Poland came close to making a concession over Danzig

[Steve]

Another writer Professor Anita Prazmowska in a book published in 1987 - Britain, Poland and the eastern front, 1939 - mentions the meeting between Lubienski and Moltke. Her source is an article by Lubienski, “Ostatnie negocjacje w sprawie Gdanska . Wyjatki z pamietnika, Dziennik Polski I Dziennik Zolnierza, 3 December 1953. Which is the same source Cienciala used. We now have two professors of history who take Lubienski seriously.

Prazmowska gives some more information. Beck told Lubienski to work on a compromise that would guarantee Polish rights in Danzig and give the Germans something. Beck’s instructions were given after he discussed the matter with Smigly-Rydz and the President. The previously mentioned proposals were put to Moltke informally. Two days later after another meeting of the Polish leadership Beck told Lubienski to abandon the proposals. Beck supposedly said that it had been decided to treat the German demands as a bluff.

I do not think that Lubienski’s contact with Moltke can be characterised as a diplomatic initiative it was perhaps just a talk over a cup of coffee. It was not much of a snub to Ribbentrop as Beck was proposing to accept half of Hitler’s proposals the “Korperschaft” bit.

Beck apparently saw his meeting with Hitler as the “decisive moment” (Szembek Journal) in Polish German relations. If the meeting with Hitler was regarded as unimportant why immediately on his return was a meeting called attended by Smigly-Rydz together with the President and Premier? The decision to maintain the status quo over Danzig and the corridor and make no concessions was a major policy decision. No matter how skilled a negotiator Beck was he could now offer Hitler nothing of importance. True neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop gave the impression that the problem needed solving quickly but it was now at the forefront of Polish German relations.

Beck did not just inform Polish diplomats that everything was fine in German Polish relations he told the British and French ambassadors in Warsaw the same. On the German side they were saying that Polish German relations remain unchanged. It seems that no one wanted a crisis. Hitler thought the Poles would eventually give way to pressure and the Poles wanted to avoid a break with Germany.

I think we have a slight misunderstanding here. I am not saying the Polish government offered any important concessions prior to Hitler meeting Beck in January and I am not saying they offered any later. All that seems to have happened is that for a day or two they considered it.

At the end of the day you have to decide whether Count Lubienski was the sort of man who after the war would make such a story up. Interestingly a book came out recently claiming that in 1938 Lubienski was caught in a honey trap by a British MI6 agent named Betty Pack. It is claimed that she obtained information from the Count about Polish efforts to crack the enigma code. Just type in Betty Pack MI6 and quite a lot comes up.

[henryk]

This topic is becoming a repeat of the discussions in;
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... s#p1424921
Example:

http://www.pogonowski.com/display.php?textid=1096
Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski

The defensive doctrine of Poland, was applied in earnest starting on January 26, 1939 when German minister von Ribbentrop was told in Warsaw that Poland will not join the pact against Russia. Poles followed the advice of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who wrote in his last will and testament, that in order to preserve not only the independence of Poland, but in fact Poland’s very existence, the government of Poland had “to veer between Germany and Russia as long as possible and then bring the rest of the world into the conflict, rather than subordinating Poland to either one of its two neighbors.” The choice of the verb “to veer” indicated that Piłsudski was fully aware of the reality, that Poland formed a barrier between two main protagonists and most powerful contenders on the European continent: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union.

Poles, threatened by Hitler with complete eradication of the Polish state in the historic Polish lands, knew that Stalin threatened Poland with terror and enslavement. However, Nazi Germany then was the worse of the two evils. Poles made a rational decision and refused to help Germany to defeat Russia. Poland’s refusal to attack Russia saved the Soviet Union from destruction. The Russians so far do not want to admit this fact and they revive the cult of Stalin.
Hitler’s plan to create “Greater Germany” populated by “racial Germans from the River Rhine to the Dnepr River in the Ukraine,” was known to marshal Piłsudski, who understood that Hitler planned eventual eviction and mass murder of Poles and Ukrainians in their historical lands. Earlier, on March 3, 1918, in Brest Litovsk, a town occupied by Germans, Lenin’s government signed a humiliating capitulation, which yielded to German dictate and agreed to make Russia a vassal state of Germany. Berlin planned to treat Russia like Britain treated India and make a colonial empire ruled by Germany from the Rhine River to Vladivostok. In 1939 the territory of Poland blocked Germany from the direct access to the Ukraine and to Russia.

Already on August 5, 1935 Hitler started pressing the government of Poland to sign a pact with Germany against Russia. This is described in detail, by Józef Lipski, the ambassador of Poland to Germany, during the years 1933-39. Stalin’s government was aware of Hitler’s plans and of the pact between Germany and Japan against Russia signed in 1936. Stalin feared a two front war, Japanese attack from the east and German attack from the west. When Poland refused to join Germany on January 26, 1939 Stalin thought that he had a chance to entangle Germany in a long lasting war on the western front, as had happened during WWI.
Thus, Poland’s decision to defend itself ruined Hitler’s “best case scenario” and his plans to defeat Stalin in a two-front war against Russia. Instead Stalin managed to entangle the Germans in a two-front war. The “great game” consisted of competition between Hitler and Stalin who defeats whom in a two-front war by means of attacks from the east and from the west.

Hitler furious with the Poles for ruining his best-case scenario, ordered his generals on August 22, 1939 to use utmost ferocity against all ethnic Poles and as an act of vengeance to complete carefully planed destruction of Warsaw. The site of the Polish capital was to become a German provincial administrative town.

In 1939 Friedrich Pabst was nominated by Hitler as the chief architect of the New Warsaw for which he produced on February 6, 1940 a complete plan, drawn up with help of the nazi architects Hubert Gross and Otto Nurnberger. Detailed plans were made to destroy systematically all the buildings of Warsaw including all archives, museums, and monuments, while the armament industry and railroad facilities were to be enlarged. Detailed plans were made including the replacement of the Royal Castle with a Parteivolkshalle and the Column of King Sigismund with a huge statue called Niederwald Germania or Nieredwalddenkmal. Piłsudski square was renamed Adolf Hitler Platz.

[wm]

At the end of the day you have to decide whether Count Lubienski was the sort of man who after the war would make such a story up. Interestingly a book came out recently claiming that in 1938 Lubienski was caught in a honey trap by a British MI6 agent named Betty Pack. It is claimed that she obtained information from the Count about Polish efforts to crack the enigma code. Just type in Betty Pack MI6 and quite a lot comes up.

Unfortunately I'm with this man:

Stephenson's story is disputed by historian Richard Woytak, who describes it as one of several examples of disinformation, by best-seller authors and others, concerning how the results of Polish cryptologic work on Enigma reached the western Allies.

Lubieński wouldn't be able to say anything intelligible on Enigma even if he badly wanted. For this technical knowledge was required and he didn't have any. He was a lawyer.
The information that the Poles had some success with Enigma wasn't even worth while. Enigma was sold commercially, its basic principle of operation had been known for centuries. Anybody could buy himself an Enigma and try his luck. The Poles had some luck, but actually didn't decode anything politically useful. This was beyond their capabilities.

Beck’s instructions were given after he discussed the matter with Smigly-Rydz and the President. The previously mentioned proposals were put to Moltke informally.

I believe it was inappropriate, such a proposal should have been sent directly to Hitler, or better discussed directly. He declared on every occasion his friendship and good will. Hitler wanted Danzig, the highway, Poland in the Anti-Comintern Pact. As the alleged proposal was much less it would require a direct discussion, not just sending through intermediary to be not seen as offensive.
And as we know Hitler had a short fuse, he got offended easily.

That "a talk over a cup of coffee" is a well known diplomatic tool, Beck himself directed his diplomats to say something unofficially, as innocently and accidentally as possible.
But Moltke was a professional, he would notice and report the cup of coffee. Ribbentrop would be overjoyed, as it would mean the Poles blinked first. He would put that information to good use later. But he didn't.

If the meeting with Hitler was regarded as unimportant why immediately on his return was a meeting called attended by Smigly-Rydz together with the President and Premier?

Well, Beck had been playing his games for two months and nobody noticed anything. It was the king-of-the-hill syndrome, diplomacy was his domain, and the others were excluded (and really weren't his friends, they belonged to hostile fractions). But after the meeting with Hitler everybody noticed, the meeting was something unusual. He had to tell the others, especially that he knew more by then.
But still if this was such a decisive moment why no military planning wasn't ordered, after all such planning required several months to complete. They knew that but did nothing. When they did it in March it was too late, and they ran out of time. This was one of the main reasons for the quick defeat by the way.

I think we have a slight misunderstanding here. I am not saying the Polish government offered any important concessions prior to Hitler meeting Beck in January and I am not saying they offered any later. All that seems to have happened is that for a day or two they considered it.

The problem with this is, I'm quite sure Beck had been considering that, thinking about it for two months already. The others weren't his equals they were diplomatic noobs. The knew what he told them, so really it was his decision, and he usually didn't behave such erratically.

According to Beck's biographer Terlecki the meeting at the royal castle was on 7 January. The he cites Lubieński, that Beck was angry at the Germans and started thinking about the French/British option, then he goes directly to 10 January when Szembek wrote in his diary:

He explained everything to me in detail. [...]
The Minister further told me that the problem of Gdansk is indeed very difficult, and it should be deeply thought over. There are two solutions: either we leave things as they are, or we look for opportunities to compromise. The first solution doesn't seem to be adequate, because in the Chancellor's mind may arise impression that he offered to us beneficial and far-reaching proposals, which we have rejected. This would lead to further discord. The Minister does not believe that Ribbentrop's visit to Warsaw could bring something specific on the Gdansk problem. In any case it is reasonable not to break contacts and threads of understanding.

So Beck said nothing about the two days. He said nothing about his earlier alleged concessions. He said he would think about them later.
Terlecki didn't mention them too. He would, he believed Beck was a failure. This would prove his point.

I don't say Lubieński is a liar. But his story doesn't fit anywhere. It is obvious that Beck was thinking about concessions, solutions all the time. But it simply wasn't doable for free.
People frequently misremember (google: science tells us not to rely on eyewitness accounts) or even embellish things, like all the Nazi generals in their post-war memoirs. Even Churchill's Nobel-winning memoirs aren't accurate.

[Steve]

Actually in the 1930s the Poles were very advanced in deciphering Enigma. In 1931 and 1932 French intelligence gave them German operating manuals and documents for Enigma. In 1933 they were reading Enigma traffic and continued reading it until December 1938. In January 38 they were reading 75% of traffic.

I confess to having trouble understanding what Mr Pogonowski is trying to say.

Hitler to my knowledge never asked Japan to invade the Soviet Union together with Germany. He never informed them that he was going to invade though he seems to have dropped hints. The Anti - Comintern Pact was not an agreement to attack the Soviet Union though obviously aimed against it.

Hitler was saying in early 1938 that because of fear of the Soviet Union Poland could become a German ally. He did suggest to the Poles that they join an attack on the Soviet Union. However, when deciding to attack Poland there is it seems no evidence that he was ever bothered about losing a potential ally in attacking the Soviet Union. How exactly Stalin entangled Germany in a war in the West and then in a two front war perhaps someone could explain.

[wm]

He says some authors troll for attention by inventing things or improving reality

The Poles were reading the low security Enigma traffic, from the "lesser" Enigmas used by police and security forces. The "real" Enigmas were beyond their reach. Shortly before the war the Germans improved their hardware and all traffic became unreadable for good.

I really don't deny that the Poles thought about concessions because it would be stupid if they didn't. I don't deny Lubienski slept with Betty Pack because really why he shouldn't, she was a beautiful woman. Polish leaders were known for their beautiful wives anyway (usually a second or third), the president's wife was almost 30 years younger than her husband.
The question which Lubienski Betty Pack used for his purpose, because Beck employed two. A the younger (Ludwik Lubienski) was much more attractive and worthy to be used, even if he didn't know anything about Enigma. And he was an aristocrat too.

[Steve]

Wm is underestimating his countrymen and in particular a Marian Rejewski. The French had an agent in the cipher branch of the German Army and were receiving documents on Enigma which they passed on but even so it was an amazing feat.

Let me quote from the official British Government publication on British Intelligence in WW2. The quote refers to the work carried out by Polish mathematicians who in late 32 or early 33 cracked Enigma. “Initially only Army traffic was decrypted regularly since after 1934, when the Navy and Air Force began to use the same plug board version of the machine as the Army, there were too few Navy and Air Force messages to make regular reading possible”. Polish reading of Enigma traffic ended December 15 1938 when the Germans further complicated Enigma.

I haven’t got a clue whether the book on Betty Pack is accurate or not but I would not expect MI6 to target the wrong Lubienski. However, we are referring to an organisation that in the 1940s didn’t believe that upper class Britons could be Soviet agents.

According to Wikipedia the father of actress Rula Lenska was Count Ludwik Lubienski who it describes as the personal secretary to Beck. The meaning of Chef de Cabinet translates as principal private secretary or chief secretary or head of staff. So, did Beck have one secretary named Count Michael Lubienski and one named Count Ludwik Lubienski or has Wikipedia got it wrong? Count Ludwik Lubienski was apparently an adjutant to Sikorski.

[steverodgers801]

Hitler made sure that there was no way Germany could receive any notes accepting German demands. He did not want some damn fool interfering with his war this time

[wm]

The quote refers to the work carried out by Polish mathematicians who in late 32 or early 33 cracked Enigma. “Initially only Army traffic was decrypted regularly since after 1934, when the Navy and Air Force began to use the same plug board version of the machine as the Army, there were too few Navy and Air Force messages to make regular reading possible”. Polish reading of Enigma traffic ended December 15 1938 when the Germans further complicated Enigma.

Exactly, I meant the time when Miss Betty supposedly operated, when only the police was decrypted and then even that stopped.
The Germans modified their Enigmas (by adding more randomness to them) according the their own timetable as they were fully aware that advances in mathematics and technology were making description easier.
It can't be denied the Poles were able to get ahead of their timetable. But all the information very gained weren't useful because both countries were at peace. When it really mattered, in 1938, 1939 nothing was available.

Lubienskis were easy to confuse. The older was doing serious diplomatic work, the younger mostly sharpen pencils.

Below count Michał Łubieński, Miss Betty should have chose him, he was only 26 years old, wifeless, and danced like a star

count Ludwik Łubieński

and another; Aleskander Łubieński (first from the right), the Chief of Protocol - certainly a landowner, maybe an aristocrat too

Lubienskis' coat of arm:

349px-Herb_Pomian.svg.png (100.39 KiB) Viewed 1444 times

[Steve]

The French arranged a meeting between the British and the Poles to discuss Enigma in Paris early January 1939. The Polish representatives said very little as they had not been given permission to say how far their work had come on. Another meeting was held July in Warsaw at this meeting the Poles described their success the methods used and promised to supply the British an Enigma replica machine. The British agreed to supply information about the effect on Enigma of different wheel order and provide certain intercepts.
From British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol.3

The British were working on Enigma in 1938 but it seems they did not know about the Polish work which was ahead of theirs. If and I say it again if in 1938 Betty gave them information about how far the Poles had come clearly they would have been very interested. Whether the Poles from late 1938 were reading only Police intercepts or whatever is beside the point they were on the road to cracking maybe the biggest secret of the German armed forces. As Chairman Mao said a journey of a thousand miles begins with a step.

Nice photo of the Count is that Betty with him? It does seem rather unlikely that most of the male Lubienski family was working for Beck in his office. That Michael Lubienski was important and no pen pusher is shown by him flying to Germany to try and meet Goring. Of course this could be another delusion by a sick man. Jan Gawronski who apparently claimed to have travelled to Berlin in May 39 to try and restart a dialogue could also have been a sick delusional man, anything is possible.

Once the Poles adopted a policy of no concessions in January there was only one way for relations with Hitler to go. Eventually he would probably have decided to settle the matter by force but the British statement of March 31 caused him to go off the deep end. Hitler’s estimate of how long it would take to defeat Poland was amazingly accurate.

[steverodgers801]

Steve, STalin was convinced by the lack of effort of the west to reach an agreement to defend Poland that they weretrying to get Stalin and Hiter to fight. The military mission sent to Russia had no authority to discuss any actual plans and their strength was not much. This was after traveling by boat.Stalin decided to turn the tables and gave Hitler a free hand in Poland in exchange for a portion and then sat by while GErmany invaded the west. Stalins error was in thinking the strike west would involve another drawn out battle that would leave Germany vulnerable to an attack in 1942 or 43

[Steve]

I agree, there was a lack of enthusiasm especialy by the British. Also it was pretty much impossible to form an eastern front as long as the Poles refused to allow Soviet troops onto their territory.

[michael mills]

According to a report to Berlin by the German ambassador Moltke, Lubienski (whichever one was Beck's Chef de Cabinet) made an unofficial visit to him bearing a secret message from Beck, to the effect that although he could not openly agree to the reunification of Danzig with Germany, since that might well trigger a revolt by the opponents of the Sanacja regime, he would not use force to resist a unilateral reunification by means of an internal coup d'état by the Danzig Senate.

That report by Moltke is in the German diplomatic records. Since Lubienski's mission was secret, it was not known to the other members of the Polish Government, and hence does not appear in the Polish diplomatic records. There would seem to be no reason why Moltke would have fabricated the purpose of the visit by Lubienski.

Beck's calculation seems to have been that if he openly agreed to the reunification of Danzig with Germany he would be overthrown by his opponents, whereas if he appeared to be reluctantly yielding to a fait accompli and force majeure, he would not be blamed, and the reunification would be grudgingly accepted by the rest of the Government and the Opposition, thereby removing one of the main causes of conflict between Germany and Poland.

Beck's main concern was to avoid war with Germany at any price, since he knew that if Poland attempted to oppose by force of arms a German takeover of Danzig, it would suffer a heavy defeat, despite the boastful posturing of the Polish military commanders. His view was that once the Danzig issue was out of the way, he could proceed to further cementing of the German-Polish relationship, which he believed had been the task bequeathed to him by Pilsudski.

Of course, once Beck and Lubienski had fled into exile after the German conquest they sought to obfuscate the machinations they had engaged in, so as not to worsen the opprobrium into which they had already fallen, given that the Polish Government-in-Exile had been taken over by the former sworn enemies of Pilsudski and the Sanacja regime. That obfuscation has essentially been perpetuated by Polish patriotic historiography.

[wm]

Please, Piłsudski had been pushing daisies for four years by then. He was too stiff to do any fleeing.
Beck didn't flee, he was on his way to France to continue fighting and was arrested. But risked his life at least once trying to escape later.

It would nice to see that report unknown to any historian, and even Ribbentrop.

Beck couldn't openly agree to the unification, but could openly agree anyway - unless that unilateral reunification would happen in secret too. I would say he couldn't agree to anything, he was just a minister and unpopular one.

That extraterritorial highway, the other Hitler's demand was going to be build in secret too?

[wm]

The British were working on Enigma in 1938 but it seems they did not know about the Polish work which was ahead of theirs. If and I say it again if in 1938 Betty gave them information about how far the Poles had come clearly they would have been very interested. Whether the Poles from late 1938 were reading only Police intercepts or whatever is beside the point they were on the road to cracking maybe the biggest secret of the German armed forces.

Not possible, it was just a few people working on Enigma. One of the reasons it was handed over to the Allies was the Poles practically hit a dead end.
As far I know it was a single British gentleman, working in his spare time in 1938, who had some success, but his bosses weren't interested.

Nice photo of the Count is that Betty with him? It does seem rather unlikely that most of the male Lubienski family was working for Beck in his office.

It's quite likely, as they say blood is thicker than water...
It's his friend, together they won a dance competition.

That Michael Lubienski was important and no pen pusher is shown by him flying to Germany to try and meet Goring. Of course this could be another delusion by a sick man. Jan Gawronski who apparently claimed to have travelled to Berlin in May 39 to try and restart a dialogue could also have been a sick delusional man, anything is possible.

It was the other Lubienski. It seems he was insufficiently important to get past Göring's secretary. Of course everything is possible, it's not that improbable, it's the fact it was done so clumsily. There were people in Poland, his hunting friends for example, who would get through anytime they wished. And Beck was a good diplomat, he didn't do things clumsily.

[michael mills]

Of course I meant Lubienski, as I think would be obvious to anyone following the discussion. I have made the requisite amendment.

The point is that once Beck and his Chef de Cabinet Lubienski had gone into exile, their main concern was to cast a veil over the fact that they had been involved in an attempt to solve the Danzig issue by not opposing a unilateral declaration of reunification with Germany. In order to save their reputations they had to give the impression that they had been prepared to resist Germany to the end.

By the way, the German proposal for an extraterritorial link to East Prussia was nothing new; throughout the period of the Polish-German détente after January 1934 the German side had been making various proposals for such a link, including Todt's suggestion of an elevated highway that would allow free Polish access underneath it. Neither Beck nor other members of the Sanacja regime had ever got hot under the collar about those proposals.

As for Beck making his way to France to continue fighting, that is an impossibility, since the new head of the Polish Government-in-Exile, Sikorski, was a sworn enemy of Pilsudski and the Sanacja regime, and had ordered that none of Pilsudki's former cronies should be allowed to participate in the new government; he would have rejected Beck if the latter had reached France, and possibly would have had him arrested for treason. After all, Smigly-Rydz managed to get back to Poland and promptly died under mysterious circumstances, possibly assassinated by anti-Sanacja members of the Underground.