100,000 marine request for ETO

[binder001]

You are quite right that we undermanned the Army. This is not only due to the needs of the other armed services but part of being the "Arsenal of Democracy". Quite a few deferrals were given to people who could build the dams, lay out the factories, etc. There were also a considerable number of medical deferments that the Germans (for instance) wouldn't have considered. There have been a number of books and other writings on the deep flaws with the US mobilization plans, especially with regard to the infantry. Part ofthat does come down to your feelings about the number of available divisions. ETOUSA in particular couldn't rotate infantry divisions out of the line for rest and absorption of new personnel. The new guys were fed into the line companies as individuals or small groups and were often KIA/WIA before they could really learn their jobs well.

The US racial attitudes towards the African-American ("colored" in 1940's parlance) was particularly wasteful. There was a pool of fit men who WANTED to fight for their country and were too often turned away or had their skills wasted because of the predjudices of the Army and the country.

The US mobilization was a compromise on many levels. How many aircraft carriers do we build and leave unmanned? How many of the specialized units like airborne divisions do we really need? How big of an air arm can the bomber barons talk us into? Which supplies go unmoved because we pulled the truck drivers into the infantry? Looking back from 2010 it's much clearer than looking forward from 1941-42.

[Delta Tank]

Binder001,

The US racial attitudes towards the African-American ("colored" in 1940's parlance) was particularly wasteful.

I just want to point out, because a lot of people don't know, but we had 3 "Colored" divisions in World War II. They were the 2d Cavalry Division (Horse) (Colored), 92d Infantry Division (Colored), 93d Infantry Division (Colored). The 2d Cav was inactivated in North Africa and turned into service troops, the 92d Infantry Division served in Italy and suffered 548 KIA, and 2,187 WIA; the 93d Infantry Division served in the Pacific and really did not see any action, but they had 12 KIA and 121 WIA. There were also more African-American soldiers in World War II serving in combat units, but I believe more served in service support units. Did we maximize their numbers, desire to serve, talents? Obviously not. During the "Battle of the Bulge" the Army out of necessity started the integration process by asking African-American soldiers to volunteer for the infantry. They volunteered and went to "white" infantry units by platoons and I also believe by squads.

Mike

[The_Enigma]

One should note, one man has been immortilised beyond all his other comrades; Sgt. Warren G. H. Crecy - A tanker in the 761st Tank Battalion- he was awarded the title of The Baddass of the Week 24 Feb 2006.

Warning: Site is not for those without a sense of humour.

[binder001]

Even though there were only three divisions of "colored" troops there were several combat arms battalions that saw combat. The 761st Tank Battalion (Third Army in ETO) was the most famous, but there was also the 784th (First Army, late ETO) and a light tank battalion in Italy (I forgot the number offhand). There were also several tank destroyer battalions and several field artillery outfits. One "colored" battalion of 155's was trapped in Bastogne with the 101st Airborne and provided valuable heavy artillery fire.

The effectiveness of the African-American troops varied directly with the leadership they received. The units were started with white officers and some of these men didn't fulfill their duties particularly well. This is one of the reasons the 93rd Div in the Pacific had a poor record - the leadership was bad and the troops were not well trained and motivated.

Speaking of the potential use of the USMC manpower, they were the most reluctant to add colored personnel to their combat divisions. I believe that there were few if any black Marines in WW2.

[The_Enigma]

So the guys working on the beaches of the likes of Iwo Jima were Army not Marine?

Just to clarify is an American Tank battalion like a British armoured regiment and not a British tank battalion; i.e. mediums/cruisers not heavy/infantry tanks?

[Delta Tank]

Binder001,

Binder001 wrote:Even though there were only three divisions of "colored" troops there were several combat arms battalions that saw combat. The 761st Tank Battalion (Third Army in ETO) was the most famous, but there was also the 784th (First Army, late ETO) and a light tank battalion in Italy (I forgot the number offhand). There were also several tank destroyer battalions and several field artillery outfits. One "colored" battalion of 155's was trapped in Bastogne with the 101st Airborne and provided valuable heavy artillery fire.

Yes I basically stated this in my post.

delta tank wrote:There were also more African-American soldiers in World War II serving in combat units, but I believe more served in service support units. Did we maximize their numbers, desire to serve, talents? Obviously not. During the "Battle of the Bulge" the Army out of necessity started the integration process by asking African-American soldiers to volunteer for the infantry. They volunteered and went to "white" infantry units by platoons and I also believe by squads.

There is one volume on the Employment of Negro Troops http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/11-4/index.htm. I have never read it, but it would be interesting to see how many served in combat units. I know there were lots of all Black Field Artillery units. Maybe it is time to look through that book.

Mike

[Delta Tank]

To all,

Just went through the chapter titles real quick and found that there were only 9 all Black FA battalions in WWII and all were in the ETO. I would of thought there would of been more than that, oh well learn something new every day.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... pter21.htm

Mike

[Delta Tank]

The_Enigma,

The Enigma wrote: So the guys working on the beaches of the likes of Iwo Jima were Army not Marine?

Just to clarify is an American Tank battalion like a British armoured regiment and not a British tank battalion; i.e. mediums/cruisers not heavy/infantry tanks?

They could of been Army I don't know. But IIRC there were Army units there at Iwo Jima, amphibous tractor battalions? and probably some service troops, but I am not sure, I did look it up once and of course I forgot the answer!

American tank battalions, there were two types, medium battalions and light battalions. The M-4 battalions were 3 companies of medium tanks (16 each?) and one company of light tanks (16 each?) and there should of been two headquarter tanks. So for a total of 66 tanks, 50 mediums and 16 light tanks? Here read through this!
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/ww ... armor.aspx

Mike

[The_Enigma]

Nice one Mike Intresting how they also field a similar number of tanks of each class compared to late war British armoured regiments and tank battalions; one takes that this was the "ideal" number then

[Ironmachine]

I believe that there were few if any black Marines in WW2.

A pair of links that will clarify this:
http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extcontent/usmc/pcn-190-003132-00/
http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-04.htm

There were 19,168 black Marines in World War II.

[Carl Schwamberger]

You are quite right that we undermanned the Army. This is not only due to the needs of the other armed services but part of being the "Arsenal of Democracy". Quite a few deferrals were given to people who could build the dams, lay out the factories, etc. There were also a considerable number of medical deferments that the Germans (for instance) wouldn't have considered. There have been a number of books and other writings on the deep flaws with the US mobilization plans, especially with regard to the infantry. Part ofthat does come down to your feelings about the number of available divisions. ETOUSA in particular couldn't rotate infantry divisions out of the line for rest and absorption of new personnel. The new guys were fed into the line companies as individuals or small groups and were often KIA/WIA before they could really learn their jobs well.

The US racial attitudes towards the African-American ("colored" in 1940's parlance) was particularly wasteful. There was a pool of fit men who WANTED to fight for their country and were too often turned away or had their skills wasted because of the predjudices of the Army and the country.

The US mobilization was a compromise on many levels. How many aircraft carriers do we build and leave unmanned? How many of the specialized units like airborne divisions do we really need? How big of an air arm can the bomber barons talk us into? Which supplies go unmoved because we pulled the truck drivers into the infantry? Looking back from 2010 it's much clearer than looking forward from 1941-42.

The decision to cap the US Army Ground Forces at a Troop Basis of 90 or 89 divisions was made by Marshall in mid 1943. (Pogue 'Architect of Victory') The reasosn were complex & I wont try to go into them now. The projected size of the Army Ground Forces had originally peaked at a proposed 200 - 210 with 60 armored divisions in 1941. A lower number of apporx 140 was identified as the "Troop Basis" for planning and scheduling in early 1942. That number was regarded as the maximum probable rather than a definite goal. The likely number was revised downward several times in 1942-43. Capping the number at 90 was in part recognition that sustaining strength of all units, Ground, air, and Service was going to be harder than originally estimated. Second there was a recognition that the US was committed to sustaining with equipment up to twenty USMC, Chinese, French, and other foreign ground combat divisions, plus general equipment and supply for at least twenty more 'divisions'. By late 1944 the US was supporting the equivalent of at least 120 combat divisions globally in terms of combat and combat support equipment.

The problem with rotating units out of the combat zone for rest and training was in part due to the port & transportation problem of August-November 1944. The dellivery schedule for fresh divisions from the US was set back a few weeks as those scheduled for arrival September-October could not be supplied. The difference was not very large. Maybe 3-4 divisions, but enough to aggravate the 'front line' shortage.

[binder001]

The_Enigma,

The Enigma wrote: American tank battalions, there were two types, medium battalions and light battalions. The M-4 battalions were 3 companies of medium tanks (16 each?) and one company of light tanks (16 each?) and there should of been two headquarter tanks. So for a total of 66 tanks, 50 mediums and 16 light tanks? Here read through this! http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/ww ... armor.aspx Mike

The standard US Army tank battalion from the fall of 1943 on was based on three medium companies (A,B,&C) each having three platoons of five mediums and two in HQ = 17 medium tanks. Company D was light tanks, again three platoons of five and two in the HQ section. Originally there was a three gun Assault Gun platoon as part of the battalion Headquarters Company - originally M8 HMCs but in the spring of 1944 they were replaced by M4s with 105mm howitzers. Each medium company was also to receive a howitzer-armed M4 (or later M4A3) raising the medium companies to 18 tanks each. Some units concentrated the company assault guns with the Assault Gun Platoon. The Battalion HQ Company also had three tanks for the Bn CO, XO and artillery observer. A tank battalion in an armored division differed from a "seperate" tank battalion in the service company logistics. So the total of a full strength 1944 US ARmy tank battalion would include 17 light tanks, and 60 medium tanks (54 gun tanks, 6 with howitzers)plus the 3 mhalftrack mortar carriers, armed jeeps, ARVs, and other support vehicles.



In the ETO the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions kept the older Armored Regiment organization to the end of the war.

[Cannonade]

I was scanning through Armageddon by Max Hastings earlier today, not a book or author I particularly like, and I noted that apparently Ike, at the height of the Ardennes campaign, made a request to Marshal for 100,000 marines to be deployed to the ETO because infantry shortages were that bad; a request that was turned down.

It seems a tad excessive and a little over the top, does anyone know if there is any truth to this claim Hastings’s make? I will provide a page number later was I get home.

Correct me if am wrong here but wouldn’t that total be practically the entire marine force, already fully engaged in the Pacific? I understand the US was undergoing similar, but not as bad, manpower problems like the British Army was however with regular and national guard army divisions being shipped into France on a regular basis (I believe the final US Army was activated during early 1945) why would a request like this be made?

On 7 January 1945 in cable S74003/SG724, Eisenhower asked Marshall in the most urgent terms for more troops while explaining his efforts to "comb out" additional men for combat from sources within the ETO. His desperation can be seen throughout the cable including his request that divisions currently in Italy be transferred to the ETO. In this context, his suggestion that "Perhaps the Marines would like to turn over a hundred thousand to us." is seen to be made with all seriousness. This is the same cable in which Eisenhower informs Marshall that he is planning to give "Negro volunteers a chance to serve in battle."

[Delta Tank]

Cannonade,

Eisenhower may of made it in all seriousness, but he had no way to know if the marines had 100,000 trained infantrymen laying around doing nothing. Did General Marshall go down to Admiral King and put in a request for 100,000 marines?

Mike

[The_Enigma]

Thanks for the info on the cable. Did Marshal and King ever even discuss the issue of sending marines in numbers, excluding - from what i seen dottered about the place - those on board ships, to the ETO?