Why Polish Air Force kept old parasol fighters up to 1939?

[durb]

By 1938 it must have apparent to Polish Air Force that their PZL P 11 an P 7 were outdated. They simply were not fit for successfull front line service in the case of war. If we think the potential enemies: 1) Soviet Union - Soviet main fighters I-16 types 5/10 and I-153 both clearly superior to PZL fighters - also SB 2 bombers were faster 2) Germany - Polish air specialists must have been aware of the development of Bf 109 and other modern equipment of Luftwaffe.

Still they decided to keep old PZL 11 and PZL 7 in active service. Even the export version PZL P 24 would have been better. The only "modernizing" effort was to equip some PZL P 11 with a new pair of machineguns. That can hardly be described as a great step toward improvement of Polish fighter forces.

At the same time Polish aircraft industry was able to produce a modern bomber PZL P 37 (Spanish Republicans would have gladly bought it had it not been the blockade of the so-called Non-involvement pact). I have read that they started a low-wing monoplane fighter project (PZL P 50) in 1938/1939 - but it was far too late then, there was no chance to develop prototype plane to something available for front line service before September 1939. I like PZL P 11 - nice lines for a parasol plane, but the truth is that it was a weak fighter plane by 1937.

Why did the Polish Air Force not opt for other more rapid "modernization" process? Like French they could have bought Curtiss Hawk 75 and if that was too expensive, there would have another modern American fighter North American NA-16-5 (NA-50, P-64) available at low price. Hurricanes might have been available to buy by spring 1939 from Britain, but my guess is that that option would have opened too late. French ordered those Hawk 75 precisely because they realised that they had to fill the gap between their old biplane/parasol planes and new modern home-built fighters like MS 406. To me it looks that Polish decision makers did not realise this.

Why did they not buy something like Hawk 75 in due time? Was it a question to keep Polish aircraft industry running with state support and ignoring the imminent possibility of the war at the same time?

[wm]

They expected a war in 1941/42, or more precisely assumed both the German Army and the Soviet Army would be capable to wage a full scale/European war by then. It really was more or less a correct assumption, Germany wasn't ready in 1939, and the USSR in 1941.

Till 1939 Poland hoped for an amicable settlement with Germany, but still its military budget was up to 40% of the GDP (because of 41/42), and that for many years. By percentage of gross domestic product Poland was one of the biggest military spenders in the world.

They expected that by 1941 the Polish planes would be mass-produced and available. This might have been a mistake but foreign planes weren't cheap, even the American ones. They really couldn't afford them (and many other nice weapons).
Anyway they eventually bought Hurricanes and Fairey Battles (thanks to a British loan) but they arrived too late.

Before March 1939 not that many expected an eminent war. Before that date Hitler's demands frequently were judged reasonable although maybe brutal in form. It was in 1939 when he really flip his lid.

[pugsville]

Hurricanes would not have been available, British would prioritize it's own rearmament. Aircraft from whatever source would have been hard to get, was the Curtis Hawk available? I doubt they would have been aircraft on inventory ready to deliver, and French deliveries would take precedence I would have thought, there would have been a lag between ordering and delivery. How much?

[durb]

Making the conclusions of the need of modernizing the fighter arm of Polish Air Force around 1936/1937 would have opened some alternatives. The North American N-16-A-5 (P-64) was put in market already in 1937 - it was a cheap modern alternative to ageing PZL P 11 - placing the order early enough could have brougth these planes to Poland before September 1939. I believe also that making orders for Hawk 75 in 1938 would have brought them to Poland.

The one option was of course to use PZL P 24 to fill the gap between outdated PZL P 11 and modern low-wing projects (PZL P 50 or appropriate adquision from abroad). PZL P 24 was a better plane than PZL 11 or PZL 7.

When it comes to PZL P 11, I think it was competitive up to 1936, when most fighters everywhere were still biplanes. PZL P 11 was better than He 51 or Ar 65/68 which at that time were main fighters of Luftwaffe. However, very many aviation specialists were by mid 1935 already convinced that low-wing monoplane was the future plane. The parasol airframe became outdated by 1937 by the appearance of new monoplane types. This I believe Polish decision makers failed to see and probably for budget reasons obliged Polish fighter pilots to fly in September 1939 planes which were suitable mainly for training purposes, not for combat. The success of PZL P 11 and P 7 fighters has been exaggerated by many Polish aviation historians. However, Polish historian Marius Emmerling has shot down the mythical numbers varying from 100 to 200 and shown, that PZL P 11 and P 7 were able to shoot only 40 - 45 Luftwaffe planes down during the September 1939.

[wm]

Making the conclusions of the need of modernizing the fighter arm of Polish Air Force around 1936/1937 would have opened some alternatives. The North American N-16-A-5 (P-64) was put in market already in 1937 - it was a cheap modern alternative to ageing PZL P 11 - placing the order early enough could have brougth these planes to Poland before September 1939. I believe also that making orders for Hawk 75 in 1938 would have brought them to Poland.

It would be better in 1939. but in 1941/42? The H-hour wasn't known beforehand. And the Hurricanes and Fairey Battles were bought with other people's money, from close allies, the US wouldn't be so accommodating.

The Poles knew perfectly well about the newest Soviet and Germans planes, it wasn't a secret.
But they planned to skip a stage of aircraft development and go for the next generation - so the slightly better PZL P.24s , PZL.43s were all exported.
Economically, Poland was 5 times weaker than Germany, and maybe 6 times than the USSR. They had to make shortcuts. They couldn't afford to replace their planes every few years just because of the fast pace of aircraft development at that time.

And the plan wasn't to win, it was know a defeat was inevitable, but to embroil an aggressor in a wider European/World war, and then to pick up the pieces.

In the end Poland was attacked by both Germany and the USSR simultaneously. A few modern planes would make no difference in the outcome.


Below the next gen. planes:

[gebhk]

Why did the Polish Air Force not opt for other more rapid "modernization" process?

Crudely put, for the same reason every nation (except perhaps III Reich) under the sun still retained biplanes in the fighter role in 1939, of similar or worse performance than the P11, in most cases exclusively: money and time. For exactly the same reason most of us do not drive the car or live in the house we would ideally like to- we can't afford it and don't have the time and resources to build one for ourselves. The choice for Poland in 1939 was not P11s or Spitfires it was P11s or nothing.

Like French they could have bought Curtiss Hawk 75 Was it a question to keep Polish aircraft industry running with state support and ignoring the imminent possibility of the war at the same time?

Perfectly aware of the inadequacy of their existing equipment and the new urgency from March 1939 of the need to correct this, Polish authorities commenced intensive efforts to purchase suitable fighter planes abroad in the Spring of 1939. Three other US fighters were offered as well as the Curtiss Hawk 75 which interested the Poles most. All four were rejected on price, delivery times (deliveries of the Hawk could start at the earliest in Feb 1940) and the lack of suitable fuel in Poland. In the event 120 French M406 were purchased - the first 20 en route to Poland in September 1939. Britain parted with 14 Hurricanes, hinting at a possible further delivery in the Autumn. The British would not contemplate releasing Spitfires to Poland beyond one trial example. The 14 Hurricanes and one Spit were also en route to Poland when the war commenced. Neither of these purchases was possible earlier because they were contingent on credit allocations which were made in the summer of 1939.

Even the export version PZL P 24 would have been better

Not enough to make a difference. On the other hand the vast expense of re-equipping the air force with these machines would have, of necessity because the money would have been spent, delayed re-equipment with modern machines even further.

Please dont be offended, but you seen to not grasp some simple realities. Armaments are renewed, of necessity, in cycles. How frequently this can be done depends on a number of interrelated factors, but broadly it will occur at the point at which the benefits of the new equipment outweigh the disadvantages of a change (capital cost, re-training, stock-adjustments, units taken out of readiness while the re-armament process takes place etc). The frequency with which these cycles can be repeated depends predominantly on financial resources. To put it in context, the budget of the Luftwaffe alone was significantly larger than the budget of the entire Polish armed forces. Yet you seem to be criticising a country with a comparatively miniscule budget for not achieving what no other comparative country in the world and the vast majority with budgets significantly greater than the Polish one also could not.

Another important factor is the ability of native industry to produce state of the art equipment. Countries such as France, Britain and Germany had well established industries with centuries of expertise behind them. Poland's native industry was at best 18 years old. Thanks, among other things, to being fortunate in possessing some talented designers, Poland could produce some excellent airframes but where were the high powered and especially inline engines for modern fighters to come from? No one was selling in 1939 because everyone who had them needed them for themselves.

Each army aims to have the end of the cycle correspond with the outbreak of the war - and that is a guess. When the earlier estimates of 1940-41 were suddenly drastically shortened in March 1939, the time was simply insufficient to make good the deficits - as the efforts to purchase aircraft abroad demonstrated.

[gebhk]

I think it was competitive up to 1936, when most fighters everywhere were still biplanes

Most fighters everywhere were still biplanes in 1939 too.

However, Polish historian Marius Emmerling has shot down the mythical numbers varying from 100 to 200

I am pretty sure ME is a German historian, and from my limited exposure to what I could verify in his work he simply replaces old myths with new ones (and some right old humdingers among them I'm afraid!). His methodology seems to be flawed in exactly the same way as that of his Polish predecessors whom he criticises, by relying almost exclusively on uncorroborated accounts of German airmen as opposed to Polish ones. The truth probably lies in the middle and until someone does a proper job of collating Polish and German histories, will remain there. However this seems a bit of a red herring as far as the subject of the discussion is concerned. I don't think anyone doubts that a P11 was inferior to the Me BF109, doubted it then or does not/did not think it needed replacing. The problem was that it was not as easy as you seem to think.

The North American N-16-A-5 (P-64) was put in market already in 1937 - it was a cheap modern alternative to ageing PZL P 11 - placing the order early enough could have brougth these planes to Poland before September 1939. I believe also that making orders for Hawk 75 in 1938 would have brought them to Poland.

This presupposes the Polish decision-makers had a glass ball that told them the war would commence on September 1st 1939. It would also have saddled them with airplanes they would have had to import fuel and replacement parts for at unaffordable expense, a flow which would in all probability have been cut off in times of war when it was essential to being able to fight.

[durb]

"This presupposes the Polish decision-makers had a glass ball that told them the war would commence on September 1st 1939."

Well, Finnish politician V. Tanner did put it this way on 8.9.1939: "No one had made arrengements in his or her life according taking in account that war will start on 1.9.1939".

Taking in account the outdated and limited equipment of Polish Air Force as well as Polish Armed Forces, one can ask if they were too stubborn in summer of 1939. It is known that Hitler had decided to invade Poland to get "glorious" war, but maybe time-winning compromises on Danzig question/Polish corridor question could have been reached. This could have given some more time to arm Polish Army better and prepare better against unavoidable invasion in neartime future. The Polish foreign policy would have needed better equipped Polish Air Force and Army to support its line in Danzig/Corridor question. I think that Polish overestimated their military resources. They were not the only ones to do that - also Chamberlain considered Poland to be more strong military power than Soviet Union! Maybe the legacy of 1920 Polish-Russian war...

The reasons why the Polish Air Force had to fight with obsolete stuff have been outlined quite well in the defense budget framework of relatively undeveloped country. I do not argue on that. Explains it pretty well, I guess.

[wm]

Never in their history the Poles were as united and determined as in 1939. Never had such powerful allies. A compromise would destroy that unity, and the country could have plunged into political chaos. A year later the allies could have changed their minds. The future had nothing better to offer.
The fates of Austria/Czechoslovakia showed that compromises were not working.
And it wasn't a Polish mistake but Hitler's, he lost his war eventually.

Another important factor is the ability of native industry to produce state of the art equipment. Countries such as France, Britain and Germany had well established industries with centuries of expertise behind them. Poland's native industry was at best 18 years old.

To be quite correct the Polish industry was as old and established as its neighbours'. The owners were simply citizens of Russia, Germany,Austria-Hungary - after 1918 they became Polish citizens.
The Polish leaders, businessmen, designers, generals were them too before 1918, but they were working/fighting for the three respective partition powers. There was no lack of talented, well educated people, the Polish middle class at that time - landed gentry had the resources to enroll their children in the best European universities.

[phylo_roadking]

It's also worth remembering that the Polish Air Force didn't really intend to get involved in a prolonged air campign - as WM notes the nation's intention was to get any aggressor embroiled in a Europe-wide war...and to this end, if faced with superior numbers and aircraft (which meant the nations on either flank, really!) the plan was to retreat by stages and camoflaged airfields, and eventually into Rumania and if possible continue the fight from there, with the British and French supplying them there...

Unfortunately the Rumanians thought different and confiscated themselves a nice medium bomber force courtesy of the Poles!


The "First Polish Spitfire" is quite a celebrated....and well-travelled!...aircraft Among other things - it never got to Poland!

But it did arrive elsewhere...

http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/17864-n ... ntry206413

[durb]

[quote="phylo_roadking"]It's also worth remembering that the Polish Air Force didn't really intend to get involved in a prolonged air campign - as WM notes the nation's intention was to get any aggressor embroiled in a Europe-wide war"

The latter was achieved, but it did not save Poland. Allies were far away, not yet mobilised and cautious in their actions (good example the infamous Saar offensive of the French).

"...and to this end, if faced with superior numbers and aircraft (which meant the nations on either flank, really!) the plan was to retreat by stages and camoflaged airfields.. "

The retreat process by stages and rough reserve fields was taken - one of the rare good points on PZL P 11 to my knowlegde is that it could land and take off on short runways of primitive airfields. How flexible mobility of groundcrews of Polish air units was? - was the retreat process well planned already before 1.9.1939?

It is afterwards easy to say that PZL P 24 should have been taken in service to replace older PZL P 7 and 11, if nothing better was available at short term. Maybe PZL P 24 was not much a improvement vs. Bf 109/110, but there were some substantial gains like 30 kph of more speed, which in air battle has some importance - it gives better chances to catch enemy bombers and little better chances of survival in fighter vs. fighter situations. Important option was also better armament (2 mg + 2 cannons or 4 mg). Compare this to 2 x 7,7 mg armament of the most PZL P 11 in September 1939.

The more effective armament of PZL P 24 would have brought more German bombers down and meant somewhat less bombs falling over Polish soldiers and civilians.

[phylo_roadking]

The retreat process by stages and rough reserve fields was taken - one of the rare good points on PZL P 11 to my knowlegde is that it could land and take off on short runways of primitive airfields. How flexible mobility of groundcrews of Polish air units was? - was the retreat process well planned already before 1.9.1939?

Somewhere buried away I've got a magazine article on this; apparently it was, with strips identified and readied, and maps marked up. It's not a strategy that could be extemporised overnight, fuel etc. would have to be prepositioned.

[wm]

The retreat was planned, although poorly. Poland lacked not only modern planes, and the time to purchase them, but also the time to prepare a plan of defense properly, not to mention war-game it.
The pre-1939 planning was haphazard and sketchy - and as the war really was out of the blue, the real planning started very late, in March 1939.

It has to be said the embroiling was a political aim. The army itself intended to fight as long as possible, and to delay the inevitable defeat as long as possible (an informal estimation was three months, certainly not a prolong campaign), tying up significant German forces, making the Allies' offensive easier.
But as no one likes to die pointlessly in an obsolete equipment, PZL P.24 or something better certainly would be useful.

They had truly spurious weapons, like the large destroyers, large submarines, and the quite modern medium bomber PZL.37 Łoś.
In fact it seems, the easiest and cheapest way was to forget the medium bombers (all 120 of them), and concentrate the resources on defensive weapons like PZL P.24.

[steverodgers801]

There are different factors in equipping. Who is the enemy, what kind of opponent(s) are there, ho competent is the civilian and the military leadership. What kind of industry does the country have and what means to purchase foreign equipment. While Germany was a threat before Hitler, its army meant the Poles did not have to worry much, the real threat were the Soviets. Poland did not have the industry nor the financial means to quickly modernize its army. Im not sure how modern thinking the Polish command was. Remember as far as the airforce, even the West had leaders who believed until midwar that the bomber could always get through so there was not as much urgency for fighters.

[Sid Guttridge]

On a technical point, the Poles did not keep "parasol" fighters. They had high, gull-wing fighters.

What is more, these were arguably the best fighters anywhere in the early 1930s and retained some potency in the air even against the Luftwaffe in 1939. (If I remember rightly, German and Polish losses in the air were pretty even in 1939. There were just far fewer Polish machines than German.)

The Romanians evolved the PZL24 into the perfectly adequate, low-wing monoplane IAR80 fighter, but the Poles preferred to develop an entirely new design with greatewr developmental possibilities. As a result, they were caught with the new design at the prototype stage and had to fight with the PZL11 and PZL7.

The real problem, which effected all the minor powers, was that although they might develop a competitive low-wing, monoplane fighter prototype (like the Poles, Romanians, Czechs and Yugoslavs) their industry was not developed enough to get the type into widespread squadron service fast enough to keep it competitive.

Cheers,

Sid