Was the Polish alliance with the UK and France a mistake?

[wm]

Germany didn't have any rights to those territories, but the Sudeten Germans had the same rights as the rest of Czechoslovakians did, the right of self determination was one of those. They would secede eventually, as the Slovaks did in 1939 and 1993.

[wm]

A lot of them did, so did a lot of ethnic Germans. It is a fact of life in every army. The rate of desertion might have been higher among Poles but still was a marginal nuisance, no more.

Not quite, the Poles deserted, but the Germans surrendered - there is nothing wrong in surrender after fulfilling your duty, those people had the right to do it.
There were 90 thousand of those deserters in the Polish Armed Forces in the West, in fact the Wehrmacht was the largest supplier of recruits to the Polish Army.

What armed desertions/killings took place were by and large in the dying stages of the war. As I said, when the army starts to disintegrate and ceases to function properly, all bets are off. I am sure if you look hard you will find examples of German soldiers killing their leaders and/or Nazi party members to avoid having to make a futile 'last stand'.

Well, this is something entirely different. A mutiny caused by a criminally inept leadership is understandable. I suppose they didn't mind fighting and dying, the problem was they was going to die in vain - without a purpose or reason.

The vast majority of ex-Wehrmacht Poles who joined the Polish Armed Forces in the West came from POW bags which they had entered alongside their German colleagues.

of course but POWs are soldiers too, for them joining an enemy army is treason too. The Germans didn't do that.

Did many or even any Poles desert," supplying valuable intelligence to the Allies etc" in the French Campaign in 1940? I have not found any examples although I expect there were some. The point is, it was a marginal issue.

It happened but there were not that many of them in the Wehrmacht at that time. The territories where they lived had been freshly conquered, the preliminary registration there started on March 1940.

You seem to wholly disregard the fact that military organisations have evolved over millenia a host of subtle and not so subtle methods to ensure compliance among their troops. One of these is the powerful bond of mutual loyalty that is created when men face danger and privation together.

Of course, but it works both ways.

I don't know if you had many dealings with Poles who underwent this experience. I did, indeed two of them were close friends. All I can say is that both, while patriotic Poles and generally confident they had done the right thing deserting to the other side in the last months/weeks of the war, still retained decades after the event, strong feelings of guilt about abandoning their German comrades in arms and friends (yes, friends).

Well, certainly nothing wrong with that, it's even commendable. But you are forgetting in the last years of war Germans units were so hastily trained and quickly deployed there were no time for any bonds to form, they were made of strangers.

A Polish civilian might have been a danger to the Reich or not, but the same Pole with a gun given him voluntarily by the same Reich certainly was.

Clearly the German authorities did not think so as they conscripted them on a massive scale from virtually the outset and continued to do so throughout the war.

They say, the Wehrmacht was surprisingly open about it, they simply didn't care. But most of that was from sheer desperation. What else could have they done? They needed soldiers but there weren't any available.

And one thing, those "Poles" frequently didn't know who they were, or whom they wanted to be: Poles, Germans or Silesians. The nationalities where they lived were frequently hopelessly messed up. It wasn't like that in the Sudetenland, those people there were pure Germans. They were even more motivated.

Let's look at that this way:

With respect, I don't see how any of this has a bearing on on my point that Czech attitudes to the war were likely to be very different in 1938 to what they were in 1943.

It should be different - 1943 was a year of optimism, Moscow, Stalingrad, the USA joining the war, El Alamein, the strategic bombings - there was nothing worth sulking about at that time. Many people naively thought the war would be over in a few months.

It was a fact the Western Powers were not willing to support them in 1938, but it was their choice - they had the right to make it. It was just politics and the lesser evil.
The Western Powers didn't take away their territories in 1938, and didn't subjugate them in 1939 - it was someone else.

The Poles were hit by two invasions in 1939, and then by the Katyń massacre in 1943, but they didn't run any anti-Western or anti-Soviet campaigns. Even in the case of Katyń, the Poles showed extraordinary restraint. The war was more important.
The suffering and misery in the GG can't even be even compared with the life in the wonderlands of Bohemia and Moravia.
It seems those who suffered the least, were sulking the most.

The different behavioural patterns of the Czechs, suggest they were less aggressive, and comparatively less resistant to external pressure, even in 1938.

This remind me of those Warsaw Jews riding the trams outside the Ghetto etc

While I am not sure what this example means to you, my best guess is that you seem to be suggesting that behaviour is ruled by some set of 'national characteristics' and remains impervious to the surrounding reality and experience. In which case we will have to agree to differ. I see very little evidence that human beings function in this manner.

Just a different upbringing, just like in the case of the Czechs. Nothing that important, good morale is nice but tanks can't be built from it.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

I posted:

Czechoslovakia in 1938 had nearly as many trained soldiers under 40 as Germany, because it had had conscription since WWI, whereas Germany hadn't.

In 1938 Czechoslovakia could field some 38 divisions or division equivalents, whereas the active German army had around 45 active divisions and only about 10 mobilizeable reserve divisions. To overwhelm Czechoslovakia would require the deployment of almost all Germany's strength,

Certainly Germans were relatively strong in the technical arms of the Czechoslovak Army in 1938. However, you seem to presume that they were universally for Reich and that the Czechs had not anticipated this. In fact, the Czech Army's 1st and 2nd Rapid Divisions had no problem in chasing the local Nazi stormtroopers from the Sudetenland over the border in mid-September 1938. What is more, Germans formed a significant proportion of the Slovak-raised Czechoslovak forces that fought border skirmishes with the Poles that year. The Germans of Czechoslovakia were relatively prosperous and, according to the Reich Yearbook of 1939-40, they had a higher life expectancy than Alt Reich Germans. Immediate and universal disloyalty should not be taken for granted.

You replied: "This is a common misconception."

However, you failed to explain why.

Perhaps you would care to do so, if you wish your opinions to be taken seriously.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

There is only one WM,and only one ME. And they should not be mixed up .

I wrote in post 297 : this is a common misconception,and I gave my reasons in post 304.

[wm]

The assumption that both forces were more or less equal is a strong argument that something was seriously wrong with that country and its leadership.

Attacking an equal force with green, unproven troops is playing the russian roulette with the result of war. It will be a stalemate or even worse. No sane commander would do it.
In that case Czechoslovakia should have defended itself. Assuming the case was just (and it was) they even would have the moral duty to do it.

[gebhk]

Not quite, the Poles deserted, but the Germans surrendered

Again an ethnicity based blanket faulty premise that all Germnans did this and all Poles did that. Some Germans deserted as did some (albeit proportinally more) conscripted Polish citizens. Far greater numbers ended up in POW camps, whether Germans or Poles, because they marched together into captivity when their units surrendered. If you believe that the majority of those just under 90K came to be in the Polish Armed Forces because they deserted and 'hopped over the hill', you are greatly mistaken.

Well, this is something entirely different

Again you seem to miss the point, which is that regardless of motivation a mutiny is only possible when the apparatus ensuring discipline is absent, such as when the army disintegrates. You cannot therefore extrapolate from what happens on the fringes of a defeated army to the behaviour of troops in a cohesive force.

of course but POWs are soldiers too, for them joining an enemy army is treason too. The Germans didn't do that.

Obviously, however how does that change the fact that the Poles in question had served the WH perfectly adequately until their unit surrendered? The fact that the unit had Poles in its number made no difference to when or why the unit surrendered. Had it been composed entirely of Germans it would havce surrendered just the same. The presence of Poles in its ranks made little or no difference to its performance.

And one thing, those "Poles" frequently didn't know who they were, or whom they wanted to be: Poles, Germans or Silesians.

While I don't know the stats regarding how many were conscripted from each of the regions annexed to the Reich, those I knew predominantly from Pomerania knew exactly who they were and it wasnt German or Silesian. Nevertheless they and their family members had little option but to remain in the German armed forces to the bitter end. Incidentally the older members of the family were all actively engaged in the resistance, a fact of which the younger generation in the WH was aware, so there is little to suggest this was a pro-German family.

[gebhk]

It should be different -

Clearly it was. At the beginning of 1938 Czechoslovacs believed they had the support of France anf the Small Entente behind them in a conflict with Germany (with the Soviey Union having a more shadowy role). Whether the behaviour of France and Britain was post hoc justifiable that is not terribly rellevant. Munich and the succeeding months showed that Czechoslovakia was entirely on its own. Despite this, Czech public opinion was to my limited knowledge overwhelmingly in favour of war. It was the government that took a deeply unpopular but pragmatic decision, probably the correct one, not to fight. The Polish example then rammed home the lesson that a country in their part of the world, fighting in the ranks of the alliance, invited catastrophy on an unimaginable scale. The Czechs weren't sulking (and I do wish people wouldn't casually insult whole nations like this), they were simply refusing to be persuaded to commit suicide for no discernible purpose that would benefit Czechoslovakia (or anyone else for that matter).

[ljadw]

May I observe that already on 17 september 1938,which means : before Münich,Benesj ,in a letter to Daladier, proposed the cession (= to give to Germany) 3 regins of SD land,with a population of 0.8 million SD Germans .

Thus, the myth of poor CZ,betrayed at Munich,

[ljadw]

About the Poles in the German army : I know the case of an ethnic Pole,who deserted,and returned 2 days later as a soldier of a Polish unit .

[wm]

Not quite, the Poles deserted, but the Germans surrendered

Again an ethnicity based blanket faulty premise that all Germnans did this and all Poles did that. Some Germans deserted as did some (albeit proportinally more) conscripted Polish citizens. Far greater numbers ended up in POW camps, whether Germans or Poles, because they marched together into captivity when their units surrendered. If you believe that the majority of those just under 90K came to be in the Polish Armed Forces because they deserted and 'hopped over the hill', you are greatly mistaken.

In 1944, during air raid, in a large aircraft plant near Poznań a force laborer was sent to the top floor of a building to guard it against fire. His job was easy - to throw away through windows the tiny American firebombs or at least to isolate them.
And he did nothing, sometimes correcting the placement of the bombs which penetrated the roof so they worked better.
In the end the plant burned to the ground, in part thanks to people who did nothing.

In the last year of the war a transport of high precision lathes arrived to the Gusen concentration camp as part of the new weapons production lines. They were so valuable only the most trusted capos and their friends were sent to unload and transport them from the station to the underground tunnels.
One of those men, a common criminal from Warsaw, was friends with one of those capos but not with the Germans. So every part of those lathes that could be removed/dismantled easily he threw away into nearby bushes.

The point is you don't need to blow stuff sky high, go over the hill en masse, or organize a mutiny to create a major disaster or at least impede the war effort.
Frequently a small effort is sufficient, or simply doing nothing. Especially in the army, where running with guns towards enemy is a minor distraction among construction, transport, guard, observation, patrol and whatever else duties. People who do them sloppily, don't care at all, sabotage them even in some tiny, insignificant manner are dangerous. Especially if there is a quarter of a million of them.

A Pole in the German Army had nowhere to go, except to the other side, through the no man's land, a risky proposition.
Those Sudeten soldiers would be fighting on their own soil, they could have defected to the Wehrmacht or the their own homes, organize partizant/sabotage units. Their people/friends were everywhere.
And really there is no need for a mass resistance - a single man with access to the plans of a defensive line would be able to do incalculable damage.

[wm]

It should be different -

Clearly it was. At the beginning of 1938 Czechoslovacs believed they had the support of France anf the Small Entente behind them in a conflict with Germany (with the Soviey Union having a more shadowy role).

That Entente was against Hungary if I'm not mistaken.
According to the contemporary diplomatic documents published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, at the beginning of 1938 the Polish diplomats in France/UK and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were quite sure that France was not going to support Czechoslovakia militarily.
And as the year developed the opinion was confirmed by new documents/reports/analyses.
They knew so the Czechoslovak leaders should have known too, unless they deceived themselves and their countrymen.

Despite this, Czech public opinion was to my limited knowledge overwhelmingly in favour of war. It was the government that took a deeply unpopular but pragmatic decision, probably the correct one, not to fight.

I would rather guess the elites of Prague supported a war, maybye inconsistently, and the opinion of the lower strata of the society are unknown - as nobody asked them.

The Polish example then rammed home the lesson that a country in their part of the world, fighting in the ranks of the alliance, invited catastrophy on an unimaginable scale.

The idea it was a catastrophe is straight from Feldzug in Polen the movie, shown abroad for propaganda value - look on the mighty Wehrmacht and despair. And later incessantly reinforced by the communist propaganda.

It was known Poland would be conquered quickly. I've seen pre-war estimations in the American press that gave Poland four weeks no more.
Rydz-Śmigły in his instructions to the negotiators with the French General Staff wrote that Poland would be knocked out of the war before the Allies would be able to do anything. In his post war analysis he didn't blame the Allies - they weren't ready he wrote, and didn't expect the war so early.

Poland couldn't defend itself against its enemies, only scare them away by the price to be paid. The catastrophe was nothing but just a battle, and the results were expected. The defeat was part of the plan.
The Polish Army was rebuilt in France almost immediately. Rydz-Śmigły returned as a common soldier to the occupied Poland - to fight.
As I said France's surrender was more of a shock than the 1939 defeat of Poland.

The Czechs weren't sulking (and I do wish people wouldn't casually insult whole nations like this), they were simply refusing to be persuaded to commit suicide for no discernible purpose that would benefit Czechoslovakia (or anyone else for that matter).

Well this is a hypothetical situation, hypothetical development, hypothetical Czechs - we don't know really it is true or, just another post war revision of history for political reasons.

Certainly, people shouldn't die pointlessly, but showing weakness, inconsistent behaviour, relying totally on the others invites aggression.
Even a limited military resistance has its uses. Waging war on a weaker opponent is still costly and not only because of the price sticker.
We really don't know what would have happened if Czechoslovakia had resisted - even symbolically.

The Lidice reprisal, proudly admitted by the Nazis themselves was a self inflicted propaganda defeat of almost Stalingrad proportions. Lots of people who didn't care or know what the war was about got really pissed off (remember Pearl Harbor and Lidice, on the ashes of Berlin we shall build a new Lidice). The Czechoslovak Government in London was showered with concessions, earlier they were happy if a government official even cared to admit their existence.

[gebhk]

That Entente was against Hungary if I'm not mistaken.

imitially to prevent resurgence of Hungary and the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy. However it quickly broadened its scope and the alliance was designed to protect member states from any foreign aggression. It was, it would appear, its inability to come up with a joint approach to the German threat which led to its eventual demise in 1938, though cracks appeared earlier with regard to the questionh of managi8ng the Sovier threat. Thus there are some parallels between the Little Entente and the French-Polish alliance.

and the opinion of the lower strata of the society are unknown - as nobody asked them.

Pretty much the same can be said of any other society till recent times and this of course includes pre-war Poland - hence on your argument there is no reason to imagine Poland was willing to fight in 1939 any more than Czechoslovakia in 1938.

The idea it was a catastrophe is straight from Feldzug in Polen the movie,

Seriously? I don't think I even need to answer this one.... apart from that do you really think that the fact that Poland was destroyed in 5 weeks as opposed to the predicted four, would be a strong motivator for the Czechs to take up arms in the allied cause?

Well this is a hypothetical situation, hypothetical development, hypothetical Czechs

The situation of Czechoslovakia was very real to the Czechs, the assassination of Heydrich a very real development and the Czechs too were very real. It is you not I who is hypothesizing that the attitudesof those Czechs necessarily reflect the attitudes of Chechoslovaks in 1938.

We really don't know what would have happened if Czechoslovakia had resisted - even symbolically

Given what happened to Poland, I (and I suspect most people) can hazard a guess fairly confidently.

The Czechoslovak Government in London was showered with concessions, earlier they were happy if a government official even cared to admit their existence.

And this of course led to the establishment of an independent democratic Czechoslovakia after tha war? On sorry, no, it would appear not. I apologise for the flippant tone, but it is difficult to respond otherwise. Apart from the Czechoslovac government in London being showered with concessioins (of what?), what exactly did Czechoslovakia substantially gain from Lidice?

[wm]

imitially to prevent resurgence of Hungary and the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy. However it quickly broadened its scope and the alliance was designed to protect member states from any foreign aggression. It was, it would appear, its inability to come up with a joint approach to the German threat which led to its eventual demise in 1938, though cracks appeared earlier with regard to the questionh of managi8ng the Sovier threat. Thus there are some parallels between the Little Entente and the French-Polish alliance.

It doesn't matter because of the frequently changing governments, instability and inconsistency in policies, and sometimes total fools as Foreign Ministers it was useless anyway.

Pretty much the same can be said of any other society till recent times and this of course includes pre-war Poland - hence on your argument there is no reason to imagine Poland was willing to fight in 1939 any more than Czechoslovakia in 1938.

Exactly, although the Polish elites were willing to fight, the fact they were largely wiped out during the WW2 proves that.

The idea it was a catastrophe is straight from Feldzug in Polen the movie,

Seriously? I don't think I even need to answer this one.... apart from that do you really think that the fact that Poland was destroyed in 5 weeks as opposed to the predicted four, would be a strong motivator for the Czechs to take up arms in the allied cause?

Well, the prediction was known to few people, it wasn't something the press was writing about. They probably knew the German predictions that it would be a quick and easy operation, nothing more.
It was just a war anyway. The Spanish Civil War was widely reported in the media - it was brutal enough, the Mussolini's wars, China. They knew war is hell - many of them fought in the WW1.

Really, this proves the Polish leaders were right. Small countries like Poland couldn't hide behind their money, battleships, strategic bombers or Maginot Lines. They didn't have them. Their only defense was their determination. Poland wasn't any different from Switzerland in that regard. The defense was their willingness to inflict maximum damage on a aggressor disregarding their own casualties, making itself unpalatable.
If the Czechs weren't ready to die for themselves they weren't ready to die for Poland too - so Poland didn't need them, especially that their territory didn't shelter the Polish borders (only Slovakia did), and their exposed frontiers made them liability.

what exactly did Czechoslovakia substantially gain from Lidice?

The Munich Agreement was revoked. It was still in force, and regarded as an adequate solution to the problem. And as a bonus they were given the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.

[gebhk]

It doesn't matter because of the frequently changing governments, instability and inconsistency in policies, and sometimes total fools as Foreign Ministers it was useless anyway.

Actually it was jolly effective at preventing Habsburg re-emergence. In any case makes no difference to the fact that broadly at the beginning of 1938 they were supporting Czechoslovakia.

the Polish elites were willing to fight, the fact they were largely wiped out during the WW2 proves that.

Sorry, but all that this fact proves is that the Germans felt the need to wipe them out. Much the same as they did the Jews. Since more of the Jewish elites were wiped out than the Polish does that prove the Jewish elites were more willing to fight?

The Munich Agreement was revoked. It was still in force, and regarded as an adequate solution to the problem. And as a bonus they were given the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.

Nothing to do with the Soviet policy of moving German borders further West and away from the Soviet heartland then?

If the Czechs weren't ready to die for themselves they weren't ready to die for Poland too - so Poland didn't need them, especially that their territory didn't shelter the Polish borders (only Slovakia did), and their exposed frontiers made them liability.

The Czechs were willing to die for themselves, however their government was not willing to let them die needlessly when there was no perceivable benefit. History rather proved them right. Czechoslovakia did shelter the Polish southern border - in fact the strategically most vital one - a simple perusal of a map demonstrates that very clearly. There is absolutely no question that Poland needed that border protecting. The excessive exposure of the Czech part, while in any case of limited relevance to the question of protecting Poland's southern flank was a product of Polish hostile neutrality in the North and the Anschluss in the South. Had the Allies been cohesive and firm in their respopnse to AH then neither of these would have been a factor. On the contrary, it would have been the German 'Bulge' that would have been at risk.

[wm]

the Polish elites were willing to fight, the fact they were largely wiped out during the WW2 proves that.

Sorry, but all that this fact proves is that the Germans felt the need to wipe them out. Much the same as they did the Jews. Since more of the Jewish elites were wiped out than the Polish does that prove the Jewish elites were more willing to fight?

No, the Jews were killed because they were Jews, the Poles because they were resisting in one form or another.
The Jews were innocent, the Poles elites were usually actually "guilty" of something. The early Auschwitz was full of the Poles caught trying to join the Polish Army in France. The AK was called by the Communists the lords' Army, not without a reason. The Warsaw Uprising was fought with the sons of the Warsaw elites.
And really the Jewish elites largely survived. The had the money, friends, knowledge, influence to survive - in Poland or by fleeing abroad. Someone even said brutally that the Jewish elites survived but the Jewish rabble perished, the Polish rabble survived but the elites perished. Of course it's a huge generalization.

The Munich Agreement was revoked. It was still in force, and regarded as an adequate solution to the problem. And as a bonus they were given the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.

Nothing to do with the Soviet policy of moving German borders further West and away from the Soviet heartland then?

No the made the decision themselves in 1943, and then implemented after the war. To do that they needed the territories where the Germans lived first.
The territories were geographically narrow, unlike the territories the Poles got, the Soviets didn't need such a pointless improvement.

If the Czechs weren't ready to die for themselves they weren't ready to die for Poland too - so Poland didn't need them, especially that their territory didn't shelter the Polish borders (only Slovakia did), and their exposed frontiers made them liability.

The Czechs were willing to die for themselves, however their government was not willing to let them die needlessly when there was no perceivable benefit. History rather proved them right.

Of course, you can't argue with results, even if a little random. If Hitler had stopped his expansion after March 1939, they would have been a colony of the thousand-year Third Reich for a long time, and certainly would have lost the Sudetenland for ever.

Additionally, if there was no perceivable benefit in fighting alone, there was no benefit in fighting a general European war alongside the Allies too. In both cases the destruction would be much greater than in our reality.

Czechoslovakia wasn't alone in that predicament, they were others countries facing identical dilemmas: Ethiopia, Albania, China.
During the battle of Shanghai the best Chinese divisions were thrown into battle to prove the Chinese were able to fight and weren't cowards. It was known they would be annihilated eventually, and the war would be lost. They did it solely to elicit support from the West - that would never come.
Etopia - the same story, another Czechoslovakia that fought.

Ethiopia, Albania, China fought as you say needlessly. They lost, and history proved them wrong.
Although the Chinese regard the battle for Shanghai as one of their finest hours.
The main reason Czechoslovakia is no more today is nobody cared to die for it, even less - Czechoslovaks didn't care for its existence - but China has survived. It seems nations are built on Shanghais.

Czechoslovakia did shelter the Polish southern border - in fact the strategically most vital one - a simple perusal of a map demonstrates that very clearly. There is absolutely no question that Poland needed that border protecting.

Czechoslovakia did, but as it was unwilling to die for Poland it didn't matter. Poland put its hopes in Slovakia and Hungary.

But anyway it looks that way only on a map without the relief of the terrain shown. There are quite nasty mountains along the border, and very few useful invasion routes - in fact it was the easiest to defend of all the Polish borders.

The excessive exposure of the Czech part, while in any case of limited relevance to the question of protecting Poland's southern flank was a product of Polish hostile neutrality in the North and the Anschluss in the South. Had the Allies been cohesive and firm in their respopnse to AH then neither of these would have been a factor. On the contrary, it would have been the German 'Bulge' that would have been at risk.

Of course, but the question is what's the point of being firm in a case of a border conflict, one of the many all around the world, in a far away country. To save some Germans from themselves?
At the same time the Chinese were fighting and dying by tens of thousands, and that certainly wasn't a border conflict.