There were a few M26 Pershings that were rushed to Okinawa in 1945 that just missed the fighting there.
How many would have been available _in the Pacific_ for Operation Olympic in Oct 1945 and in Operation Cornet in March 1946?
As a minimum the rushed Okinawa M26's would have been there for the Oct 1945 Operation Olympic. How many more were scheduled to arrive?
The 13th and 20th Armored Divisions would have left directly from the West Coast in Feb 1946 for Japan as a part of Operation Cornet.
What would/could their kit have included in terms of M26 variants?
M26 Pershing vs Japan
-
ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Welcome to the forum Mil-bard. Searching for "war-game" back-ground? I really think your topic resides in the "What-if" section.
For starters, I don't see the M26 as being a vehicle neccessary for "Coronet", as it was not needed, plus the logistical problems presented to transporting a "Heavy Tank". Even in the realm of "product testing" the US did not need the M26 in Japan, as it was a tank designed to fight other tanks , not an "assault gun", or a lighter tank with much less atttendant logistical supporting problems. The Japanese simply were not an opponent the Pershing was designed for, or needed against.
More than likely someone here at the forum will will come along to assist you in the projected strenghts of possible M26 in Feb46 for two armored divisions for Coronet. I've never heard of such long term planning, as the nature of the M26 was never considered a high priority vehicle by the US army in WWII and I doubt there was little planning at higher levels about it . And the end of the war pretty much cancelled everything for a while.
I.E. replace your Shermans with Pershings in these two divisions, if enough Pershings were built by say Dec 45.
Regards,
Chris
For starters, I don't see the M26 as being a vehicle neccessary for "Coronet", as it was not needed, plus the logistical problems presented to transporting a "Heavy Tank". Even in the realm of "product testing" the US did not need the M26 in Japan, as it was a tank designed to fight other tanks , not an "assault gun", or a lighter tank with much less atttendant logistical supporting problems. The Japanese simply were not an opponent the Pershing was designed for, or needed against.
More than likely someone here at the forum will will come along to assist you in the projected strenghts of possible M26 in Feb46 for two armored divisions for Coronet. I've never heard of such long term planning, as the nature of the M26 was never considered a high priority vehicle by the US army in WWII and I doubt there was little planning at higher levels about it . And the end of the war pretty much cancelled everything for a while.
I.E. replace your Shermans with Pershings in these two divisions, if enough Pershings were built by say Dec 45.
Regards,
Chris
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
The Sherman was given a very bad time in Okinawa and the US Army Ordnance response in the "Okinawa: Last Battle" Green Book was to rush M26 Pershings and tell Pacific commanders to use more of them to deal with the Japanese 47mm.
Hence my questions.
Hence my questions.
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Snips
ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... index.html
Chapter 24
Heavy Tank Losses
The tanks were having a hard enough time against the withering Japanese fire, especially fire from the 47-mm. antitank gun, which was accurate and deadly. The gun was small and easily concealed and its high muzzle velocity would send a projectile through any part of a medium tank except the glacis plate. At Kakazu on the morning of 19 April in the 27th Division's sector, Company A of the 193d Tank Battalion lost four tanks from a single 47-mm. piece firing only sixteen shots and later in the day had many more cut down by artillery fire, some of them the scarce and valued flame throwers. The company returned with only eight out of thirty tanks— the greatest loss suffered by American armor in any single engagement on Okinawa.
Six of the tanks lost in this action at Kakazu were destroyed by satchel charges placed by Japanese suicide squads that seemed to spring out of the grass beside the tank, sometimes forcing turret lids open and throwing in grenades that killed the tankers. These squads of three to nine men did not cause as many tank casualties as the 47-mm. gun, but they continued to be a constant source of danger. Each man of the squad had his own job: one would blind the tank with smoke grenades, another would force it to button up by hurling fragmentation grenades, another would immobilize it with a mine under the track. The final act was destruction of the tank and crew by a satchel charge.
Against such tactics, Tenth Army Ordnance in Hawaii had devised the backscratcher but just what it accomplished was hard to determine. Only a few were actually mounted on Army tanks, none on Marine tanks. In one case the device wounded rather than killed the attacker; in another, rain shorted the circuit so that the mine did not detonate. The few times the backscratcher appeared to be effective, friendly fire took equal credit for destroying the enemy.26
The test of the sanded paint applied to the tanks of the 713th Armored Flame Thrower Battalion for protection against magnetic mines was also inconclusive, for the battalion encountered no mines of this type.27 Antitank mines did, however, account for about 31 percent of all tank losses on Okinawa. Luckily there were few antipersonnel mines among them to interfere with tank recovery. The problem in bringing back the tanks was the lack of enough tank recovery vehicles to do an adequate job. Often after a tank was immobilized by a mine, satchel charge, or antitank projectile, or because it had simply thrown a track or bogged down in bad terrain, it was abandoned by its crew, and if not recovered by nightfall it would be demolished at leisure by the returning Japanese.
By the end of May, the four Army tank battalions and the one armored flame thrower battalion had suffered 221 tank casualties, not counting Marine losses. Among the 221 tanks put out of action, 94 (including at least 12 of the irreplaceable flame throwers), or 43 percent, had been completely destroyed. The effort by Tenth Army Ordnance to make up these losses was painfully unproductive. To begin with, losses on such a scale had not been anticipated. In the planning, a small reserve stock of 13 medium tanks was to be placed on Saipan for fast emergency shipment to Okinawa. These were sent for on 25 April. But even this small reserve had not been established on Saipan. The tanks had to be ordered from Oahu and did not arrive at Okinawa until 10 June— some ten days before the campaign was virtually over. An additional shipment of 65 Shermans and 25 tank recovery vehicles was requested from Oahu on 28 April. They were shipped on 20 May and did not arrive until 15 July—almost two weeks after the campaign had been declared officially at an end.
Because of the delay, all serviceable medium tanks were stripped from the 193d Tank Battalion (the unit crippled at Kakazu) and distributed to other tank battalions. By early May the tankers were asking for a tank heavier than the Sherman, with a weapon of higher muzzle velocity and thicker armor plate. The M26 Pershings seemed to be the answer. In mid-May (after V-E Day) twelve were requested from the United States, but they were not received until August.[/color] In the meantime, to provide better protection against the 47-mm. gun, the Ordnance tank maintenance companies welded steel track sections to the side sponsors, turret sides, and glacis plate of the Shermans, and also used armor plate from wrecked tanks to reinforce the sponson and shield the suspension system.
In the end, however, the best defense for the Sherman turned out to be the infantrymen who accompanied it as part of the tank-infantry team, a truth forcibly brought home to commanders in the catastrophe at Kakazu where the tanks had been operating alone.
ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... index.html
Chapter 24
Heavy Tank Losses
The tanks were having a hard enough time against the withering Japanese fire, especially fire from the 47-mm. antitank gun, which was accurate and deadly. The gun was small and easily concealed and its high muzzle velocity would send a projectile through any part of a medium tank except the glacis plate. At Kakazu on the morning of 19 April in the 27th Division's sector, Company A of the 193d Tank Battalion lost four tanks from a single 47-mm. piece firing only sixteen shots and later in the day had many more cut down by artillery fire, some of them the scarce and valued flame throwers. The company returned with only eight out of thirty tanks— the greatest loss suffered by American armor in any single engagement on Okinawa.
Six of the tanks lost in this action at Kakazu were destroyed by satchel charges placed by Japanese suicide squads that seemed to spring out of the grass beside the tank, sometimes forcing turret lids open and throwing in grenades that killed the tankers. These squads of three to nine men did not cause as many tank casualties as the 47-mm. gun, but they continued to be a constant source of danger. Each man of the squad had his own job: one would blind the tank with smoke grenades, another would force it to button up by hurling fragmentation grenades, another would immobilize it with a mine under the track. The final act was destruction of the tank and crew by a satchel charge.
Against such tactics, Tenth Army Ordnance in Hawaii had devised the backscratcher but just what it accomplished was hard to determine. Only a few were actually mounted on Army tanks, none on Marine tanks. In one case the device wounded rather than killed the attacker; in another, rain shorted the circuit so that the mine did not detonate. The few times the backscratcher appeared to be effective, friendly fire took equal credit for destroying the enemy.26
The test of the sanded paint applied to the tanks of the 713th Armored Flame Thrower Battalion for protection against magnetic mines was also inconclusive, for the battalion encountered no mines of this type.27 Antitank mines did, however, account for about 31 percent of all tank losses on Okinawa. Luckily there were few antipersonnel mines among them to interfere with tank recovery. The problem in bringing back the tanks was the lack of enough tank recovery vehicles to do an adequate job. Often after a tank was immobilized by a mine, satchel charge, or antitank projectile, or because it had simply thrown a track or bogged down in bad terrain, it was abandoned by its crew, and if not recovered by nightfall it would be demolished at leisure by the returning Japanese.
By the end of May, the four Army tank battalions and the one armored flame thrower battalion had suffered 221 tank casualties, not counting Marine losses. Among the 221 tanks put out of action, 94 (including at least 12 of the irreplaceable flame throwers), or 43 percent, had been completely destroyed. The effort by Tenth Army Ordnance to make up these losses was painfully unproductive. To begin with, losses on such a scale had not been anticipated. In the planning, a small reserve stock of 13 medium tanks was to be placed on Saipan for fast emergency shipment to Okinawa. These were sent for on 25 April. But even this small reserve had not been established on Saipan. The tanks had to be ordered from Oahu and did not arrive at Okinawa until 10 June— some ten days before the campaign was virtually over. An additional shipment of 65 Shermans and 25 tank recovery vehicles was requested from Oahu on 28 April. They were shipped on 20 May and did not arrive until 15 July—almost two weeks after the campaign had been declared officially at an end.
Because of the delay, all serviceable medium tanks were stripped from the 193d Tank Battalion (the unit crippled at Kakazu) and distributed to other tank battalions. By early May the tankers were asking for a tank heavier than the Sherman, with a weapon of higher muzzle velocity and thicker armor plate. The M26 Pershings seemed to be the answer. In mid-May (after V-E Day) twelve were requested from the United States, but they were not received until August.[/color] In the meantime, to provide better protection against the 47-mm. gun, the Ordnance tank maintenance companies welded steel track sections to the side sponsors, turret sides, and glacis plate of the Shermans, and also used armor plate from wrecked tanks to reinforce the sponson and shield the suspension system.
In the end, however, the best defense for the Sherman turned out to be the infantrymen who accompanied it as part of the tank-infantry team, a truth forcibly brought home to commanders in the catastrophe at Kakazu where the tanks had been operating alone.
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Chris,
I agree that this topic is better served being in the "What If?" section.
Would the "powers that be" please do so?
I agree that this topic is better served being in the "What If?" section.
Would the "powers that be" please do so?
ChristopherPerrien wrote:Welcome to the forum Mil-bard. Searching for "war-game" back-ground? I really think your topic resides in the "What-if" section.
For starters, I don't see the M26 as being a vehicle neccessary for "Coronet", as it was not needed, plus the logistical problems presented to transporting a "Heavy Tank". Even in the realm of "product testing" the US did not need the M26 in Japan, as it was a tank designed to fight other tanks , not an "assault gun", or a lighter tank with much less atttendant logistical supporting problems. The Japanese simply were not an opponent the Pershing was designed for, or needed against.
More than likely someone here at the forum will will come along to assist you in the projected strenghts of possible M26 in Feb46 for two armored divisions for Coronet. I've never heard of such long term planning, as the nature of the M26 was never considered a high priority vehicle by the US army in WWII and I doubt there was little planning at higher levels about it . And the end of the war pretty much cancelled everything for a while.
I.E. replace your Shermans with Pershings in these two divisions, if enough Pershings were built by say Dec 45.
Regards,
Chris
-
ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Interesting story, but I doubt it. And the story/Grren book section posted by James L. does nothing to bolster the idea.Mil-tech Bard wrote:The Sherman was given a very bad time in Okinawa and the US Army Ordnance response in the "Okinawa: Last Battle" Green Book was to rush M26 Pershings and tell Pacific commanders to use more of them to deal with the Japanese 47mm.
Hence my questions.
While Sherman losses were excessive on OKi, so were all losses. And occasional bad armor tactics(none or lousy infantry support, allowing side armor shots) and the close-in nature of tank actions on OKI(mines and IED's) there was why. Plus inadequate replacement Sherman had been alloted.. As far as supposed solutions by ordinance , yea, they sent 10 :roll: M26's to OKI, and they were not even off-loaded till after the war ended, IIRC,. No rush there. But it also goes toward showing that it was harder to get an M26 to the "battlefield" than a Sherman, again logistics is the issue as the side armor of an early M26 was hardly any thicker than the side armor on the later Shermans.http://www.onwar.com/tanks/usa/index.htmexcellent info there
After looking around the net , the Wiki on the M26 is a good article,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M26_Pershing and it puts M26 production at 2000 by the end of 1945. Which I believe goes far for saying we would have had two divisions equipped by Mar 46, if there had been a Coronet. Of course by Mar46, most Japanese, if not nearly all, would have starved to death, so there s not much point unless you really stretch an ATL.
Forgot one thing ,
The "variant" invovled would be the T26E3, a.k.a. , the M26. Not exactly sure what you mean by 'kit"( M3 90mm, 2x.30mgs,1x.50mg). Perhaps someone else has a "SOP/load plan" for a WWII M26, as to personal weapons, mines, grenades and such.Mil-tech Bard wrote:Operation Cornet.
What would/could their kit have included in terms of M26 variants?
Regards Chris
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Chris,
Per the site you posted:
The hull side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 38mm@90°.
The turret side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 51mm@85°.
The Pershing front hull side armor (AKA crew compartment) is 76mm@90°(front).
The Pershing rear hull side armor (AKA engine compartment) is 51mm@90°(rear).
From what I have read of the IJA 47mm gun penetration performance at http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/japan_guns3.html. The 47mm could not punch out the Pershing crew compartment side armor and had to be at 500 yards or closer to get the through to the engine compartment.
Per the site you posted:
The hull side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 38mm@90°.
The turret side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 51mm@85°.
The Pershing front hull side armor (AKA crew compartment) is 76mm@90°(front).
The Pershing rear hull side armor (AKA engine compartment) is 51mm@90°(rear).
From what I have read of the IJA 47mm gun penetration performance at http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/japan_guns3.html. The 47mm could not punch out the Pershing crew compartment side armor and had to be at 500 yards or closer to get the through to the engine compartment.
ChristopherPerrien wrote:Interesting story, but I doubt it. And the story/Grren book section posted by James L. does nothing to bolster the idea.Mil-tech Bard wrote:The Sherman was given a very bad time in Okinawa and the US Army Ordnance response in the "Okinawa: Last Battle" Green Book was to rush M26 Pershings and tell Pacific commanders to use more of them to deal with the Japanese 47mm.
Hence my questions.
While Sherman losses were excessive on OKi, so were all losses. And occasional bad armor tactics(none or lousy infantry support, allowing side armor shots) and the close-in nature of tank actions on OKI(mines and IED's) there was why. Plus inadequate replacement Sherman had been alloted.. As far as supposed solutions by ordinance , yea, they sent 10 :roll: M26's to OKI, and they were not even off-loaded till after the war ended, IIRC,. No rush there. But it also goes toward showing that it was harder to get an M26 to the "battlefield" than a Sherman, again logistics is the issue as the side armor of an early M26 was hardly any thicker than the side armor on the later Shermans.http://www.onwar.com/tanks/usa/index.htmexcellent info there
After looking around the net , the Wiki on the M26 is a good article,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M26_Pershing and it puts M26 production at 2000 by the end of 1945. Which I believe goes far for saying we would have had two divisions equipped by Mar 46, if there had been a Coronet. Of course by Mar46, most Japanese, if not nearly all, would have starved to death, so there s not much point unless you really stretch an ATL.
Forgot one thing ,The "variant" invovled would be the T26E3, a.k.a. , the M26. Not exactly sure what you mean by 'kit"( M3 90mm, 2x.30mgs,1x.50mg). Perhaps someone else has a "SOP/load plan" for a WWII M26, as to personal weapons, mines, grenades and such.Mil-tech Bard wrote:Operation Cornet.
What would/could their kit have included in terms of M26 variants?
Regards Chris
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
>Of course by Mar46, most Japanese, if not nearly all, would have starved to death, so there s not much point unless you really
>stretch an ATL.
The US bombing survey _did not_ say that.
A "greatly reduced calorie intake" did not represent starvation for the IJA fighting forces.
Many left of center acedemics have since greatly over exagerated that case in ther high political dungeon against the decision to drop the A-bomb.
>stretch an ATL.
The US bombing survey _did not_ say that.
A "greatly reduced calorie intake" did not represent starvation for the IJA fighting forces.
Many left of center acedemics have since greatly over exagerated that case in ther high political dungeon against the decision to drop the A-bomb.
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Against the Japanese defenses one might question if the tank that was needed was the M26 or the M45. M45 was the M26 equipped with the 105mm howitzer M4 in place of the 90mm gun M3. I'd have to go through my Hunnicutt "Pershing" to see when M45 entered series production, but it was develpoed in parallel with the 90mm version. The earlier reports from ETOUSA favored deployment of equal numbers of gun-armed and howitzer-armed new medium tanks. As the war progressed the German armor threat pushed the production and deployment of the 90mm gun tank, the howitzer version was given low priority and ended up with a very low production.
There is a photo in Hunnicutt's "Sherman" of a depot on Luzon that had medium tanks stockpiled for the invasion of Japan. These are mixed M4A3 75mm Wet HVSS and M4A3 75mm Wet. Another photo from the web claims to show Ordnance workers in the ETOUSA preparing M4A3 75mm Wet medium tanks for "shipment to the Pacific" after VE day. If these are captioned correctly one can see that the Army and Marines had planned for many of the tanks going in to be M4A3s with 75mm guns. The Marines preferred the 75mm guns as they had a slightly better HE shell that the US 76's. THe Marines only retired their last M4A3 75mm Wet tanks right before Korea. One would also think that the existing M4 and M4A3s with 105mm howitzers might have been desirable in Japan, although their ammo capacity and rate of fire were lower than the 75mm tanks. The M4/M4A3 would likely have been the primary equipment seen in the assault waves as the Shermans fit existing landing craft, cranes, etc. One of the delays in getting the M26 to Okinawa was not only a lack of urgency (the ship waited at Ulithi to be called forward) but the difficulties of getting the heavier tanks unloaded and lightered to shore (ref. Hunnicutt "Pershing"). The M4A3 also offered slightly better mobility (as shown several years later in Korea). The M26 had basically the same engine moving 10 ton more tank.
So whether the armored division would come forward with M26s or mixed M4A3/M26 would remain to be seen. One would expect that at least some units would have M26s available. I am surprised that there was no gathering of the surviving M4A3E2s from ETOUSA. They could have received general repairs and upgrades, perhaps getting HVSS and then be shipped to the Pacific. I have not yet heard of any such orders, although a at least a few of the "Jumbos" were brought back to the CONUS from the ETO and ended up used as training and later a few as monument tanks.
The armored divisions almost certainly would have brough M24s with them. They would have offered a mobile 75mm gun but at the price of being vulnerable to most Japanese AT weapons.
There is a photo in Hunnicutt's "Sherman" of a depot on Luzon that had medium tanks stockpiled for the invasion of Japan. These are mixed M4A3 75mm Wet HVSS and M4A3 75mm Wet. Another photo from the web claims to show Ordnance workers in the ETOUSA preparing M4A3 75mm Wet medium tanks for "shipment to the Pacific" after VE day. If these are captioned correctly one can see that the Army and Marines had planned for many of the tanks going in to be M4A3s with 75mm guns. The Marines preferred the 75mm guns as they had a slightly better HE shell that the US 76's. THe Marines only retired their last M4A3 75mm Wet tanks right before Korea. One would also think that the existing M4 and M4A3s with 105mm howitzers might have been desirable in Japan, although their ammo capacity and rate of fire were lower than the 75mm tanks. The M4/M4A3 would likely have been the primary equipment seen in the assault waves as the Shermans fit existing landing craft, cranes, etc. One of the delays in getting the M26 to Okinawa was not only a lack of urgency (the ship waited at Ulithi to be called forward) but the difficulties of getting the heavier tanks unloaded and lightered to shore (ref. Hunnicutt "Pershing"). The M4A3 also offered slightly better mobility (as shown several years later in Korea). The M26 had basically the same engine moving 10 ton more tank.
So whether the armored division would come forward with M26s or mixed M4A3/M26 would remain to be seen. One would expect that at least some units would have M26s available. I am surprised that there was no gathering of the surviving M4A3E2s from ETOUSA. They could have received general repairs and upgrades, perhaps getting HVSS and then be shipped to the Pacific. I have not yet heard of any such orders, although a at least a few of the "Jumbos" were brought back to the CONUS from the ETO and ended up used as training and later a few as monument tanks.
The armored divisions almost certainly would have brough M24s with them. They would have offered a mobile 75mm gun but at the price of being vulnerable to most Japanese AT weapons.
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces mentioned that the Marines were satisfied with the M4's 75mm gun and were leary of the M26's weight.
They were also interested in M24's as replacements for the M3/M5 Stuart's/suppliments for the M4 Sherman.
US Army Ordnance had proposed an improved HVSS M4A3E2, but it died IIRC.
They were also interested in M24's as replacements for the M3/M5 Stuart's/suppliments for the M4 Sherman.
US Army Ordnance had proposed an improved HVSS M4A3E2, but it died IIRC.
-
ChristopherPerrien
- Member
- Posts: 7051
- Joined: 26 Dec 2002, 01:58
- Location: Mississippi
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
True to an extent , however Shermans had "superstructure armor" which in some cases was as thick as their front glacis plate. Superstructure is the part of the Shermans hull that was above the track. Using that, the side armor diffences between many Shermans and Pershings becomes a matter of how high they are hit in the side. An M4E3 has 78mm of armor on its side super-structure, thicker than any Pershing's side armor. Which is why I said what I said. Average wise as a percentage of target area many Shermans may have had slightly thicker side armor than all Pershings. So I conceeded the whole math excercise in my earlier post by saying Pershings had slightly thicker side armor because I really didn't wish to go into such detail, as some detail nuts around here would look at each and every model of both tanks and do the math and compare them just to "find my error"Mil-tech Bard wrote:Chris,
Per the site you posted:
The hull side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 38mm@90°.
The turret side armor of a M4A3(76)W HVSS Sherman is listed as 51mm@85°.
The Pershing front hull side armor (AKA crew compartment) is 76mm@90°(front).
The Pershing rear hull side armor (AKA engine compartment) is 51mm@90°(rear).
From what I have read of the IJA 47mm gun penetration performance at http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/japan_guns3.html. The 47mm could not punch out the Pershing crew compartment side armor and had to be at 500 yards or closer to get the through to the engine compartment.
. All of this is academic and not worth much; If proper tactics Arm/inf tactics had been consistently followed on OKi, There should had been very few instances when Japanese defenders in static positions with AT guns should have been able to get a side shot at any tank,or been able to detonate IED's or use at mines against US tanks.. This points to either incompetence and/or inexperience at diffenrent command levels on the part of the atttacking force. Ordinance said and did stuff to cover thier butts, Dumb-ass Tankers cried they needed a better/bigger/badder tank.
Either way or both ways, Having a heavier tank would not have fixed this "stupid" so to speak.
The same similar "bs/stuff" has been brought up RECENTLY on how the M1A1 is not a good tank because similar :roll: situations have occured in Iraq, and I don't buy that either. Note though, as compared to many "armchair generals" I slept on the last "models" of Pershings, the M60A1 and A3, for a couple years and did a few years on M1's too.
Regards,
Chris
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
Chris,
The July 1945 Project Sphinx found that 90mm guns were superior to both 75mm and 76mm guns at killing Japanese cave positions.
What seems to have hapened is that Operation Olympus was going to be done with Pacific Theater equipment and Opeation Coronet would be more US equipment based.
I am still looking for what the pipeline for Olympus included in terms of Pershings beyond the "quickie shipment" to Okinawa.
The July 1945 Project Sphinx found that 90mm guns were superior to both 75mm and 76mm guns at killing Japanese cave positions.
What seems to have hapened is that Operation Olympus was going to be done with Pacific Theater equipment and Opeation Coronet would be more US equipment based.
I am still looking for what the pipeline for Olympus included in terms of Pershings beyond the "quickie shipment" to Okinawa.
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
The production lines for the M4-series were pretty much closed out by that time so any NEW tanks would be M26s or M24s. There were a lot of unissued or low mileage M4A3s around and the older M4-series could be run through upgrade remanufacture (although many original M4/M4A1 types had already gone through remanufacture or upgrade and had gone to the ETO and/or Lend-Lease). If one drives around and notes the various "monument" tanks in the USA most of them are M4A3 derivatives - the M4/M4A1s were left overseas. The tanks left in the CONUS were mostly M4A3s and M4A1 76 HVSS. Some M4A3s were returned to the US from Europe but the Army basically just walked away from thousands of older tanks. M26/M45 and M24 were the only tanks coming off the assembly lines. A few of the "giant" tanks (t29/30/32) were being built for testing. So your Ordnance supply pipeline could offer M4A3 variants, M26s and M24s plus any rebuilds.
-
Mil-tech Bard
- Member
- Posts: 678
- Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50
Re: M26 Pershing vs Japan
The wikipedia article here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_a ... rld_War_II
Light tanks
[edit] Stuart series
The USA began 1942 with the M2 Light Tanks and M1 Combat Cars (later re-designated M2 Light Tank). These were machine gun-armed light vehicles, the tanks belonging to the Infantry and the Combat Cars belonging to the Cavalry. In 1940, the M2A4 Light Tank introduced a cannon (37mm) armament. The machine gun-armed tanks were never used in combat, and only a handful of cannon-armed vehicles saw service in the Pacific; but their design formed the basis of the later M3/M5 Light Tanks (evolved from the M2A4). M2, M3 and M5 light tanks. The British officially called their M3s Stuarts, and often referred to them as "Honeys".
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M1 34 - - - - - 34
M2 325 40 10 - - - 375
M3 - 2,551 7,839 3,469 - - 13,859
M5 & M8 HMC - - 2,825 4,063 1,963 - 8,851
Total 359 2,591 10,674 7,532 1,963 - 23,119
Notes:
M1 = Combat Car M1, machine gun
M2 = Light Tank M2, 37 mm gun
M3 = Light Tank M3, 37 mm gun
M5 = Light Tank M5, 37 mm gun
M8 HMC = M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage, 75 mm M2 or M3 howitzer on M5 hull
[edit] Other light AVFs
The M22 Locust was specially designed as an airmobile tank, to be delivered to the battlefield by glider.
The M24 Chaffee was intended as a replacement for the M3 and M5 series;
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M22 - - - 680 150 - 830
M24 - - - - 1,930 2,801 4,731
M18 GMC - - - 812 1,695 - 2,507
Total - - - 1,492 3,775 2,801 8,068
M22 = Light Tank M22 Locust, 37 mm M6 gun
M24 = Light Tank M24 Chaffee, 75 mm M6 gun
M18 GMC = M18 Gun Motor Carriage, also known as the Hellcat, was a tank destroyer armed with a 76 mm M1 gun
[edit] Medium Tanks and AFVs
In 1939, the USA had manufactured 18 examples of the Medium M2 tank. This tank was never to see combat service, but its chassis and suspension were used as a basis for the Lee and Sherman tanks. Following the German invasion of France in 1940, a small number of Medium M2A1 tanks (an improved model) were manufactured for training, while a more modern tank (which was eventually to become the Medium M3 Lee) was designed.
The Lee was superseded by the Medium M4 Sherman. This originally carried a 75 mm gun; later versions of the Sherman were armed with a 76 mm gun or a 105 mm howitzer.
On the Sherman hull, the M10 and M36 tank destroyers (officially called Gun Motor Carriages) were produced.
The M7 Howitzer Motor Carriage was originally built on the M-3 medium tank chassis, but later versions were built on the similar M-4 tank chassis.
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M2A1 6 88 - - - - 94
M3 - 1,342 4,916 - - - 6,258
M4 - - 8,017 21,231 3,504 651 33,403
M4 (76) - - - - 7,135 3,748 10,883
M4 (105) - - - - 2,286 2,394 4,680
M10 GMC - - 639 6,067 - - 6,706
M36 GMC - - - - 1,400 924 2,324
M7 HMC - - 2,028 786 1,164 338 4,316
M12 GMC - - 60 40 - - 100
M30 CC - - 60 40 - - 100
Total 6 1,430 15,720 28,164 15,489 8,055 68,864
Notes:
M2A1 = Medium M2A1
M3 = Medium M3 Lee/Grant. The original US version was the Lee (named after General Lee); the slightly modified British version was the Grant (named after General Grant).
M4 = Medium M4 Sherman with 75 mm M3 (L/38) gun
M4 (76) = Medium M4 Sherman with 76 mm M1-series gun
M4 (105) = Medium M4 Sherman with 105 mm howitzer
M10 GMC = M10 Gun Motor Carriage with 3" M7 gun
M36 GMC = M36 Gun Motor Carriage with 90 mm M1 gun
M7 HMC = M7 Howitzer Motor Carriage, M3 (Grant) or M4 (Sherman) hull with 105 mm howitzer in forward-facing mount. Given the nickname Priest by British gunners.
M12 GMC = M12 Gun Motor Carriage, M3 (Grant) hull with 155 mm M1918 gun in forward-facing mount
M30 CC = M30 Cargo Carrier, ammunition carrier for M12 GMC.
[edit] Heavy tanks
The Pershing heavy tank (named after General Pershing) was the only heavy tank used in combat by the US armed forces during World War II. An earlier design, the M-6 heavy tank, was not accepted for series production.
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M26 - - - 40 2,162 2,202
M26 = Heavy M26 Pershing, 90 mm M3 gun
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_a ... rld_War_II
Light tanks
[edit] Stuart series
The USA began 1942 with the M2 Light Tanks and M1 Combat Cars (later re-designated M2 Light Tank). These were machine gun-armed light vehicles, the tanks belonging to the Infantry and the Combat Cars belonging to the Cavalry. In 1940, the M2A4 Light Tank introduced a cannon (37mm) armament. The machine gun-armed tanks were never used in combat, and only a handful of cannon-armed vehicles saw service in the Pacific; but their design formed the basis of the later M3/M5 Light Tanks (evolved from the M2A4). M2, M3 and M5 light tanks. The British officially called their M3s Stuarts, and often referred to them as "Honeys".
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M1 34 - - - - - 34
M2 325 40 10 - - - 375
M3 - 2,551 7,839 3,469 - - 13,859
M5 & M8 HMC - - 2,825 4,063 1,963 - 8,851
Total 359 2,591 10,674 7,532 1,963 - 23,119
Notes:
M1 = Combat Car M1, machine gun
M2 = Light Tank M2, 37 mm gun
M3 = Light Tank M3, 37 mm gun
M5 = Light Tank M5, 37 mm gun
M8 HMC = M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage, 75 mm M2 or M3 howitzer on M5 hull
[edit] Other light AVFs
The M22 Locust was specially designed as an airmobile tank, to be delivered to the battlefield by glider.
The M24 Chaffee was intended as a replacement for the M3 and M5 series;
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M22 - - - 680 150 - 830
M24 - - - - 1,930 2,801 4,731
M18 GMC - - - 812 1,695 - 2,507
Total - - - 1,492 3,775 2,801 8,068
M22 = Light Tank M22 Locust, 37 mm M6 gun
M24 = Light Tank M24 Chaffee, 75 mm M6 gun
M18 GMC = M18 Gun Motor Carriage, also known as the Hellcat, was a tank destroyer armed with a 76 mm M1 gun
[edit] Medium Tanks and AFVs
In 1939, the USA had manufactured 18 examples of the Medium M2 tank. This tank was never to see combat service, but its chassis and suspension were used as a basis for the Lee and Sherman tanks. Following the German invasion of France in 1940, a small number of Medium M2A1 tanks (an improved model) were manufactured for training, while a more modern tank (which was eventually to become the Medium M3 Lee) was designed.
The Lee was superseded by the Medium M4 Sherman. This originally carried a 75 mm gun; later versions of the Sherman were armed with a 76 mm gun or a 105 mm howitzer.
On the Sherman hull, the M10 and M36 tank destroyers (officially called Gun Motor Carriages) were produced.
The M7 Howitzer Motor Carriage was originally built on the M-3 medium tank chassis, but later versions were built on the similar M-4 tank chassis.
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M2A1 6 88 - - - - 94
M3 - 1,342 4,916 - - - 6,258
M4 - - 8,017 21,231 3,504 651 33,403
M4 (76) - - - - 7,135 3,748 10,883
M4 (105) - - - - 2,286 2,394 4,680
M10 GMC - - 639 6,067 - - 6,706
M36 GMC - - - - 1,400 924 2,324
M7 HMC - - 2,028 786 1,164 338 4,316
M12 GMC - - 60 40 - - 100
M30 CC - - 60 40 - - 100
Total 6 1,430 15,720 28,164 15,489 8,055 68,864
Notes:
M2A1 = Medium M2A1
M3 = Medium M3 Lee/Grant. The original US version was the Lee (named after General Lee); the slightly modified British version was the Grant (named after General Grant).
M4 = Medium M4 Sherman with 75 mm M3 (L/38) gun
M4 (76) = Medium M4 Sherman with 76 mm M1-series gun
M4 (105) = Medium M4 Sherman with 105 mm howitzer
M10 GMC = M10 Gun Motor Carriage with 3" M7 gun
M36 GMC = M36 Gun Motor Carriage with 90 mm M1 gun
M7 HMC = M7 Howitzer Motor Carriage, M3 (Grant) or M4 (Sherman) hull with 105 mm howitzer in forward-facing mount. Given the nickname Priest by British gunners.
M12 GMC = M12 Gun Motor Carriage, M3 (Grant) hull with 155 mm M1918 gun in forward-facing mount
M30 CC = M30 Cargo Carrier, ammunition carrier for M12 GMC.
[edit] Heavy tanks
The Pershing heavy tank (named after General Pershing) was the only heavy tank used in combat by the US armed forces during World War II. An earlier design, the M-6 heavy tank, was not accepted for series production.
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
M26 - - - 40 2,162 2,202
M26 = Heavy M26 Pershing, 90 mm M3 gun