Eighth Air Force Losses 1943

[Pips]

1943 almost broke the Eighth Air Force. So terrible were the losses suffered throughout the year, leading up to the climatic 2nd Schweinfurt raid in October 1943, that effectively the Eighth had been fought to a standstill. Without total fighter support to all targets in Germany the US belief in strategic bombing was at a crucial crossroads. It could not continue to sustain the huge losses.

1943 had become a battle of attrition, and the Eighth was losing it. The following graphs illustrate the high rate of losses suffered by the Eighth during 1943.

[Pips]

Forgot to mention that the charts (above) are taken from the book "Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945"; by Williamson Murray.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Similar charts or data available for the other US Air Forces?

[Pips]

Sadly no. And those in the book are more a way of making the point of just how severe were the losses of the Eighth in relation to the growing strength of German aircraft production. Those losses could not have been tolerated in 1944. If it wasn't for the advent of the P-51 in large numbers, and with it the change to a more offensive fighter policy, the strategic bombing campaign may well have foundered.

As it was, it was the ability of the P-51 to wrest air supremacy from the Luftwaffe in 1944 that saved strategic bomber war.

[Mil-tech Bard]

This web article makes the case that it was less the arrival of the P-51 than British drop tank production of Oct 1943 - March 1944 and the change to a three shift fighter escort doctrine for Operation Point Blank that won air superiority over Europe.

History Friday: Deconstructing the P-51 Mustang Historical Narrative
Posted by Trent Telenko on September 27th, 2013 (All posts by Trent Telenko)
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/38801.html

The "Figure 10: Plate No. XII Fighter Escort Mission Profiles" in the article taken from “History of the 8th Fighter Command” 31 Oct 1944 is particularly damning of the Bomber General "official P-51 narrative."

[Carl Schwamberger]

This web article makes the case that it was less the arrival of the P-51 than British drop tank production of Oct 1943 - March 1944 and the change to a three shift fighter escort doctrine for Operation Point Blank that won air superiority over Europe.

Over the 'Reich' or over Europe? My take has been the German AF had ceased contesting the air over France/Belgium at the end of 1942 and most of Italy by September 1943. Is that not correct?

[Mil-tech Bard]

Carl,

No, that wasn't the case. The Luftwaffe had a defense in depth that went from the coast of France to Germany and back.

Luftwaffe fighters simply avoided American fighters and waited until they had to leave the bombers before attacking.

This was aided by General Eaker's “close escort all the way to target and back” doctrine of fighter operations, which meant that German fighters could pace the bomber stream and radio when American fighters left the bomber stream to call in assembled combined arms formations of German single engine cannon and rocket armed twin engine fighters to destroy bombers.

Page 195 of the book "Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II" By Robert C Ehrhart, Jr Alexander S Cochran, Robert F Futrell, Thomas A Fabyanic, John F Kreis gives the following breakdown of German fighters by theater in August 1943:

60% German fighters are on the Western Front,
18% on the Mediterranean Front, and
22% on the Eastern Front.

Zemke and a number of other 8th Fighter Command fighter group commanders organized a defacto mutiny to this “close escort all the way to target and back” doctrine starting in the late Summer of 1943 by splitting off small groups of fighters to range ahead of the bomber stream to break up these German fighter concentrations.

When Jimmy Dolittle took over 8th Air Force in January 1944, he ratified what Zemke et al were doing and organized a three shift fighter escort doctrine -- which greatly expanded the time that American fighters could use chasing German fighters -- and changed their rules of engagement to “kill German fighters where ever they are found.”

This turned German air bases from sanctuaries to targets and, combined with the strikes on German synthetic oil, denied newbie German fighter pilots the time and beathing room to learn their trade.

This strangling of new German replacement pilots is what lead to the "Lancaster Square Collapse" of the Luftwaffe single engine fighter force in March-thru-May 1944.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Carl,

No, that wasn't the case. The Luftwaffe had a defense in depth that went from the coast of France to Germany and back.Luftwaffe fighters simply avoided American fighters and waited until they had to leave the bombers before attacking.

Ok, so I misread some text. Where were the fighters covering from the coast of France & back based?

This was aided by General Eaker's “close escort all the way to target and back” doctrine of fighter operations, which meant that German fighters could pace the bomber stream and radio when American fighters left the bomber stream to call in assembled combined arms formations of German single engine cannon and rocket armed twin engine fighters to destroy bombers.

Did this apply to the medium bomber groups of the 9th Bomber Division/Air Force as well?

Page 195 of the book "Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II" By Robert C Ehrhart, Jr Alexander S Cochran, Robert F Futrell, Thomas A Fabyanic, John F Kreis gives the following breakdown of German fighters by theater in August 1943:

Very roughly estimating numbers...

60% German fighters are on the Western Front = 2400. I assume this includes Norway (150?) & south France?

18% on the Mediterranean Front = 720. Including some in the Balkans?

22% on the Eastern Front = 900

Zemke and a number of other 8th Fighter Command fighter group commanders organized a defacto mutiny to this “close escort all the way to target and back” doctrine starting in the late Summer of 1943 by splitting off small groups of fighters to range ahead of the bomber stream to break up these German fighter concentrations.

When Jimmy Dolittle took over 8th Air Force in January 1944, he ratified what Zemke et al were doing and organized a three shift fighter escort doctrine -- which greatly expanded the time that American fighters could use chasing German fighters -- and changed their rules of engagement to “kill German fighters where ever they are found.”

This turned German air bases from sanctuaries to targets ....

The mediums of the 9th had attacked the airbases in France in 1943. What effect did that & their other missions over France have on the attrition of the defending interceptors?

The 18% of the fighter force in the Mediterranean, how active was it in attacking the bombing operations over Italy in 1943? Particularly in the latter half of 1943?

[Mil-tech Bard]

>>Did this apply to the medium bomber groups of the 9th Bomber Division/Air Force as well?

The Germans ignored medium bombers, even those attacking their advanced airfields, in favor of 4-engine bombers.

>>18% on the Mediterranean Front = 720. Including some in the Balkans?

Ploesti predominently, the Germans were protecting their fuel.

>>The mediums of the 9th had attacked the airbases in France in 1943. What effect did that & their other missions over
>>France have on the attrition of the defending interceptors?

Ninth Air Force was not stood up until Octover 1943.

The 9th AF mediums were diverted to CROSSBOW strikes on German V-1 and V-2 sites starting in November 1943.

The two big problem 9th AF Mediums had was first, that German flak was hugely superior to Japanese AAA in terms of fire control optics and directors and second, that the A-20's and B-26's groups of the 9th AF never develop the combined arms tactics of the 5th Air Force in dealing with heavy concentrations of low level autocannons via .50 cal straffing, para-frag low level and frag-cluster medium level bombing and air laid smoke screens.

The combined arms strike package tactics of 5th Air Force airstrikes on Wewak, Hollindia and Rabaul's airfields in 1943-1944 would have worked very well in Europe.

Heck, even the combined arms strikes of the MAAF at Anzio would have worked better.

See: Craven and Crate, "The Army Air Force in WW2 part III Europe: ARGUEMENT to V-E Day Jan 1944 to May 1945" Chapter 5 pgs 122-123

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III ... .html#cn50

Against enemy airdromes in France and the Low Countries the B-26's achieved indifferent results, at best merely denying the GAF use of those fields for short periods of time, It had been hoped that the medium attacks would serve to draw enemy fighters away from the heavy bombers, and the heavy and medium missions were accordingly coordinated for that purpose. But the Germans elected to withdraw their fighters from the advanced fields for concentrations against the heavies, and seldom were any enemy aircraft found on the fields under attack. "Never," wrote Brereton in November 1943, "so far as is known, have enemy fighters been drawn from adjacent areas to attack the mediums when a large force of heavies was on the screen."47 Even when Leigh-Mallory acted on Brereton's suggestion that the efficient escort for medium bombers provided by 11 Group of the RAF be reduced as an invitation to the enemy to engage the B-26's,48 German fighter reaction showed no great increase and medium bomber losses remained low. Some of the attacks on airdromes produced good results in terms of damage to installations and facilities, as in the attack of 3 November by seventy-two Marauders on the airdrome at St.-André-de-l'Eure. On 1 December successful attacks were made on airfields at Cambrai/Niergnies and Lille/Vendeville in northern France, and on 13 December, in the largest mission yet undertaken by IX Bomber Command, 199 planes dropped almost 400 tons of bombs on the Amsterdam-Schiphol airdrome, inflicting severe damage. But the attrition forced upon the enemy remained small, and in January 1944 only one attack was directed against an airdrome target at Cherbourg/Maupertuis on the 7th.49
.
The growing concern in December over the V-weapon threat caused Leigh-Mallory to direct the mediums increasingly against V-weapon sites. This change found justification in the feeling on the part of tactical air commanders that the attacks against enemy airfields had proved ineffectual,50 but the strategic air commanders disagreed." It is absolutely essential," Spaatz wrote Arnold on 1 February 1944," that mediums attack airdromes properly timed with our attacks to secure not only the maximum protection to our own formations, but the maximum destruction of the German Air Force."51 As the result of visits and letters from Spaatz and Fred Anderson, the Air Ministry early in February asked Leigh-Mallory to make it clear to all concerned that CROSSBOW'S claim to the services of the medium bombers ranked second to that of POINTBLANK. Nevertheless, Spaatz continued to find during February reason to complain of AEAF's refusal to send the mediums against airfields as requested by USSTAF.52 The failure to achieve cooperation between USSTAF and AEAF, coupled with other differences over the training of Ninth Air Force units and over control of the strategic air forces themselves, created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between the two headquarters, which was the exception rather than the rule in Anglo-American relations in the European theater. The fact that medium attacks on NOBALL targets (German launching sites) were usually coordinated with heavy bomber missions so as to provide some diversion had little effect in easing the tension.

and see also See: Craven and Crate, "The Army Air Force in WW2 part III Europe: ARGUEMENT to V-E Day Jan 1944 to May 1945" Chapter 5 pgs 350-to-351

It was of vital importance in the first ten days of SHINGLE that the German Air Force be kept under control. Although it was not strong enough to pose a serious threat, by D plus 1 the GAF had started a definite effort against the beachhead and its tenuous supply line. Bombers attacked shipping, notably at Anzio on the 23d, 24th, and 26th and at Naples on the 23d and 24th; although they usually struck at dusk when MAAF's fighters had left for their hundred-mile

--350--

distant bases and although they used controlled glide bombs in the course of almost a week of operations, they achieved only the scantiest success while losing fifteen of their number to Allied fighters and flak.69 The bombers came mostly from southern France, so on the 27th, 132 B-17's bombed Montpellier and Salon and 29 B-24's of the 450th Bombardment Group hit Istres/Le Tubé, inflicting heavy damage on planes, runways, and installations at all three places, especially at Istres.70

Each of the GAF bomber raids against Anzio and Naples had been carried out by from 50 to 60 planes; heavier attacks were delivered on the 29th by around 110 Do-217's, Ju-88's, and Me-210's. Collectively, these constituted the greatest German bomber offensive since the landings in Sicily in July 1943.71

It was made possible because the enemy had strengthened his weak Italy-based bomber units by moving in two Ju-88 groups from Greece and Crete and returning a number of bombers which had been withdrawn from the peninsula in December and January (and which had bombed London as recently as 21 January). These transfers placed some 200 long-range bombers within reach of Anzio. No substantial fighter reinforcements were moved in, but a sufficient flow of replacement aircraft was maintained.72 To counter these developments MAAF directed a series of devastating blows against Italian fields. After small raids on Rieti and Aviano on 23 January, the Fifteenth blasted fighter fields in the Udine area near Austria on the 30th, using one of the cleverer tricks of the air war. B-17's and B-24's from the 97th, 99th, 301st, 449th, and 450th Bombardment Groups, well escorted by P-38's from the 1st, 14th, and 82d Fighter Groups, flew at normal altitude so as to be plotted by enemy radar. P-47's of the 325th Fighter Group took off after the bombers had left, went out over the Adriatic, flew on the deck, and when they overtook the bombers, climbed high and headed for the target area. They arrived fifteen minutes ahead of the bombers and caught the enemy's fighters, warned of the bombers' approach, in the act of taking off and assembling for combat. The surprise was complete, and the P-47's had a field day, destroying thirty-six aircraft, including fourteen Me-109's, and probably destroying eight other fighters, for the loss of two P-47's. When the bombers arrived they met almost no opposition and covered the fields with 29,000 frag bombs. For the entire operation the Fifteenth's bombers and fighters claimed the destruction, in the air and on the ground, of about 140 enemy planes; Allied losses were six bombers and three fighters.73

[Carl Schwamberger]

Ninth Air Force was not stood up until Octover 1943.

It had been stood up in 1943, in Africa. Its HQ & selected perssonel were transfered to the UK in the autum of 1943. The mediums were operating as part of the 8th AF before October. Same Groups and Wings.

The two big problem 9th AF Mediums had was first, that German flak was hugely superior to Japanese AAA in terms of fire control optics and directors and second, that the A-20's and B-26's groups of the 9th AF never develop the combined arms tactics of the 5th Air Force in dealing with heavy concentrations of low level autocannons via .50 cal straffing, .......
.........................................
.........and see also See: Craven and Crate, "The Army Air Force in WW2 part III Europe: ARGUEMENT to V-E Day Jan 1944 to May 1945" Chapter 5 pgs 350-to-351

My father, a ordnance officer in one of the B26 groups remembered the arguments over much of this & a number of other matters. He refered to multiple schools of thought on the most efficient courses in their general mission. His remembrance included remarks that can be summed up as ''Those knotheads had us doing what we knew would not work.' The term "knotheads" seemed to refer to a Brit as well as a couple USAAF generals. Unfortunatly I did not take notes and have not a clue who those leaders might have been, other than Berton was head of the 9th AF for most of the time in question. Maj Gen Anderson seems to have been disatisfied with the performance of the 9th AF in certain aspects and in that may have been a player in Berteton leaving the 9th AF in July 1944.

Do you have a good source for the numbers of German aircraft operating out the Franco/Belgian airfields during 1943? & early 1944? I've seen a few 'snapshot' numbers, but those dont provide a complete picture.

[Mil-tech Bard]

My father, a ordnance officer in one of the B26 groups remembered the arguments over much of this & a number of other matters. He refered to multiple schools of thought on the most efficient courses in their general mission. His remembrance included remarks that can be summed up as ''Those knotheads had us doing what we knew would not work.' The term "knotheads" seemed to refer to a Brit as well as a couple USAAF generals.

Carl,

I don't have the original source documents to answer the question of light flak numbers on German airfields in France.

I don't think the numbers are knowable, given the German use of flak decoys messing with Allied flak intelligence and the chaotic retreat from France doing in German records.

As far as bomber tactics in the ETO, the 9th AF took so many casualties during the raid at Ijmuiden that the Bomber Barons turned their backs on low level attack and essentially stuck bannanas in their ears and said "Naa-Naa-Naa I can hear you" when Kenney's AAR's flowed in from the Pacific.

AFAIK, there no single attempt to use air laid smoke to block German daylight light flak fire in the way Kenney's 5th AF did against Japanese light flak in New Guinea and particularly while raiding Rabaul.

What I know on the subject of WW2 American medium bombers and flak is from the following sources --

1) "THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD PHASE TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 5 May 1944 - 8 May 1945" Prepared by THE ARMY AIR FORCES EVALUATION BOARD IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS August 1945


page 310

It is vulnerable to flak at altitudes below 10,000 feet. Fifty guns is the maximum density normally acceptable for attack of a defended target without excessive losses. Vulnerability to flak precludes its use in low-level attacks on targets against which the fighter-bomber can be employed without excessive losses.
.
Other limitations of an operational nature are: Runways must be of 5 500 feet minimum length, and capable of sustaining 30,000 lb. loads. To obtain an effective density of bomb pattern, medium bombers should not be employed in formations of less than six.
.
The use of the synchronous bomb sight in level bombing, requires 2000 feet minimum altitude, and a straight and level bomb run of from 30 to 60 seconds.
.
Fighter escort is necessary if air opposition is likely to be encountered.
.
Due to the foregoing and other tactical considerations, medium bomber missions cannot be hurriedly arranged, but must be carefully planned in advance of execution to produce satisfactory results.
.
From a comparison of the capabilities of fighter-bombers and medium bombers, it is apparent that the fighter-bomber excels for employment in close-in air cooperation under all conditions, except those where area or pattern bombing is required.
.
The field of employment for which the medium bomber is particularly adapted is that of Second Phase operations, including all targets which require pattern or area bombing, or a sudden, heavy concentration. Its suitability for night operations makes it a complementary arm to the fighter-bomber, by providing a means for around-the-clock air operations which give the enemy no rest.

and


page 311

A-26: The A-26, which was a development of the A-20, was a marked improvement over the latter in bomb carrying capacity and performance. With respect to bomb load, it compared favorably with the weight carrying capacity of the B-26, although it does not possess the same versatility for loading. The volume of fire power represented by its eighteen forward firing .50 caliber guns, upper turret included, was not employed due to the impracticability of low-level attack with an airplane of this size.
.
It is felt that an increase in bomb-carrying capacity and speed would have been realized by the elimination of this excess armament and armor. The A-26 was obsolescent when it reached the theater, if it is considered that enemy defenses and the nature of its own attacks did not make such heavy armament necessary.
.
The operating crew of two to four men, according to position in formation, was economical in comparison to the B-26. The opinion has been expressed, however, that the airplane would have been improved by provision for a co-pilot. The location and multiplicity of bombing controls increased the pilot's burden when trying to maintain position in formation. Experience snowed that this factor resulted in an increase in the number of abortive and noneffective sorties.

2) EDWARD B. WESTERMANN, Lt. Col., USAF,"Sword in the Heavens": German Ground-based Air Defenses, 1914-1945, 380pp., Ph.D., University of North Carolina, 2000.

It was published as "Flak: German Anti-Aircraft Defenses, 1914-1945" in November 12, 2001

See:

http://www.amazon.com/Flak-German-Anti- ... WESTERMANN

The book concentrated on Luftwaffe strategic flak as opposed to light flak, but the institutional and operation background to Luftwaffe flak can be matched elsewhere. This is what Westerman said regards light flak --

page 197

One veteran of Bomber Command described his impression of the system during a raid in early 1941:
.
The only lighting was masses of blinding searchlights
stretching along the Dutch and German coastline and
strategically placed along the German/Dutch border and
surrounding all major cities and towns. Accompanying the
searchlights were batteries of heavy calibre anti-aircraft
guns and light flak guns. The latter were to prevent flying
attacks and were 'hosepiped' into the sky.
He then remarked that night fighters loitered "near the cones of the
searchlights, so any British bomber caught in them was 'easy meat'."159
.
The system, although certainly not impenetrable, obviously earned the respect of British bomber crews. The searchlight batteries also were critical in assisting German night fighters; a point often overlooked in discussions of the effectiveness of ground-based air defenses during the war. Third, the above totals also highlighted the success enjoyed by the light flak batteries whether alone or in combination with heavy flak guns. Indeed, these guns were effective at altitudes between 5,400 feet and 6,500 feet and posed a significant threat to R.A.F.operations against ports and airfields.

3) "The History of Flak lntelligence" By Earl W. Thomson, Colonel. Coast Artillery Corps, COAST ARTillERY JOURNAL, July- Aug 1946 pages 16 - 22


Pages 17 - 18

The Coast Artillery in estimating the effectiveness of a harbor defense has always drawn circles on its maps at maximum range of the guns and mortars. Overlapping circiles in certain areas showed an effective defense. The same technique will give an approximate estimate of antiaircraft defenses, if the circiles are drawn with a radius equal to the horizontal range for the altitude of the attack. Colored pencile, cross-hatching, and red danger zones where numerous circiles overlap will show the air commander, with even the most rudimentary understanding of antiaircraft, that certain zones or courses are dangerous.
.
Early flak analysis of the Twelfth air force in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Air Force and Thirteenth in the Pacific, and the Navy, all followed the gun circle method.
.
and
.
Page 21
.
AuTOMATIC WEAPONs COMPuTER
The original flak computers were for high altitudes and for heavy guns only. The need for estimating the effectiveness of automatic weapons, 20mm, 2Smm, 40mm for low flying planes was evident, particularly to the Ninth Air Force in the pre D-Day planning, and to the Navy for their glide and dive bombers. The lesson of Ijmuiden had not been forgotten. In one o£: the early flak classes at Davis an automatic weapons computer was attempted, but was never published. Captain Norman H. Ball, CAC, in peacetime a mathematics professor at the Naval Academy and Lieutenant Frederick G. Kingt CAC, in the spring of 1944 analyzed several sets of data from the Antiaircx:aft Board automatic weapons practices. These data showed that the probability of hits was not only a function of time of Bight, but also of the tracking rate in the slant plane. These two antiaircraft officers from then on worked closely with a group of Navy Department civilian analysts, among whom were Drs. Jastram and Steenrod, and numerous automatic weapons computers, for low level, dive and glide bombing were developed late in 1944 and early in 1945.

page 22

...Late in 1944 and early in 1945 accurate flak data was difficult to obtain in the P~cific area, and many times flak officers reverted to peripheral gun circles as thi best solution under the conditions of inaccurate data.
.
later on the same page.
.
(d) Automatic Weapons Flak Analysis. A satisfactory method of flak analysis against automatic weapons has not yet been worked out, although target centered computers were constructed for glide and dive bombing. With accurate firing data from Fort Bliss, this should be accomplished. It is just possible that the use of computers may be abandoned, and effectiveness will include factors of terrain and sun, which are now neglected in flak computation, but are very important in operational planning for low level attacks.

4) THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, The Fifth Air Force in THE War Against Japan, Military Analysis Division, June 1947

This is what the 5th AF said about it tactics in the USSBS --


Page 76

TacticsThe shortage of specialized aircraft due to the relative priority of the Pacific war forced the development of tactics to permit all types of aircraft to carry out any required mission.
.
The coordinated attack utilized medium or high altitude bombers initially to beat down anti-aircraft and thus to cover the approach of strafers which were assigned pin point targets. This proved most effective. Further development of coordinating low altitude attack, with leading units assigned to neutralize enemy defenses and to screen following units attacking primary targets made this method a favored means of attack against the Japanese.

Note that "screening" mentioned above meant with air-laid smoke from Chemical Warfare Service M-10 smoke tanks and M-47 WP smoke bombs.

Page 87

Thus we find the initial factors of terrain affording the enemy screened approach to our bases, inadequate early warning and a shortage of fighters. These factors developed the theory that our most effective defense against enemy bombardment was to seek out his aircraft on their bases and destroy them on the ground. In the preparation of every campaign our fighters and our light and medium bombardment concentrated on this offensive role as the best means of air defense.

[Carl Schwamberger]

My father, a ordnance officer in one of the B26 groups remembered the arguments over much of this & a number of other matters. He refered to multiple schools of thought on the most efficient courses in their general mission. His remembrance included remarks that can be summed up as ''Those knotheads had us doing what we knew would not work.' The term "knotheads" seemed to refer to a Brit as well as a couple USAAF generals.

Carl,

I don't have the original source documents to answer the question of light flak numbers on German airfields in France.

...

Bud, that is a impressive compiliation of material, & I am grateful for the effort it is not wasted, but my questions was about the numbers of German aircraft, not light flak. It may also be you thought this:

He refered to multiple schools of thought on the most efficient courses in their general mission.

meant flight paths over the target. It meant courses of action or the broader selection of tactics, and strategy in target selection. Sorry my phrase was not perfectly clear there

[Mil-tech Bard]

Well Carl, you seem to be in luck on the German aircraft question.

I was just given a copy of Martin Bowman's Osprey book "P-47 THUNDERBOLT VS BF109G/K Europe 1943-45.

According to Bowman on pages 39 and 40, there were two mixed BG109/FW190 Luftwaffe fighter Gruppen JGs 2 and 26 in Normandy. Between them they had 425 BF109 and FW-190, of which only 250-280 were operational at any one time in the spring of 1944.

In the time immediately after the Normandy landings, the Germans put in 15 more Jagdgruppen into France by June 9, 1944...and lost 170 pilots killed in action plus lost another 350 panes destroyed or damaged on the ground by the time they withdrew at the end of June 1944.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Great, that fits what I remembered, but dont have refrences for. Returning loaned books can suck, but it is the Right thing to do. The only difference would be the aircraft of those groups I remember being based much further east than Normandy. Maybe it was Albert Prices volume that had a map of locations. That map placed precious little west of Paris in the spring of 1944, if I am remembering correctly. I also see a note here that "1,370" operational aircraft were based in range and operating agains the Normandy lodgement in late June 44; perhaps the peak of the German air force reaction to to the invasion.

Problem is 99% of the historians address the subject is sweeping descriptions of the main talking points. Few are like Ellis who pack in charts & data in sufficient quantities to see the trends in hard numbers.

Thanks for sharing that info & the source.

[Mil-tech Bard]

You're welcome, Carl.

As for this:

Problem is 99% of the historians address the subject is sweeping descriptions of the main talking points.

Oh heck yeah!

The part that are the Radar lessons of Anzio, the wider Mediterranean and even New Guinea played with the invasion at Normandy is one of those things that are glossed over.

You can see the radar/fighter direction lessons of the American fighter campaign in March thru July 1942 at Darwin Australia and New Guinea thru early 1943 with 1.5 meter height finding radars that show up in North Africa right through to Anzio. Then the triple shock of German radio guided missiles, active radar jamming and Window (AKA early Chaff) kicking the Allies to centimeter wave radar plus VHF fighter radio based fighter direction in early 1944 right in time for Normandy landing in June 1944.

Had the Germans waited six months between Operation Shingle/Anzio (January 22, 1944) and Normandy (June1944) to hit the Allies with that guided missile plus electronic warfare surprise, Normandy would have been a great deal more costly and protracted.

The only book that got near that flow of radar doctrine was "OVERLORD: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in WW2" by Thomas Alexander Hughes.

Note as well that the air fighting in Southern Italy up to Anzio convinced the USAAF to replace the P-40 with the P-51 because the P-40 was obviously no match for the BF-109 as a cheap 2nd line single engine tactical support fighter. This required two large aircraft factories to accomplish.

That two factory industrial infrastructure plus the British RAF test establishment in England, to include the Rolls Royce-Merlin development staff, was what allowed both the accelerated development of and numerical increase in the P-51B/C and P-51D available for both "Big Week" and Operation Pointblank in general.

All those decisions on P-51 industrial infrastructure happened _before_ the Germans bloodied the 8th Air Force in October 1943 second raid over Schweinfurt.