Georges JEROME wrote:Durant the "drôle de guerre" before german offensive he was the alone general to consider all is ok in his sector while his neighborough Corap complain against the weakness of his positions.
- His best units were in position alongside Maginot line while the less experimented units were in the weakest area.
- During the panzer marsch at Sedan, his reports to General Georges don't give view of the danger of the situation
- On 14 mai he moved with his PC South of Verdun at 100 km of the front.
- the moving of his right wing opened a wide path to the Panzers.
This looks like a very incomplete, and distorted, list of items relating to Hustzinger & his command of the 2d Army. To address just one:
"- His best units were in position alongside Maginot line while the less experimented units were in the weakest area. "
This does not consider what reinforcements were present at the start of the battle, or planned for reinforcement of the "weakest" units, nor does it consider the reinforcements actually sent to this "weakest" sector.
Does not consider this sector was reinforced from the start with a "Active" or first rate unit standing during peace time, which permanetly remained in the sector & reinforced the B Series formations that occupied the area.
It does not consider the relative front covered by the 'better' units & 'weaker' units.
Does not consider that the deployment of the 2d Army had been reviewed in detail by Gamelin, a micro manager who fussed over everything within reach.
Does not consider the guidance or directives Hustzinger had concerning the priorities for his armies sector & the larger defense scheme. Specificaly here the stated priority was to cover the flank of the main fortification zone which lay further to the east near Longwy. That was seen as a pivotal position & any commander of the area would have been considered remiss has he defended it with third rate formations.