This seems like a reasonable conclusion. So we have, according to Stalin, one potential party who offered nothing.

So what did the Germans offer? Well, they let Stalin know that they saw no conflict between German interests and Soviet interests. This was later worked out in detail as far as Finland, the Baltic states and Poland was concerned. This obviously was more than the Anglo-British "nothing". I think it's also reasonable to conclude that the British & French never could have offered Stalin a large piece of Poland if he were to join forces with them in protecting Poland.

So I see no problem with concluding that Stalin refused the British & French because they offered "nothing" and signed a treaty with the Germans because they offered better terms than "nothing".

[buba01]

If the Germans had also offered Stalin nothing, by his own logic (and universal common sense) he should have turned them down too. But he didn't, so they must have offered him something he valued. And something is always more than nothing.

[Kasatonov]

Hungary

And what about Hungary? Did Germany or Poland do anything to Hungary? Am I missing something here? Poland had very good relations with Hungary, despite her hostility to Poland's other good friend - Roumania.

Yes, you missed my point completely -- I was meaning Germany's and Poland's contributions in order to bring the Carpatho-Rus to Hungary in November 1938.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpathian ... nt_history

In November 1938, under the First Vienna Award — which was a result of the Munich Agreement — Czechoslovakia, and later Slovakia, were forced by Germany and Italy to cede the southern third of Slovakia and southern Carpathian Rus to Hungary. The remainder of Carpathian Rus received autonomy, with Avhustyn Voloshyn as the prime minister of the autonomous government.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pole_and_H ... cousins_be

Following the Munich Agreement (September 30, 1938) — which doomed Czechoslovakia to takeover by Germany — Poland and Hungary, from common as well as their own special interests, worked together, by diplomatic as well as paramilitary means, to restore their historic common border by engineering the return of Carpathian Rus to Hungary.[5] A step toward their goal was realized with the First Vienna Award (November 2, 1938).

Is it ok with you that Poland, supervised by Germany and in collaboration with Hungary used their "diplomatic as well as paramilitary means", to wreck the Carpatho-Rus out of the hands of the Czechoslovakia, a country which Pilsudski had called "a creature of the Versailles Treaty"?

[michael mills]

Has ever any plans for the proposed Soviet campaign against Germany in the autumn of 1939 been published? The size of the force involved, how and when the attack was to be launched, estimates of the German forces etc.?

During the August 1939 talks with the Anglo-French military mission, the Soviet side put on the table precise details of the forces they were prepared to commit against Germany. Those details are in the Soviet record of the talks.

The Soviet side then asked the Anglo-French delegation to give equivalent details of the forces they were prepared to commit against Germany. The Anglo-French delegation could not give any such details, since it had not been authorised by the British and French Governments to make any specific offers.

It is impossible to tell whether the Soviet Government was genuinely proposing military action against Germany, or whether its offer to commit enormous forces against Germany was simply a bluff, designed to establish a case for going with Germany rather than the Anglo-French alliance. It appears to me that the different interpretations of the negotiations by various commentators depend essentially on the respective biases of those commentators, either pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet. We see examples of precisely those biases in some of the posts made on this thread.

With regard to Beck himself, I think there is no hard evidence that he was ever a German agent, if by that is meant a person working specifically to forward the interests of Germany. He always saw himself as working solely for the national interests of Poland.

Nevertheless, the way in which Beck interpreted the national interests. Beck was a disciple of PIlsudski, and as such a Polish nationalist of the Jagiellonian variety, seeing Russia as the arch-enemy of Poland, with Germany as a potential ally against the threat from the east, so long as it was not itself hostile to Poland.

Once Hitler had ended the anti-Polish policies of preceding German governments and sought detente with Poland, there was a basis for a close German-Polish relationship based on their common interests, such as hostility toward the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and both Pilsudski and Beck seized the opening offered by Hitler.

According to a post-war statement by Rauschning, who late in 1933 carried out negotiations in Warsaw that led to the German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression of 28 Janaury 1934, Pilsudski hinted that he would be willing to enter into an alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union.

[I introduced that statement in a separate thread on this section of the Forum. Details can be found there].

The main obstacle to a German-Polish alliance was the strong anti-Pilsudski opposition within Poland, mainly from Endecja and the Peasant Parties, which PIlsudski was able to suppress only with difficulty. That same opposition, which was even stronger once the strong personality of PIlsudski had vanished from the scene, applied in 1938-39, and was probably the main factor that prevented Beck from responding more favourably to the German offer of a package deal in October 1938.

One issue on which Beck and Hitler had a common interest was that of hostility toward Czechoslovakia. The Polish Government had its own reasons for desiring the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, unrelated to those of Germany. The main reason was a desire to establish a common border with Hungary, which required the separation of Slovakia and Ruthenia from Czechia and their annexation by Poland or Hungary or both. Furthermore, Pilsudski and Beck considered Czechoslovakia to be aligned with the Soviet Union, and therefore equally an enemy of Poland.

That is the reason why in 1938 Beck co-operated with Germany in the moves toward the overthrow of Czechoslovakia. He was not acting as an agent of Germany, but rather rather according to the Pilsudskiite interpretation of Polish national interests, which in this case happened to coincide with those of Germany.

[michael mills]

Google books is very useful in these cases. A search for Göring + Beck + 1938 gives some relevant results, for instance the book "Poland and the Western powers 1938-1939". The discussions between Beck and Göring are mentioned on page 47, which is available for preview. Göring + Bialowieza + 1938 also works, resulting for example in "Die polnisch-deutschen Beziehungen 1933-1938" by Marian Wojciechowski (page 388 - available for preview).

Bojns,

Have you read the book by Wojciechowski? I have, and he maintains throughout that Beck was pursuing a pro-German policy, although he does not in any way allege that he was a paid agent of Germany.

Wojciechowski's book is also the source of the claim that in 1933 Pilsudski hinted at the possibility of a Gewrman-POlish alliance against the Soviet Union.

[michael mills]

A lot of the argument in this thread seems to revolve around the idea that Ribbentrop suggested to Beck a joint German-Polish invasion of the Soviet Union.

In fact, what Ribbentrop suggested in October 1938 to the Polish ambassador Lipski, and what he repeated to Beck in Janaury 1939, was that Poland should join the Anti-Comintern Pact, of which at the time only Germany and Japan were members. There was no overt suggestion of an invasion of the Soviet Union.

Back in 1934, Göring on a visit to Poland had suggested to Pilsudski a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union, and had spoken of a division of Ukraine between the two countries, with Poland gaining a port on the Black Sea. The Polish record of the conversation states that Pilsudski said that he did not wish to pursue that discussion. Göring however came home with the distinct impression that Pilsudski was not totally averse to the idea.

[michael mills]

Here is a link to my earlier thread on the possibilty that in December 1933 Pilsudski hinted at the possibility of a war against the Soviet Union, and a German-Polish alliance in such a war:

viewtopic.php?f=111&t=173133

[Bojns]

Google books is very useful in these cases. A search for Göring + Beck + 1938 gives some relevant results, for instance the book "Poland and the Western powers 1938-1939". The discussions between Beck and Göring are mentioned on page 47, which is available for preview. Göring + Bialowieza + 1938 also works, resulting for example in "Die polnisch-deutschen Beziehungen 1933-1938" by Marian Wojciechowski (page 388 - available for preview).

Bojns,

Have you read the book by Wojciechowski? I have, and he maintains throughout that Beck was pursuing a pro-German policy, although he does not in any way allege that he was a paid agent of Germany.

Wojciechowski's book is also the source of the claim that in 1933 Pilsudski hinted at the possibility of a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union.

Only partially, but I want to emphasize that my opposition was directed against the suggestion that Gerstenberg's testimony proved that Beck had been a German agent and that this explained the Polish foreign policy in 1938-39. If the political situation is analyzed from the perspective of Beck (and Pilsudski) I am not surprised that they distrusted the Soviet Union (or for that matter that the Soviet Union distrusted Poland). There was just too much of a historical "baggage" in the relationship between the two countries.

[Bojns]

Has ever any plans for the proposed Soviet campaign against Germany in the autumn of 1939 been published? The size of the force involved, how and when the attack was to be launched, estimates of the German forces etc.?

During the August 1939 talks with the Anglo-French military mission, the Soviet side put on the table precise details of the forces they were prepared to commit against Germany. Those details are in the Soviet record of the talks.

These are in the "Documents of British Foreign Policy" volume as well. I was thinking of detailed plans for march routes, units involved, maps, evaluation of the German strength - material which would show all the detailed planning behind the figures given by Voroshilov. It would also be interesting to know when such detailed plans were made. Were they in existence long before August 1939 or were the material Voroshilov presented put together more or less upon the arrival of the Anglo-French delegation. At what point did this demand for passage through Polish territory become the key element in Stalin's thinking?

[wm]

I thought this may be of interest to some of you. These clips are from "About My Father", 2007 Polish documentary about Józef Beck.
The first one shows Beck's life in Romania during his internment:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=96Lz2tSCPUI
The second is the 1936 Goering's hunting trip, the only one during which Beck accompanied him in the Białowieża forest and the only one when Goering's wife went along with him.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbf_SwOrTUE

The man in a red sweater is a Polish Jew who found shelter in the Beck's villa during Jewish persecution in Romania. The more formally dressed one is Beck's son. The woman in the second clip is a former employee of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Second Polish Republic.

[wm]

Here is a link to my earlier thread on the possibilty that in December 1933 Pilsudski hinted at the possibility of a war against the Soviet Union, and a German-Polish alliance in such a war:

This is interesting but in his last months of life, after the disastrous for him Eugenia Lewicka's affair in 1931, Piłsudzki aged very rapidly, exhibited erratic or unpredictable behavior and a lone wolf mentality. If he only said this once I wouldn't count on it having any significance.

[wm]

Well, according to the Ribbentrop version of the conversation on 26 January he suggested a German-Polish collaboration in regard to the Ukraine. Beck replied that Poland certainly had aspirations towards Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea, but that a German-Polish treaty directed against the Soviet Union would be dangerous for Poland. He felt that the Soviet Union would either disintegrate as a result of internal decay or, to avoid this fate, try to gather all its strength and then attack.

According to Beck's memories this was during small talks, probably after the main discussion was over. Ribbentrop said "you are so stubborn in this (Baltic) Sea problem but the Black Sea is a sea, too" and the response was that the treaty with the Soviet Union is immutable.

Has ever any plans for the proposed Soviet campaign against Germany in the autumn of 1939 been published? The size of the force involved, how and when the attack was to be launched, estimates of the German forces etc.?

according to Beck they wanted to advance through the territory of the Eastern Lesser Poland and through the Wilno region.