Polish-soviet war

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panzerkrieg
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Polish-soviet war

#1

Post by panzerkrieg » 18 Mar 2006, 22:32

just browsing through this often neglected war in wikipedia
I was wondering what kind of role MGs heavy Artillery aircraft and tanks played in this conflict.
In most battles the emphasis seems to be on cavalry and to a lesser extent infantry with little mention of any modern weapons playing any notable part
Also was the russian civil war similar in terms of the kind of tactics used
Hope anyone can give me an overview of the kind of tactics used and how they compared with WW1 on western front

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Victor
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#2

Post by Victor » 19 Mar 2006, 09:19

Please look through the older discussions first and try to continue in there, rather than opne a new topic on the same subject:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=51523
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=86427
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=66115


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RCW Mark
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#3

Post by RCW Mark » 20 Mar 2006, 11:18

In most battles the emphasis seems to be on cavalry and to a lesser extent infantry
That is because the Wikipedia articles are written by Poles, who are cavalry obsessed. During the war there were very few cavalry vs cavalry engagements, which suggests that the cavalry weren't the predominant fighting forces.

The war was largely fought and won by infantry. The battles around Warsaw saw almost no Red horse (it had been sent off in a flanking move, largely unopposed) and there wasn't a great amount of Polish cavalry. In the southern front the Reds' main thrust was the 1st Horse Army (mostly cavalry), but that was largely countered by Polish infantry. (In fact the Polish 1st Cavalry Division was withdrawn from the front during the crucial period and only returned when the campaign had already been won.)

MGs were extremely powerful in such open terrain. Tanks were near useless, due to the speed at which the fronts moved. Polish airplanes created havoc in the Red rear areas and on their marching forces, but the lack of stable front lines meant that they could not intervene during the actual fighting.

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#4

Post by henryk » 20 Mar 2006, 21:56

Here is a breakdown:
http://pygmy-wars.50megs.com/lvivwar/lvivwarchap6.pdf
Poland in the Fight for its Borders 1918––1920
(translated from La Pologne en lutte pour ses frontiers 1918––1920)
by Adam Przybylski
Chapter VI
General Offensive on the Russian Front
1. – The State of Polish Forces at the end of 1919
At the end of 1919, the united Polish army already had 21 infantry divisions and 7 cavalry brigades, with a strength at the front and the interior of about 600,000 men.

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Musashi
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#5

Post by Musashi » 20 Mar 2006, 22:54

RCW Mark wrote:
panzerkrieg wrote:In most battles the emphasis seems to be on cavalry and to a lesser extent infantry
That is because the Wikipedia articles are written by Poles, who are cavalry obsessed.
Yes, we are. Is it a surprise for you, if we have much bigger cavalry traditions than infantry traditions? If you were a Pole, you would be cavalry-obsessed, either.
The great Polish infantry traditions began probably from the times of Napoleonic Wars. For example during the battle of Leipzig in 1813 Polish infantry did an outstanding job fighting to the bitter end. It played a role of vanguard and then rearguard covering retreat of the Napoleonic Army. While the Napoleonic Army as a whole (including Poles) suffered 22% losses during that battle, the Poles suffered 75%. Napoleon named prince Józef Poniatowski Marshall of France during that battle. The French blew up a bridge on the Elster River and Poles could not escape, but it is other matter. Besides some French regiments were also trapped.
Our cavalry traditions were always greater than infantry traditions, even at that time and it was my point.
RCW Mark wrote: During the war there were very few cavalry vs cavalry engagements, which suggests that the cavalry weren't the predominant fighting forces.
It's true. There were not many cavalry vs cavalry engagements. The Polish Army started building cavalry units at the end of the war to cope with the Soviet cavalry. When Polish Generals had to excuse themselves for successes of the Soviet cavalry they replied they would defeat Soviet cavalry when a similar unit of Polish cavalry would be built. Of course it succeeded. During the battle of Komarów (the greatest cavalry battle since 1813) six Polish cavalry regiments with infantry support defeated entire Soviet 1st Cavalry Army (20 cavalry regiments).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Komar%C3%B3w
RCW Mark wrote:The war was largely fought and won by infantry. The battles around Warsaw saw almost no Red horse (it had been sent off in a flanking move, largely unopposed) and there wasn't a great amount of Polish cavalry.
In the southern front the Reds' main thrust was the 1st Horse Army (mostly cavalry), but that was largely countered by Polish infantry.
This part is true.
RCW Mark wrote:(In fact the Polish 1st Cavalry Division was withdrawn from the front during the crucial period and only returned when the campaign had already been won.)
Negative. See my link above.
RCW Mark wrote:MGs were extremely powerful in such open terrain.
It was not only open terrain. See Belarus. It-is-all-swamp country with forests.
RCW Mark wrote:Tanks were near useless, due to the speed at which the fronts moved.
As a Frenchman you ignore the French contribution to that war. The French built the first Polish armoured unit and commanded it. I haven't heard until now those tanks were "near useless". I read their contribution in some battles was large.
RCW Mark wrote:Polish airplanes created havoc in the Red rear areas and on their marching forces, but the lack of stable front lines meant that they could not intervene during the actual fighting.
I'd like to point out many of these planes were manned by American volunteers.

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#6

Post by RCW Mark » 20 Mar 2006, 23:45

The tanks were a major asset at Radzymin, which to be fair was a crucial engagement as Warsaw depended on it. But that sort of fixed position fighting was rare. Generally, if a tank appeared the enemy could just move to another point. I know tanks were used at Grodno (in desperation) and apparently with success at Nasielsk but that is the only actions I have heard of. True, if L'viv (Lwów) had been attacked they would probably have been useful there too.
During the battle of Komarów (the greatest cavalry battle since 1813) six Polish cavalry regiments with infantry support defeated entire Soviet 1st Cavalry Army (20 cavalry regiments).
Firstly, it was not the greatest cavalry battle since 1813. Several others challenge for that.

Secondly, the Polish 1st CD fought sections of the 1st Horse Army at various times in the day. Never did they take on anything like the full Army.

And Komarow was not a Polish victory. The Poles aimed to cut off the Red cavalry in a "pocket" so that it could be wiped out. In the result, every unit of Soviet cavalry made it out of the trap. So the Soviets achieved their aim 100% and the Poles failed at theirs. That is, a stategic defeat. (Failure to achieve your goals while your opponent achieves his is pretty much the definition of defeat.) That the Polish cavalry remained on the battlefield at the end of the day is hardly surprising as the Soviets were already in retreat at the start of it. Being able to take ground off a retreating enemy is not a victory. Sorry to labour the point, but this battle seems to have reached mythic status in Polish eyes because it "proves" that the Polish cavalry was better than the Russian cavalry. Actually it proves no such thing.

My full version of the battle, which takes eyewitness French and (brief) Russian versions of the battle into account, can be found here:
http://pygmy-wars.50megs.com/czesniki/c ... intro.html
(I am so interested in this battle that I intend to visit Komarow later this year to check it out in person.)

The silly thing is that the Polish infantry, which did so brilliantly in front of Warsaw and then on the Nieman River, never gets the credit it deserves as the interest is all on the cavalry, planes and armour.

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#7

Post by Musashi » 21 Mar 2006, 00:23

RCW Mark wrote: And Komarow was not a Polish victory. The Poles aimed to cut off the Red cavalry in a "pocket" so that it could be wiped out. In the result, every unit of Soviet cavalry made it out of the trap. So the Soviets achieved their aim 100% and the Poles failed at theirs. That is, a stategic defeat. (Failure to achieve your goals while your opponent achieves his is pretty much the definition of defeat.) That the Polish cavalry remained on the battlefield at the end of the day is hardly surprising as the Soviets were already in retreat at the start of it. Being able to take ground off a retreating enemy is not a victory. Sorry to labour the point, but this battle seems to have reached mythic status in Polish eyes because it "proves" that the Polish cavalry was better than the Russian cavalry. Actually it proves no such thing.

My full version of the battle, which takes eyewitness French and (brief) Russian versions of the battle into account, can be found here:
http://pygmy-wars.50megs.com/czesniki/c ... intro.html
(I am so interested in this battle that I intend to visit Komarow later this year to check it out in person.)
Following your logic the battle of Falaise in 1944 was a German success, because a few German Panzer"divisions" broke the encirclement. Those "divisions" numbered several tanks each (some probably not more than 3).
I totally agree the Polish Army failed to destroy Soviet 1st Horse Army, but the units of that army, that broke the encirclement were unable to perform any effective operations and could only keep retreating.
It is clearly written on the site you provided the link of:
The result was nearly a complete disaster for the Soviets, but the Poles lack of co-ordination and failure to pursue allowed Budënniy to escape: however, it is true that it spelled the end of the 1st Horse Army’s campaign against the Poles.
As I pointed out an annihilation of the Soviet 1st Horse Army had not been achieved.
RCW Mark wrote: The silly thing is that the Polish infantry, which did so brilliantly in front of Warsaw and then on the Nieman River, never gets the credit it deserves as the interest is all on the cavalry, planes and armour.
You are somewhat right :)

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#8

Post by RCW Mark » 21 Mar 2006, 01:02

You make valid points and I will be more specific. :roll:

Taken overall the "Zamosc Ring" was a very successful operation by the Poles. They took on and beat the Soviet 1st Horse Army resoundingly. However, the Poles failed to destroy the Soviet cavalry completely, only bruising it sufficiently to put it out of operation for a few weeks (it was soon back in action in the Ukraine). That success was almost entirely due to the Polish infantry (and Ukrainian infantry and Cossack cavalry, for that matter -- they almost always get left out).

However, the operations of the Polish 1st Cavalry Division on 31 August were a failure from a strategic point of view. If they had succeeded the result would have been astounding, presumably including the capture of Budenniy. During the day their tactical performance, which was good, was not matched by similar strategic success. (One could argue that this inability to convert tactical advantage to strategic success at divisional level was the greatest Polish weakness in the 1920 War).

Unfortunately, I feel that the traditonal focusing of the whole operation on the cavalry actions at the Wolica-Czesniki portion is extremely misleading. It makes it look as if the Soviet retreat was caused by the Polish cavalry. In fact the infantry had done the hard work and all the cavalry managed was to divert the Soviet line of retreat a little. Credit is therefore wrongly attributed. I would love someone to give details on the infantry operations around Zamosc, but all we ever get is more on the cavalry. :cry:

There are similarities between Zamosc and Falaise. The overall actions were a success, but the individual attempts to close the pockets off were failures.

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#9

Post by Musashi » 21 Mar 2006, 01:13

Now I agree with you.
RCW Mark wrote:If they had succeeded the result would have been astounding, presumably including the capture of Budenniy.
Don't forget about Stalin and Voroshilov ;)

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Krzysiek

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#10

Post by Piotr Kapuscinski » 25 Mar 2011, 11:53

MGs were extremely powerful in such open terrain.
Only if soldiers knew how to properly use them in combat - i.e. if you had time to train them:

Inspection of 12th Infantry Division at the front in July of 1920 by Cpt. Dudzinski from General Staff:

"Training: 90% - 95% of all soldiers are 4-weeks recruits (...) poor training. Their shooting abilities are limited to leveling barrel towards a certain place and pressing fire. Any aiming is not the case. Soldiers don't even understand how to do it."

Colonel Jarosz, commander of Training Camp of 6th Army on 29 August 1920:

"30% of these spare units are untrained, thus incapable of combat actions (...) they are shepherds wearing uniforms. (...) I propose to keep these units in the camp for 3 weeks because it's necessary to elaborate with them:
1. train shooting with them, this means at least 15 rounds
2. combat service
3. throwing hand grenades"


Yet these units were ordered to be kept in marching alert due to shortage of reserves. Some men from those spare units were former soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army but equipped with French Lebel rifles.

The above quotes are about rifles, but using MGs on the battlefield is much more complicated than using rifles.

I doubt untrained MG crews and riflemen would be able to stop a cavalry charge.

Another problem was that Polish rear units were generally unarmed.

And if even if rear units were armed, they were still untrained.

================================

Of course 12th Infantry Division is not an example of an "average" unit. There were many unit with much better training - for example units which came from France or those which took part in the Greater Poland Uprising.

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#11

Post by Liluh » 01 Apr 2011, 00:54

I`d like to drop my 2 cents.

I`m a glad owner of the book called "The Great Book of Infantry Glory" (Księga Chwały Piechoty) published by the Polish Ministry of Defence in 1937. It's basically a pampleth written by polish infantry officers desribing the history, tradition, tactics and battles of polish infantry. It also mentions in much details (although in one sided view - I admit) the history of every infantry regiment which started its existence in 1918 and was still operating in 1937. Plus some stories of fallen heroes of those regiments.

So if you`ll need some specific data, just drop me a note. :)

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#12

Post by tigre » 06 Jun 2015, 13:58

Hello to all :D; a briefing about this neglected issue......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

The war of 1919-1920 can be divided into the following three phases. Until May 1920 the star of Poland ascended; the occupation of Kiev being the high light of the Polish advance. During the second phase the Russian forces advanced to the doors of Warsaw. In the third phase, the battle of the Vistula, we again have a change of scene-the defeat and withdrawal of the Russian troops in rear of the Niemen.

On 13 November, 1918, the All-Russian executive committee declared the treaty of Brest-Litovsk void, and the loss of any territory of the former Russian empire was countermanded. After the German troops had left Russia, poorly organized Russian troops gradually occupied the vacated areas. On 5 January, 1919, they occupied Vilna and two weeks later Minsk, Lida, and Brest-Litovsk were occupied. This brought the Russian troops into contact with the advancing Polish forces.

As early as February, 1919, twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry,-and three batteries of artillery of the Polish Army came in contact with the Russian forces. This was the beginning of the war, which did not fully develop until the spring and summer of 1920. The events of the war during 1919 can be divided into three phases: first, from the beginning of the war until April, when the Polish troops took Wilna; the second phase included the occupation of East Galicia and West Wohlhynla; and the third phase: the advance of the Polish front to the Duna-Berezina and the line: Novograd Proskurow-Kamieniec. (See Sketch No. 1.).

On 8 December, 1919, the Entente decided to designate the "Curzon line" (the Njemen and Bug rivers) as the east boundary of Poland. Of course Poland, having already advanced more than 300 km. farther east, was dissatisfied with this decision and, considering the designated boundary only as temporary, it pushed eastward to a line more favorable from a military point of view, in order to have the advantage in the final decision for a permanent eastern boundary.

Hardly a rifle shot was fired on either front during the first quarter of 1920. Only the army group Polesie advanced its front in the beginning of March, in order to cut the enemy's line of communication. (See Sketch No.2.)

On 10 March, a meeting between Kamenew and the Commanding General of the northeast front, at that time Gittis, was held; and the following decisions were made:

(1) The main attack was to be made on the northwestern front with the occupation of Minsk as the objective.

(2) The southwestern front was to contain the enemy and to use the cavalry under Budennij for this purpose.

(3) Further attacks to be made by both army groups simultaneously, the direction of the south group to be: Berdyczew-Rowna-Brest-Litovsk.

(4) The operations were to be in charge of Commissar Kamenew, with Tuchatschewskij in command of the northwest front and Jegorow in command of the southwest front.

Poland could act in two different ways: (1) To wait for the Russian offensive and to make a decisive counterattack; (2) To attack before the Russians had their forces assembled. The situation was not favorable for a defense. The more than 1000 km. front was held by 16 weak divisions and 4 cavalry brigades. The positions were hastily prepared, and second lines were barely reconnoitered, which accounts for the fact that most breakthroughs by the Russians could be widened so quickly.

Pilsudski decided on the second alternative. He wanted to take advantage of the weakness of the Russians. He also decided to attack south of Polesie with Kiew as his objective. Political considerations favored this plan. Information of the enemy (until the end of March) indicated that he would make his main attack on the south. It was not until the middle of April that the general staff at Warsaw received correct information of the enemy situation, but it was too late to re-group the Polish forces. Sufficient transportation was lacking and the preparations for the operations had advanced too far to be changed. General Haller insisted, however, on a change of plan, and when Pilsudski refused, stating that time would be gained by a rapid attack on Kiew, General Haller left the Polish Army under protest.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#13

Post by tigre » 07 Jun 2015, 15:21

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

The Polish operation toward Kiev, in which 9 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry brigades, and 2 Ukrainian groups of the strength of one division participated, were to be divided into two phases as follows:

(1) To advance to the line: Owrucz-Berdyczew-Zmerinka-Mogilew.
(2) To continue the advance with a view of taking Kiew and the Dniepr line on both sides of Kiew. (See Sketch No.3.)

The cavalry was to open the way. The 1st Cavalry Division had as an objective the railroad point Kozotin, at which place the Red XIV Army headquarters was located. The 7th Cavalry Brigade was to take the bridges over the Teterew near Malin. The north flank (Third Army) and the center (Second Army) should advance at the same time, while the south flank (Sixth Army) was to start the advance 24 hours later in the direction: Winnica-Mogilew.

The offensive, which started on 25 April, surprised the Russians, but they refused battle, withdrawing along the entire front. On 26 April, the divisions of the north flank had advanced about 50 km., and the 3d and 7th Cavalry Brigades had reached the Teterew. The 1st Cavalry Division was at Kozotin, after having marched for 39 hours.

At dawn on 27 April, the town was occupied. The 1st Cavalry Division considered its mission fulfilled and took up a defensive position. It failed to pursue or to cut the Red lines of communication, (See Sketch No.3 for lines reached on 28 April and 3 May.)

On 4 May, the first phase of the operation was completed. The troops rested and reorganized the next two days. On 7 May, the Polish cavalry entered Kiev, followed the next day by infantry.

Following the methods of 1812, the Russians had withdrawn without giving any serious opposition, even Kiev was given up without a fight. On 10 May, the Russians attacked the Polish bridgehead east of the Dniepr. This attack was unsuccessful, and the Polish troops pursued the Russian troops 30 km. east of Kiev.

According to plans and in conjunction with the advance of the Third Army, the Polesie group also advanced now to the Dniepr. (See Sketch No.3.)

The Polish troops had reached their objectives, but strategically the operation was a failure, for they had failed to get a decision over the Russian forces. The new front forced the Polish Army to place great' forces at a place where a decision would not be fought, for the Russian command had not changed its plans.

Politically the advance was also unsuccessful. The Ukrainian people did not help the Polish troops, but often robbed their supply trains. England became suspicious of Poland and was rather cool, when Poland asked for assistance. Russia used the occupation of Kiev advantageously in its propaganda and called on the Russian people for vengeance for Kiev. Many former officers of the old army now joined the Red Army.

Source: Review of Military Literature. March 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Polish-soviet war

#14

Post by gebhk » 16 Jun 2015, 14:16

Peter K wrote: MGs were extremely powerful in such open terrain.

Only if soldiers knew how to properly use them in combat - i.e. if you had time to train them:
To add my tuppence ha-worth - that is true of any weaponry and a problem which bedevilled both sides. Clearly, the more technical and the more elevated the role, the more training was required. In this respect a newly-minted army was relatively quickly going to be able to field reasonably competent riflemen and junior officers but was likely to have increasing difficulties with more technical arms. However, most importantly things would be difficult at the higher levels of command which besides knowledge and skill, required a degree of routine and mutual understanding. Achieving this would have been particularly problematic for the emerging Polish armed forces whose professional officers, such as were available, had came from four+ very different backgrounds with very different cultures and 'ways of doing things'. It is therefore hardly surprising that the problems of converting tactical advantage into operational success (which requires efficient staff work and coordination at all levels) that RCW Mark points out, plagued both sides.

I would suggest however that what mainly limited the use of MGs (and artillery for that matter), was the supply of ammunition from factory to gun. Poland's armaments industry was in its infancy and foreign imports were limited. The delivery system, relying on tracks and peasant's wagon, was, given the low density of the railway network in the theatre of operations, incapable of delivering the amounts required much of the time. Tanks were, in much the same way as MGs/artillery severely limited by their reliance on the railways - they had very limited operational range away from the railways. It is not perhaps surprising therefore that lightly armed by western standards cavalry and infantry who could 'live off the land' were the dominant arms.

As to why the infantry don't get the coverage they deserve? - alas that is the human condition. Like it or not, the bigger, flashier, noisier stuff gets all the attention and this is hardly restricted to the Poles. No doubt that is why Airfix produced a model of the Mk whatever WWI tank but not of a truck, let alone a supply wagon. A panther but not a Hf2. And books on rivets of SS panzers outsell the rest of military historical literature combined :roll:

Best wishes

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Re: Polish-soviet war

#15

Post by tigre » 21 Jun 2015, 01:15

Hello to all :D; something more......................

THE RUSSO·POLISH WAR 1919·1920. NONCRITICAL AND CRITICAL VIEWS.

["Der Russisch-Polnische Krieg 1919-1920. Unkritische und kritische Betrachtungen." By Colonel von Wittich. Militarwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen, June 1933]. Captain F. During.

Commissar Kamenew inspected the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Armies on 20 April, 1920, and, not being satisfied with the measures taken, ordered that in the future all reinforcements be sent to the north group (Sixteenth Army).

On the same date a conference of Polish leaders took place at Molodeczno, during which General Majewski, commander of the First Army, suggested an offensive in the direction of Witebsk and Orscha. This was approved and he was directed to take the necessary steps and prepare plans. At a meeting between Pilsudski and the commanders of the Polish First and Fourth Armies on 11 May, the commander of the latter reported a Russian troop concentration in the vicinity of Witebsk, which clearly pointed to an early Russian offensive. Pilsudski, however, did not share this view and directed the Fourth Army to prepare for an offensive on 17 May, in which the right flank of the Fourth Army was to attack towards Zlobin-Rogaczew.

But before the Poles were ready to attack, the Russians commenced their offensive. The Russian, Fifteenth Army consisted of nine divisions the Sixteenth Army of six, and the Group Mozyr of two, while four additional divisions were located between Witebsk and Orscha. The Russian plan provided for the Fifteenth Army, making the main effort, to destroy the Polish north flank and then to drive the Polish forces south into the marshes of Pinsk. The Russian Sixteenth Army was to force a crossing of the Berezina and attack in the direction of Igumen in order to keep the Polish in the south from assisting the northern group.

The Russian offensive on the north started on 14 May and drove the Polish Army, which had used all its reserves, to the line: Berezina-Plissa-See-Perebrodje. The Polish high command moved the 17th Division from Lida to Dokoszycy and the 4th Division from Korosten in the Ukraine to Minsk and placed the First Army under the command of General Szeptycki. The mass of the Polish Fourth Army was concentrated on its right (south) flank and could not come to the assistance of the First Army. On 20 May the Russian Sixteenth Army began its offensive and' advanced on Igumen.

The Russians reached the line: Zembin-Budslaw-Miadziol by 27 May. A counterattack by the Polish Fourth Army drove the Russian Sixteenth Army in rear of the Berezina again. In the meantime, Pilsudski caused the concentration of the Polish Seventh Army (Reserve Army) under command of General Sosnkowski, in rear of the north flank of the Polish First Army. It was Pilsudski's plan to have General Skierski's group attack from the south and the Seventh Army in a northeasterly direction in order to encircle the Russian forces. But while the Russians were forced back, the encircling did not materialize. When the Poles reached the line: Zembin-Drissa, Pilsudski ordered the advance stopped and the Polish forces took up defensive position. The first Russian offensive was a failure, but it forced Pilsudski to use all of his reserves and to weaken the Ukrainian front by three and one half divisions.

In the Ukraine a new and dangerous opponent had appeared. A former Russian noncommissioned officer by the name of Budennij had raised a cavalry division with which he defeated Denekin's cavalry in the winter, 1919-1920. After this he raised his cavalry to 4 divisions of 6 regiments each and a special brigade of 3 regiments. This force left the vicinity of Rostow for the Ukraine, and arrived at Human on 27 May. Buderinij's cavalry was recruited from Cossacks of all kinds: Kirgbitz, Tartars, Turcomans, and others.

Source: Review of Military Literature. December 1934.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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